POLYBIUS ON ROME
A REEXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE

What did Polybius think of the Roman rule? Were his opinions of the imperial power that had subdued Greece and destroyed her liberty always the same or did they change with the times and the circumstances of his life and work? The answers to these questions will determine, to a great degree, our final judgement of the historian of Roman imperialism and of his work. The problem has recently been studied repeatedly by Walbank and by others; we hope to add something to its solution.[1]

Ate has turned what was intended as a tribute into a memorial. We who had the good fortune to be the friends, the colleagues and the pupils of Alexander Fuks, will always remember his tact, his goodness and helpfulness and above all his scholarship.

As Polybius' opinions on Rome must be deduced from his work we are confronted with difficulties: we are not always on safe ground in distinguishing earlier or later parts of a given context; the main texts relevant to our problem are fragmented and it can hardly be assumed that by chance everything relevant to it has been preserved.[2] There will always remain an element of uncertainty in any conclusions. We shall therefore first try to sketch the background against which Polybius

[1] F.W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Sather Lectures 42) (Berkeley-London 1972); "Polybius between Greece and Rome" in *Polybe*, Entretiens sur L'Antiquité Classique XX (Vandoeuvres-Geneve 1974)'; *Polybius' Last Ten Books*" in *Historiographia Antiqua, Comm. in honorem W. Peremans* (Leuven 1977). These will be quoted as S (for 'Sather-Lectures), H. LTB respectively. K.E. Petzold, *Studien zur Methode des Polybius u.z. ihrer historischen Auswertung* (Munich 1969). A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* (Cambridge 1975). Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford, 1957–1979) is quoted by volume and page or by passage referred to.

[2] Or that the "existing excerpts ... are likely not to have omitted anything very important for Polybius," as claimed by Walbank in his reply to a remark by Momigliano, H 33 in the discussion after Walbank's lecture.

shaped his ideas; then we shall try to elucidate his opinions on Rome and her policies in the empire; this will lead us to an examination of the solutions to the problem that have been proposed. It lies in the nature of such things that the parts cannot be completely separated.

Several facts must be kept in mind when dealing with Polybius' convictions and opinions and their development or their expression in his work. The first and foremost is the fact that he was and remained through all his life — as far as it can be reconstructed, well into his sixties, perhaps seventies — a loyal Achaean and Greek; these two loyalties were virtually one to him. He always wrote as such and his particular concern was with the welfare of Greece, as he understood it.[3] He never became a quisling, or, as Momigliano put it, he never capitulated morally or intellectually to Rome. On the other hand, he was a member of a ruling class and a ruling family and interested in the preservation of the existing order; therefore when writing he acted, again in Momigliano's words, "as a Greek who has a vital interest in the proper functioning of the Roman hegemony over Greece". We hope to show that this is only one part of the explanation.

A second basic point to consider is his position after 167. He had become an exile by a brutal and unjust decision of the Romans and was held in Italy for sixteen years, but no trial — the pretext for his and his compatriots' deportation — had been held. In Rome his status was hardly different from that of a client and he was aware of this or at least felt it subconsciously, as appears from a sentence in the story of the beginning of his connection with Scipio Aemilianus: "Polybius was on the one hand very happy to see the enthusiasm and affection of the young man, yet was embarrassed when he reflected on the high position of the family and the wealth of its members". Probably the leading family of Megalopolis could not emulate the *Scipiones* or *Aemilii* in wealth, but a *hipparchus* and son of a strategus of the Achaean League might consider himself the social equal of a Roman senator and *consularis* or his sons, whom he was supposed to educate. If we remember that this was written at least twenty years (and probably much more) after the event we feel how the recollection rankled in his

[3] H 27, Momigliano (supra n. 1) 29. How a quisling acted is shown and condemned in 30. 4.11.

mind. Cato's jokes were not exactly suited either to assuage his feelings.[4] It is hardly idle speculation to assume that his Roman friends behaved a little condescendingly towards the "*graeculus*", even if that connotation had not yet been invented. All this was bound to influence his attitude to Rome and the Romans.

When at last he was released and allowed to return to Greece, he nevertheless remained at the beck and call of his patron[5] and after the final catastrophe of the Achaeans his role in his own country was — may we say that of a Roman commissar? All the honours he was awarded by the grateful Achaeans[6] could not conceal the fact that he was the servant of the Romans and not the elected leader of a free people as Aratus had been even at the time of Philip V's preponderance.

However, besides his personal circumstances and his reactions to them there remains one stark political fact, namely the progressive eclipse of the Achaean League, long before it was extinguished by the combined efforts of men like Callicrates or Diaeus and Critolaus and of the Romans. While it is true that "the Roman alliance had enabled Achaea to incorporate the whole Peloponnese"[7] one must also consider under what conditions this happened. Beginning in 198 the League became ever more subservient to Rome as a result of Aristaenus' and his successsors' policy.[8] Certainly Polybius did not like this development. When in 180 Callicrates came to the fore it was still possible for people like Lycortas and Polybius to be active in politics (if they did not deviate too much from the official "line") in spite of what is said in 24.10.8–10,

[4] Cf. H 9, Momigliano (supra n. 1) 20 f., 26. Polyb. 31. 24.11 (Paton's translation as everywhere in this paper). The Greek (διηπορεῖτο, τάδε, ὑπεροχήν, εὐκαιρία) is much stronger than Paton's scholarly English. Cf. the German translation by H. Drexler, *Polybios Geschichte* (Zürich-Stuttgart 1963), ch. 22. 10 in his — Hultsch' — arrangement: "gewaltige Stellung" etc. On Polybius' understanding of clientela see I.E.M. Edlund, *Klio* (1977), 129 ff. She does not refer to this passage. See 36. 11.2 on Polybius' reaction to Scipio's wishes.

[5] 36. 11. 2.

[6] 39. 5, cf. 4. See Mioni, *Polibio* (Padova 1949) 15 on Polybius' feelings.

[7] H 8–9.

[8] 24. 13.6 ff., cf. 24. 11.4. It will be noted that in what looks like an attempt at selfjustification (28. 12 f.) Polybius does not call his own policy εὐσχήμων and from 28. 13.14 it seems that it was not καλή either in his own eyes.

but "from 168 onwards. ... Roman power was complete: it was universally accepted that henceforth everyone must submit to Rome and obey her orders."[9] This was, it should be noted, his final judgement, written and published long after the events when he could review the whole process. Whatever power and prosperity the League achieved as the satellite of Rome, it was no longer the independent league which since Aratus' time had striven for the freedom of the Peloponnese and Greece. His feelings may be gauged by his abuse of Callicrates which equals what the says of the men of 149–146.[10] If we admit that he always remained a Greek patriot we must also admit that for such a man the

[9] 3. 4.2–3, cf. S 27. A page earlier Walbank states that while in 146 all Greek independence was at an end, "in 168 ... Roman power was already supreme in the Mediterranean; but this was not necessarily disastrous to Greece, nor had it removed all independence," and a few lines later, "after Pydna ... Achaea and Greece generally might still hope to prosper ..." — Is this the same? Polybius in 170 took the extreme pro-Roman line: 28. 6.7 f., 28.12.3 f, cf. 28.13.7 f. See also 24.11.3 which throws the real end of Greek independence even further back; also ib. sect. 9 κατὰ πόσον.

E.S. Gruen, "The Origins of the Achaean War," *JHS* 96 (1976) 46 ff. reexamining Roman policy towards Achaea and Greece after 168 does not distinguish sufficiently between Roman intentions and Greek politics. His general argument — that Roman policy from 168 onwards was not deliberately devised in order to cripple and eventually crush the League — is valid but this does not mean that Rome did not attempt to control Achaean affairs as stated on p. 50. Polybius' contention that "Rome's obstinacy on the exiles was designed to solidify Callicrates' control in Achaea and that of other pro-Roman politicians elsewhere, like Charops in Epirus" is not refuted by the "facts ... in the historian's own narrative" presented by Gruen. The five embassies (on that mentioned in 30.29.1 see Comm. ad 1.) sent to secure the release of the exiles constitute a special case: the exiles were of the leading families in Achaea and Callicrates may have consented to send opponents on missions which he might well consider as hopeless (undoubtedly doing his part to render them so). The example of Charops is hardly decisive: he was snubbed in Rome but left to do as he liked in his country. It is no contradiction that Callicrates' regime was not "monolithic" (p. 53) or that Rome refused to be drawn into particular Greek problems; provided that Achaea (or others) created no difficulties (cf. p. 49) Rome was content with her overlordship; Callicrates' opponents, as far as can be ascertained were not active opponents of Rome.

[10] 24.10.8, 13ff. on Callicrates. On the leaders of 146 see 38.3.9f.; 38.10.8f., 38.11.7f. etc. See also 30.13.5 on the withdrawal of the opponents of the pro-Roman policy from active politics, cf. 30.32.8. Obviously Polybius did not think like Walbank (see previous note) that Roman power had not "removed all independence." 24.10.9–10 puts the guilt squarely on Callicrates; through him began the decline of the League. 18.13.8–9 shows that Polybius was conscious of the fact that the increase in Achaean power was due to a timely switch in allegiance. In 2.40.2 Lycortas is said to have "assured the permanency of the League ἐπὶ πόσον "for a time at least."

predominant consideration was *eleutheria* for the Greeks whatever was his ideal of a free *politeia.* For Polybius the ideal was the constitution of Achaea; with all its defects it had ensured security and moderate prosperity for its members for quite a long time; upheavals like the Cleomenic war had come from outside. Callicrates had achieved the same, but he guarded the social order as the henchman of the Romans and not as the leader of a free people. Callicrates was also the man who had destroyed Polybius' own career, which perhaps explains partly the extremely violent abuse by the historian, but whatever Callicrates did he carried into effect as a Roman tool and we will credit Polybius with the ability to distinguish between the instrument and its wielder.[11]

A final point is the problem of the composition and the time or times of publication. He composed the first part of his work (books 1–29) according to a preconceived plan[12] and that means not only the arrangement of the events in the various books according to whether there happened much or little in a given year or Olympiad, but also that he had, before he started writing, formed in outline certain principles by which he tried to understand the events. So much is clear from the first chapters of the whole together with such passages as 3. 118.5 ff., 12. Obviously he formed such a plan also for the second part of the "Histories" which he conceived while working on the first part and he indicated his guiding ideas in 3.4. Here his guiding principle is to provide evidence for a judgment on the Roman dominion of the world. It has been doubted that Polybius presents such a judgement;[13] to this we will return, but this intention gives at least in conception some unity to the last ten books. This, too, is a basic fact to be remembered.

The times of writing have been elucidated by Walbank, as far as this is possible at all. For our purpose it is sufficient to state that 3. 4–5 is, by general consent, late, that most probably by 150 he had progressed until book 15, but may have written more and that the last ten books in their

[11] H 8. Cf. E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford 1958) 90 ff.; R. Errington, *Philopoemen* (Oxford 1969) 195 ff., but see now P.S. Derow, "Polybios and the Embassy of Callikrates," *Essays Presented to C.M. Bowra,* (Oxford 1970) 12 ff. For the Achaean constitution as Polybius' ideal see 2. 37.9–11; 2. 38.6 f.; also 43.7. Any criticisms he may have had, he kept to himself.

[12] 3. 2–3.

[13] LTB 146 et al.; cf. Strasburger, *JRS* 55 (1965) 46.

final form were probably composed after 129, but the work on them did not necessarily begin "*ab initio* from that date."[14] For our purpose it is important to keep in mind that with regard to the period after 168 the later the books the longer the time between the events described in them and their account.

We now turn to the examination of Polybius' opinions on Rome and her empire and shall also ask whether his opinions remained more or less constant or whether he changed them with the changes in the political situation and in his personal circumstances. Doing this we have always to keep in mind one result of his personal status:[15] he was never completely free to express his real opinions; as we shall see, his criticism is given vent to by the exposition of Roman actions; evaluations take the form of presenting arguments pro and con., or, more often, of telling a story with an occasional cynical remark.[16]

Every enquiry into this matter must start with 3. 4–5. We offer the following interpretation, referring where necessary to Paton's and Drexler's translations and to Mauersperger's Lexicon.[17] Sections 4–5 of chapter 4 contain the reasons for adding the last ten books which he obviously decided to write after 146, although he may have thought of it already a little earlier.[18] Read in their place, at the beginning of the main work, when the reader knows the outline of the events and their outcome, but not Polybius' presentation of the "story behind the events," these sections appear to say: As the Roman rule is now complete, I might stop here, but I think it necessary to deal with it also from a new point of view,[19] namely that of the conquered peoples. Furthermore, not success or failure are the real criteria for judging conquerors or conquered, but the proper use of the victory or the brave endurance of the catastrophe. Therefore I add an account of the victors'

[14] Walbank, Comm. I 299 ff.; cf. S 16 ff.; LTB 140 ff.; the quotation from 145.

[15] See above p. 95.

[16] See later p. ii and S. 168 ff. See also 30.31.10 with commentary ad 1. (vol. III p. 459).

[17] See s.v. ἀναδέχομαι, where 3. 4.5 is listed under "in Kauf nehmen, sich abfinden"; for συμφέρον only Schweighaeuser is available; the present passage is not listed. H. Drexler, *Polybios Geschichte* (Zürich-Stuttgart 1961).

[18] LTB 145.

[19] S 181, H 24 "a novel concept." Occasional inverted commas in the following refer to Walbank's formulations.

"subsequent policy" (αἵρεσις) and of the judgements of the subjects on them. This will enable contemporaries to judge whether to accept or to reject Roman rule and later generations whether to praise or to censure it. And "the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people" after all of them had been conquered until the subsequent time of ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις.

It appears that Polybius' chief concern was with the condition and the opinions of the subjects, and particularly, of course, of the Greeks.[20] His aim is precisely to show how they bore their fate, but in order to do this, he must describe the behaviour of the ruling power and their "condition ... after all ... had come under the dominion of Rome". In the course of his work he shows that the Greeks did not bear their fate as they should have done, because many of them did not understand that they had to obey and make the best of it.[21] He does not claim that his words will influence Roman politics; he undertakes as it were to provide the raw material for a correct judgement of Roman rule. Again, when he states that he must also describe "the ..., tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples," the "social climate,"[22] his aim is not[23] to illustrate the truth of his words on the effects of success or failure in sect. 5 or that the decision of 168 could be reversed; it is, in Drexler's translation of the passage, "*Denn ersichtlich muss sich für die jetzt Lebenden klar ergeben, ob die römische Herrschaft abzulehnen oder im Gegenteil zu bejahen ist* ...". In short, his work is intended — here — as a guide to attitudes and not to political actions, as the implications of "staving off Roman rule" after 146 would be serious, indeed, and one hesitates "to cast Polybius in the role of its advocate."[24] The various peoples, and the Greeks in particular have no choice of action left, only the one of accepting Roman suzerainty with good or bad grace and he wants to make this clear to contemporaries and posterity alike. Although the choice is seemingly left to the reader there can be little doubt as to the criterion of judging in Polybius' opinion or in the mind

[20] See also later, p. 105.
[21] 3. 4.3; cf. 30. 32.8; 30. 13.5.
[22] 3. 4.6.; cf. LTB 147 f.
[23] Ib. 146.
[24] Ib. 148.

of a Greek reader between 146 and say 86, namely, the condition of the Greeks under Roman rule.[25]

If the *protegé* of the victor of 168 and of his famous son proposed that criterion, that is the criterion the Greeks would use, regardless of what Polybius' own opinion may have been, especially as it was not given *expressis verbis.* When Polybius wrote what he did at such a conspicuous place in the framework of a "declaration of intent" he had to anticipate such a reaction; if he had wanted to avoid the inference, he would have had to keep quiet.[26]

In connection with Polybius' intention it is necessary to say a word on 3. 4. 12 "ἕως — κινήσεως."[27] The events, listed in ch. 5.1–6 not in exact chronological order — this is interesting and perhaps significant — extend from 158 till 146. Together with 4.12 this seems to mean that Polybius saw the years from 168 to 158 as a time from which one could gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people under Roman rule before the time of the troubles. But if so, books 30–33 which form a unit[28] appear to provide the answer to this question and 35–39 describe the time of *tarakhē kai kinēsis.* Undoubtedly the events from 158 onwards and especially the troubles in Greece were the outcome of Roman dominion whatever their immediate *prophaseis* or even *aitiai.*[29] Again, Polybius puts before the reader the whole story and lets him judge. This will be of crucial importance in our debate with Walbank.

Polybius wants to make his work useful to the reader — he repeats this *ad nauseam.*[30] In 4.11 the ὠφέλιμον and τέλος is expounded: it consists of ἡδύ, καλόν, συμφέρον, and the "final end" (τελεσιούργημα) of the work is not the material or political advantage of the readers, but γνῶναι, the knowledge of the condition of the world under Roman rule. It is not a guide to political action; while he may have hoped for a revival of Greek liberty, this would come in some undetermined future

[25] All Greeks wanted liberty, but some when faced with the alternative, preferred "law and order" to it. See also H 31 on the "problems" of co-existence.

[26] Polybius hints perhaps at censorship in 31. 22.11. See also later p. 115.

[27] For a more detailed argument see below p. 109 ff.

[28] LTB 150.

[29] Cf. below p. 109 ff. and from a different point of view Gruen (see n. 9 sup.)

[30] 3. 4.8; cf. S. 6 n. 24.

time, not to be precipitated by irresponsible actions that were doomed to failure from their beginning.[31]

Another point to be considered in the evaluation of Polybius' attitude to Rome is: what is, according to him, the relation between success and morality, and, connected with this, what were his relations with his pupil and patron Aemilianus, more specifically what did he think of the latter's policy regarding the peoples he conquered, as e.g. Carthage. Above we have already remarked on his social status as Aemilius' client.[32] However, his praises of Scipio are curiously restricted: it is the man who is praised. In 31. 25.1 ff. his temperance is confronted with the behaviour of his contemporaries; in sect. 9 his "cleanhandedness in money matters" is exemplified; in ch. 26–28 this is compared with the methods of others — of people like Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica and not of usurers or the like. In ch. 29 his courage is described and compared with the ways of his fellow-youths. The pattern is repeated in a political context where again Scipio's personal qualities are praised; in a similar context Scipio lets his quest for honour influence his decisions.[33] In the same book in ch. 20 we are presented an edifying sentiment and there is, of course, the famous scene at the burning of Carthage.[34]

[31] See also below p. 106 ff. Walbank objects to Petzold's interpretation of 3, 4 by Polybius' own characterisation of the anti-Roman statesmen (LTB 147 n. 45. Petzold [supra n. 1] 69). He says that this passage (30. 6.3–4) has no bearing on 3. 4.6 "which is concerned with views the subjected peoples entertained about Rome, not with the characteristics of their statesmen." But 30. 6 and the following chapters (disregarded by Walbank) do not deal only with those. The discussion of their προαιρέσεις is intended to enable future statesmen to choose the "path of honour" in unstable situations. This is hardly crudely utilitarian. Furthermore the ὁρμὰς καὶ ... ζήλους of the peoples are obviously expressed by their leaders; this emerges from "... (I must describe) what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life" (3. 4.6). Petzold adds many relevant pssages. Polybius hardly ever says that Roman rule was "good;" in 1. 4. 4. (written very early) the unification of the *oecumene* by *Tykhe* is praised, not the means by which Rome executed her design.

[32] P. 95. It is unnecessary to stress that his obligations did not end with his release; he would not express his — by Roman standards — inferiority in so many words, but 36. 11.2 is drily eloquent.

[33] 35. 4.8 f., 38. 8.3 respectively.

[34] Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967) 282 ff., cf. on p. 285 Momigliano (above n. 1) 22. See also 18. 35; 18, cf. Liv. 44.1–3; Pol. 38. 21; at the summit of the campaign Polybius exalts Scipio's philosophical mood; see also Frg. 47, 67, 76 BW. He speaks differently of Africanus maior: 16. 23, 14.

It is of course possible, perhaps even probable, that in other, lost, passages Polybius mentioned and presumbly praised his hero as a politician and general. It is still remarkable that he does not even hint at Scipio's future greatness as such in the passage where he gives a character sketch of him which apparently was not shortened by the excerptor. One would think that his solidierly qualities at least might have found a place amongst his *virtutes,* if Polybius had dwelled on them.

Be that as it may, and even if Scipio was Polybius' contemporary hero in all respects it does not mean that he approved automatically of every political act of Scipio. Such an inference cannot be drawn from his praise of the man or from the fact that he accompanied Scipio on the campaign against Carthage or even that he advised Scipio on technical matters (advice that, incidentally, was rejected.)[35] This is again an *argumentum e silentio,* but one would have thought that at least an echo of an express approval by Polybius of Scipio's actions or, more important, of Roman policy in general and in Greece in particular between say 151–146 might have found its way into Constantinus' pages.[36] He kept his peace as a client, a friend, a recent exile and later, when writing long after the events, because he had resigned himself to Roman rule.[37]

A comparison with Polybius' attitude to an earlier hero of his and one to whom he was probably more deeply attached may be instructive. He had sat on Philopoemen's knees, he may have learned from him something of what he knew of politics and war (if he really was only 16 at Philopoemen's death, he would have listened to table-talk), he considered his policy regarding Rome καλὴν, "honorable" and he had written an encomium on him. Certainly his feelings for him did not cool off with the years. Two points come to mind. In 23. 12 Philopoemen is praised for the "pursuit of glory in a democratic state"; he did not "usually" stoop to courting the favor of the people and is compared with the elder Scipio who pursued glory in an aristocratic state. More

[35] S 176, 179, H 16. More on this later.

[36] On Walbank's assumption that we have everything "very important" for Roman policy — H 33 — the *argumentum e silentio* would be valid!

[37] Cf. 8. 8.9. On the significance of this to what Walbank calls "new diplomacy" see below p. 106 ff.

important, perhaps, is the fact that all this did not prevent Polybius from voicing criticism of Philopoemen where he considered this warranted. In 22.19 he states that he once disapproved of what Philopoemen said at a certain occasion and did not change his opinion τῆς ἡλικίας προβαινούσης. He was perfectly able to distinguish between hero-worship and judgement; it is therefore not self-evident that he must have approved of Scipio's politics because he loved and exalted him.[38]

From here we turn to the problem of the connection between success and morality and enter on the third part of this paper.

In three recent works Walbank has put forward the argument that Polybius, in the course of his sojourn in Rome and afterwards, after 151, changed his attitude to Rome. While before 168, as the son of Lycortas and the disciple of Philopoemen, he was cautiously anti-Roman, he became during his exile cynical and detached, only to change his opinions again, when with the change in his personal circumstances and in the wake of the events between 150 and 146 he became strongly pro-Roman.[39] Walbank bases his argument on three main reasons: Polybius' attitude to the leaders of Achaea during 150–146; his inability — in Walbank's view — to understand the events of the time of the *tarakhē kai kinesis*, especially those in Carthage and in Greece (and Macedon), and Polybius' conception of the connection between success and morality, as expounded by Walbank. As Polybius nowhere in the last ten books (together with a few undoubtedly late insertions in the earlier ones, especially, of course, 3. 4–5) expresses his opinions positively, Walbank adduces a number of passages and some general reasons which in his interprtation support his argument. In the foregoing we have offered our different interpretation of some of these passages and shall now try to meet Walbank's argumentation, starting with 3. 4–5. Unavoidably there will be some cross-references and even repetitions.

According to Walbank the implications of 3. 4–5 are that "what matters is how one reacts to success or disaster."[40] Walbank interprets this as implying that the decision of 168 "had not proved final" and that

[38] 10. 21.8.

[39] For Walbank's works see n. 1 sup. "Cynical" S 168 f., "detached" H 11. For the changed attitudes see S ch. VI, H and LTB passim.

[40] LTB 146 and seq.

"the defeated powers ... had turned the set-back into success by their firm reaction to it" which is of course "manifestly untrue." But is this really the only possible inference from Polybius' words or even the most compelling one? How could anyone after 146 entertain such a notion without being laughed out of the court of history? Do we not have here one of those general maxims so beloved by Polybius for giving his work a sort of philosophical flavour, although or perhaps because they are not very profound or original, but express what "the informed reader," to use a modern expression, i.e. one whose general education is similar to that of Polybius, feels? How can he be supposed to have thought on those lines or to assume that his readers would do so, he whose every page speaks of Roman invincibility and of the inexorable progress of her *tykhē*? But if he did not think on those lines, Walbank's interpretion and his conclusion that the reasons which Polybius gives for adding the ten books have no obvious place in the story of the years 167–146 is neither compelling nor plausible. If "Polybius does not press the point" this is obviously for the reason that his point was already made. At the risk of being pedantic or worse we must repeat that when Polybius gives advice for action it is directed at Greeks and geared to future Greek politics, even 4. 7.3 f., which according to Walbank[41] had topical interest in 150 and serves for determining the times of publication.

Walbank is unsure[42] "from what point of view the future reader is to judge Roman rule," whether "from the standpoint of Rome herself, or from that of the rest of the world." Polybius states that he does not propose to judge himself, but to provide his readers with the means for judging. This appears to be the natural meaning of φανερὸν ἐσται (sect. 7). As stated above he must have anticipated that Greeks would judge from their own point of view — based on the quest for *eleutheria* — and that the judgement would necessarily be negative. Even Walbank considers it possible that the point of view implied "may be that of the rest of the world,"[43] specified on the next page as "the subject peoples." Together with the fact that all this comes at one of the most conspicuous places of the work — can we really doubt that Polybius wanted to lead

[41] S 20.
[42] LTB 148.
[43] Ibid.

his readers to an, at least, equivocal judgement? But we think that one may go further: why, if Polybius after 151 became progressively pro-Roman, did he not speak out? Gruen has recently made a forceful case for the contention that the *bellum Achaeicum* was neither the result of deliberate Roman provocation nor of the presumed desire of the Achaean leaders to bring on an Achaean or general Greek war of liberation.[44] The Achaean leaders wanted to preserve the integrity of the League and that purpose was not primarily directed against Rome. If so, Polybius' violent language against Critolaus and the rest cannot be taken as, "defence" of Roman policy, but must be understood as what it purposes to be, criticism of irresponsible leaders.[45] After the defeat, however, the situation was different: in the eyes of the Achaeans made miserable by the conquerors Polybius had condemned himself by accepting office from them and later, when he published his work, by his abuse of the leaders of the war. Openly taking the side of Rome could not impair his standing with the Greeks and would enhance it with the Romans, but open criticism of Rome would be dangerous and violate his obligations to Scipio, at least. If he did not speak out in "defence" of Rome, the most probable reason is that he did not want to and we are led again to the conclusion that he wanted his readers to judge for themselves; he could not doubt what their judgement would be.

We now take up again the problem of Polybius' attitude to the relations between success and morality. We have already examined it a propos his attitude to Scipio's policy; here we look into a connected aspect. Walbank calls attention to the *nova sapientia*, the "*new diplomacy*" with its Macchiavellian implications, which was executed also by Aemilianus. In order to show that Polybius agreed with this, Walbank adduced a passage from Diodorus "almost certainly derived from Polybius" as was "convincingly argued by Gelzer"; two years later

[44] Op. cit. (n. 9 supra). Incidentally, he is not sure of Walbank's thesis, see p. 60. For the following see 67 and elsewhere.

[45] Cf. Gruen (supra n. 9) 48, 64 and see later. If vituperative language is an argument, that used against Callicrates (24. 10; 30. 29; 36. 13) is a strong one for anti-Roman opinions of Polybius, as Callicrates was undoubtedly "pro-Roman" and the relevant passages were written long after 146.

the derivation was disposed of (as convincingly?) by Toulomakos.[46] But with this single piece of evidence removed one falls back to deductions and inferences. Walbank repeatedly asserts that Polybius must have *approved morally* — this is the decisive issue — of those policies: "if, as seems likely, he accepted the Roman case over Carthage and in view of his relations with Aemilianus the alternative is barely credible," or "it is hard to believe that Polybius ... did not sympathise with Scipio's harsh policy against Carthage", or "was he all the time condemning the policy to which by his presence he lent not only moral support ...?" or, finally, "I would argue that Polybius accepted the events at Carthage, Corinth ... as ... certainly not blameworthy manifestations of imperial power."[47] But is "condemn" the only alternative to "accept," "sympathise" or "consider not blameworthy?" There exists no evidence what so ever for Polybius' alleged attitude and all the probabilities speak against it, provided what is denied neither by Walbank nor by anybody else that he always remained a loyal Greek, whatever he was compelled by circumstances to do or what he thought he had to do.[48] Should we not see in his violent abuse of the men of 146 (and of Callicrates, too) the mental agony of a Greek who must look on helplessly on the destrution of his country and on the remnants of his personal hopes by men whom he considers worthless ignorants leading their people into the abyss? It is enough to make him write emotionally, violently, even a little unjustly, and pitilessly.

This gives a different perspective to the problem. Does he really condemn the luckless partisans of Perseus only because of their "mistake of backing" the king, or the traitors of Abydus only for not slaughtering all women and children?[49] At least he claims different reasons: in spite of the fate awaiting them Perseus' backers were not brave enough to act according to the code of honour. He has no pity for the victims of Abydus and blames those who stopped the slaughter, but could the survivors of a city taken by storm expect pity?

[46] S 178/9 and n. 130, Diod. 32. 2, 4; Gelzer, *Kl. Schr.* II 64 ff., H 18–20; J. Touloumakos, *Zum Geschichtsbewusstsein d. Griechen i.d. Zeit d. röm. Herrschaft* (Göttingen 1971), p. 28 n. 22.

[47] In order of reference, S 179, 176, H 16, 20.

[48] See n. 3 sup. Did he also agree with Glabrio's dealing with the Aetolians, 20. 10. 8?

[49] 30. 7.2–4 cf. 6–8.; 16. 31–33; S 178, H 9f.

In 30. 8 Polybius censures some Greek statesmen who had sided with Perseus, but had not been able to bring their countries to join him in the war and had been found out; nevertheless they did not commit suicide and lost their reputation. Others (ch. 7) who had persuaded their fellow-citizens to support Perseus faced the situation honorably and died bravely, thereby — the implication is — expiating their own errors and the harm they had brought on their cities. However, these people had acted in good faith; in 171 one might still believe in the possibility of a draw between Rome and Macedonia; even Polybius hesitated for a moment.[50] But in 150–146 the situation was different, at least in Polybius' view. The Achaean leaders set themselves unrealistic aims from the beginning and therefore could not succeed; their advice and their actions were foolish and criminal, based on a grave misreading of the situation and of Roman methods.[51] For these reasons they were contemptible, not because of their inevitable lack of success. Together with his personal enmity to them this, too, explains his vituperations and lack of pity.

Above we have already referred by implication to Walbank's argument that ψευκτὴν ἢ ... αἱρετήν can be interpreted only as meaning that the subject peoples had a choice between accepting or "staving off" the Roman rule and that the whole passage is intended as a guide to political action, although Walbank himself hesitates to see Polybius in the role of an advocate of anti-Roman action after 146.[52] But if this were true Polybius would be guilty of equivocation or worse of incitement to what he censures in the Achaean leaders, a hopeless insurrection.[53] Walbank does not follow up this point; he accepts Polybius' stated reason — to provide a basis for judgement — only for posterity and connects this aim with the question of the period of ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις.[54]

[50] 28. 13.1.

[51] See 38. 3.10, 13; (in spite of the lacunae intelligible); 38. 9.7. In 30. 9.20 Polybius excuses his "lack of pity." What is said in the text, may also be objected to Gruen (supra n. 9) 65 (and earlier). Those responsible for a small state versus the greatest, and ruling, power had to anticipate every possibility, even if for a long time the worst had not happened.

[52] 3. 4.7; LTB 148, sup. p. 7. For the following see LTB 146.

[53] These seem to be the logical consequences of Walbank's assumption, but both do not suit his pro-Roman Polybius.

[54] LTB 148, sup. p. 101.

We have tried to show that Walbank's partition of this period into two parts and the application of the term to 151–146 only is not compelling. The condition of the various peoples after 167 and certainly after 158 was the outcome of Roman rule after the subjection of Macedonia, the humbling of Antiochus IV and the reduction of Greece proper to at least *de facto clientela*.[55] Signs for Polybius' awareness of such a connection can be found. *Tykhe* was not idle in this time. She settled the fate of Rhodes;[56] Eumenes felt too secure after Pydna and suffered from the Galatians;[57] Antiochus' fate has been mentioned just now; Attalus disappointed the Senate and was made to suffer.[58] Aetolia suffered from internal strife because of the *pax Romana*, although this was a good thing for their neighbours.[59] Direct or indirect harmful results of the Roman domination are noted for Epirus;[60] Prusias behaved in an unspeakable manner and as a result Eumenes suffered from the Galatians.[61] The list can be extended considerably. No less imporant and significant is the fact that many of the upheavals of the period of the troubles[62] are reported to have started during the ten years of relative quiet preceding it. E.g. the story of Ariarathes, with whose expulsion from his kingdom and his subsequent return the period starts according to Polybius,[63] begins much earlier, in 164/3,[64] continues in the same book ch. 5–6 and in the portion of book 32 lost immediately before the present ch. 11, on 158/7. The troubles of the Greek exiles filled the whole period 167–151; the first embassy asking for their return appeared in Rome in 165/4.[65] Likewise the story of the calamities of Carthage begins with the year 162/1[66] but this was not the first such

[55] Badian (supra n. 11) 97, 112; see also 26, 158, 165.

[56] 29. 19, *expressis verbis* connected with Perseus' fall.

[57] Ibid. 22.

[58] 30. 3, cf. Comm. ad 1.

[59] Ibid. 11, the effect on the neighbours is implied.

[60] 30. 12, cf. 32; 32. 5–6; two noble Romans showed indignation, the Senate procrastinated and Charops continued as before.

[61] 32. 18–19.

[62] We use this connotation to avoid the rather clumsy Greek in excess.

[63] 3. 5.2, sup. p. 101.

[64] 31. 3.

[65] 30. 32. For the order of the fragments see now Commentary III, Introduction, and Table of Fragments for all books p. 51 ff.

[66] 31. 21, Comm. III p. 36 and ad 1.

incident, as appears from "not many years before (this) time," "numerous embassies" "*always* came off second best." Of course, the oncoming Punic war was one of the most violent *kineseis*.[67] Even from our very incomplete record one might get the impression that Polybius wishes to lead his readers — by the hand and imperceptibly as it were — to the time for judgement. One should not forget that what might have appeared to some Romans as petty squabbles (viz. Cato's jokes) and is called so, a little condescendingly, sometimes by moderns, was usually a very serious matter to those concerned, often at the boundary of life and death. Polybius had experienced this and continued to do so after 145, when he reconstructed the Achaean cities and — conceivably — had a hand in the reorganisation of the Achaean League.[68] He was very concerned, indeed.

If all this is plausible, then Polybius' own division into two periods at 158/7 should be accepted. Walbank offers two reasons for rejecting this.[69] One is "that it would be quite false to say" that Polybius began his account of the events from 158 onwards "as if making a new start," because his personal involvement in important events began only in 151. This is of course true, but he does not claim to have been involved in all the events of the time of troubles. He claims to have been αὐτοπτής of most events, but not of all; this need only mean that he witnessed events in Rome at close hand until his release; many of the embassies recorded under *res Italiae* were certainly important. In addition he certainly received reports from his friends about events elsewhere, besides accompanying Scipio before 151 or making journeys at least in Italy.[70]

However, far more important, but, as we shall try to show, unacceptable is Walbank's second argument that the events after 151 were incomprehensible to Polybius. "Carthage was in the hands" of a callous and extravagant leader; Macedonia presents "an example of ...

[67] This list can be extended, too. E.g. the affair of the Ptolemies, (31. 10, 17 ff.; 33. 11, 39. 7 and undoubtedly also in lost passages, as appears from 35. 1, from the Suda, not from the Excerpts). It is not listed in 3. 5 except for a hint in sect. 3, see Comm. ad 1., but it is certainly a part of the unrest that began to evolve after 167 and continued into the time of the troubles.

[68] See in general Th. Schwertfeger, *Der Achaiische Bund* (München 1974).

[69] LTB 149 f., S 29 f., 174, 176, H 16 f.

[70] Commentary I p. 4. See also 29.5, especially sect. 3.

daimonoblabeia;" the Achaean disaster "could furnish no consolation, so replete was it with shameful catastrophe", people in their madness "throwing themselves into wells and over precipices."[71] "It is evidently because power was exercised and abused by irresponsible and crazy leaders in so many countries that Polybius regarded the period as one of ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις."[72] As this argument is central to Walbank's thesis of Polybius' change of mind it needs close consideration. Polybius may have wished to write up material which he had collected and this may have been an incentive to add the last ten books, but one may hardly dismiss Polybius' declared reason as only a *rationale*.[73]

Does the scorn poured on one Carthaginian leader really prove that Polybius did not longer grasp politics or that he considered them as irrational? Other Carthaginians are described differently — was Hamilcar Phameas less inimical to Rome?[74] A comparison with what he says of Aratus' generalship or of Cleomenes' — where we have his complete account — should warn us against too categorical explanations.

Be that as it may, whatever was Polybius' stand on Roman policy towards Carthage, the description of her reactions to Roman (and Massinissa's) provocations is perfectly rational. An oppressed people was systematically driven to political suicide or to a desperate eruption (in the end by open trickery) which was tantamount to physical suicide. The Carthaginians were unreasonable to expect that they could hold out against the Romans, but to say or imply so is a perfectly legitimate historical explanation: why are we to assume that Polybius did not understand this? The single case of a worthless and irresponsible leader cannot disprove this; at worst this is another case of Polybius succumbing to the vice of emotional writing which he censures in others.[75]

[71] 38. 16.7.

[72] Summary and quotation from LTB 155; cf. n. 70.

[73] H 27. For this passage see also LTB 161, H 26. For the following cf. LTB 149 f., 154 ff., S 29 f., 174, 176, H 16, 26 f.

[74] 38. 8.1, 3. See our remark supra n. 2. According to a tradition going back to Polybius Hamilcar Phameas and Hasdrubal later lived in Italy (App. Lib. 131, ibid. 97, 100, 109). One wonders what Polybius had written.

[75] The scene with Hasdrubal's wife is connected with this.

This applies to Greece too.[76] What is in Walbank's opinion incomprehension may be consisdered an explanation by psychological criteria, whether or not it is a correct one or one acceptable to us. The Greek reactions to the situation brought about by the Roman dominion — this is the basic fact — may have been irrational, but they were initiated by their ἰδίαν ἀβουλίαν or by φόβῳ διὰ τὴν ⟨ὑπερ⟩βολ⟨ὴν⟩ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτημάτων and Polybius adds "if they must be called their own. For I should rather say that the people in general acted mistakenly ... but that the actual authors (τοὺς αἰτίους) ... were the real offenders."[77] Errors, faithlessness, cowardice, whether of the multitude or of their leaders or both, certainly can bring about disasters and with them shame, but it is unclear why this shame should mean that Polybius did not understand the events, however shallow his interpretation may look to us.

Only in the case of Macedonia Polybius speaks of οὐδ' ἀνεκτὸς ὁ λόγος "a Philip fallen from the skies" and the incomprehensible attiude of the Macedonians to him, or of the δαιμονοβλάβεια which visited them.[78]

However, is this really a parallel with Greece which "hits one in the eye?"[79] Polybius does not use similar language relating to the actions of Diaeus or Critolaus. They "were under an entire and absolute misconception" in evaluating the political situation because of their ignorance and their ill disposition, but their policy was rational, given their erroneous premises. It was not insane, but foolish.[80]

Only when speaking of the decisive assembly does Polybius use expressions like ἐκορύζων or συνενθουσῶντος. He describes the impact of a demagogue's propaganda on an excited mob,[81] the like of which should not cause suprise in our times; neither should

[76] S 30, cf. 38. 3.7–13; 38. 16.7–8; 38. 8.4–15.

[77] 38. 1–4; for the following see especially 38. 1.5; 38. 3.7, 9, 13. Drexler, supplementing sect. 3 and 7 differently, translates, "Denn ich wenigstens möchte es einen Irrtum der Menge nennen, eine Pflichtvergessenheit; die Verbrecher waren jene, die für diesen ungeheuren Irrtum die Verantwortung trugen."

[78] 36. 10.1–2; 36. 17.13 f. but even *daimonoblabeia* does not always exclude a rational explanation, see 28. 9.4 and cf. 23. 10.14.

[79] S 177.

[80] 38. 10.9 ff.

[81] Ib. ch. 12, demagogue and mob in Polybius' eyes.

the "madness" of mass audiences in times of crisis. But even under such circumstances Polybius admits that Critolaus used also rational arguments.[82]

Walbank does not refer to these chapters;[83] he bases his parallels with Macedon on 38. 16. 7, but the incidents related there are the outcome of a defeat that was caused "by the folly of their leaders and their own errors;" *aboulia* is a grave fault of a leader, perhaps his greatest, but not madness, and charging him with it is legitimate and rational criticism.[84]

Therefore, when in 38. 18.5 Polybius appeals to *tykhe* for an explanation in the last resort, this is in line with his general ideas. At the very start of his work he invokes the *paradoxon* and *Tykhe*, but this does not prevent him from ascribing the success of Rome to her polity. Why should the same at the end mean lack of understanding?[85]

But if so, Walbank's main argument both for restricting the time of the troubles to 151 onwards only and for his explanation of Polybius' motives for adding the last ten books to the work is unproven and with it his interpretation of 3. 4–5.

Walbank in our opinion stresses too much Polybius' personal circumstances in his thesis. He almost makes of him a "one-dimensional man"[86] who reacts — mechanically as it were — to impulses, becomes critical or cynical in his exile and pro-Roman with the fortunate change of 151. There exists some inner contradiction between such an assumption and the picture of Polybius as a faithful Greek who never submitted morally or intellectually to Rome.[87]

[82] Ibid. sect. 11.

[83] Except to 38. 10.8, the vituperation of the leaders. The index may be incomplete; passages missing in the index loc. include 3. 59.4 (p. 24 n. 122); 18. 35 (19 n. 90); 36.1 (ib. 91); 31. 22–30 (ibid.); 38. 3.7–13 (p. 30 n. 154); 7–20 (ibid). Under "firesignalling" (in the general index) correct to "57 n. 151, 181."

[84] 38. 16.9. Drexler's "Torheit" is preferable to Paton's "errors."

[85] 1. 1.4–5; ch. 4 pass. Cf. ch. 63 and see S 60 ff., especially 63 f. for *Tykhe*, a convincing explanation. E.g. 1. 20. 13 shows that not every time when *paradoxon* was invoked we must assume incomprehension. Perhaps Polybius wanted, by exaggerating the events in Macedonia, minimise Greek "guilt", which may be also one reason why he tried to present the Achaean uprising as the work of a minority (see for this attempt Fuks, *JHS* 90 (1970) 78 ff., see p. 86 f. and pass.).

[86] Cf. D.H. Fisher, *Historians' Fallacies* (London, 1971) 200 ff., cf. 213.

[87] Momigliano (supra n. 1) 29.

Furthermore, it would appear that on Walbank's assumptions Polybius suffered from a split personality. In Rome, while working on the first books, he wrote memoranda of what was happening during that time which were later incorporated in the last ten books. Walbank believes that the judgements of Roman policy during 167–151 which appear in the later books were formulated when Polybius wrote those memoranda or, "much of it (the material collected during that time) would necessarily reflect his views at the time he wrote it down';[88] a few lines earlier we read "... as I hope to show, Polybius' account of Roman policy in books 30–33 plainly reflects the views he held at the time the events were taking place." However, in the Sather-lectures[89] Walbank said, discussing Polybius' belief in the value of geographical knowledge, "if he had ceased to believe it, it is difficult to see why he should have left it in the revised edition." But surely this applies *a fortiori* to his views on Rome! Did he never reread his own notes and those of "other interested parties"[90] which dealt with such a delicate problem as the evaluation of the rule of the super-power? But if he did, as we must assume, and left the judgments of the time when he wrote those notes stand as they were, he could not prevent his readers from assuming that he still thought them correct. The alternative, namely that while writing before 151 the first fifteen books from a cautiously pro-Roman standpoint he composed those cynical and critical memoranda, which he published — unchanged — when his real attitude — *vide* 35–39 in Walbank's view — was violently pro-Roman again, together with his earlier anti-Roman stand as a follower of Philopoemen, would make him a sorry man and historian, indeed. Whatever his faults, he deserves better than that.[91]

Similar considerations apply to Walbank's conclusions from the "debate" on Roman policy towards Carthage presented by Polybius.[92] He considers the views of the fourth group as those of Polybius himself; this is argued from the chiastic arrangement which puts the pro-Roman

[88] LTB 145.
[89] S 124, cf. 9. 20.5–6.
[90] H 5, and Gelzer, quoted there.
[91] See S 168 with 176 f., 179, H 13, LTB 159.
[92] 36. 9. S 174–176, H 14 ff., LTB 156 ff.

opinions at the beginning and the end, although the second and third view are rather two versions of one argument, and from the position and the length of the last one: it answers the third argument in detail and "I find it hard to believe that it does not represent Polybius' view of the matter."[93] It contains arguments based on legal definitions and the intangibles (the provocations, the intentional misleading of Carthage etc.) are left out and therefore "the Romans are placed in a legally impregnable position."

However, those intangibles had been alluded to in the middle arguments, and more important they had been faithfully registered earlier.[94] One must assume that Greek readers would be reminded of them, when the whole debate with its arguments pro and con. was put before them. Roman policy in Greece had not been essentially different from that towards Carthage, witness the destruction of Epirus and Corinth. It is therefore remarkable that no such discussion is recorded on Greece which might have been more interesting to the Greek reader (and the excerptor). Was it too dangerous? When Roman censorship prevented the sages of the Talmud from speaking out against the rulers, they spoke of "Edom" (Idumea), and so did Jewish writers during the Middle Ages for fear of Christian censorship. Could it be that Polybius did something similar? Perhaps Momigliano hints at this: "It is doubtful whether, given his premises and the situation in which he found himself, he could have done more than convey the expression of widespread discontent and indicate at the same time that something had changed in the Roman governing class."[95]

But when all is said and done, Polybius' position must still have been ambivalent. The restrictions imposed on him by his status as exile and client, the necessity to consider his fellow exiles and the Greeks in general[96] are part of the explanation. However, the main reason may be deeper. His work was intended chiefly for his compatriots:[97] he wanted to explain to them the rise of Rome and to console them and himself for

[93] H 16; for the following see S 175.
[94] 30. 6–9; 31. 6 f.. 31. 10.7, 21; 36. 3–8 and probably also in now lost passages.
[95] Op. cit. (n. 1 sup.) 30.
[96] Cf. 38. 4.7.
[97] S 13, 26 and elsewhere. See, taken at random, 1 83.3–4, 10. 17.5 etc.

the loss of their independence, which in the beginning he might have considered temporary. After all, the Greeks had survived Alexander and held their own against the Antigonids; Aratus had even liberated the Peloponnese and guarded it against Philip V. But with the years, when he came to understand better the developments that had led to the subjugation of Greece[98] and there appeared no sign of weakening of the Roman power, when he recognised that unlike the king the Republic would not die and no *diadochi* were forthcoming to provide a renewed "concert of powers" such as had helped Greece to preserve some autonomy in the third century — when all this became clear to him, he had to readjust his life and thoughts. His task was now to make the Greeks realise that Rome was there to stay and that she was at the zenith of her power owing to her constitution.

But as shown earlier his troubles were personal as well. He had to readjust to his situation as an exile, a member of a ruling class and a ruling family, but above all as a Greek who had become the client of a people whom in his heart he could not but consider semi-barbarians,[99] but who enjoyed with the help of *Tykhe* what was by right the Greeks', namely the rule over the world. If he drew the conclusions from his own theories he had no real hope left; many generations after him would not see the resurrection of Greece. Is it really strange that sometimes he wavers or appears to waver in his opinions? Do we not get a passing glimpse of his real feelings in 30. 4.16–17 where he blames informers who "for fear revealed τοῖς κρατοῦσιν ... the errors of others ... which time had already veiled from the eyes of their masters?"

Such admittedly speculative but not baseless considerations could explain his attitudes to Rome and her policies; at least they provide a

[98] See e.g. 11. 5.1 written probably during the later part of his exile.

[99] Notwithstanding what is said in Comm. ad 9. 37.6. See 11. 5.7, 30. 22 adduced by Mioni (supra n. 6) 85; 18. 22.8; does Polybius only-naively and artlessly as it were- repeat his sources? Cato is represented as comparing Rome or the Senate-chamber with Polyphemus' cave- could it not be with tongue in cheek? And what did Polybius think of the destruction of Corinth and of the Romans playing draughts on famous pictures (39. 2)? Cf. 10.15.5 with Com. ad 1.; "His dispassionate ... account does not wholly hide his distaste" implies — in Polybius' circumstances — criticism of the "barbarous custom," It is hardly convincing to say" he does not condemn the practice as going beyond what is permissible" (ibid.). At least the Romans were no Greeks.

different but equally plausible construction as Walbank's. Given the main point that the world was Rome's for the duration, he would study her methods and faithfully analyse and describe them to the best of his ability. True to his decision to write pragmatic not tragic history he would endeavour not to give vent to his feelings. He would not, however, surrender his intellectual liberty. He would show "by what means and under what system of polity" the Romans had succeeded. He would show the superiority of their regime and their arms. He would lay open the mistakes, follies and insipidities of their adversaries, but also their own greed and their unjust deeds. He might admire their capabilities and efficiency, and he would record accurately and reliably their policies; he was not, however, called upon to identify himself with them. He recorded the "beautiful" moment of the destruction of Carthage, but he also recorded Scipio's tears and fears.

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY B. SHIMRON