

## THE INFLUX OF MONEY INTO SPARTA AT THE END OF THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.\*

“Ἀρχὴν μὲν οὖν διαφθορᾶς καὶ τοῦ νοσεῖν ἔσχε τὰ πράγματα τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων σχεδὸν ἄφ’ οὗ τὴν Ἀθηναίων καταλύσαντες ἡγεμονίαν χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργυρίου κατέπλησαν ἑαυτούς.”<sup>1</sup>

(“The state of the Lacedaemonians began to suffer distemper and corruption soon after they had subverted the Athenian supremacy and filled themselves with gold and silver.”)

This statement of Plutarch, which opens a concise description of Sparta’s decline — based, most probably, mainly on Phylarchus<sup>2</sup> — sums up the commonly accepted view of ancient sources on this subject. This view ascribed the beginning of Sparta’s decline to the very days of her apogee as a great power, after her decisive victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War. Ironically, it was that very factor which had helped her so much in gaining this victory and in obtaining the hegemony in Greece — foreign capital — that was also held chiefly responsible for having engendered the roots of the decline.

This opinion had already been current in the fourth century B.C., that is, in contemporary or almost contemporary sources, such as Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates and Ephorus. Their views were to have a far-reaching influence in later sources such as Phylarchus, Polybius, Posidonius, Diodorus, Plutarch, Pausanias and Aelianus.<sup>3</sup>

\* This paper is based on an introductory chapter of my doctoral dissertation, *Internal Problems of Sparta from the End of the Fifth to Mid-Third Century B.C. and their Place in Contemporary Greek Consciousness*. The work was carried out under the supervision of the late Professor Alexander Fuks, to whom I am deeply indebted.

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Agis*, 5, 1.

<sup>2</sup> With respect to Plutarch’s close dependence on Phylarchus for his biographies of Agis and Cleomenes, see, e.g., E. Gabba, “Studi su Filarco”, *Athen.* 35 (1957) 3 ff., 193 ff.; Th. W. Africa, *Phylarchus and the Spartan Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961).

<sup>3</sup> See below, n. 24.

Plutarch's above-quoted statement also echoes the moralist and rhetorical tones which had accompanied the exposition of this viewpoint since the very beginning. However, the moralist and rhetorical tendencies of many members of this impressive chorus do not in this case affect the basic historical truth of their judgement, namely, that at the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries B.C., Spartan society underwent many dramatic changes, which were to have dire consequences. As is well known, these changes were closely connected with the *foreign capital* obtained by Sparta in the final stages and cessation of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>4</sup> This major economic factor, which lies behind the processes of change in the social fabric, has not, in fact, yet received the attention it deserves in modern research. The purpose of this paper is to concentrate on the *quantitative* aspect of this economic factor — to examine the various sources of the wealth, the stages of its influx and the total amount of capital.

### 1. *The Persian Grants*

Persian aid was formally promised to Sparta in three successive treaties, the first two in the year 412 and the third at the beginning of 411 B.C.<sup>5</sup> These treaties formed the basis of an alliance between Sparta and her allies on the one hand, and Persia on the other, in the war against Athens and her allies. The Spartans' main purpose was to ensure financial support from Persia — even at the expense of the Asiatic Greeks and their freedom — in order to undertake large-scale military operations in the Aegean Sea region and along the coast of Asia Minor. The third treaty contained a clause which particularly emphasised financial aid, together with an undertaking on the part of Sparta to repay at the end of the war whatever sums of money had been supplied to her. However, in spite of these treaties, cooperation between the parties was not always steady. The Persians at times raised difficulties in supplying the subsidies, and in the early stages aid was irregular and rather limited.

<sup>4</sup> See below, pp. 44–45.

<sup>5</sup> Thuc. 8, 18; 37; 58 (=H. Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, nn. 200–202, with bibliography); see also M. Amit, "A Peace Treaty between Sparta and Persia", *RSA* 4 (1974) 55 ff., and D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Cincinnati Classical Studies, N.S. Vol. I) (Leiden, 1977) 87ff.

After the first treaty, Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, on his arrival at Miletus paid each member of the ships' crews a month's wages, at the rate of one Attic drachma per day. But at the same time he stated that in future, pending receipt of fresh instructions from the King, he could not pay more than three obols (that is, half a drachma) per day, and would revert to one drachma only if and when authorised to do so. This statement raised a protest, and Tissaphernes agreed to a small increase.<sup>6</sup>

Soon after the signing of the second treaty, the Spartans found it necessary to collect money from Rhodes (32 talents).<sup>7</sup> Persia's financial aid was greatly reduced and for some time almost completely stopped following the volte-face of Alcibiades and his contacts with Tissaphernes. The former Athenian general had now adopted a hostile attitude towards Sparta and succeeded in persuading the Persian satrap that it was not in the interests of his country to give unqualified support to the Lacedaemonians. Alcibiades explained to Tissaphernes that for various reasons (which are given in full by Thucydides) he would serve Persia better by adopting a more balanced attitude towards the disputants. The satrap was persuaded by Alcibiades to reduce the sailors' wages this time to half a drachma, and even that was not paid regularly. Certain senior officers were bribed by Tissaphernes in order to get them to accept his new policy. For some time the satrap paid the Spartans and the armies under their command a minimum allowance so as not to allow them to make war.<sup>8</sup>

However, the fear that the Athenians might become too powerful led to the third treaty, which, as already mentioned, stressed more than the previous treaties the aspect of financial aid to Sparta. Indeed, there was for some time after the signing of this treaty an increase in the financial aid to Sparta. Not for long, however. Within less than a year there were

<sup>6</sup> Thuc. 8, 29. He agreed to pay 30 talents (i.e., 180,000 drachmas=1,080,000 obols) per month for 55 ships instead of 60 — an amount of five ships' wages in addition to the three obols per day per man. All ships beyond that number, possessed by the Lacedaemonians, were to be paid at the same rate. On the assumption that a ship's crew on average numbered 200 men, the increase would have amounted to less than half an obol daily per crew member.

<sup>7</sup> Thuc. 8, 44. 4.

<sup>8</sup> *id.* 8, 45; 46; cf. Isocr. *De Bigis*, 20; Plut. *Alcib.* 25, 1–2; *Lys.* 4, 1; *Iust.* 5, 2, 8 sq. See also J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade* (Paris, 1951) 228 ff.; cf. Lewis, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 92, 98 ff.

already complaints from the soldiers about the low wages they were receiving from Tissaphernes; in particular, they complained about the admiral Astyochus, who was suspected of taking bribes at their expense and collaborating with the Persian satrap.<sup>9</sup>

In the spring of 410 B.C., Mindarus, who succeeded Astyochus as commander of the navy, laid siege to Cyzicus, and did so with the active support of Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontic Phrygia. However, when Athenian forces arrived in the area and engaged Mindarus' forces in battle, the Spartan admiral was defeated and killed. The report sent by Mindarus' vice-admiral to Sparta after this defeat reflects the critical situation, at the time, of the Spartan forces in the East: "The ships are gone; Mindarus is dead; the men are starving; we don't know what to do." Pharnabazus revived the morale of the Spartan army after the defeat: he supplied each man with clothing and subsistence for two months and, most important of all, he provided money for the rebuilding of the navy.<sup>10</sup>

In the year 407 B.C., Lysander was appointed admiral and came to the East. Until then, as we have seen, Persian help had been irregular and grudgingly given. Although Pharnabazus seems to have been more generously inclined than Tissaphernes, and the King of Persia made repeated promises to help, yet the aid actually supplied up to the time of Lysander's appointment was often meagre and barely sufficient to maintain the army and navy. Sparta's financial position was far from satisfactory, and the situation of her fighting forces in the East was at times even critical. The desperate dispatch sent to Sparta after Mindarus' death is highly significant from this point of view. However, even during this period there appears to have been a marked rise in the income of certain senior officers. This we gather from the bribing of the

<sup>9</sup> Thuc. 8, 83; cf. 8, 50, 3; Plut. *Alcib.* 25, 5–7. On the scandalous behaviour of some Spartan generals in the East see also E. Delebecque (Review of H.D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides*) *REA* 71 (1969) 475; S. Van de Maele, "Le livre VIII de Thucydide et la politique de Sparte en Asie Mineure," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 42 ff.; "On a beau objecter que les généraux spartiates en Ionie ont été les victimes des intrigues conjuguées de Tissapherne et d'Alcibiade ... L'attitude des généraux montre toutefois qu'ils n'ont pas été victimes, mais complices ..."; cf. Lewis, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 96 f.

<sup>10</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1, 1, 23–25; On the support given by Pharnabazus, see also *ibid.* 4, 1, 32; Plut. *Lys.* 20, 3; *Ages.* 12, 2.

generals by Tissaphernes — the outstanding example emphasised by Thucydides being that of Astyochus.

Lysander's arrival in the East in the year 407 B.C. in his capacity as admiral was followed by a certain increase in Persian aid. Not long before, a Spartan embassy which had visited Darius II is reported to have obtained from him all its requests, but no details are known on this issue.<sup>11</sup> Soon after taking command of the fleet, Lysander met with Cyrus at Sardis and learnt that the Persian prince had in his possession five hundred talents which his father had earmarked for aid to Sparta. Moreover, as it is related, Cyrus told Lysander that if this sum was insufficient he would donate a further sum from his private purse. He also emphasised his readiness to make every effort to aid Sparta. However, when it came to discussing immediate requirements for payment of the soldiers' wages, pressure was required to persuade Cyrus to agree to increase the subsidies. At first he turned down the proposal that the sailors' pay be raised, explaining that according to the original agreement his father was to give 30 minae (= 3,000 drachmae) per month to each ship (i.e., three obols per day per man), whatever the number of ships the Spartans wished to maintain. It was only after much persuasion that he agreed to an increase of one obol per day, so as to bring their daily wage to four obols instead of half a drachma. Consequently, Sparta received a further sum of 10,000 darics.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1, 4, 2–3.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 5, 1–7; Diod. 13, 70, 3; Plut. *Lys.* 4, 3–4; *Alcib.* 35, 4; Iust. 5, 5, 1. cf. G. Cousin, *Kyros le Jeune en Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1905) 40 f. Cousin seems to have overestimated Lysander's success at this stage in obtaining whatever financial support he wanted from Cyrus. See also D. Lotze, *Lysander und der Peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin, 1964) 16 f. and Lewis (*op. cit.* (n. 5) 123 ff.), who stresses that the King himself had personally intervened at this stage regarding a clear-cut policy of support for Sparta, despite his satraps' policy — especially that of Tissaphernes — which was aimed at wearing down both sides, Sparta and Athens. Lewis believes also that the treaties of 412–1 B.C. had recently been replaced by a new treaty (407 B.C.) which is not mentioned explicitly in the sources. He argues that a clause of the allegedly new treaty is to be found in Xen. *Hell.* 1, 5, 5, in Cyrus' above-mentioned statement about the arrangement agreed upon concerning the pay on an unlimited number of ships. (Lewis seeks circumstantial evidence of this treaty in Xenophon's report about the Spartan embassy to the King — see above n. 11). However, the arrangement mentioned by Xen. *loc. cit.* reminds us very much of Thuc. 8, 29, 2 (cf. 8, 58, 5, and see above n. 6), though it may suggest a more generous interpretation of what had already been agreed concerning the number of ships. Nevertheless, the difficulties

After this first meeting with Cyrus, Lysander went to Ephesus and succeeded in collecting money from influential persons from various Greek cities who had met together there, by promising them the foundation of oligarchic governments under their control after the final victory.<sup>13</sup>

In the year 406 B.C., the financial situation of the Spartan forces took a turn for the worse as a result, paradoxically, of the personal ambition of a Spartan — Lysander. Callicratidas, an exceptionally honest officer, was appointed admiral and came to the East to take over from Lysander, who had completed his term of office. The latter had returned to Cyrus the balance of the money received from him — an act which, in view of Sparta's difficulties while then at war, amounted almost to treachery. It would seem that Cyrus, at Lysander's instigation, was at first unwilling to help the new commander.<sup>14</sup> Callicratidas was therefore obliged to send messengers to Sparta to ask for money. At the same time, he appealed to the citizens of Miletus and succeeded in persuading them to give him financial support. Some of them yielded out of fear, knowing that they were suspected of opposing the new admiral and of intriguing with Lysander against him; they were afraid that Callicratidas might report to Sparta, and consequently they offered private contributions in addition to the sum granted by the city. The money received from Miletus was supplemented by a further amount obtained from Chios, which enabled Callicratidas to pay each sailor five drachmas.<sup>15</sup> Some time later Persian aid was renewed, but though it is known that Cyrus sent money, there is no evidence as to the amount.<sup>16</sup> From the fact that soon after receipt of this money from Cyrus the soldiers were

which had been raised by the Persians were mainly connected with the amount of pay for the crew (not with the number of ships), and on this issue the situation does not, even at this stage, appear to have significantly improved.

<sup>13</sup> Diod. 13, 70, 4; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 5, 3–4.

<sup>14</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 3; 10; Plut. *Lys.* 6, 1; 5; cf. *Mor.* 222 C–D. cf. Cousin, *op. cit.* (n. 12) 44 ff.; Lotze, *op. cit.* (n. 12) 24 ff.; W.K. Prentice, "The Character of Lysander", *AJA* 38 (1934) 37 f., argues that this episode is the only one in which Lysander is presented in an unfavourable light by Xenophon. (But see E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris, 1957) 66 f.) Prentice's attempt at a moral rehabilitation of Lysander is highly apologetic and hardly convincing.

<sup>15</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 12.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* 18; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 222 E.

seeking other sources of income in Chios, it may be assumed that the sum sent by Cyrus was a rather modest one.

After Callicratidas was killed in the Battle of Arginusae, the Lacedaemonian forces and those of their allies remained in Chios under the command of Eteonicus. Until the end of the summer of 406 B.C., they lived there on the produce of the land and on wages earned from whatever work they could secure in the area. When winter came, and with it the lack of a livelihood, the soldiers planned to plunder the inhabitants of Chios. Their plan was foiled by a successful ruse played by Eteonicus. However, realising the danger they were in, the people of Chios responded readily to Eteonicus' request for money to pay the soldiers' wages regularly.<sup>17</sup>

Towards the end of 406 B.C., Sparta's eastern allies met at Ephesus and decided to request the Spartan government to renew Lysander's appointment to the command of the fleet. To give greater weight to their request, Cyrus made himself a party to it. However, since Spartan law did not allow the same person to hold this office for a second term, Aracus was officially appointed admiral and Lysander vice-admiral (*epistoleus*) for the year 405 B.C. Thus Lysander was in effect charged once again with the conduct of war, while Aracus played the puppet.<sup>18</sup>

At his first meeting with Cyrus in that year, Lysander was given to understand that there were certain obstacles in connection with financial aid. Cyrus is reported to have made it clear to Lysander that all the resources the King had provided for aid to Sparta had already been exhausted. He nevertheless gave Lysander a certain sum of money to enable him to pay the soldiers' wages.<sup>19</sup> It seemed, therefore, at the beginning of 405 B.C., that in spite of Lysander's return to the command at Cyrus' own request, the amount of aid was not going to exceed what had been given in the past. However, soon after this meeting between Cyrus and Lysander there came a decisive change.

<sup>17</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2, 1, 1-5.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 6-7; Plut *Lys.* 7, 1-2; see also Cousin, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 45; Lotze, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 26, n. 7. On the growing importance of the *nauarchia* in Sparta in the last stages of the Peloponnesian War, see L. Pareti, *Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani* (Torino, 1908) 71 ff. (= *Studi Minori di Storia Antica*, II, Roma, 1961); P. Oliva, *Sparta and Her Social Problems* (Prague, 1971) 179 f. with further literature.

<sup>19</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2, 1, 11-12.



The heyday of Persian aid, when money began to pour into Spartan coffers as never before, started when Cyrus was called to his father's sickbed. It was then that he probably began to plot to gain the throne, and, it would seem, believed that Sparta could be of assistance to him in his struggle with his brother. This would explain his sudden generosity in assigning to Lysander the collection of tribute from the cities which were under his command, and also in giving him the balance he had in hand.<sup>20</sup>

After a long period of frugal living and anxious foraging for financial means to carry on the war — with Persian money near at hand yet often hardly accessible — now, all of a sudden, came a period of plenty. The transition to abundance was rapid and drastic, and the avidity of the Spartans (about which much has been written in relation to the late classical period) was at least in part one of its consequences. Even when Sparta's financial resources were at their lowest ebb, certain senior officers had nevertheless found ways of enriching themselves. Now, in the last year of the war, it had become very much easier to do so.

We must take care, however, not to oversimplify. Greed for money and cases of bribery among the Spartans are already mentioned by Herodotus.<sup>21</sup> It is not a new phenomenon, and to a considerable extent may very likely be a consequence of the rigid norms and numerous prohibitions of the so-called "Lycurgan" code. Even so, these tendencies could only find an outlet if given the opportunity, and the latter was now rampant. Another necessary condition was a change in the economic and social system, and this too was about to occur.

In the last year of the war, a new source of wealth was added to that accruing from Persian aid, and this was booty from the conquered cities, which was considerably larger now than in former years. Cedreiae was conquered and its inhabitants reduced to slavery. Lysander, in a joint campaign with Thorax, conquered Lampsacus, and much booty fell into Spartan hands, for the city was an especially wealthy one and a rich source of plunder. Iasus was also conquered and a large part of its

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* 13–15; Diod. 13, 104, 3–4; Plut. *Lys.* 9, 2; cf. Paus. 9, 32, 7.

<sup>21</sup> E.g., 6, 72; 8, 5, 1. For attempts at, and charges of, bribery, see 3, 148; 5, 51, 2; 6, 50, 2; 82, 1.



population killed or sold as slaves.<sup>22</sup> The sale of slaves brought a considerable income to the Spartan treasury.

It is worth noting in this connection the difference between Callicratidas' policy and that of Lysander in respect to their treatment of the conquered cities. Callicratidas, even in time of need, did not sell their inhabitants into slavery (although he did allow his soldiers to pillage), whereas Lysander did not hesitate to sell large numbers as slaves — though his financial situation left nothing to be desired — and even to massacre them.<sup>23</sup>

## 2. *The Basic Capital at the End of the War*

There are many sources, both contemporary and later, which refer to the influx of money into Sparta at the end of the war and the impressive amount of wealth amassed by the Spartans,<sup>24</sup> but most of them do so only in general terms, especially with reference to its corrupting influence or to its role in the process of concentration of land in a few hands, and the disintegration of the traditional, so-called "Lycurgan order". Very few of these sources provide information that can assist us in estimating the actual sums received.

Soon after the decisive victory at Aegospotami, Lysander is said to have sent money and property to Sparta with the general Gylippus.

<sup>22</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2, 1, 15; 18–19; Diod. 13, 104, 7–8; Plut. *Lys.* 9, 4. See also Lotze, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 30, 31, n. 6.

<sup>23</sup> See on Callicratidas' behaviour Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 14; Diod. 13, 76, 2; Plut. *Mor.* 222 B–C.

<sup>24</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2, 3, 8–9; cf. *Lac. Resp.* 14; Isocr. *Pac.* 95 sq.; 102 sq. cf. *Areop.* 7; Plat. *Alcib.* I, 122 E. sq.; *Hipp. Mai.* 283 B sq.; *Resp.* 548 A–B; 549 B; 550 D sq. (with J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato* II (Cambridge, 1902), 211 ff.); Ephor. (70 F 205) et Theop. (115 F 332) ap. Plut. *Lys.* 17, 1–2; Polyb. 6, 49, 7–10; Posid. (87 F 48) ap. Athen. 6, 233 F — 234 A; Diod. 7, 12, 5 (=H.W. Parke/D.E. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1956), II, No. 222 with further evidence), *id.* 7, 12, 8 (cf. 15, 1, 3 — based most probably on Ephorus — cf. Jacoby, *F Gr Hist* II C 86 and see below, n. 26); *id.* 13, 106, 8; Plut. *Lyc.* 30, 1; *Lys.* 2, 4; 16–17; *Comp. Lys.* — *Sul.* 3, 4; *Nicias*, 28, 3; *Agis*, 5 (based most probably on Phylarchus — see above, n. 2); *Inst. Lac.* 42 (= *Mor.* 239 E–F); Paus. 9, 32, 10; *Iust.* 5, 7, 2; *Ael. Var. Hist.* 14, 29. It is worth noting that Sparta is not mentioned explicitly in the above-quoted passages from Plato's *Republic*. However, these passages belong to the discussion on timocracy, for which Sparta is known to have served as the prototype. See *Resp.* 544 C; 545 A; cf. *Arist. Pol.* 1316 a 17–22.

There are two sources of information concerning the sum involved: according to Diodorus, Lysander sent 1,500; according to Plutarch he sent 1,000 talents.<sup>25</sup> Diodorus' source of information was most probably Ephorus.<sup>26</sup> Probably, too, he was also Plutarch's source of information, and the difference may be due to an error or lack of precision (on the part of either Diodorus or of Plutarch). It is also possible, however, that the latter's information was from a different source — Theopompus, perhaps.<sup>27</sup>

Xenophon relates that after conquering Samos and setting up a decarchy there, Lysander discharged the allied naval contingents and returned to Sparta with booty. This included the prows of the captured ships, the triremes from Piraeus (except for twelve), the crowns received from the cities as personal gifts and 470 talents — reported to be the monies remaining from the tribute which Cyrus authorised him to collect for the prosecution of the war. All this he brought back to Sparta himself at the end of the summer of 404 B.C.<sup>28</sup>

Xenophon's statement may convey the impression that all the money that came into Sparta at the end of the war was brought in by Lysander, and that the total sum was 470 talents. It is on the basis of this evidence that H.W. Parke, in his comprehensive article on the Spartan empire, states that the total amount of money received in Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War was 470 talents only, and his view is accepted, too, by other scholars.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Diod. 13, 106, 8–10; Plut. *Nicias*, 28, 3. The amount sent by Lysander with Gylippus is mentioned only in these places. On Gylippus and the embezzlement affair in which he was involved, see also Posid. *loc. cit.*; Plut. *Lys.* 16, 17; cf. *Pericl.* 22, 3.

<sup>26</sup> With respect to Diodorus' close dependence upon Ephorus for the books XI–XV of his history, see, e.g., E. Schwartz, *RE* s.v. "Diodorus", col. 679; Jacoby, *F Gr Hist* II C, 33; E. Cavaignac, "Réflexions sur Éphore", *Mélanges G. Glotz* I (Paris, 1932) 143 ff.; G.L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935) vii. ff.; 31 ff.; 125 ff.; 156.

<sup>27</sup> In his biography of Nicias (*loc. cit.* n. 25), when specifying the sum of money brought by Gylippus, Plutarch does not mention his source. However, in his *Vita Lysandri* (17, 1–2), after relating the embezzlement affair in which Gylippus was involved, he quotes Ephorus and Theopompus in connection with the name of the ephor involved in the controversy caused in Sparta by the introduction of the foreign capital and its corruptive effects. See also above n. 24 and J. Smits, *Plutarchus' Leven van Lysander* (Amsterdam, 1939) 165.

<sup>28</sup> *Hell.* 2, 3, 7–9.

<sup>29</sup> "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire", *JHS* 50 (1930) 56; cf. A.H.M. Jones, *Sparta* (Oxford, 1967) 96; Lewis, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 122, n. 98.

This estimate is, I believe, erroneous, and the error is due to the fact that Parke relies solely on Xenophon, who fails to mention the Gylippus episode, his mission and the embezzlement affair in which he was involved. This omission, which is not the only one in Xenophon's account of events belonging to this period as compared with that of Ephorus and Theopompus, cannot discredit the authenticity of the Gylippus episode. Nor does acceptance of this episode in any way conflict with Xenophon's statement that Lysander brought money with him to Sparta. He must have needed money even after the victory at Aegospotami, and would not therefore have sent all the funds in his possession with Gylippus. In other words, it appears that at the end of the summer of 404 B.C., Lysander brought back with him both money and property *in addition* to what he had sent with Gylippus. That Lysander brought foreign capital to Sparta we know also from sources other than Xenophon,<sup>30</sup> but the latter is the only one to specify the sum involved, and I see no reason to question the estimate given by him.

We may conclude, therefore, that two main sums of money and property were brought into Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War:

- the sum of 1,000–1,500 talents brought by Gylippus, and
- the sum of 470 talents brought by Lysander himself.

It follows that the basic capital accumulated in Sparta at the end of the war was not, as Parke and others believed, 470 talents only, but three or four times that amount — in all, some *1,500–2,000 talents*. In addition, there was also much booty and many valuable gifts.

The sums of money that came into Sparta after the victory prove that Andocides' and Isocrates' estimate of the financial aid supplied by Persia for the war — 5,000 talents or more<sup>31</sup> is not greatly exaggerated. The size of the accumulated fund also lends support to the statement made above concerning the dramatic increase in the flow of Persian money in the year 405 B.C. Taking into account that during the last year of the war there was also a considerable increase in Sparta's war budget, it

<sup>30</sup> See above, n. 24 — *loc. cit.* from Posidonius, Plutarch, Iustinus and Aelianus.

<sup>31</sup> Andoc. 3, 29; Isocr. *Pac.* 97. Lewis (*op. cit.* (n. 5), 131, n. 138) believes that this estimate is not to be taken at all seriously. However, this view is probably connected with his erroneous estimate of the capital accumulated by Sparta at the end of the war, which he supposes to be only 470 talents. See above, n. 29.

would appear that at the time she received from Persia as much, if not more, than she received in the seven previous years, that is, since the treaties of 412/411 B.C.

It is worth stressing that Sparta did not, after the war, return even a part of the sums she had received, as she had undertaken to do. Nor did she give a share of the booty to any of her allies, not even the most powerful among them, such as Thebes and Corinth, in spite of their repeated requests.<sup>32</sup> Thus, all the money and property that was brought into Sparta remained there; in addition, after the war she received a regular income from tribute collected from the newly acquired empire.

### 3. *Income from Tribute*

Information on the details of Sparta's tribute policy is very meagre, but it is known for certain that tribute was a fundamental feature of the new empire.

Isocrates criticises Sparta for collecting tribute from "the islanders" despite their straitened circumstances resulting from the difficulty of cultivating their hilly country.<sup>33</sup> In another speech Isocrates compares the Spartan and Athenian imperial policies. He claims that the states paying tribute to Athens did so of their own free will, and that they maintained their freedom and their own political systems, whereas the subject states of Sparta were not only compelled to pay tribute, but also to adopt oligarchies and decarchies.<sup>34</sup>

I shall not discuss the historical truth, or otherwise, of Isocrates' comparatory remarks, but it is relevant to our subject that he considered tribute together with the system of narrow oligarchies an integral part of Sparta's imperial policy. The same is true of Diodorus (Ephorus), who

<sup>32</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 5; Plut. *Lys.* 27, 2; Iust. 5, 10, 12. Xenophon and Plutarch mention the request of the Thebans. Plutarch relates (*loc. cit.*) that Lysander was angry with the Thebans because they were the only ally to claim a tenth part of the spoils of the war, while the rest of the allies had no claims to their share. However, according to Iustinus (*loc. cit.*) the situation was different: the Corinthians had also claimed their share and were equally rejected. This account is clearly compatible with later developments in the relations between Sparta and Corinth.

<sup>33</sup> *Panegy.* 132.

<sup>34</sup> *Panath.* 67, 68; On the Spartan Empire and tribute, see also [Herodes], *περὶ πολ.* 24 (Drerup).

viewed the imposition of tribute along with the appointment of ἄρμοσται and the establishment of oligarchic governments as the basic features of the new Spartan empire.<sup>35</sup>

Aristotle provides valuable information about the imposition of tribute and the method of assessment in the first years after the war. He states that the settlers at Eleusis, like all the other Athenians, were to contribute to the fund for the common defence: “συντελεῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων εἰς τὸ συμμαχικόν.”<sup>36</sup> We gather from Aristotle’s statement that the tribute was levied on τὰ προσιόντα [χρήματα], that is, the public revenues of the cities, their treasuries, and that Sparta did not resort to indirect taxation on imports and exports.<sup>37</sup>

Polybius provides further information concerning this feature of the Spartan empire. He states that so long as Spartan domination was confined to the Peloponnese, her own resources were sufficient for her needs; but when she began to undertake naval expeditions and to make military campaigns beyond the Peloponnese in order to enlarge the area of her hegemony, then those resources and her Lycurgan economy no longer sufficed for her enterprises. Thus Sparta was obliged to secure additional resources from overseas. She accordingly turned to Persia for financial aid, imposed tribute on the islands and exacted contributions from all the Greeks:

“ὄθεν ἠναγκάσθησαν ἐπὶ θύρας μὲν πορεύεσθαι τὰς Περσῶν. φόρους δὲ τοῖς νησιώταις ἐπιτάττειν, ἀργυρολογεῖν δὲ πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας.”<sup>38</sup>

ἀργυρολογία appears frequently to differ from the imposition of φόροι — it is often not a regular collection of tribute, but a one-time, *ad*

<sup>35</sup> Diod. 14, 10, 1–2; on harmosts, oligarchies and decarchies, cf. *id.* 14, 13, 1; Plut. *Lys.* 13, 3–5. On the organization of the new empire see Parke, *op. cit.* (n. 29), 50 ff., which is the most basic and detailed treatment of the subject.

<sup>36</sup> *Ath. Resp.* 39, 2.

<sup>37</sup> Parke, *op. cit.* (n. 29) 56 f., who also points out that Aristotle’s statement may indicate a temporary change of the name from φόρος to συντέλεια.

<sup>38</sup> Polyb. 6, 49, 7–10; cf. F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius I* (Oxford, 1957) 735.

*hoc*, levy for a particular purpose, usually to finance a war.<sup>39</sup> It is likely, therefore, that Polybius intended in this sentence to specify two methods of collecting tribute as employed by Sparta.

The first was a regular, annual levy — of φόροι — from all regions of the former Athenian empire, with the exception of Asia Minor. These regular tribute payers are referred to by Isocrates and Polybius as “the Islanders”. The only estimate of Sparta’s income from this regular tribute is that given by Diodorus (Ephorus) — *more than 1,000 talents per year*.<sup>40</sup> By calculating the annual expenses incurred by the empire — payment of wages to mercenary soldiers, maintenance of the fleet, in some instances the cost of supporting garrisons in the cities placed under the direct control of harmosts, etc. — Parke has convincingly demonstrated that this figure is a plausible one, or at least not grossly exaggerated.<sup>41</sup> The significance of this estimate is that the total amount of tribute collected by Sparta was about the same as that gathered by Athens in her heyday.<sup>42</sup>

The second method of levying money — ἀργυρολογία — was applied, apparently, mainly to the members of the old Peloponnesian League, Sparta’s original allies. These states did not have to pay regular tribute, but were under an obligation to supply aid in time of need. This system was not a new one: Sparta had demanded financial aid from her allies during the Peloponnesian war, too;<sup>43</sup> and those of her allies who had not

<sup>39</sup> See the use of this term by Polyb. 3, 13, 7; 4, 16, 8; cf. A. Mauersberger, *Polybios — Lexicon* I (Berlin, 1956) 219. See also this use of the word by, e.g., Thuc. 8, 3, 1; Xen. *Hell.* 1, 1, 8; 1, 1, 12; 4, 8, 30; Aesch. 3, 159; Plut. *Alcib.* 35, 4. (But sometimes it is also used in a different sense, as, for instance, in the case of the Athenian νῆες ἀργυρολόγου; See Ar. *Eq.* 1071; Thuc. 2, 69, 1; 3, 19, 1; 4, 50, 1; cf. A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* II (Oxford, 1956) 202 f.)

<sup>40</sup> Diod. 14, 10, 2.

<sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 29), 56 and n. 35.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> See, e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 12; Ditt. *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> I, No. 84. (The inscription contains a tribute list, 428–421 B.C.) See also Pareti, *op. cit.* (n. 18), 90 and n. 11; A.M. Andreades, *A History of Greek Public Finance* (Cambridge, 1933) 62 ff. For a later system (first mentioned for the year 383/82 B.C.) of levying money from the allies, see Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 21–22; 6, 2, 16. According to this system, the allies were allowed to substitute monetary payment in place of military service — three Aeginetan obols daily per hoplite, and twelve obols per horseman. This money was to enable Sparta to hire mercenaries. Those of the allies who failed to send their due contingents to the army were to be fined one stater (=two drachmas) per day per man.

paid their full share of expenses in the course of that war were required to make up the balance after the victory.<sup>44</sup> This was therefore an additional source of income.

Although this second method of levying money was not a new one, the former method of regular, annual, tribute was, and its adoption became one of the basic features of the new empire.

Sparta's basic capital of 1,500–2,000 talents, with the addition of further sums from tribute (about 1,000 talents from regular tribute alone) as well as other sources (sale of war booty, slaves, valuable gifts, etc.) — all these represented a vast amount of monetary wealth for the Spartan treasury. Andreades remarks that the concentration of gold in Sparta at the end of the fifth century B.C. was so great that it influenced the circulation of currency in various parts of the ancient world.<sup>45</sup> But this result, however important, was relatively shortlived in its effects, whereas the sudden wealth and newly-acquired empire were to have a far-reaching influence on the socio-economic structure of Sparta.

A few Spartan families, especially of those fulfilling various functions abroad, succeeded in accumulating a considerable amount of money. Due to the agrarian character of the Spartan economy, the purchase of land was the main means of investing capital. Many old rules of the so-called "Lycurgan order", especially those concerning the inalienability and indivisibility of the ancestral *kleroi* within the "civic land", had now become an obstacle to the newly-rich, and they sought to bypass it by introducing changes in the laws of inheritance.

A law enacted at the beginning of the fourth century B.C., permitting a citizen to transfer his allotment by will or by way of gift to any person of his choice, gave legal endorsement to a practice which had probably begun in one way or another at a somewhat earlier date. This law was intended to protect the interests of money-lenders who, with the increased supply of currency, had become a regular feature of Sparta's economic life. Under the new conditions, as repayment of debts due, creditors could not only lay hands on the produce of their debtors' land,

<sup>44</sup> Such a request is explicitly mentioned only in the case of Elis (Diod. 14, 17, 5), but it is likely that other allies were also not spared.

<sup>45</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 43), 48.



but also on the land itself. Thus, the old rule concerning the inalienability of the *kleros* was in effect nullified: the *kleros* had become a commodity which could be seized by creditors or even bought and sold by means of a fictitious gift or bequest. The process of land concentration in the hands of a few was thereby facilitated, and brought in its wake disastrous results. An increasing number of impoverished Spartans who were losing their allotments in part or in their entirety, became unable to fulfill the material duties required of a Spartan citizen and were consequently deprived of their political rights; they ceased to be considered as members of the citizen-body, and together with their families sank from the ranks of the "peers" (*homoioi*) to those of the "inferiors" (*hypomeiones*). The revolutionary aspirations of the latter were a grave threat to the Spartan ruling class.<sup>46</sup>

The collapse of the traditional economic structure as a result of the influx of capital has created an extremely unbalanced society suffering from acute polarity, inner tensions and a perpetual decrease in the citizen-body. Under these conditions, political decline was imminent and inevitable.

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<sup>46</sup> See above, n. 24, particularly Plut. *Agis*, 5, and add esp. Xen. *Hell.* 3, 3, 4-11; Arist. *Pol.* 1270a 15 sqq.; 1306 b 34-36; See also D. Asheri, "Sulla legge di Epitadeo", *Athen.* 39 (1961) 45 ff.; A. Fuks, "The Spartan Citizen-Body in Mid-Third Century B.C. and its Enlargement Proposed by Agis IV", *Athen.* 40 (1962) 249 ff.; Oliva, *op. cit.* (n. 18) 188 ff.; J. Christien, "La loi d'Epitadeus; un aspect de l'histoire économique et sociale de Sparte", *Rev. Hist. Dr. Fr. Étr.* 52 (1974), 197 ff.; E. David, "The Conspiracy of Cinadon", *Athen.* 57 (1979), 239ff., with further evidence.