

Bohdan Wiśniewski, *Philon von Larissa, Testimonia und Kommentar*, Societas Scientiarum Lodziensis, Wrocław 1982, 46pp., zł. 35.-

This new edition is on the same pattern as Wiśniewski's *Karneades* of 1970, and, unfortunately, on the same level of incompetence — except, perhaps, that the misprints in the texts of the testimonia are fewer. But we still have such gems as εἶπειν, ἀῤρησιν, Νουμένιος, νόρπι, on p. 9; εὔραντο on p. 10, and *fieri on potest* on p. 20, to give but a few. The 'fragments' (they are properly called testimonia on the title-page and improperly called fragments in the rest of the book) are divided into "Leben und Wirken," "Erkenntnistheorie," "Rhetorik," "Sittenlehre" (so far, passages ascribed to Philo by name), and "*Incerta*." The texts, with apparatus, are reproduced mostly from the latest critical editions — but no explanation of sigla is anywhere supplied. Why cite *De Natura Deorum* passages from Pease's edition, with its obsessive apparatus full of dead wood, when there is Plasberg-Ax with a more sensible apparatus; and why cite all the variant readings from a 'maximal' apparatus like Knoll's CSEL text of Augustine's *Contra Academicos*? I suppose, because W. has done here — as in *Karneades* — mostly a 'scissors-and-paste' job. He does offer two emendations of his own on p. 8 and one on p. 19. All three are 'parasitic' emendation, growing out of what former editors had suggested, and none is necessary or convincing. Within each section, I can find no rhyme or reason for the order of the 'fragments.' The two fragments of Numenius (10–11, pp. 9–10) are reproduced from Mras' Eusebius, as if Leemans and Des Places had never existed. 'Fr.' 11 carries on, for a whole long page after we have heard the last of Numenius' testimony, with Eusebius' own 'final reckoning' with a pagan physical philosophy — an interesting piece of Christian writing in itself, but it has nothing to do with Numenius, let alone Philo. 'Fr.' 23 begins with Cic. *Luc.* 68, which merely expounds some of the traditional arguments of the school of Carneades, as if it had anything to do with the more specific reference to Philo at 69. Of all the '*Incerta*' (which are then quietly treated on pp. 30–32 and elsewhere in the 'Commentary' as if they were Philo's *tout court*), none could be ascribed with any probability to Philo, and certainly not to works representing any innovation of Philo's. Most of them come from Lucullus' speech in Cicero's *Lucullus*, where the speaker has warned us at the beginning (12): *sed ea quae contra Philonem erat praetermittenda est... ad Arcesilan Carneademque veniamus*. On part of *Luc.* 34 (here 'Fr.' 30), I argued in *Antiochus* 77–8 that it may represent a view of Metrodorus of Stratonicea and his pupils — but this is still not Philo. It would have been far more to the point to include *Acad.* I.44–46, where Cicero does represent *partes Philonis*, as an *incertum* (?), and Eusebius *PE* 14.4.16 could have been added — coming from the same late doxographic source — to 'Fr.' 7 (Sextus *PH* I, 220 — not 120 without book number as printed). The apparatus is usually reproduced as it is from the edition used. But in the one passage from Cicero's *Acad.* I ('Fr.' 19), Plasberg's Greek sigla are

omitted in the apparatus, and the uninitiate may wonder where the readings have come from. In 'Fr.' I, from *Acad. Index Herc.*, the apparatus has been reduced and made more readable, but a note of W. to the effect that he had omitted lines 21–33 appears after line 11.

The two-page Introduction (pp. 5–6) makes some general statements about Philo and his predecessors, many of them wrong. The 'Commentary' (pp. 23–42) is no commentary on the 'fragments,' taking them one by one and explaining their various aspects, as one has been accustomed to in a few centuries of scholarship. It consists of four essays, with the same titles as the four first sections of the collection of testimonia, in which W. discusses, mostly in general terms, Philo's life, theory of knowledge, and the rest, going into details (but never philological ones) when it suits him. There is an *index fontium* (p. 43), a short bibliography (p. 44) and a Polish summary (p. 45). There is no index of names or concepts. Both Introduction and 'Commentary' show a thoroughly twisted reading of many of the sources, as well as a profound ignorance of most of the literature on Philo of the last hundred years or so (including some works cited in the bibliography). This is not a very pleasant statement to make, and I shall have to substantiate it. It can be substantiated almost on every page; but since it would be futile to correct all, or most of, the errors in a thoroughly inadequate edition, I shall only give examples.

On p. 5 Clitomachus is presented as Carneades' successor — as if Carneades, son of Polemarchus, and Crates of Tarsus had never existed. On the same page, Cicero's *Lucullus* (properly cited by this name elsewhere) is cited as '*Acad. 2.*' On the following page, we are told of Metrodorus: "Er soll die Lehre des Karneades im Sinne des Kleitomachos interpretiert haben." This despite Cic., *Luc. 78* and *Acad. Ind. Herc. 26.4ff.* On p. 25, we are told that Heraclitus of Tyre, P. and C. Selsius and Tertilius Rogus (Cic. *Luc. 11*) were "dort" — that is, in Athens of the last sentence. Cicero puts them in Alexandria. On p. 31, we are given a new interpretation of *impressum* in Cicero's epistemological vocabulary. A glance at *SVF I, 59* and *II, 53* would be enough to show that this is Cicero's translation of the word *ἐναπομεμαγμένη* in Zeno's definition of *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*. We are told on the same page that the idea that there are some distinctions in clarity and stability between various sense-perceptions, "die uns erlauben, das, was der Wahrheit am nächsten kommt, zu erkennen," is "eine Milderung des skeptischen Standpunktes gegenüber Karneades." But "das, was der Wahrheit am nächsten kommt" is Cicero's *veri simile*, one of his two renderings (the other, more successful, being *probabile*) of the *πιθανόν* of Carneades himself (*Luc. 32; 99* — where the source is the faithful Clitomachus; *Acad. II, pp. 21, 17–22, 9 Plasberg*, where Augustine follows his Ciceronian source very closely, and it speaks of *Academici*). On p. 30, W. has forgotten that the words *simili in errore versantur* in *Luc. 34* are those of Lucullus (= Antiochus), and therefore do not represent Philo. On p. 34, he has forgotten that the description of the Platonic *ἰδέα* in *Acad. I, 30* is part of the speech of

Varro(=Antiochus), and is followed in the same speech (33; 40–42) by an *acceptance* of Aristotle's refutation of the Platonic Forms, and of Zeno's new criterion as *correctio veteris Academiae*. It can therefore be no evidence for assuming that either Philo or Antiochus returned to Plato's theory. Quoting (p. 36) one of the pieces assembled by von Arnim in *SVF* I, 65, which says clearly that the Stoics did not believe that the Ideas had existence (and this is confirmed by the other parts of this 'fragment,' not cited by W.), he concludes "dass es nach Zenon eine Welt der Ideen gab, ein Sein..." One could add more.

I am far from being a devotee of the present-day mania for complete bibliographies and for drawing on all the available secondary literature, and I have said this more than once in print. The amount of secondary literature published since the Second World War has become unmanageable even for the most industrious scholar. Much of this secondary literature — because it is written in a hurry by academics in need of tenure, and because they are expected to be 'with it' — tends to stew in one or other of our ephemeral modern juices, and bears little or no relation to the ancient sources it professes to illuminate. But there are cases, especially where we have to reconstruct some part of the past from fragmentary evidence, where the modern literature is indispensable. This is one of those cases. We have to do here with a minor philosopher, about whom we have very little evidence, much of it controversial. He belonged to a disintegrating school, full of rival factions, constantly on the defensive against more vigorous enemies, and in order to unravel his position, one has to disentangle much of the evidence concerning his contemporaries and predecessors, both in the Academy and the Stoa. Many scholars — not a few of them very distinguished — have tried their hand in the last 130 years or so. W.'s treatment of the main problem — Philo's "Erkenntnistheorie" (pp. 24–37) — shows no evidence of proper familiarity with anything beyond Karl Friedrich Hermann's two dissertations of 1851 and 1855, Zeller's *PdG* II, 1 of 1881, slightly revised by Wellmann in 1909, and Kurt von Fritz' short *RE* article. Had he read his Brochard properly (and he is only quoted on a minor point on p. 31), he might have realized that another solution (which I greatly prefer) has been available for almost a hundred years. Had he read properly his Hirzel and Goedeckemeyer (both in his bibliography), he would have found another attempt at reconstruction, still closer to the sources than that of Hermann and Zeller. Had he read *Antiochus* (also in the bibliography), pp. 64–88, he would have found there a detailed discussion of all the relevant sources and most of the important solutions offered so far. Instead, he serves us up with a theory which is a combination of Hermann's 'back to Plato' view, a brilliant non-starter right from the start, and the more recent speculation about 'die ungeschriebene Lehre Platons' — accepting, into the bargain, also the ancient myth of 'secret doctrines' taught in the sceptical Academy, on which see *Antiochus* pp. 269–306. In the essay on "Sittenlehre" (pp. 39–42), he could have benefited greatly from Giusta's discussion (*I dossografi di etica*

I, 214–17), available since 1964, which argues convincingly that this division of ethics ascribed by Stobaeus to Philo (and, of course, found by him in a lost book of Philo) is essentially an older Stoic division, to which Philo added no contribution of his own. *Antiochus* p. 100, note 11, would have given him at least a most probable date for Philo's death, based on new epigraphic evidence. He dithers on this issue on pp. 24–26. Again, these are only a few examples.

If I have gone into some detail, this is because — unfortunately — Wiśniewski's is the only edition available, as a separate book, of the testimonia on Philo, and I have already seen some scholars mention it in print with no word of warning. It may be no accident that his *Carneades* was issued by the Polish Academy, while this volume is issued by his own local 'Societas Scientiarum;' but the Academy did give it its supervision, and I am distressed to see a decent scholar like Marian Plezia as one of the two signatories to the *nihil obstat*. W.'s German is clear, fluent and readable, but I wish he did not keep calling the late Kurt von Fritz plain 'Fritz.'

Tel-Aviv University.

John Glucker

G. Alföldy *Die römische Gesellschaft. Ausgewählte Beiträge*. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1986, 516 pp.

Is the writing of Roman social history possible? G. Alföldy's answer is affirmative, witness his *Römische Sozialgeschichte* which appeared in three successive editions in German (1975, 1978 and 1984) and was then translated and published in English under the title *The Social History of Rome* (1985, to be cited hereafter *SHR*). Not Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, as in the famous work of M. Rostovtzeff, not *Verfassung-und Sozialgeschichte des römischen Kaiserreichs* (1978, J. Bleicken), not even *Roman Social Relations* (1974, R. MacMullen), but Roman social history pure and simple. According to A., the essence of social history is to be found in "the social structure of society...in those enduring features which determine its particular nature. These figure in the bases and criteria for the division of society in particular parts, in its very system of organization with particular strata, orders or classes, and, finally, in the interrelations between particular parts of society, embodied in social bonds, tensions and conflicts, and in mobility within the stratification as well as in a common political framework and system of reference" (*SHR* X). While Roman social history is conditioned by the political confines of the Roman state, it does not deal with local social structures but rather with the "general or at least super-regional features of