

## Klearchos in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

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Having brought the history of Kyros' expedition to the point where Tissaphernes seized the generals of the Greek mercenaries, Xenophon breaks the narrative of the *Anabasis* to draw the portrait of three of them, namely of Klearchos, Proxenos, and Meno.<sup>1</sup> The portraits deal, by and large, with the *strategoi's* character and ambitions. Thus the sketch of Klearchos the Spartan is dominated by three themes: his being *aner philopolemos, polemikos*, and *archikos* (2.6.1–15). Although Xenophon thinks well of Klearchos the warrior and his ability to turn his troops into an efficient war machine (2.6. 7–8, 11, 14), the scale is clearly tipped towards criticism when he describes him as almost obsessed with a love of war, enforcing discipline by fear and punishment, and gaining command because of his rank and his followers' difficult circumstances (2.6.2–6, 9–10, 12–15). The characterisation of Klearchos is brief, occupying about 63 lines in the Teubner edition of Xenophon's *Anabasis*.<sup>2</sup> Yet its impact on students of Xenophon who evaluated Klearchos' role in the expedition seems to have been out of proportion to its size. Two examples may illustrate the phenomenon: a) After their arrival at Tarsos the mercenaries refused to follow Kyros to the Euphrates. Klearchos persuaded them to change their minds by using manipulative tactics which would have made a veteran demagogue green with envy.<sup>3</sup> However, due to the impact of Klearchos' portrait in 2.6.1–5, it has been concluded that on this occasion Klear-

- 1 Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.6. Unless otherwise stated all references in this paper are to Xenophon's *Anabasis*. The remarks about Agias and Sokrates in 2.6.30 are too brief to constitute a character-sketch.
- 2 2.6.1–15 in C. Hude (ed.), *Xenophontis Expeditio Cyri* (Leipzig, 1972).
- 3 1.3. See H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford 1933) 30.

chos revealed his resourcefulness and skill as a *military* leader.<sup>4</sup> b) A scholar who praises Klearchos' leadership in the period between the battle of Kunaxa and his capture hastens to add: "It is significant, although we do not see it in the events of the Anabasis, that his claim <to leadership> ebbed and flowed with dangers or pressures from outside."<sup>5</sup> The inspiration for this remark clearly comes from the brief character-sketch (2.6.12). Xenophon, however, provides not a single example of fluctuation in the soldiers' loyalty toward Klearchos once the latter became a prominent leader in the camp.<sup>6</sup> The character-sketch, more than Xenophon's narrative, seems to be responsible for the judgement of Klearchos as a harsh disciplinarian, an autocratic and egoistic leader, a violent and power-seeking man, jealous, stupid and stubborn.<sup>7</sup> This paper will try to show that these and similar evaluations are unjustified in view of Xenophon's account of his actions in the *Anabasis*.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: a) To follow the career of Klearchos in the *Anabasis* in order to trace the growth, development, and nature of his leadership in Kyros' army; and b) To examine to what degree Klearchos' portrait at the end of the second book of the *Anabasis* corresponds to, complements, or contradicts the description of his conduct in the rest of the narrative.

In the course of the *Anabasis* Xenophon occasionally refers to the special relationship which existed between Kyros and Klearchos. He says that Klearchos was the only person among the Greek mercenaries who knew from the outset that Kyros aimed at usurping the Persian throne (3.1.10). He claims

- 4 R.J. Kelly, *Studies in the Speeches in the First Book of Xenophon's "Anabasis"*, (Diss. University of California, Berkeley 1977) (hereafter cited as Kelly) 34 (italics mine; see, however, p.166, n.200); cf. W.E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany 1977) 84.
- 5 G.B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand: A Study in Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Leiden 1967) (hereafter cited as Nussbaum) 116.
- 6 The desertion of Thracian cavalry and peltasts after Kunaxa (2.2.7) could not have been on Xenophon's mind when he wrote 2.6.12, for he refers there to soldiers who left Klearchos in times of peace. Cf. J.G. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen 1969) 56.
- 7 The cues for these evaluations seem to have been taken from 2.6.9–10,15. See A. Boucher, *L'Anabase de Xénophon* (Paris, Nancy, 1913) 101f; Lenschau, 'Klearchos' (no. 3), *RE* 11 (1921) 577; Nussbaum, pp. 35,60, 118ff; J.B. Bury and R. Meiggs, *A History of Greece*, 4th revised ed. (NY 1975) 239; J. Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien* (Berlin 1978) 'Klearchos' (no. 1), p. 103. T.S. Brown, 'Menon of Thessaly,' *Historia* 35 (1986) 395, thinks, however, that in contrast to the narrative Klearchos is idealised in 2.6.1–15.

that Kyros admired Klearchos and regarded him, with the rest of the Persians, as most distinguished among the Greeks (1.1.9, 6.5). Klearchos, however, did not command such stature right from the beginning of the march. Xenophon's narrative suggests that Klearchos rose to prominence in Kyros' army only gradually and not without effort.

While ultimate authority and power in Kyros' camp lay with Kyros himself, his Greek generals wielded some power and influence as well. The power of the *strategos* was probably derived in part from his personal aptitude as a leader, but mainly from his relationship with Kyros and the fact that he recruited the mercenaries under his command.<sup>8</sup> Judging from Kyros' preparations for his expedition, Klearchos was not his most promising mercenary commander. Klearchos indeed got from Kyros 10,000 darics to collect mercenaries (1.1.9; 2.6.4), but the Thessalian Aristippos received from the Persian prince 4000 mercenaries and their salary for six months (1.1.10). At a rate of a daric per month, Aristippos got 24,000 darics as opposed to Klearchos' 10,000. Fortunately for Klearchos, Aristippos decided to stay in Thessaly and apparently to retain part of his mercenaries. In his stead came Meno with 1000 hoplites and 500 peltasts.<sup>9</sup>

When Kyros commenced his march eastward he had in his employ several *strategoi*, each in command of a different number of mercenaries. *Prima facie*, Xenias, who had served Kyros prior to the expedition and was in charge of the largest contingent, of 4000 hoplites, was the natural candidate to assume a leading position in camp. But it has been shown that Xenias, unlike his colleagues, led troops whom he had probably not recruited. His troops seem to have been drafted independently by Kyros' local agents and were grouped into a single unit shortly before Kyros' *anabasis*.<sup>10</sup> The general who appears to

8 See J. Roy, 'The Mercenaries of Cyrus,' *Historia* 16 (1967) (hereafter cited as Roy) 292; Nussbaum, p.101; S. Perlman, 'The Ten Thousand. A Chapter in the Military, Social, and Economic History of the Fourth Century,' *RSA* 6-7 (1976-77) 250.

9 For Aristippos' conduct see Parke, note 3 above, p. 25, n. 5; H.D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century* (London 1935) 55; Brown, note 7 above, p. 404 (with bibliography). Meno: 1.2.6. Rate of Pay: Roy, p. 309. Best's, note 6 above, p. 52, n. 92, and Roy's, p. 299, different speculations about the origin of Klearchos' recruits are equally likely.

10 For the *strategoi* and their separate forces: Parke, p. 25f.; Roy, p. 287ff., who, together with other scholars, rejects Diodorus of Sicily's 14.19.8 version of the extent of Klearchos' command at the outset of the expedition. Xenias' and Pasion's recruits: Roy, p. 292, 298f. J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London, 1974) 88

have enjoyed a preferred position at the early stages of the march was the Thessalian Meno. At the review of the Greek soldiers in Phrygia, held in honor of the Kilikian queen Epyaxa, Meno was put in charge of the more important right wing of the Greek army while Klearchos was positioned at the head of its less significant left wing (1.2.15). Significantly, in the review held shortly before the battle of Kunaxa, as well as in the battle itself, Klearchos and Meno reversed their positions (1.7.1, 8.5).<sup>11</sup> The rise of Klearchos to prominence took place between these two stations on the march.

Meno's early distinction is further revealed by his mission to Kilikia. We are told that he was sent to escort the Kilikian queen back home (1.2.20). His mission, however, went beyond protecting the queen on the road. Kyros had to neutralize the potential threat of Syennesis, the Kilikian ruler, to block his way into Asia. One of the main reasons which led Syennesis to desert a strategic, easy-to-defend pass on Kyros' route was the presence of Meno and his troops in Kilikia (1.2.21). The plundering of Tarsos by Meno's soldiers probably added incentive to the Kilikian's decision to come to terms with Kyros.<sup>12</sup>

Judging from Xenophon's account, therefore, Meno was the most conspicuous Greek general by the time the army reached Tarsos. It was at Tarsos, however, that Klearchos came to occupy the leading position, which he never forfeited until his capture. The occasion was a mutiny of the Greek soldiers. Xenophon says that the soldiers refused to go on because they suspected that Kyros was taking them to fight the Persian king rather than Pisidian rebels as he had proclaimed at the beginning of the campaign (1.3.1). The mutiny was a severe blow to Kyros' plans. He was under pressure to forestall a massive

and n. 1, argues that Xenias was Kyros' leading general at the beginning of the march. But he is noted during this part of the expedition only for his celebration of the Arkadian festival of the *Lykaia* (1.2.10); cf. Roy, p. 314.

11 As far as I know the relevance of these facts to Klearchos' status was noted only by Kelly, pp. 178, n. 240; 187, n. 281, and Brown, *Historia*, 1986, 390f. The former, however, postdates Klearchos' prominence to a very late stage in the march, while the latter does not deal with the causes of the reversal in Meno's and Klearchos' positions.

12 See 1.2.26–27; G. Cawkwell in *Xenophon, The Persian Expedition* (trans. R. Werner) (Harmondsworth 1972) 63, n.4; Brown, op. cit. Syennesis' double game: Ktesias, *F. Gr. Hist.* 688 F27=Phot. *Bibl.* 72,43b; Diod. 14.20.3. Anderson, note 10 above, p. 87, thinks that Meno was given his mission in Kilikia since his light-armed troops came from a mountainous country. But Klearchos' Thrakian peltasts were used to mountain warfare as well and yet he stayed with the rest of the army.

mobilization of troops by his brother Artaxerxes and the insurrection delayed his progress (cf. 1.5.9.). Worse still was the fact that Kyros stood in a somewhat inferior bargaining position in relation to the Greeks. Their presence at Tarsos made it impossible for him to claim that they were still going to fight the Pisidians or even the Kilikians; in addition, since the troops had been recently given four-months' pay and held in their possession Kilikian booty, there was less pressure on them to reach an immediate agreement with him.<sup>13</sup> There could be no doubt about Kyros' predicament, nor about his gratitude to the person who could help him out of it.

The soldiers' complaint that they had not been hired to fight the formidable might of the Persian king was lodged primarily against Kyros. But we can imagine that the Greek generals had to answer similar criticism. In fact, in Diodoros' version of the event — where Klearchos plays no part — the soldiers' anger was directed against their commanders (14.20.5). As recruiting agents the generals had hired the troops for a definite task which now appeared to have been changed. Xenophon does not expressly state on whose side the generals stood in the conflict, but it is possible to infer from his account that they supported the Persian employer.<sup>14</sup> The fact that many of Xenias' and Pasion's mercenaries joined Klearchos, whom they saw as willing to disobey the prince, suggests that the other *strategoï* tried to force their troops to follow Kyros (1.3.1,7). Their success was, at best, limited. Xenophon focuses on Klearchos because the Spartan was the officer most instrumental in quelling the rebellion, and because of the high position he came to hold after it.

The story of the mutiny is known and needs no elaboration.<sup>15</sup> In essence, after Klearchos' attempt to force his troops to continue the march had almost

13 The soldiers' recent gains: 1.2.12,19, 3.14. It is possible that they also received a bonus from Syennesis' contribution to Kyros' exchequer: 1.2.27. For what it is worth, Diodorus 14.21.6 mentions a reward by Kyros prior to the soldiers' second mutiny at Thapsakos. Roy's explanation that the troops rebelled against a breach of contract (p. 313) is preferred here to the one which links their grievance to lack of payment: Kelly, p. 8f.

14 *Contra*: G. Grote, *History of Greece* (London 1852) vol. 9, p. 29.

15 1.3. For a literary analysis of Xenophon's description of the mutiny see G. Stégen, 'Sur deux chapitres de l'Anabase,' *LEC* 30 (1962) 404–412. Kelly, pp. 8ff. focuses on the rhetorics of Klearchos and other speakers in the soldiers' assemblies. For other discussions see, e.g., G. Cousin, *Kyros le jeune en Asie Mineure* (Paris, Nancy, 1905) 8, 288f; Anderson, note 10 above, 87–88. The problem of the authenticity of the speeches is as thorny as with most ancient historians. The

cost him his life, he resorted to persuasion. According to Xenophon, Klearchos disguised his true aim. At first Klearchos appeared to have capitulated to the soldiers' demands. Later, however, he and his deputies put an end to the revolt by convincing the troops of the serious implications of their insubordination, and that it would be in their best interest to follow Kyros' orders. It is worth noticing the way Klearchos came into the foreground and rose to power in Kyros' camp. The Spartan made his first significant appearance in the story of the expedition not as a harsh disciplinarian but as a shrewd and skilled demagogue. In other words, Klearchos achieved prominence among the generals thanks to his political rather than his military talents.<sup>16</sup> This is the first, though not the last, incongruity between Xenophon's narrative and the portrait of Klearchos the military man in 2.6.1–15.

The mutiny in Tarsos reveals other relevant aspects of Klearchos' leadership. According to Xenophon, Klearchos' first step in dealing with his rebellious soldiers was to convince them that he would not go with Kyros against their wishes.<sup>17</sup> As a result he was joined by more than 2000 of Xenias' and Pasion's men (1.3.7). Xenophon's account makes it quite clear that he did not plan his address to the soldiers to increase his following. His speech was intended for the ears of his troops alone (1.3.2). However, once the lines between the different Greek units were crossed by the mercenaries, Klearchos became the only Greek leader in camp whose contingent comprised more than his original recruits. He also replaced Xenias as the commander of the largest group of mercenaries in the army. These were new and unforeseen developments and the first to recognize their significance was Kyros. He twice asked Klearchos to meet him but Klearchos declined to come (1.3.8). Xenophon claims that the parade of Persian emissaries to Klearchos was orchestrated between the Spartan and Kyros (*ibid.*), probably to impress the soldiers

attitude adopted here was to regard the main arguments of the speeches as essentially authentic as long as they do not flatly contradict what is elsewhere said in the *Anabasis* or in other sources. Cf. Roy, 'Xenophon's evidence for the Anabasis,' *Athenaeum* 46 (1968) 46; Kelly, pp. 80–87.

- 16 *Contra*: W. Lengauer, *Greek Commanders in the 5th and 4th Centuries B.C.* (Warsaw 1979) 87, cf. 89.
- 17 1.3.3–7. Pace S.W. Hirsh, *The friendship of the Barbarians* (Hanover and London 1985) 24, Klearchos did not deny, or lie about, Kyros' true aim, or even conceal his knowledge of that aim: see 1.3.7. There is no sign of any implicit censure of Klearchos' conduct by Xenophon here: cf. Hirsh, p. 25. Klearchos' dishonesty is stressed, among others, by Hofstetter, note 7 above; Kelly, pp. 11ff.; Nussbaum, p. 127.

with the Spartan's steadfastness. Yet he admits that the dispatch of petitioners to Klearchos was honest at its outset. Moreover, the parade of the mock embassies called for the prince, not the Spartan, to swallow his pride. The cooperation between Kyros and Klearchos was not premeditated. It was due to the perception both in the Greek and the Persian camps that Klearchos had become the man of the hour who could lead the mercenaries back to Ionia or onward to the Euphrates.

Klearchos chose to reconcile the troops with Kyros. The growth of his influence is indicated in the second assembly called by him. It was attended by his original troops, and by those who had joined them from Xenias' and Pasion's contingents, as well as by other soldiers who wished not to be left out (1.3.9). In a way which would characterize his leadership later on in the expedition he did not force his opinion on his audience. He merely urged them to form some plan of action instead of lingering on in defiance, for by antagonizing Kyros they were bound to make an enemy out of him, and he would have been a formidable one. Xenophon may be right in suggesting that Klearchos and his emissaries were leading the soldiers toward their later decision to stick with Kyros (1.3.8,13). It was in the Spartan's interest to continue the march in view of the uncertain future awaiting him had the Greeks retraced their steps.<sup>18</sup> But we may also ask whether he was not acting responsibly. The mercenaries were far from home and without provisions and guides. As pointed out by different speakers in the assembly, it would have been very unwise to expect Kyros to help them return or be indifferent to their marching back home through (and living off) his territory (1.3.16–17). Klearchos' personal interests and those of the soldiers here seem not to have been in conflict but rather in agreement.

The mercenaries eventually decided to follow Kyros on the basis of his undertaking to increase their pay by half (1.3.21). In spite of the promise of future gain it was a concession on their part. Kyros was, as many suspected, going to lead them against the King after all (*ibid.*). It is true that the prince's ostensible new goal for the march was to fight a Syrian satrap all the way to the Euphrates. However, those who were wary of deluding themselves had ample reason to suspect his sincerity. Kyros himself agreed to discuss the (final?) goal of the expedition further when they reached the river (1.3.20). Moreover, the fact that the new aim of pursuing the satrap was only disclosed

18 Nussbaum claims that he sacrificed the soldiers' wishes to his own egoistic goal of retaining his leadership: pp. 59 (but see his note 2 *ibid.*), 118, 127. Cf. note 14 above.

under pressure and was different from the original aim of suppressing Pisidian rebels, should have confirmed the soldiers' suspicions rather than assuaging them. It is characteristic of those in the *Anabasis* who blamed Kyros for deceiving them that they were not unwilling to be duped.<sup>19</sup>

Nor did Kyros emerge from the mutiny unscathed. His relationship with the mercenaries became strained and he was forced to regain their loyalty by granting them substantial pay-increases. He also had to let Klearchos keep the troops who joined his force during the mutiny. It was in his power to order these men to return to their original units, but he let them stay with Klearchos. Consequently, not long after these events Xenias and Pasion left the camp in anger at the prince (1.4.7). Kyros must have reluctantly rejected the demands of, at least, Xenias to have his troops back. Xenias had been in his service for some years, and Kyros' employment of young and unseasoned generals indicates the difficulties he had in recruiting experienced commanders.<sup>20</sup> But he could not afford to antagonize Klearchos, who was popular with the soldiers and had to be rewarded for his efforts on Kyros' behalf.

Thus the real winner in the crisis in Tarsos was Klearchos.<sup>21</sup> Unlike Kyros or the mercenaries, the Spartan was the only one who did not have to pay a price for his gains. Without defying the troops he was their first choice for their leader when they opposed marching on the King (1.3.14–15). He was also one of their delegates to Kyros when they wished to renegotiate the terms and purpose of their service (1.3.18,20). His popularity in the mercenaries' camp and his (informal) recognition by the troops as their representative is worth emphasizing. These points indicate that he was regarded by the soldiers as an authentic leader and was not followed, as Xenophon claims in his portrait of Klearchos (2.6.13), because of his rank as an officer or out of necessity. His claim to leadership among the soldiers enhanced his power at

19 Thus the mercenaries in Thapsakos (1.4.11–12), or Klearchos and the generals after Kunaxa (2.3.21). Xenophon is much clearer in revealing how much the soldiers knew at Kilikia about the true goal of the expedition in 3.1.10. The promise of a pay increase seemed to have been Kyros' most persuasive argument: Cousin, note 15 above, p. 169f.

20 Xenias and Kyros: 1.1.2,2.1,10. For Kyros' problems with recruiting experienced generals see Roy, p. 293; cf. Perlman, note 8 above, p. 279 for their small number.

21 Cf. especially Anderson, note 10 above; Parke, note 3 above, p. 34. Kyros' relationship with Klearchos was based on sympathy (cf. Nussbaum, p. 123; D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, Leiden 1977, 151, n. 104), but no less so on a sober assessment of the situation in the Greek camp.



the expense of other Greek generals such as Xenias and Meno and increased Kyros' dependence on him. This is not to say that Kyros lost ultimate authority or that his relationship with Klearchos became strained. The prince probably preferred to deal with the Greeks primarily through Klearchos, whose loyalty to him he had no reason to question, rather than with a group of ambitious and quarrelsome commanders.

From Tarsos the soldiers followed Kyros to Thapsakos on the Euphrates. There the prince made his plan to march on the King known and asked the Greek *stratēgoi* to persuade the soldiers to follow him. The troops reacted angrily to the news, some because their suspicions of Kyros' intentions were now confirmed, and others, perhaps, because they hoped to make Kyros' newly proclaimed plan the excuse for an additional payment (1.4.11–12). The soldiers blamed all the generals, not only Klearchos, for concealing Kyros' true purpose all along.<sup>22</sup> Hence the charge of being false to the troops could not have been substantiated against Klearchos alone, in the event that a competitive colleague had wished to undermine his position. Indeed Meno tried a different approach. Before the troops made up their minds about how to react to Kyros' announcement, he persuaded his men to show their willingness to follow the prince by crossing the Euphrates. Meno argued that they would become Kyros' favorites whatever the rest of the soldiers decided, and especially so, if the Persian concluded that it was their action that swayed the soldiers to continue the march (1.4.13–16). The division of opinion among the troops, as evinced by the action of Meno's men, explained the ease with which Kyros was able to persuade the troops to stay with him on the basis of a promise of future rewards (1.4.13). He also made a point of showing his special appreciation of Meno and his force (1.4.17). What Kyros, however, did not do was to raise Meno's position to that of Klearchos or above it. It is true that Meno at Thapsakos, like Klearchos at Tarsos, was instrumental in putting the soldiers' mutiny down. However, Meno's action isolated him and his mercenaries from the rest of the Greeks. His leadership drew its strength from his special bond with his men and his currying favor with Kyros. Klearchos' leadership, on the other hand, was based on his influence over more than his own contingent as well as his close relationship with the prince.

22 1.4.11–12. Diodoros' assertion that Kyros' Greek officers knew of his plan before the mutiny at Thapsakos (14.19.9) makes sense of the soldiers' reaction here. Xenophon, however, claims that of all Greeks Klearchos was the only one who knew of Kyros' aim (3.1.10). If not totally wrong, Xenophon is at least inaccurate. Cheirisiphos, who was sent by Sparta to assist Kyros (1.4.3; Diod. 14.19.4–5), and probably Xenias, must have known of his plan as well.

Between the particular and the more universal leader, Kyros naturally chose the latter.<sup>23</sup>

Klearchos' ambition to extend his influence over many troops collided with the separatist tendencies of the different contingents of Kyros' army. The Greek forces were distinguished from one another by their different generals or recruiting officers, at times by their ethnic origin, and in the course of the march, by their separate encampments, search for provisions, and position in the battle line.<sup>24</sup> Klearchos' success in augmenting his power, therefore, was bound to be limited. This is shown in an incident which took place on the march along the Euphrates. For reasons which Xenophon did not take the trouble to record, Klearchos had one of Meno's men flogged.<sup>25</sup> His action angered some of Meno's troops, who almost stoned him to death. Enraged, Klearchos returned to his unit, put his hoplites on the alert, and marched against Meno's force with his Thracian peltasts and horsemen.<sup>26</sup> His advance was blocked by another general, the Boiotian Proxenos, who chanced to come by and decided to intervene. Klearchos, still angry, accused Proxenos of showing no sympathy when his life was in danger. The crisis was resolved with Kyros' arrival at the scene. He warned the generals that their fighting among themselves would lead to his and their end. Klearchos calmed down and each force went back to its quarters. (1.5.11–17).

Much of this incident concerned conflicting claims of honor and shame. But the affair also brings to light the particularistic *esprit de corps* which prevailed in the various Greek contingents in the army, which was a great

- 23 Meno's breach of solidarity is harshly criticized in modern research: e.g. Grote, note 14 above, p. 332, and Nussbaum, pp. 80; 137, who describes his leadership as based on complicity in crime and unscrupulous shamelessness; cf. Kelly, p. 44f. The impact of his character-sketch in 2.6. 21–29 on these evaluations is evident. Meno committed no crime here: Brown, note 9 above, p. 369, (although his contrasting analysis is somewhat one-sided). If there is a link between this episode and Meno's portrait it relates to his greediness (2.6.21).
- 24 See Parke, note 3 above, p. 31; Roy, p. 292f.; Perlman, *RSA*, 1976–7, 277; Anderson, *Xenophon*, 1974, p. 94.
- 25 The Spartans had faith in the whip as effecting discipline and putting people in their places: Klearchos in the expedition: 1.5.4; 2.3.11; Kallibios at Athens: Plut. *Lys.* 15.5; Mnasippos in Kerkyra: Xen., *HG* 6.2.19; and cf. Plut. *Lyk.* 17.3; <Xen.>, *Res. Lac.* 2.2.
- 26 Klearchos chose to use his Thracians against Meno either because he trusted them more than his Greeks (Perlman, n. 24 above) and/or because of tactical considerations (Best, n.6 above, pp. 57; 74).

obstacle to anyone aspiring to occupy a preferred position. By his impetuous conduct Klearchos only contributed to the cohesion of the different Greek units, and especially that of Meno. Part of his anger at Meno's troops and Proxenos was probably due to his frustration at his failure to become the undisputed leader of all the Greeks.

Nevertheless, Klearchos' quarrel with Meno seemed to have no effect on his relationship with Kyros. Kyros protected Meno from Klearchos and thus repaid him for his assistance in breaking the soldiers' mutiny at Thapsakos. But Klearchos' superior position remained intact.<sup>27</sup> If someone questioned this state of affairs, the best proof that Klearchos' status in camp had not changed was his participation in the trial for treason of the very distinguished Persian noble, Orontas. Xenophon's ultimate source for the proceedings of the trial was Klearchos himself, who was probably also responsible for the remark that he was invited to sit in at the trial because he was regarded by Kyros and the Persians as the most honored among the Greeks (1.6.5). But the fact that Xenophon — and Klearchos — were greatly impressed by this invitation to participate in this significant hearing should not dissuade us from asking if regard for Klearchos' position was Kyros' only reason for asking him to sit in at the trial. The answer to this question can be deduced from the delicate nature of the trial. Orontas was a very important Persian dignitary and a kinsman of the King (1.6.1). His prominence in camp as well as the danger he posed for Kyros is attested to by Kyros' surrounding the scene of the trial with 3000 hoplites as well as by the *proskynesis* made to Orontas by certain Persians even after his conviction.<sup>28</sup> Kyros needed all the help he could get in dealing with a man of such importance. For the trial he recruited seven of his noblest Persians, to demonstrate their support. In addition, the most prominent Greek commander, Klearchos, was present to demonstrate the mercenaries' backing of Kyros. Significantly, Klearchos was the first of all the councillors to be asked what punishment ought to be meted out to the traitor (1.6.9). It is not unlikely that the Spartan saw this priority as a sign of distinction (cf. 1.6.5). But it is also possible that Klearchos was asked to pass

27 Cf. Anderson, p. 94. Kelly, p. 178f., n.240, dates Klearchos' hold of power to the time after his quarrel with Meno. Klearchos' quarrel with Proxenos here did not necessarily make the two enemies or Proxenos Meno's friend. Klearchos and Proxenos cooperated later with no signs of animosity or tension: 1.8.4, 10. 5; 2.4.15–18. For 2.5.38 see below.

28 On Orontas' position and trial: 1.6.1–11. See also Kelly, pp. 56; 62, 193, n.309; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 148. For an analysis of the structure of Xenophon's description of the trial see G. Stégen, note 15 above, p. 412–416.

judgement on Orontas first, in order to leave no doubt about the verdict and to make the task of anyone who might have wished to defend the Persian (viz. Orontas' kinsmen: 1.6.10) difficult, if not impossible. Klearchos and Kyros had already shown at Tarsos how mutually beneficial their cooperation could be.

Klearchos' rank in politics complemented his military position. He was now in charge of the right wing in Kyros' battle-line against the Persian king, which included all Greek contingents and a thousand Paphlagonian horse. As noted above, Klearchos had changed positions with Meno, who now was demoted to the Greeks' left wing.<sup>29</sup> It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgement on the military wisdom, or lack thereof, of Klearchos' conduct at the battle of Kunaxa.<sup>30</sup> Our interest lies in the extent of Klearchos' power, indicated by his command of Kyros' right wing as well as by his refusal to respond to Kyros' call to join him in his charge against the Persian center (1.8.12–13). Apparently Klearchos could risk having to answer to Kyros for his actions. As it happened, Kyros was killed and Klearchos survived to begin a new chapter in his career.

Kyros' death left the Greeks without their employer, provider, and sponsor. The mercenaries needed a leader, but Xenophon places the Greeks' informal recognition of Klearchos' leadership rather late in his narrative. He first describes a series of negotiations they conducted with Kyros' second-in-command and later with emissaries of the Persian king. Only then does he say that the Greeks were willing to obey Klearchos because they recognized that he alone understood what one needs for command, while the others lacked experience (*apeiroi esan*: 2.2.5). Xenophon's explanation is problematical on two counts. Firstly, Kyros, it is true, did not have many veteran generals, but Klearchos was not the only experienced commander in camp. There were also the Spartan Cheirisophos, not a young man, who had been sent by Sparta to

29 1.8.4–5 and compare the battle-order in Phrygia: 1.2.15. See page 33 and note 11 above. For Klearchos' conversation with Kyros shortly before Kunaxa: 1.7.9; Plut. *Artox.* 8.2; Polyain. 2.2.3. Despite the different versions all sources restrict Klearchos' dramatic role to eliciting answers from Kyros that attest to the prince's character.

30 Plut. *Artox.* 8.3–7 criticizes Klearchos' conduct at Kunaxa and is followed, among others, by Parke., p. 33. Anderson, p. 104–6, tries to defend Klearchos' decision based on his interpretation of the course of the battle. Cf. also Boucher, n.7 above, p. 74; O. Lendle, 'Der Bericht Xenophons über die Schlacht von Kunaxa,' *Gymnasium* 73 (1966) 440ff.

assist Kyros, and other mature officers such as Kleanor and Sophainetos.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, Klearchos seems to have had the advantage over his colleagues in that he could adduce his former prominence under Kyros, his command over the largest group of mercenaries, his rhetorical skills, and, as would become clear in his dealing with the Persians, cunning in negotiation and healthy suspicion of outsiders. A combination of military experience with a gift for diplomacy and politics enabled Klearchos to become the Greeks' leader without much opposition.<sup>32</sup>

Secondly, Xenophon's account of the events following Kunaxa strongly indicates that Klearchos had the decisive voice in camp earlier than stated. The Greeks learned of Kyros' death from the messengers of his second-in-command, the Persian Ariaaios. The *strategoï* and the troops were shocked. Klearchos, however, hastened to take the initiative: speaking on behalf of the mercenaries, he offered their services in obtaining the kingship for Ariaaios (2.1.3–4). Later Klearchos played the central role in the discussions with the King's envoys on the nature of the relationship between the Greeks and Artaxerxes (2.1.9ff.). Thus, Klearchos' authority was recognized in camp not only after the negotiations with Ariaaios and the King, but even right after the battle of Kunaxa. His leadership was neither undermined by Kyros' death nor was it entirely dependent on the prince's favor.<sup>33</sup>

The challenges facing Klearchos and the Greeks after Kunaxa were great indeed. Kyros' death neutralized the potential advantages of their victory in battle, and Klearchos knew that in order to survive they needed provisions and guides. It was also imperative that the mercenaries stay together as a deterrent to a future Persian attack. But keeping the Greeks together meant

31 Cheirisophos: 1.4.3; 3.3.11. Sophainetos: 1.1.11; 2.3.9; 5.3.1. Kleanor, though not a general at this time, was an old and respected officer: 2.1.10, 5.37, 39. Roy, p. 293, accepts Xenophon's assertion about the lack of experience of other generals mainly on the basis of *argumenta ex silentio*. He admits, however, that the inclusion of Cheirisophos in this category is peculiar.

32 Klearchos as a crafty negotiator: 2.1.16–20; 2.2; 3.1–9, 17–21. His caution in dealing with Ariaaios, the King, and Tissaphernes: 2.1.21, 2.2–5, 3.10, 13, 23, 4.26. As a military leader: 2.2.4, 16, 19–21, 3.10–13, 4.11.26. (His strategem in calming the soldiers in panic was probably based on his experience in night warfare against the Thracians: cf. Aen. Tac. 27.11; Polyain. 2.2.10). Higgins', n.4 above, p. 87, assessment of Klearchos' leadership after Kunaxa is harsh. For the following cf. Grote (n. 14 above) 98f.

33 In Diodoros' version Ariaaios' messengers address Klearchos, thus indicating the fact that he was recognized as a leader by outsiders as well (14.24.7).

provisioning a huge group of warriors that no one seemed to want and very few could afford to employ. The problem of maintaining thousands of troops in a hostile territory forced Klearchos to search desperately for a prospective employer. Hence, his offer to Ariaaios, who was not the noblest of Persians (2.2.1) and who had shown no sign of royal ambitions, to help him usurp the Persian throne with the Greeks' help. Among the reasons Klearchos later fell into Tissaphernes' trap was his belief that the Greeks' survival depended on their employment as mercenaries. The Spartan of necessity perceived Tissaphernes as a potential patron.<sup>34</sup>

If Klearchos' goal was to find the Greeks a new master, his method of leading them until such could be found was to act in concert with the wishes of, at least, the majority of the Greek officers. The major organ of decision-making in the mercenary camp was the council of the Greeks' generals and *lochagoi* (captains).<sup>35</sup> This was natural, as the special links which existed between each force and its commander were not severed after Kunaxa and the officers represented the wishes of the soldiers. But in spite of the divisive potential of this organization, the seriousness of the Greeks' situation was so great that it was likely to encourage the emergence of an authoritative leader who would take all responsibilities and decision-making upon himself. Klearchos was the natural candidate for such a position. As noted above, his prominence under Kyros, the large group of soldiers under his direct command, his age and experience (2.2.5,6.15), all combined to hold forth the promise of an undivided command. Klearchos, however, led the Greeks on the basis of the largest consensus which he could find among his colleagues and presumably the troops. This feature of his leadership should be stressed in view of the redoubtable picture of his figure in Xenophon's character-sketch (2.6.9–10,13), or his characterization in modern research as an autocrat. For when one examines the decisions taken by Klearchos up to his last meeting with Tissaphernes, it becomes evident that the Spartan led by consent rather than by force.<sup>36</sup>

34 Cf. Anderson, n.10 above, p. 118. It goes without saying that Klearchos was constantly on the alert not to lose his position of power. However, *pace* Nussbaum, pp. 104, 127, his personal ambitions were not necessarily in conflict with the Greeks' interests but coincided with them.

35 See, e.g., Nussbaum, esp. pp. 43ff. For the *lochagoi* see *idem*, 'The Captains in the Army of the Ten Thousand,' *Class. et Med.* 20 (1959) 16ff.

36 2.6.10,13. Nussbaum, *passim*, and esp. pp. 35; 48; 60, stresses the autocratic and compulsory behavior of Klearchos. Nussbaum's intellectual honesty is evinced in his admission that Klearchos could lead also by consent (e.g., pp. 72; 110). But the

Klearchos' unimposing leadership is revealed already in the decision to offer to replace Kyros with Ariaaios as the mercenaries' employer. Xenophon's account of the event creates the impression that Klearchos made the offer to Ariaaios all by himself and without consultation. However, the embassy sent to Ariaaios with the Greeks' proposal included two prominent generals — the Spartan Cheirisophos and the Thessalian Meno — whose approval of Klearchos' plan had to be attained before their dispatch.<sup>37</sup>

The search for consensus in the Greek camp continued to characterize later significant decisions. After the Greek embassy had left for Ariaaios, envoys arrived from the Persian king demanding a surrender of arms in return for the King's favor. The discussion of the Persian proposal by the Greek officers was opened by Klearchos who also set the tone for the entire debate. He said that victors do not surrender their arms, thus articulating, though more moderately than some other speakers, the Greeks' initial angry response. Klearchos then had to leave the council to perform a religious duty, but he must have been certain that the discussion in his absence would not take a radical turn. Several speakers followed his lead and, each in his own way, rejected the King's demand.<sup>38</sup> Others, however, proposed to offer the King their services in Egypt. The council was thus divided as to whether they should remain the King's foes or become his employees. When Klearchos returned to the council he was called upon by Phalinos, the chief negotiator for the Persians, to give the decisive opinion, thus indicating that his leadership was recognized inside and outside the mercenary camp. Following a brief contest of wits between Phalinos and Klearchos the Spartan finally declared that the Greeks would keep the arms they needed as the King's friends or foes (2.1.15–21). Klearchos' summation of the discussion is revealing. He rejected the surrender of arms, a demand unacceptable to all Greeks present, including those in favor

strong impact of 2.6.1–15 and certain sociological “ideal types” on his analysis seem to have led him to overemphasize intimidation and opportunism in Klearchos' leadership.

- 37 2.1.5. It was Meno's wish to go to Ariaaios: *ibid.* Brown, *Historia*, (1986) 392, thinks that the dispatch of Meno by Klearchos indicates that he was trusted by the Spartan and hence the two were not really rivals. It is no less likely that the success of the mission overwhelmed all other considerations. Meno, as Ariaaios' *philos* and *xenos* (2.1.5), was a most suitable envoy.
- 38 The debate in council: 2.1.7–23. The prospect of cooperation with Ariaaios can explain much of the Greeks' self-assurance in their dealing with the King's envoys. In Diodoros' more dramatic version of the negotiations Klearchos is pushed somewhat to the background (14.25. 1–6).

of cooperation with the King. However, he left the door open for a settlement with the Persians when he said that the Greeks might use them in the King's interests. His answer reflected the only common ground that could have been reached in the council.

To be sure, there were times when Klearchos decided on a certain course of action all by himself. Such was the case when Ariaaios' messengers came and announced his rejection of the plan to make him king but invited the Greeks to join him in his return to Ionia. Klearchos dismissed the envoys without giving them an immediate response (2.2.1–2). On other occasions he resolved to avoid battle with the King's troops, or demanded provisions before negotiations when offered a truce by the Persians (2.2.16, 3.5–6). These independent judgements, however, were not of great consequence and bound to gain general approval. When major decisions had to be taken they were always discussed in the commanders' council where Klearchos gained support for his plans by persuasion. Thus he used favorable omens and logistical considerations to persuade the Greeks to join Ariaaios (2.2.3–5). He demonstrated his own approval of a truce with the King and made it easy for the hungry Greeks to agree to it when he exacted promises from the Persians to give them provisions and to avoid hostilities (2.3.4–9). Later, when the mercenaries were approached by Tissaphernes who invited them to join him in his return to the Aegean, the negotiation took place with all Greek *strategoí* present, Klearchos acting as their spokesman (2.3.17–27). In view of the unique structure of the Greek mercenary army Klearchos would have found it difficult, and perhaps did not intend, to impose his will on the army by force or harsh discipline. His means were persuasion, diplomacy, and finding the least controversial solution for the Greeks' problems.

Klearchos, to be sure, was not an ideal leader. He was temperamental (1.5.11ff.; cf. 2.6.9), occasionally cruel (cf. 2.3.9, 6.10), and he could become frightened and confused in times of emergency (2.4.18). But there is nothing in his circumspect and cautious dealing with the Persians (esp. 2.1.16–21; 2.2.3–10, 13) to prepare us for his falling into Tissaphernes' deadly trap. The story of Klearchos' capture begins with Tissaphernes' initial contacts with the Greeks. The Persian satrap offered to lead the mercenaries home and to supply them on the way with provisions and guides. The Greeks, speaking through Klearchos, accepted his proposition (2.3.17–27). It is peculiar that the Greeks did not wonder at Tissaphernes' motives in changing his ways and becoming their savior. After all, the satrap was Kyros' arch-enemy and chief general for the King in Kunaxa (1.1.3, 6–8, 2.4, 10.7). But apart from a vague hope of becoming the Greeks' benefactor expressed by Tissaphernes (2.3.18), there is no indication of his aims in Xenophon's account of the meetings



between the Greeks and Tissaphernes. Moreover, Tissaphernes made a point of stressing that he was acting in the King's name (2.3.17–20, 24–25, 28). Nevertheless, in their debate with those in camp who opposed reconciliation with the Persians, Klearchos and other generals made no reference to the King's goal in allowing the Greeks free passage home. When some Greeks argued that the King wished their destruction in order to deter others from following their example, Klearchos coldly analysed the danger which would result from their violation of the agreement with Tissaphernes, and concluded that he saw no reason why the King, who could have destroyed them easily, should break his oath and thus gain notoriety.<sup>39</sup> Klearchos, perhaps, saw no reason why the King should violate his agreement with the Greeks, but neither did he give any good reason why the King should make such an agreement in the first place. The problem of the Persian's motivation remains unsolved even after reading Xenophon's description of the last conference between Klearchos and Tissaphernes. Klearchos tried to persuade the satrap to make use of the mercenaries in his future wars with his enemies. Tissaphernes, however, talked about his wish to become the Greeks' *euergetes* as his main reason for helping them.<sup>40</sup> His noble intention might have touched a tender cord in the Greeks' hearts but it should hardly have been sufficient to assuage their suspicions. Klearchos and the Greeks had been careful in their dealings with the Persians. They were also soldiers for hire. If Tissaphernes desired their trust he should have focused his proposal on future employment rather than using platitudes about his kind heart. There are crucial elements missing in Xenophon's account, and the historian is to blame.<sup>41</sup>

- 39 2.4.2–7. Hirsh, n.17 above, pp. 28–29; 160, n. 48, believes that the Persians' reputation for honesty convinced Klearchos and other Greeks of their sincerity. But Klearchos' previous suspicion of the Persians (n.32 above) shows that he did not take their trustworthiness for granted.
- 40 Klearchos: 2.5.13, 14. Tissaphernes: 2.5.16, 20–22. Tissaphernes fleetingly alludes to his possible use of the Greeks (2.5.23), but chiefly speaks on *pistis* and *euergesia* as his main incentives for helping them. He refers to the same motives in his supposed wish to wear the tiara, not like the King on his head, but on his heart (*ibid.*). As the context of the remark makes clear, it meant that the King leads by virtue of his rank and office while Tissaphernes leads because of the affections he stirs among his followers. Such a claim did not constitute an ambition for the Persian throne.
- 41 According to Ktesias (in Phot. *Bibl.* 72, p. 44a) Klearchos was reluctant to meet with Tissaphernes once again but compelled to meet his fate by other Greeks. Cawkwell, n.12 above, p. 25, suggested that Klearchos, and even Tissaphernes,

Why did Xenophon not make Tissaphernes' proposal more convincing? The question is linked to other problems involving Klearchos' conduct shortly before his captivity. We are told that with the increasing tension and mutual suspicion between the Greeks and the Persians, Klearchos decided to meet with Tissaphernes in an attempt to avert the imminent conflict (2.5.2). This was not Klearchos' way. Usually the Spartan was content to respond to challenges rather than to initiate them. He also refrained from meeting problems head on (unlike what he seems to have done here), and from risking everything on the success of one mission.<sup>42</sup> Klearchos carried his untypical conduct even further. When he returned to the Greek camp from his conference with Tissaphernes he proposed another meeting with the satrap in order to settle all differences between Greeks and Persians. His plan was opposed by some speakers. Unlike the way he handled his colleagues and troops earlier, Klearchos forced a decision in favor of his motion (2.5.30). This and other anomalies in Klearchos' behavior, as well as the fact that the Greeks apparently made no attempt to ascertain Tissaphernes' motives, stem from the deficiencies of our source. Xenophon, perhaps absorbed with the imminent surprising capture of the Greek generals, perhaps content to blame Klearchos for having let himself and his colleagues fall into the Persian trap, made little effort to understand what moved Klearchos to behave the way he did.<sup>43</sup>

Apparently what Xenophon failed to mention or appreciate was the tremendous pressure Klearchos was under by dint of the Greeks' circumstances. Ever since they had been informed of Kyros' death the mercenaries had faced constant dangers, but they actually managed only to delay disaster. It was pointed out to them by the Persian negotiators, and even by Klearchos himself, that they lacked supplies, intelligence of their whereabouts or their way home, and cavalry to meet the enemy's horse (2.3.18–19, 4.5–7, 5.17–20; cf. 2.1.19; 3.1.2). In addition, their truce with the Persians was highly unstable.

fell prey to Meno's and Proxenos' slanderous machinations against the Spartan. However, Ktesias' source was Klearchos in captivity, a fact which puts his version under the heaviest suspicion, and Cawkwell's additional evidence is not very strong; see Hirsh, n.17 above, p. 160, n. 48; J.M. Bigwood, 'The Ancient Accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa,' *AJP* 104 (1983) 345,356; Brown, n.7 above, p. 398.

42 See n.32 above and *cf.* Nussbaum, p. 118ff. (slightly exaggerated).

43 Discomfort with Xenophon's description of Klearchos' and Tissaphernes' conference was also felt by e.g., Grote, n.14 above, pp. 98–100; Hirsh, n.17 above, pp. 28ff. For Cawkwell, p. 25, see n.41 above and for the following: Higgins, n.4 above, p. 87.

The Greeks and the Persians competed for the same local resources at times and there were Greeks who could not afford to buy provisions and were unable to seize them because of the terms of the truce (2.4.11–12; 3.1.20). The mercenaries were also well aware of the King's ability to attack them or put obstacles in their way at will, especially at the river-crossing. Their relationship with Ariaïos, their Persian ally, had deteriorated ever since Tissaphernes approached the mercenaries with his offer of joint return (2.4.1–2). The tension between Ariaïos and the Greeks grew following an incident in which what the Greeks regarded as disinformation from Ariaïos' quarters played a major part (2.4.15–22). The fact that Ariaïos was perceived as the King's friend rather than the Greeks' only reinforced the suspicion the mercenaries entertained of the King's sincerity about his truce with them (2.1.21–23, 2.16, 3.10, 13, 4.3, 7, 10, 21–22, 5.1, 29). The strain in the relationship between Greeks and Persians intensified the frictions within the Greek camp as well. Klearchos had to defend the decision to rely on Tissaphernes against opposition to cooperation with the Persians (2.4.1–7, 5.29–30). Interwoven with these difficulties was the challenge to his leadership from Meno. Through the agency of his close friend Ariaïos the Thessalian general tried to induce Tissaphernes to help him replace Klearchos as the mercenaries' leader. He probably did it by accusing Klearchos of harboring sinister plans against the Persians.<sup>44</sup> The cumulative impact of all these problems pushed Klearchos to seek a solution he hoped would relieve him from most of his troubles, one that eventually led to his death.

The fact was that there was no real alternative to seeking cooperation with the Persians. Klearchos could have pushed forward to the Aegean, ignored present difficulties with the King, and hoped for the best. He could have disengaged himself completely from the Persians and forced his way out. He might also have tried to reestablish his alliance with Ariaïos on firmer ground. But all these potential remedies to the Greeks' problems were either impractical or unpromising. The status quo with the Persians could not have been maintained in view of the antagonism which existed between the two camps

44 2.5.24,28–29,38,40; *cf.* Cawkwell, *op. cit.* Was it Meno who inspired the Persians to think that Klearchos had plans to settle in Babylonia (*cf.* 2.4.15–22)? Brown, n.7 above, pp. 394,397, thinks that Klearchos' wish to exonerate himself led him to tell incriminating stories about Meno to Ktesias and from there his version reached Xenophon. However, Klearchos could have easily been Xenophon's direct source before he was captured: 2.5.30. Moreover, in view of Klearchos-Meno's previous relationship Klearchos had very good reasons to suspect the Thessalian.

(2.4.10–11, 5.1). Breaking the truce with the King would have left the mercenaries with no alternative but to fight their way home with no provisions or cavalry (cf. 2.4.5–7). Renewal of the alliance with Ariaaios was out of the question both because of the rapport recently established between Ariaaios and the King, and because Ariaaios would have liked Meno, and not Klearchos, to have been the Greeks' leader. Cooperation with Tissaphernes, on the other hand, held out the promise of improving relations with the Persians and of an uninterrupted supply of food and intelligence. Besides, so far Tissaphernes had kept to the terms of the truce, while the Greeks came to believe that the Persians wanted them out of Asia (2.4.21–22). It was probably this assessment of the situation which was the basis of Klearchos' policy.<sup>45</sup>

Left with no other option than cooperation with Tissaphernes, Klearchos made an effort to clear the air between them. He denied harboring any hostility against the Persians and let the satrap understand that he, and no other, could bring the Greeks over to him (2.5.10–14). It is true that Klearchos was concerned to ensure his position over the mercenaries. But as in Tarsos, his personal goals complemented rather than collided with the Greeks', for he merely wished to guarantee himself and his troops a relatively safe return. What Klearchos failed or refused to realize was that Tissaphernes had no desire to become a second Kyros, if only because he did not entertain any royal ambitions.<sup>46</sup> It was the Spartan's misfortune that the King had resolved to destroy the mercenaries; that the satrap had no need for them; and that Klearchos lacked the power to force cooperation on the Persians. His desperate attempt to convince Tissaphernes that he and his mercenaries could be useful made it easy for the satrap to play a passive role and pretend to agree with him. When Klearchos threw in the matter of getting rid of those trying to spoil their new understanding, namely, Meno, Tissaphernes expressed his willingness to cement the alliance by denouncing the culprits (2.5.24–26). Content with what he regarded as an answer to most of his and the Greeks' problems Klearchos returned to camp. His plan, which combined future employment, safe return, and elimination of political rivals, met with opposition. If Xenophon is to be trusted, the majority of those who opposed him argued that the Persians were not to be trusted (2.5.29). Meno's arguments probably focused on refuting Klearchos' charges, for he advocated collaboration with the Persians as much as Klearchos had (2.5.28). Eventually Klear-

45 Cf. Grote, pp. 98ff. The bleak prospects of the Greeks in Asia: 2.4.5–7, 16–20.

46 Tissaphernes was the main beneficiary of Kyros' failure: 2.5.11; Xen. *HG* 3.1.3; Diod. 14.26.4, 35.2; H.D. Westlake, 'Decline and fall of Tissaphernes,' *Historia* 30 (1981) 257f., 262. For 2.5.23 see n.40 above.

chos had his way and Meno agreed, or was forced to agree, to a showdown at Tissaphernes' tent. He, Klearchos, three other generals, and twenty *lochagoi*, were seized and executed sometime later by the Persians.

Klearchos' last decision was disastrous and irrevocable, but he seemed not to have been moved by egoistic considerations alone in reaching it.<sup>47</sup> The critical situation of the Greeks, the pressures of his responsibilities as a leader, and the threat to his position, all combined to neutralize his natural caution and cunning in his choice of solutions. Following his capture it was easy for the mercenaries to conclude that the Persians were not interested in reconciliation and that their best chance of survival lay in fighting their way out. However, the outcome of Klearchos' attempt at cooperation became known only after it had been made, and could have been predicted only by very few, if at all.

Thus Klearchos' career came to its end. If the analysis of his generalship suggested above is not far from the mark, Klearchos' conduct during the expedition was based more on compromise and responsible leadership than on self-regard, coercion, or intimidation. Such a conclusion does not easily adapt itself to Xenophon's biographical sketch in 2.6.1–15. There Klearchos is mainly depicted as moved by an overriding passion for war, as a severe disciplinarian who was feared but not loved by his troops, and as a man who liked being subordinate to no one (2.6.1,9–10,15). It may be that Klearchos' portrait in the character-sketch (which refers also to a period prior to Kyros' expedition) complements his description in the narrative,<sup>48</sup> yet it is striking that nothing in books I and II of the *Anabasis* suggests his love of war or his dislike of being second in command. In fact, even though he dominates much of the narrative of these books, his disciplinary methods or harsh character are only poorly attested (1.3.1, 5.11; 2.3.9, 11–12). Conversely, the biographical notes ignore, if they do not contradict, Klearchos' popularity among the soldiers as illustrated in the mutiny in Tarsos, and his shrewdness in negotia-

47 Grote, n.45 above, should be preferred here to Boucher, n.7 above, p. 134, and Nussbaum, p. 127, *cf.* p. 104. It is hard to see how Klearchos, with all his influence and power, could prevail upon the Greeks and most of their generals to agree to a political trial of his colleague(s) where Tissaphernes was to be a star witness; *cf.* Boucher, p. 129. Xenophon's account here is very incomplete either because he did not bother to collect more information, or because he blamed Klearchos for the death of his friend Proxenos; *cf.* Anderson, n.10 above, p. 84; Hirsh, n.17 above, p. 28.

48 See Kelly, p. 2; Nussbaum, p. 101, n. 3.

tion. I wish to suggest the following hypothesis as an explanation for the lack of any real congruity between the narrative and the character-sketch.

The lack of harmony between them is probably the result of the different kinds of evidence used by the author as a basis for each. It seems that when Xenophon decided to introduce the character sketches of Klearchos and other *strategoï* into the narrative he abandoned his notes in favor of general, personal impressions of these men.<sup>49</sup> These impressions were then grouped around certain themes which the author perceived as dominant in the general's character and career. Such methods can give only an incomplete, if not a one-sided, picture. For example, if Klearchos was to be presented as an *aner polemikos* there was no room in his portrait for his craftiness as a negotiator or his popular leadership. His harshness as a commander did not tally well with his policy of balance and compromise. At least in the case of Klearchos, therefore, Xenophon's attempt at characterization came at the expense of accuracy and comprehensiveness.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, a major theme in Klearchos' and his colleagues' portraits is the nature of their relationship with their subordinates. Common to all the generals' treatment of their troops was some shortcoming. Klearchos was too harsh and intimidating, Proxenos too gentle, and Meno too sordid and opportunistic (2.6.9ff. 18–19, 27). It is reasonable to assume that by depicting their faults the author prepared his readers for the portrayal of a general whose leadership would approach perfection, namely,

49 I follow here in the main the scholars who believe Xenophon used his campaign notes for the writing of the *Anabasis*. See, e.g., F.H. Weissbach, 'Kyros,' *RE*, Suppl. 4 (1924) 1871; Roy, n.15 above, pp. 42–5; cf. H.R. Breitenbach, 'Xenophon,' *RE*, Suppl. 9A, 2 (1966) 1649. Even Cawkwell, n.12 above, pp. 21–23, who argues that Xenophon relied primarily on his memory, admits he may have kept a diary, though irregularly. For the biographical sketches in 2.6 see, generally, I. Bruns, *Das Literarische Porträt der Griechen im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert vor Christi Geburt* (Berlin 1896) 137–144; F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer litterarischen Form* (Leipzig 1901) 89f.; A. Dihle, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie* (Göttingen 1956) esp. 26; A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971) 49–52.

50 A similar case may be made for Proxenos, Meno, and Kyros, although Xenophon's narrative says too little about Proxenos while his portraits of Meno (2.6.21–29) and Kyros (1.9) are extremely biased. Lengauer, n.16 above, pp. 83, 86ff., claims that Xenophon consciously emphasized military, rather than civilian characteristics of Greek *strategoï* in the *Anabasis* and parts of the *Hellenica*. But the dichotomy he draws between the civilian and the professional general is not always valid and often too rigid. He also ignores Xenophon's occasional criticism of Klearchos.

Xenophon the Athenian.<sup>51</sup> Any student of the *Anabasis* is forced to notice how Xenophon rewarded and punished his soldiers in right measure and never used them to attain his private goals.<sup>52</sup> The criticism of Klearchos' generalship in his portrait paves the way for the coming of a new and better leader. In evaluating Klearchos' leadership, therefore, the reader of the *Anabasis* would do better to rely on the description of Klearchos' actions in the narrative rather than taking his cues from Xenophon's sketch of his character in 2.6.1–15.

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51 See especially C. Hoeg, 'ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΚΥΡΟΥ ΑΝΑΒΑΣΙΣ. Oeuvre anonyme ou pseudonyme ou orthonyme,' *Class. et Med.* 11 (1950) 177; Nussbaum, pp. 72, 96, 120. This does not contradict Xenophon's appreciation of certain aspects of Klearchos' leadership: F. Dürbach, 'L'apologie de Xénophon dans L'Anabase,' *REG* 6 (1893) 348; Cousin, n.15 above, p. 73f.; Lenschau, *RE* 11 (1921) 577.

52 See Nussbaum, p. 71ff; cf. N. Wood, 'Xenophon's Theory of Leadership,' *Class. et Med.* 25 (1964) esp. 52; Lengauer, n.16 above, esp. pp. 149–151.