

in his 1981 edition of *The Fragments of Anaxagoras*. The traditional view, lately defended by J. Mansfeld in a note in *Mnemosyne* 1980, is that Empedocles was Anaxagoras' senior and that the Clazomenian's doctrine of homogeneous indefinitely divisible substances, called by Aristotle (or possibly by Anaxagoras himself) *homoiomere*, was meant to counter the difficulties of Empedocles' doctrine of four elements. In the present collection, C. H. Kahn re-examines the evidence for the dating of Anaxagoras and comes to the conclusion that 'it is a mistake to see him in any way dependent upon the new ideas of Empedocles and the atomists. On the contrary, it is Anaxagoras' version of the Ionian cosmology that provides the point of departure for Empedocles and Leucippus' (p. 307).

O. Gigon presents an exhaustive analysis of Anaxagoras in Plato and Aristotle (and in the later doxography). He tries to recover those aspects of Anaxagoras' thought which do not appear in the twenty-two fragments printed by Diels-Kranz, mainly from Alexander and Simplicius. Among these aspects, Gigon points out the relation between the cosmic *nous* and *agathon* and between that *nous* and the *nous* of men and of living things in general.

M. L. Silvestre reappraises Simplicius' testimony concerning Anaxagoras.



This new series, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, of which this volume is the first, is a welcome addition to the still small but fast-growing list of serials and periodicals specializing in Greek philosophy. It is a pity that the book is marred by careless proofreading, resulting in a great many misprints and spelling inconsistencies (Heraclitus / Heraklitus / Heraclitos). One paper was printed without its notes.

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Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (eds.), *Philosophia Togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, clarendon Prss, Oxford 1989, 302 p.

'This volume contains nine papers from the editors' Oxford seminar: Miriam Griffin writes on "Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome", I. G. Kidd on "Posidonius and Philosopher-Historian", Jonathan Barnes on "Antiochus of Ascalon", David Sedley on "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World", D. P. Fowler on "Lucretius and Politics", Julia Annas on "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property", P. A. Brunt on "Philosophy and Religion in the Late Republic", Christopher Pelling on "Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture" and lastly there is a paper by the late Elizabeth Rawson on "Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Adviser".

The choice of title, *Philosophia Togata*, has not been entirely fortunate: the question is not whether philosophy donned the toga, but rather how much philosophy there was beneath the toga. Sedley is the only contributor who sticks to the Hellenistic background: according to him philosophical allegiance in the Hellenistic schools was “less a disinterested common quest for the truth than a virtually religious commitment to the authority of a founder figure” (97); this is then illustrated in detail on Philodemus. It is a most interesting argument that what appears to us as eclecticism — the validity of the term is denied by S. (119 n. 48) — is but adherence to the doctrines of different teachers.

Among the different philosophers active in Rome or influential with Romans we get discussions of two outstanding men. Kidd argues for the philosophical background of Posidonius’ history and shows that his was “a moralist’s view of historiography” (45) but, contrary to Plutarch he “was seeking to trace causal explanation, as opposed to presenting exemplars” (46). Barnes leads us through the labyrinth of the controversies of the Academy while scrutinizing the life, career and philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon and attempts to demonstrate that philosophizing for Cicero and his friends was a rather more serious business than most people would suspect. His fellow editor arrives at a rather different emphasis: according to Griffin philosophy supplied the language, the form for Roman ideas; but philosophy thus came to play “an important role in a society where religion had little metaphysics and less ethics” (37) and provided ethical preconceptions even for those innocent of the dogmas of the schools of philosophy. This seems to harmonize with the view of Brunt, who holds that philosophy had no real influence on the religious beliefs and practices even of those Romans who did have a philosophical education.

Among extant writers Lucretius, Cicero and Plutarch receive special attention. Fowler analyses the political language of Lucretius. Of course nobody would doubt that Lucretius was serious about philosophy; F. shows that he had a deep interest in politics while sticking to the Epicurean orthodoxy of staying away from it. Annas discusses the relationship between philosophy and real life on hand the debate between Antipater and Diogenes in *de off.* III. Pelling analyses a number of Lives (giving the connexions between two halves of a pair their due) and brings out the subtle differences between the individual biographies also in the matter of the influence of Greek education and culture on the various Roman heroes.

The last essay in the volume shows once again the heavy loss scholarship suffered with the untimely death of Elizabeth Rawson. In a detailed investigation she shows case by case that Greek philosophers advised Roman rulers on how to rule only according to such late writers as Themistius and, of course, modern scholars; there is simply no evidence to be found for such a view in contemporary or near-contemporary sources.

Thus, on balance, both the extent and the limits of the influence of Greek philosophy in Rome are well brought out: one wishes for the seminar to continue and for the editors to publish a sequel of yet more aspects of Greek philosophy in Rome.

I note in passing a few slips, mistakes or queries in what is, on the whole, a carefully edited and elegant volume and an important contribution to the subject. P. 25 (Griffin): though Hortensius did have a son by Marcia (see *CR* 20 [1970] 132ff.), Cic. *Att.* 7.3.9 (even with the emendation *heredis*) is no evidence that this son became Hortensius' heir; on the contrary Val. Max. 5.9.2 is quite clear that the elder son was reinstated. P. 70 (Barnes): I could not find 'to suss out' in the *OED*. P. 107 (Sedley): only *some* of Philodemus' poetry did survive antiquity through the regular Ms tradition. P. 121 n. 6 (Fowler): one is looking forward (not unseptically) to the promised defence "of the term 'published' ... not essentially different from modern publication". P. 139 (Fowler): the similarities in the language between Lucretius and Sallust's *Catiline*, even if they show influence of the former on the latter, can hardly prove that the language was already politically tinted in Lucretius. P. 164 (Annas): to my mind — admittedly better used to the vagaries of *Quellenforschung* than to philosophical argument — it seems fallacious to assert that since Antipater and Diogenes are arguing at cross-purposes this must be a spurious debate constructed by Cicero: why do we have to ascribe the logical slip to Cicero (on p. 171 we are told that "Cicero's philosophical works show a sharp mind") rather than to the Greek philosophers, about whom after all we know so much less? P. 176 (Brunt): "Anchises had saved the Penates" (but n. 5 quotes correctly August. *CD* 6.2 Aeneas de Troiano excidio penates liberasse praedicatur). P. 180 (Brunt): there were eighty conspirators against Caesar (Suet. *Iul.* 80.4 sexaginta amplius). On p. 196 Brunt quotes Horace from memory and on p. 197 Virgil somewhat strangely. Pelling's assertion (p. 217) that "*Cicero* really is a good Life" is one I failed to appreciate in my recent work on it. P. 225f.: Pelling is quite right that in the *Brutus* Plutarch declines the opportunity to discuss suicide from the point of view of the Epicureans, Stoics and Academics; he could have adduced the surprisingly similar case of *Cato minor*, where representatives of the schools attend the suicide (cf. *Athenaeum* 57 [1979] 65f.). P. 235 (Rawson): the omission of Alexander from the examples of Dio Chrysostom should not be ascribed to the tendency of "classicizing Greek writers of the imperial period" who were "inclined to omit the Hellenistic figures"; such omission never included Alexander himself (J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander. A Commentary* [Oxford 1969] XXII; cf. also *Hermes* 109 [1981] 89 for a slight correction).

Such details can detract very little from the pleasure one takes in this volume. It is a very good read indeed.