

This example may illustrate another feature of Rosén's critical edition. Its apparatus criticus is not only more comprehensive than that of Hude, but it also contains more detailed information about the origin of many textual corruptions and a deeper insight into the reasons which lay behind the editors with regard to matters of recension and emendation than one could get from any previous edition.

Limit of space prevents us from giving a full account of Rosén's contribution to the "Textgeschichte" of Herodotus. But our review would be incomplete without a reference to Rosén's 'collatio' of the codex Hierosolymitanus (J), an achievement of which he is rightfully proud: "Herodotea Hierosolymitana ipse contuli et benignitate curatoris usus in Bibliotheca post annum 1967 potui exscribere (praef. XXXVI). Codex Hierosolymitanus dates from the middle of the XVth century. According to the testimony of A. Papadopoulos Kerameus ('Ἱεροσολυμιτικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη I, 160 s.) it is a compilation based on fragmentary pieces of MSS dating from the end of the XIVth and the beginning of the XVth century. The binding of the pages was carried out in the library of Patmos. There the closing and opening pages, written in 1769, were added. Finally, the manuscript was brought to Jerusalem (not later than 1860). The value of this manuscript consists in the fact that it constitutes an important member of the stirps Romana. Rosén tried to determine its exact location within the scheme of the stemma Romana propounded by Weber (*Analecta Herodotea*, Philologus supp. 12). For further details we refer the reader to praef. XXXVIff.

Summing up, we welcome the publication of the first part of Rosén's critical edition of Herodotus, hoping that it will soon be followed up by the publication of the second part.

By selecting only a few examples, we tried to draw the attention of scholars to the wealth of new information and new insights contained in this monumental work.

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K. J. Boudouris (ed.), *Ionian Philosophy* (Athens: International Association for Greek Philosophy, 1989), 454 p.

'The articles in this volume are, in the main, the texts of papers read either in full or in part at the First International Conference on Greek Philosophy (Samos 1988)' (from the editor's Preface). Appropriately to such a first conference, it was devoted to the beginnings of philosophy in Greece and, more specifically, in Ionia itself. The volume includes forty-seven papers dealing with all the major figures of Ionian philosophy, from the Milesians to Anaxagoras. Pythagoras, the most illustrious native of Samos, and the Pythagoreans (technically considered an 'Italian' sect, but included by courtesy in the theme of the conference), attract the attention of seven scholars. The other notable Samian, Melissus, is the subject of only one contribution, by D. Furley, possibly because Melissus is usually

classified by the doxographers as an Eleatic. Xenophanes of Colophon is dealt with in five of the articles. Perhaps not surprisingly, almost half of the papers deal with Heraclitus of Ephesus, just across the water from Samos. Among those excluded from this book are the Italians Parmenides, Zeno and Empedocles, and the atomists of Abdera.

The papers in this collection are of very uneven quality, ranging from substantial contributions to scholarship and imaginative interpretations to the downright embarrassing. The sheer bulk of the book and of good papers in it constrain me to consider only some of the articles.



Forty years after W. Jaeger's *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, the wave of protest against Burnet's positivistic view of the Milesian beginnings of philosophy seems unabated. V. Tejera, in his 'The expressive medium of the Ionian presocratics', warns us not to assimilate the thinkers of the sixth century to those of the fifth. Archaic culture, he reminds us, was oral-aural and compositions were committed to writing, if at all, only after being publicly heard (Pherecydes being the exception that proves the rule). 'It is only the logicalistic presumption that assertive prose is the medium most suited to rational thinking that predisposes scholars to believe that *some* of the sixth-century Ionians write propositional prose' (p. 388, author's italics). It is the Hellenistic doxographers who are to blame for anachronistically imposing their own cosmological and physical interest on the Ionians. Tejera would rather see the early philosophers as 'reflective poets', dealing with natural inquiry only *en passant*. Accordingly, he suggests that the list of the presocratic thinkers be headed by Solon.

Tejera's thesis has undeniable appeal, especially if one takes seriously the cultural and literary context of the Ionian *sophoi*. But his claim that *none* of the sixth-century thinkers wrote propositional prose seems to me far-fetched. Anaximenes, the obvious counter-example, is too summarily dismissed as uncertainly quoted. Herodotus is not mentioned. Although admittedly his *Historiai* are not to be assimilated to the compositions of the late Archaic *sophoi*, nevertheless the fact that he too wrote discursive prose makes Pherecydes somewhat less than a remarkable exception in his century. I wish some attention were given to the case of Parmenides. Tejera includes him in his list of 'reflective poets', even though, as the author points out, he was not an Ionian. Parmenides wrote hexametres, indeed, but his mode is propositional and apodictic. Moreover, his polemical edge is difficult to understand if one does not assume a prior interest in philosophy of nature as something more than a side-line.

A. Juffras too questions the assumption that Milesian philosophy is the beginning of (rational) cosmology. He disputes Cornford's influential view that the origins of philosophy are to be found in mythology. Whereas the author's qualms about reducing Ionian philosophy to cosmology and his rejection of the evolutionary approach in the

historiography of philosophy are understandable, I can find no support for his delineation of the concerns of the first philosophers as 'the long standing problem of personal existence' (p. 196).

R. D. McKirahan points to the 'Greeks' contact with and awareness of a plurality of other culturally impressive civilizations' as the main historical circumstance responsible for the rise of 'the rational-critical approach to traditional problems' (p. 247). J. Glucker elegantly reminds us that 'hylozoism' was invented by Cudworth in 1678, originally referring to Strato of Lampsacus.



For our knowledge of early pythagoreanism we are dependent, to a great extent, on Aristotle, and the spectre of *interpretatio aristotelica* has haunted scholars from the days of Cherniss' *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* and before. C. Huffman and E. N. Ostenfeld, in separate articles, make plausible cases for reading Aristotle's reports as his own platonizing interpretations of early pythagoreanism. By contrast, R. Purtill considers Aristotle 'our best witness to pre-Socratic Pythagorean doctrine'. But I fail to see why Aristotle's being 'honestly puzzled by some elements of the [pythagorean] view' should bring us to the conclusion 'that he is reporting not reconstructing' (p. 342 n. 2). Along a different line, M. Tjiattas' construction of pythagorean *askesis* as proto-rationality is attractive, although his detecting in it premonitions of Davidson and Foucault may raise some eyebrows.



It is chiefly the epistemology of Xenophanes that draws the attention of the scholars in this collection. For J. Philippoussis this was Xenophanes' main interest. He questioned 'the epistemic certainty and its ontic reference which both his predecessors and his immediate posterity took for granted' (p. 327). Philippoussis' Xenophanes is not an Eleatic nor is he a Heraclitean. In contradistinction to Parmenides, Xenophanes does not claim to have access to the truth: καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὐτις ἀνὴρ ἶδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων ... δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται (B34. 1–2, 4). Philippoussis seems to be justified in interpreting these lines as if Xenophanes were including himself in the reference of οὐτις ἀνὴρ. Conjecture (δόκος) is all Xenophanes himself can hope for. Philippoussis' arguments on the critical side of Xenophanes' philosophical approach have much force, but one would expect, in this context, an explanation of the conviction with which Xenophanes puts forward his (admittedly negative) conception of God.

The scepticist interpretation of Xenophanes goes back in modern times at least to H. Fraenkel's 'Xenophanesstudien' (*Hermes* 1925), and it has been regaining ground in the last

twenty years or so, following the revived interest in the sceptical tradition in ancient philosophy and in the history of western thought in general. One of the consequences of this interpretation is the rehabilitation of Xenophanes as a philosopher. But our enthusiasm for the newly rediscovered Xenophanes should not push us to read back into his poems the frame of mind and the preoccupations of a modern positivist. M. McCoy must be overstating his case when he calls Xenophanes a 'strict empiricist' (p. 238), empiricism being 'a way of thinking universal to all men' (p. 236). The fact that the sun 'first makes its appearance on the horizon (the earth) and again returns into the horizon' (p. 236) can perhaps be taken as Xenophanes' evidence for stating that the sun comes into being each day, but could hardly exemplify his dictum that 'From earth come all things, all things end in earth' (fr. 27), especially since the western horizon in Colophon is the sea.

Taking a more conservative line, C. J. Classen, in a carefully researched and well-argued article, stresses the need of reading Xenophanes against the background of epic poetry and shows how Xenophanes uses non-homeric words in order to drive home his criticism of Homer.



J. Mansfeld's 'Fiddling the books', is a perceptive analysis of Heraclitus B129, showing how the Ephesian's accusations of eclecticism against Pythagoras are further sharpened by the way in which this apophthegm parodies the *incipit* of a book: Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ιστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ἐκλεζόμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποίησατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην — and the anti-climax: πολυμαθίην κακοτεχνίην. 'It is, moreover, a nice touch that someone who did not write is presented as a writer who failed' (p. 232).

D. Sider shows 'how artfully Heraclitus can position his words' (p. 365). As in fr. 1, so in fr. 5, 12, 51, 119, the same word can simultaneously serve two distinct syntactical functions. This points to a written style, adducing one more argument for those who believe that Heraclitus did write a book.

L. Couloubaritsis argues that αἰών in Heraclitus still refers to a life-time rather than to time in general. Thus, he sees in fr. 52 'la co-présence d'un aspect mythique et d'un aspect non-mythique, qui indiquerait que Aion est un nom, parmi d'autres, pour indiquer le temps propre de chaque chose qui devient à partir du fondement' (p. 112).

S. N. Mouraviev and T. M. Robinson are concerned with the methodology of Heraclitean interpretation (and, by extension, of the interpretation of the pre-socratics in general). Mouraviev decries the fact that 'l'héraclitologie ne s'est toujours pas constituée en science' (p. 270). Therefore, he proposes a preliminary sketch of a scientific methodology of heraclitean studies, starting with a full inventory and critique of the sources and of the texts, followed by a systematic and critical analysis of the resulting *corpus* and culminating in the

reconstruction of Heraclitus' book. Mouraviev is not unaware of the role of hermeneutics in such a project, but I fear he underestimates it. He is surely right in warning us against short-circuiting the necessary philological stages; but his partition between the philological procedures and the hermeneutical circle (to be resorted to 'seulement quand sont épuisés tous les autres moyens') may be too water-tight.

This is independently recognized by Robinson, who warns us of the danger inherent in 'the assumption on the part of an investigator that he or she is actually ideology-free'. He himself admits to being partial to a 'philological empiricism', which however he considers 'of all ideologies the least harmful' (p. 346). As a 'useful brake' on unbridled empiricism, he recommends the hermeneutical approach articulated by C. H. Kahn in *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (1979), with his emphasis on the notions of linguistic density, resonance and systematic ambiguity as major guides of interpretation.

Counterpointing Robinson, L. Rossetti, in his 'The disunity of Heraclitus' thought', is wary of assuming that Heraclitus' sentences can be made to conform to any general or unifying features. Any such features, 'however representative they may be, are not without exceptions, and ... exceptions too deserve careful attention, at least if hurried generalizations are to be avoided' (p. 353). 'Why not assume, at least tentatively,' so Rossetti concludes, 'that Heraclitus was willing to put aside his own theoretical guidelines (and therefore his virtual philosophical system) in order not to deviate from what he believed to be the facts of a particular matter?' (p. 361).

Rossetti's approach, salutary as it may be, is open to two opposite objections, which, fittingly enough, turn out to coincide. On the one hand, there is always the methodological danger of untimely despair: When does an interpreter decide that the pieces do not fit together, not for lack of trying but because they themselves do not belong to a single whole? And, on the other hand, any interpreter — especially of pre-socratic philosophy — must be acutely aware of the inevitability of working at all times against the background of an assumed overall interpretation of the philosopher. One should remember that the 'virtual philosophical system' into which some sentences do not fit is not Heraclitus' but our own reconstruction to the best of our critical ability. So, for example, when Rossetti argues that the static equalization of opposites, as in the beginning and the end of the circle or in salt-water being simultaneously pure and foul, cannot be reconciled with the dynamic view exemplified by the opposition of day and night, quick and dead, etc., he is assuming for Heraclitus a very definite, quasi-aristotelian conception of opposition. That Heraclitus' underlying Principle of Non-contradiction was not of that type, I have argued in my contribution to the *Symposium Heracliteum* 1981.

Another possible explanation for apparent disunity in Heraclitus is explored by D. O'Brien. The tradition ascribes to Heraclitus two different laws of the unity of opposites, the one linking both opposites in a unity which is not itself either of them (the way is not identical either with 'up' or with 'down', the sea-water is not identical either with 'pure' or with 'impure'), the other inclining towards one of the opposites to the exclusion of the other

(what men think just and unjust is all just for God). O'Brien traces back this difference to divergent interpretations of Heraclitus by Plato and by Aristotle. While Plato in the *Sophist* (and one could also add Eryximachus' speech in the *Symposium*) pointedly distinguishes Heraclitus from Empedocles, Aristotle in the *Physics* and the *de caelo* runs them together, thus finding in Heraclitus a difference of approach in the logical fragments (e.g., fr. 60, 61) and in the cosmic (e.g., fr. 30) and ethical (e.g., fr. 102) fragments. This difference is ignored by Plato, rightly, to O'Brien's mind, as irrelevant to Heraclitus' thought.

On a lighter note, D. Gallop reads Heraclitus' pronouncements as riddles, serving serious purposes 'by playful, even frivolous means' (p. 130). Riddles force upon us the recognition of paradox and antinomy. But surely this was not *all* Heraclitus was up to?

J. Moravcsik's paper is titled 'Heraclitus at the crossroads of pre-socratic thought'. The Milesians changed the traditional 'productive' pattern of explanation (' $x$  is  $F$  because it comes from  $y$ ') into the 'constitutive' pattern (' $x$  is  $F$  because it is constituted of  $F$ '). On Moravcsik's showing, Heraclitus 'sees the shortcomings of constitutive patterns of explanations, [but] does not propose to replace the constitutive model with another one' (p. 267). The next stage would be the 'attributive' model of Plato, Aristotle and modern science, which produces laws 'showing why things with certain attributes have been transformed into things with other attributes' (p. 259). But Moravcsik does not consider the possibility that Heraclitus' preferred pattern of explanation could have been radically different from both that of his predecessors and those of his successors (or some of them).

R. Bolton re-states the claim that Heraclitus was the first explicitly to appeal to nature in his ethical theory. K. Boudouris takes seriously Diodotus' report, as handed down to us by Diogenes Laertius, that the main topic of Heraclitus' book was 'not nature, but the things of the state, while what has been said in it about nature was used as a kind of example'. Boudouris reconstructs Heraclitus' political philosophy, beginning with the view of the city as a whole which unites all citizens and is expressed by the law and determined by a 'common measure of change prevail[ing] for every act of civil society' (p. 72). That this law 'guarantees the interests of the many and, of course, the vital interests of the demos' (p. 67) seems to me rather more questionable.

D. Lambrellis and J. Vicenzo show, again, the links between Heraclitus and Nietzsche. H. Yamakawa compares Heraclitus and the Taoist Chinese philosopher Chuang-tzi (ca. 369–286 B.C.E.) on the question of the unity of the opposites. N. Georgopoulos denies that Heraclitus qualifies as a philosopher, presumably because 'all philosophy, including materialism, is basically idealism' (p. 137).

F. Hetzler's main suggestion is that a street be named after Heraclitus (p. 184–5).



The controversy about the relative chronology of Anaxagoras and Empedocles was rekindled by D. O'Brien in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 1968, and more recently by D. Sider

in his 1981 edition of *The Fragments of Anaxagoras*. The traditional view, lately defended by J. Mansfeld in a note in *Mnemosyne* 1980, is that Empedocles was Anaxagoras' senior and that the Clazomenian's doctrine of homogeneous indefinitely divisible substances, called by Aristotle (or possibly by Anaxagoras himself) *homoiomere*, was meant to counter the difficulties of Empedocles' doctrine of four elements. In the present collection, C. H. Kahn re-examines the evidence for the dating of Anaxagoras and comes to the conclusion that 'it is a mistake to see him in any way dependent upon the new ideas of Empedocles and the atomists. On the contrary, it is Anaxagoras' version of the Ionian cosmology that provides the point of departure for Empedocles and Leucippus' (p. 307).

O. Gigon presents an exhaustive analysis of Anaxagoras in Plato and Aristotle (and in the later doxography). He tries to recover those aspects of Anaxagoras' thought which do not appear in the twenty-two fragments printed by Diels-Kranz, mainly from Alexander and Simplicius. Among these aspects, Gigon points out the relation between the cosmic *nous* and *agathon* and between that *nous* and the *nous* of men and of living things in general.

M. L. Silvestre reappraises Simplicius' testimony concerning Anaxagoras.



This new series, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, of which this volume is the first, is a welcome addition to the still small but fast-growing list of serials and periodicals specializing in Greek philosophy. It is a pity that the book is marred by careless proofreading, resulting in a great many misprints and spelling inconsistencies (Heraclitus / Heraklitus / Heraclitos). One paper was printed without its notes.

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Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (eds.), *Philosophia Togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, 302 p.

'This volume contains nine papers from the editors' Oxford seminar: Miriam Griffin writes on "Philosophy, Politics and Politicians at Rome", I. G. Kidd on "Posidonius and Philosopher-Historian", Jonathan Barnes on "Antiochus of Ascalon", David Sedley on "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World", D. P. Fowler on "Lucretius and Politics", Julia Annas on "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property", P. A. Brunt on "Philosophy and Religion in the Late Republic", Christopher Pelling on "Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture" and lastly there is a paper by the late Elizabeth Rawson on "Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Adviser".