

'Αναζωγράφημα and Related Terms in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Notion of *Phantasia**

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Basing his theory of the soul on Aristotle's theses, Alexander cannot pretend to be unfamiliar with the doctrine of the Stoics who offered a powerful alternative to the Aristotelian version. This holds true particularly of the concept of *phantasia*, since they made it central to the theory of knowledge, and so forced Alexander to elaborate a notion more detailed and, perhaps, more clear-cut than what we find in Aristotle.¹ No wonder that in doing so he incorporates much of the views of the rival school into his account. Apart from remarks scattered throughout the corpus, Alexander discusses this problem in a relatively long portion of his *de Anima*, where he follows the line of Aristotle's *de Anima* III 3.² As my aim is to examine the role and meaning of some special terms, I am going to dwell mainly on this text, although, when necessary, relevant passages elsewhere will also be examined.

First, it may be useful to give an overall picture of what Alexander calls *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is a discriminating faculty or capacity which enables us to form true or false statements.³ By this definition Alexander at once marks it off

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¹ Aristotle's own account is notoriously complex. New unitarian approaches have been proposed by G. Watson, "*Phantasia* in Aristotle *de Anima* III 3", *CQ* n.s. 32, 1982, 100-113, and H.J. Horn, "Aristote, *Traité de l'âme*, III 3, et le concept aristotélicien de *phantasia*", *Les Études Philosophiques* 2, 1988, 221-235. As my purpose is not to examine Aristotle's concept, it is unnecessary to list even the main items of the vast literature.

² 66.9-73.13 Bruns, *CAG Suppl.* II,1. A translation of Alexander's *de Anima* has been offered in A. Fotinis, *The de anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias. A translation and commentary*, 1979. His own treatment of *phantasia* is to be found on pp. 262-274. For an evaluation of his work which I accept, see P. Donini, *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino*, 1982, 247 n. 50. According to R.B. Todd, "Two displaced passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias' *de Anima*", *Eranos* 74, 1976, 28-31, 72.5-13 and 73.3-7 have been displaced from its original place in all our manuscripts of the whole treatise. But this fact, I believe, does not alter my point.

³ κριτική δύναμις, 66.9-10.

from sense-perception (αἴσθησις), that both receives and discriminates its objects.⁴ The active character of *phantasia* may be emphasized in this way. Indeed, later we are told that it is a process (κίνησις) through which images (φαντάσματα) are brought about in our soul.⁵ But what are these images? To determine them is all the more necessary because Alexander employs several terms denoting either the means by which *phantasia* works or the results of its working, or perhaps both.⁶ The approach I should like to try starts from examining the distinction he makes between *phantasia* and opinion (δόξα). One way in which they differ is that opinion is affirmative or negative, but this cannot be said of every *phantasia*.⁷ As a consequence, for affirmation or negation involves composition (σύνθεσις) - either of words into sentences, as in the case of opinion and knowledge, or of parts into a new whole -, there has to be *phantasia* which is of this sort and also that which does not require composition. Further on, he does not expound how these two kinds or aspects of this capacity are to be qualified, but a certain amount of evidence indicates their grounds, the imprint (τύπος) or picture (ἀναζωγράφημα), which are called forth by the activity concerning perceptible objects of the senses and house in the first sensing organ which is a body where the sensing faculty of the soul is lodged.⁸ This imprint is called residual trace (ἐγκατάλειμμα), the outcome of the process raised by perceptible objects, which remains even when the objects of which it is the likeness (εἰκόν) are no longer present.⁹ Memory images take their origin from such traces too.

As Alexander reports, some people call this residual trace and this imprint *phantasia* and therefore they define *phantasia* as impression (τύπωσις) or, rather, impression in the regent part of the soul. Whoever these philosophers may be, Alexander left them unnamed, but the general consensus has been to attribute such a doctrine to the Stoics, though the term ἐγκατάλειμμα is to be found in

⁴ δύναμις δεκτική τε καὶ κριτική, 66.13-14.

⁵ 66.20-21.

⁶ Such a multiplicity of terms was apparent also to D. Papadis (*Die Seelenlehre bei Alexander von Aphrodisias*, 1991, 314 n. 5) but he does not attempt to qualify their meanings. See also the comprehensive approach by D.K.W. Modrak, "Alexander on *Phantasia*: A hopeless muddle or a better account", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* XXXI, 1993, *Supplement*, 173-193, who however fails to pay attention to this multiplicity of terms.

⁷ οὐ πάντα δὲ φαντασία τοιαύτη. 67.20-22.

⁸ 68.4ff. τύπος is used of "imprints" on the liver, the seat of desires, at Plato, *Timaeus* 71B4; ἀναζωγράφημα may echo *Philebus* 40A-B, on "painted" (perhaps imaginary) pleasures, and the use of ἀναζωγραφοῖ [scil. φαντάσματα] at *Timaeus* 71C4. Aristotle uses ζωγράφημα at *de Memoria* 450a 29-30.

⁹ 68.7; 69.15-17. For ἐγκατάλειμμα, see R. B. Todd, "Lexicographical notes on Alexander of Aphrodisias' philosophical terminology", *Glotta* 52, 1974, 207-215, esp. 210-11. Aristotle speaks of ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος at *Insomn.* 3, 461b21-22.

Epicurus as well.¹⁰ One reason why Alexander rejects this view is that the equation of imprint with *phantasia* would imply that *phantasia* must coincide either with perception or with memory,¹¹ which is of course impossible. Two things will be clear from the criticism. In the last resort, *phantasia* is an activity of a separate faculty and has an object of its own, called φανταστόν. Moreover, we have arrived at the two neighbouring cognitive activities from which it has to be distinguished. But now we have to face the question how the entities signified by terms like imprint, picture, residual trace and likeness can be related to each other and to the φανταστόν that seems to cover all of them. For the moment, let me leave aside the image (φάντασμα), as its relation to φανταστόν may be a bit different from the way imprints and the other terms mentioned above are connected to it.

For that very reason, it may be helpful to discuss at the beginning, chiefly to get it out of the way, the most comprehensive among such things, the imprint. The following brief remarks may be to the point. Imprint may comprise all kinds of products of perception in the soul, both those which disappear after the process of perceiving has ceased and those which remain even then, being thus the appropriate object for *phantasia*. Incidentally, it cannot be said that the problem of how to define imprint occupies Alexander very much. Nevertheless, he does devote a fairly long paragraph to explaining what τύπος is not.¹² Alexander here reacts to Cleanthes' description (SVF I, 484), but his arguments are not those of Chrysippus (SVF II, 56). They seem to derive from a Peripatetic source: either Alexander himself, using Peripatetic terminology to refute a Stoic position, or an earlier Peripatetic, working when Cleanthes' view was still widely held, before

¹⁰ πύκνωμα καὶ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου *Ep. Herod.* 50.7, for references see the notes in G. Arrighetti ed., *Epicuro. Opere*, 1973², 500. Alexander uses ἐγκατάλειμμα also in treating perception (cf. 63.2-4) and parallels it to "trace" (ἵχνος) as having the same function. As for Stoic vestiges here, cf. Fotinis (n. 2), 263 who thinks ἐγκατάλειμμα to be of Stoic origin, but see Todd (n. 2), 211. For an examination of the Stoic background in Alexander's notion, see R.B. Todd, "Aristotelianism and Stoicism: Alexander of Aphrodisias on *Phantasia* (de Anima 66.9-73.13 Bruns)", *Canadian Classical Association* 1976, 3/5/76 and 8/6/76 respectively. My purpose, however, is rather to point to the twofold aspect of *phantasia* in Alexander, which, it is true, is not unique, but the way in which he reaches it seems to be original. For *phantasia* in the Stoics, see M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, 1984⁶, 54-64; F.H. Sandbach, "Phantasia kataleptike", *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A.A. Long, 1971, 9-21; G. Watson, *Phantasia in classical thought*, 1988, 44-58; A.A. Long, "Representation and the self in Stoicism", *Companions to ancient thought*, Vol. 2, *Psychology*, ed. S. Everson, 1991, 102-121.

¹¹ 68.18-21; later on, he repeats that *phantasia* and perception seem to be the same, but only if we take their way of functioning in the presence of perceptible objects into account, see 69.14-15.

¹² Cf. 72.5-13. But it is striking that elsewhere he employs the term very rarely. For a short clarification of this term, see W. Dooley (trans.), *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Metaphysics I*, 1989, 17 nn. 23, 24.

Chrysippus' retort gained publicity.¹³ The term τύπος, then, cannot be used in a physical sense. Alexander does not allow the simple, physical sense of τύπος even to sense-perceptions. He makes clear that the τύπος of the basic sense-perceptions, like colour and smell, has no σχῆμα, and therefore could not be a plain physical imprint like that made by a seal. The implication is that even such basic sense-perceptions are somehow imprinted in our soul, and therefore the whole idea of τύπος must be taken figuratively, not literally, in the Cleanthean sense.¹⁴ Back to Alexander's own explanation. The twofold aspect may be of some interest. Furthermore, we also find a passage where mention is made of imprint in the strict sense to be applied exclusively when we are talking of sense-perception, illustrated by the example of the seal, but we are also permitted to speak of imprint, though in a more general sense, when it comes to *phantasia*.¹⁵

Consider, next, residual trace. First of all, Alexander asserts φανταστόν to be the same as the trace which remains.¹⁶ In order to emphasize the independence of this capacity, he compares it to perception and thinking by establishing that just as these two need objects proper to them so there have to be objects from which *phantasia* sets out. This role is fulfilled by the residual trace that, drawing a further parallel, he calls inner perceptible while the object proper to perception is called outer perceptible.¹⁷ Given that no subordination of the activity of *phantasia* to perceiving can be discerned here, and that we are not entitled to suppose that the output of the one would immediately be a starting point for the other in all cases, there is a need to explain the differences between the objects peculiar to each capacity. Alexander is well aware of the task and, to change the point of view, he now considers the residual trace as a product (ἔργον) of the perceptive faculty and goes on to make a typically Aristotelian point. As he says, the capacity of *phantasia* is identical with the perceptive faculty in substrate (κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον), but it differs in account (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ).¹⁸ Here he appears to claim that it is one and the same faculty that works now as *phantasia*, then as sense-perception. This approach underlies the new definition of *phantasia* according to which it is a process raised by actual sense-perception. Here Alexander is faithful to Aristotle.¹⁹ But, in what follows, he dissents from Aristotle who turns to the etymology of the word and claims that animals, too, act according to this capacity. Alexander contradicts the Stoics who identified *phantasia* with the imprint, or impression (τύπωσις), in the ἡγεμονικόν,²⁰ and goes on to expound the twofold aspect of *phantasia*. I suggest that both the statement and the definition imply only that there is no sharp line to be drawn between per-

¹³ As my reader has pointed out to me.

¹⁴ The phrase κατ' εἰσοχὴν καὶ ἐξοχὴν at 72.6 is an echo of Cleanthes' words at SVF I, 484.

¹⁵ 72.6-10.

¹⁶ 68.26-27.

¹⁷ αἰσθητὰ ἐντός/ἐκτός, 69.1-2.

¹⁸ 69.5-6.

¹⁹ κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως, 70.2-3; cf. *Quaestiones* III 13, 108.3-4 Bruns, *CAG Suppl.* II, 2. See also Aristotle's *de Anima* III, 3, 429a1-2.

²⁰ Cf. also 68.10-21 and SVF II, 56.

ceiving and imagining about objects outside our soul. To have actually perceived is to have such imprint from perceptible objects, and we look on the imprint as residual trace only if it remains even in the absence of the object that has impressed it into the sense organ. For this reason, to be residual trace is a part of what it is to be imprint, but not the reverse. The same can be said of the likeness (εἰκὼν) and trace (ἴχνος) that seem to be substitutes for residual trace.²¹ Moreover here it may be seen that both imprint and residual trace are immediate results of sense-perception and the apparent problem of how *phantasia* and sense-perception can be the same has also been removed by relying on the Peripatetic doctrine of actuality and potentiality.

But still before this “new” definition, which repeats Aristotle’s, Alexander turns to treating the inward aspects of *phantasia* and its objects. To introduce the point, he refers to a familiar principle which says that it is quite possible for something moved to move another thing.²² In our case this thesis involves that the first sensing organ which is moved by perceptible objects through its activity concerning them moves the imaginative soul (φανταστική ψυχή) with a movement within raised by perceptibles. And then he adds:

καὶ τὰ κατὰ ἀναζωγράφῃσιν ἐν ἡμῖν γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ μὴ παρόντων κινεῖ.

“and those which have come about through a picturing process within us move [our capacity], similarly to those [imprints] resulting from objects no longer present”.²³

It is quite plain that the results of “picturing process” correspond to what Alexander called “pictures”, ἀναζωγραφήματα, and those which have been impressed by objects no longer present are residual traces. Furthermore, I think that nothing compels us to take καὶ as explicative and therefore to place these products on the same level. It is more plausible that the picturing process takes place in the imaginative part of our soul and transforms residual traces or imprints issuing from perceptible objects into pictures. It may also be clear that picturing is an internal process which takes place in us and brings forth pictures even when

²¹ As Robert Todd has pointed out in n. 31 to his English translation of Themistius’ in *de Anima*, forthcoming.

²² 69.20-22. Alexander is commenting Aristotle’s *de Anima* III 3, 428b10ff., but see also *Physics* III 1, 201a23-25, 2, 202a3, where we are told that that which moves physically is also moved and moves by being moved. For Alexander, the process of impression into the sensing organ may be a physical one, as it was for the Stoics too. This is not to say that he would not have been clear about the problem of the coloration of the sense organs: he tried to eliminate it by denying that sense organs can receive qualities contrary to their matter, as pointed out by R. Sorabji, “From Aristotle to Brentano: The development of the concept of intentionality”, *Aristotle and the later tradition*, edd. H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson, 1991, 227-261. Moreover, the text may be corrupt - at least the one before the Hebrew translator: see Bruns’ *app. crit.*

²³ 69.25-26. I follow the translation by Fotinis here only with serious reservations for he seems to have interpolated terms into his version which are misleading in this context. See also 70.17-18.

we are asleep.²⁴ Of course, the ultimate base for producing pictures remains sense-perception, that which brings about imprints in us which in turn become the ingredients of such pictures. If this suggestion is right, and we do not consider the picturing process as the only activity of the imaginative soul, then we have to surmise two kinds of objects for *phantasia*. The one includes imprint and other immediate products of sense-perception, the other the “picture” developed from them. Alexander confirms this when he describes how true and false *phantasiai* come into being in us.²⁵ Our *phantasia* is probably true when it stems from perceptibles proper to a given sense organ, that is in the case of sight it is derived from perceiving colour, and retains the reliability of perception from which it results. By contrast with this, it is probably false when it comes from one of the five common perceptibles or from accidental perceptibles, to which substances also belong, for there is no direct perception of such qualities; they can be apprehended only derivatively and therefore more obscurely.²⁶ Another source of falsity is when the residual traces from which *phantasia* sets out are not fully preserved, but remoulded (προσανατυπούσα) by *phantasia*, possibly by a previous one.²⁷ And then, it is this remoulded trace that is useful as a starting point and matter for another *phantasia* or judgement. On the strength of what has been said, there is room for image (φάντασμα) as well. As an outcome of *phantasia* it is not to be subsumed under imprints, in whatever broad sense we may take them, but its affinity to picture is striking. However, they are not identical. Picture is produced through a picturing process while image is said to be product of all sorts of *phantasia*. But because the picturing process is not the only activity of the imaginative faculty, the image must possess a meaning broader than that of the picture.

It remains to be examined whether the two kinds of object correspond to the two kinds of *phantasia*, and if so, in what way they do. The differences are meant to be noticed as much as the similarities, but in the end we may feel that there is at least some kind of correlation. As has been mentioned above, Alexander distinguished *phantasia* of one kind which involves composition from another kind which does not.²⁸ Developing this line of thought, we may not be rash in inferring that the object of one *phantasia* must be compound, in a sense to be explained, while the other *phantasia* must have objects that are not com-

²⁴ Cf. 70.18.

²⁵ 70.5ff.

²⁶ Cf. Aristotle's *de Anima* 428b18. His example of accidental perceptible (αἰσθητὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός) is Kleon's son (*de Anima* III, 1, 425a24-27); Alexander instances “foam” (ἀφρός, *de Anima* 41.7-8) which is not, in Aristotle's terms, primary substance, as the son of Kleon is, but a secondary one. Despite this discrepancy, I think Alexander used this example rightly, for the point was not to make a distinction between substances of different sorts, but to stress that substance, of whatever sort, cannot be perceived in itself.

²⁷ 70.13; as far as I know, this is the only occurrence of the verb προσανατυπεῖν in Alexander. Its literal meaning may be “remould in addition/again” and surely implies a further transformation of a trace already given in the soul.

²⁸ 67.20-22.

posed. But in what sense are they composed? At first glance, one may think of two candidates. It may be feasible to conceive of compound objects as substances made up of matter and form. Thus one object would consist of matter and form, while the other, which is not complex, is pure form. Although it is true that Alexander was faithful to the Aristotelian tenet in saying that sense-perception consists in receiving the form of the perceived body without its matter, it would be impossible to justify such a double claim within a Peripatetic intellectual ambience.²⁹ For what would it mean for *phantasia* to be directed towards objects composed of matter and form? In Alexander's eyes, the faculty of *phantasia* can evidently not possess the matter of external objects.³⁰ Or again, if by matter we mean the stuff of the imaginative faculty into which residual traces are supposed to be embedded then what about objects of pure form? Secondly, the passage in *de Mixtione*, which says that the kinds of *phantasia* differ according to the mixtures that constitute each thing, would not be helpful here either.³¹ For the word "phantasia" signifies here, I believe, nothing but "appearance" with reference to the way in which things look, and the way in which a thing appears is determined by the constitutive elements and their relation to each other.³² There is no allusion to any faculty of the soul either.

Consequently, we have to look for a third candidate. As a speculation I suggest the following. To begin with, it may be useful to remind ourselves of the composition ascribed to opinion. According to this, negation and affirmation are what make an opinion compound. That is, composition is not something given from the outset, rather, propositions are composed by the proper capacity of the soul, in our case by opinion. But *phantasia* also displays a process through which compound images are brought about: this is the picturing process that transforms residual traces or parts of them into pictures and may be exemplified by our vision of the centaur, as well as by dreams when the perceptible objects are missing. Moreover, this kind of *phantasia* reveals itself in the fine arts too and therefore stands quite close to what we now call creative imagination, the notion of which was first put on the map in the late Hellenistic period.³³ One

²⁹ *de Anima* 83.13-14 and see Aristotle, *de Anima* II 12, 424a17-24, III 12, 434a29.

³⁰ Among others, this follows from his view of the problem of contrary qualities in the sense-organ, cf. R. Sorabji (n. 22).

³¹ 217.4-9 Bruns, *CAG Suppl.* II, 2. For a different view, see R.B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics*, 1976, 188-190. He thinks Alexander introduced the Stoic concept of "presentation" here. But even if he is right it does not invalidate my argument, for those "presentations" are also to be seen as immediate products of external objects and therefore would belong to the class of imprints here.

³² As in *de Sensu* 60.21-23, 63.17, 65.7, 66.17 Wendland, *CAG* III, 1.

³³ Cf. G. Watson (n. 1), 59-96 and id., "Discovering the imagination: Platonists and Stoics on *phantasia*", *The question of Eclecticism: Studies in later Greek philosophy*, edd. J. Dillon and A.A. Long, 1988, 208-233. According to M. Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, 2 Bände, 1880, Alexander elaborated the modern concept of *phantasia* simply by contrasting sense-perception, which is

should still ask whether the other type of *phantasia*, which does not admit composition, can have any affinity to objects subsumed under the imprint. The answer seems on the whole to be affirmative. Although imprints or residual traces are divisible into parts in thought without more ado, looking at them in relation to *phantasia* we see that they provide the starting point for further analysis, and in this respect they are not divided. They are elementary in a way. The *phantasia* working with such objects is called true and strong and, in a term recalling Stoic theories, comprehensive (καταληπτική).³⁴ These are the imprints to be remoulded by *phantasia*. Apart from the name, this comprehensive *phantasia* has of course many other features in common with its Stoic antecedent, but it is not the same. Being restricted to using imprints, it may indicate that Alexander has learnt a great deal from the Academic attack against the Stoic notion. For it is only this kind of *phantasia* that is to be considered true. In this way, Alexander may successfully avoid the objection based on dreams.³⁵ Nevertheless the problem of delusion still remains a puzzle, since it is hard to see how traces wrongly considered to be caused directly by an external thing are objects for comprehensive *phantasia*. That is, comprehensive *phantasia* cannot reach all imprints, only part of them. The correspondence is therefore not complete, but enough nonetheless to establish a certain correlation.

Finally, it should be added that with this kind of twofold division of *phantasia* and its objects Alexander stands alone among his contemporaries and predecessors. There is no trace of such a doctrine in neither the Stoics whose contribution to the development of the concept was enormous, and who may have elaborated a similar view, but in a different way, nor in Epicurus.³⁶ On the other

always true, to *phantasia*, which is not always so (II, pp. 200-201). I do not think this evidence alone is sufficient to justify taking this view. His opinion was also rejected by M.W. Bundy, *The theory of imagination in classical and mediaeval thought*, University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, XII 2-3, 1927, who thinks, it seems wrongly, that the Peripatetics added nothing to Aristotle's notion (pp. 85 and 103), but rightly emphasizes the development of the concept in Quintilian, Longinus and Philostratus (pp. 105-116).

³⁴ τὰς δὲ ἀληθεῖς τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ σφοδρὰς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν καὶ καταληπτικὰς..., 71.10-13.

³⁵ The Academic objection is reported by Sextus, *AM* VII 188, 402-404, and Cicero, *Lucullus* 77.103, 99.84.

³⁶ For the Stoic distinction, see G. Watson (n. 10), 44-45. It can easily be seen that the Stoic distinction of perceptual and non-perceptual *phantasia* cannot be the direct source for Alexander. Nor is there any trace of such a distinction in Posidonius, see L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd edd, *Posidonius. Vol. I, The Fragments*, 1989, *passim*. The most important Stoic antecedent of Alexander's doctrine is reported by Diogenes Laertius, VII 53, according to which we can produce the picture of the centaur by way of composition (κατὰ σύνθεσιν). However, Diogenes is silent about the precise way and ground of producing such pictures. Neither is there any other source which attributes the manner described by Alexander to the Stoics. Themistius' theory has been examined, with ample references to Alexander, by R.B. Todd, "Themistius and the traditional interpre-

hand, though indebted to him in other matters, even Plotinus ignored this view when elaborating his notion of the twofold *phantasia*.³⁷ It may come as no surprise then that the most faithful advocates of his theory in late Antiquity are to be found among the Alexandrian Neoplatonists who rejected the Plotinian doctrine and whose terminology and approach suggest a return to the Peripatetics in this field.

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tation of Aristotle's theory of *phantasia*", *Acta Classica* 24, 1981, 49-59, and see his notes to the forthcoming English translation of Themistius' in *de Anima*.

³⁷ See H.J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' psychology: His doctrine of the embodied soul*, 1971, esp. 88-95 and J. Dillon, "Plotinus and the transcendental imagination", *Religious imagination*, ed. J.P. Mackey, 1986, 55-65, and id., "Plotinus, the first Cartesian?", *Hermathena* 149, 1990, 19-31. Some striking similarities between their theories of the soul have been pointed out by P. Henry, "Une comparaison chez Aristote, Alexandre et Plotin", *Les sources de Plotin*, 1960, 429-449.