requires much more than philosophical scholarship and a reading of the more recent secondary literature written by philosophical scholars in English. It should be an exercise in philological dexterity, historical method and literary comprehension as well as in philosophical analysis. Treating the arguments of various passages as grist to one's philosophical mill, and treading safely in the footsteps of those who have trodden safely in the footsteps, is far less demanding. One merely plays the game 'within the family'. My guess is that it will go on.

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Whose Plato?

Harold Tarrant, *Thrasyllan Platonism*, Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1993, xii + 260 pp.

While most philosophical scholars have taken a modern edition of Plato (or a translation based on a modern edition) as a 'given', and constructed 'Platonisms' or reconstructed 'Socratic philosophies' on the basis of such a 'given', a number of Classical scholars have begun in recent years to question the reliability of much of the transmitted text itself. The issue is no longer that of athetizing whole dialogues known to some or many of the ancients as Plato's - that was a preoccupation of nineteenth-century scholars, mainly in the German tradition: the problem now is how much possible interference with the text of Plato could have occurred before our manuscript tradition began. After all, no MS of Plato is earlier than the ninth century — that is, a good twelve centuries after Plato — and the testimonia in ancient and mediaeval sources (which also depend on MSS and where 'normalization' is always possible and often practised) and in the papyri cover, between them, only small sections of the dialogues. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Proclus knew of 'Platonists' who interfered with the text of Plato for 'ideological' reasons, and Galen suspected similar procedures in his copy of *Timaeus* and looked for what he believed to be a more reliable 'edition'. More recently, John Whittaker (*Phoenix* 23, 1969, 181-5; 27, 1973, 387-91 - now chapters II and III of his *Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought*, London 1984) and John Dillon (*AJP* 110, 1989, 50-72) have shown that other 'ideological' tamperings with Plato's text may also have occurred. Clearly, much was going on during the period of the emergence of Middle Platonism. One 'minor' problem is that the evidence, precisely for that period, is meagre in the extreme.

Harold Tarrant is something of a 'maximalist'. In his previous book, *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy* (Cambridge 1985), he was willing to ascribe to Philo of Larissa's 'Fourth Academy' the anonymous commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus* (Pap. Berlin 9782), and — through the mediation of Antiochus of Ascalon καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος — the whole of Sextus *M VII* 89-260 (See my review in *JHS CIX*, 1989, 272-3). His present hero is Thrasyllus, Tiberius' astrologer and the initiator of the tetralogical division and order of Plato's dialogues which is preserved in Diogenes and in the main MSS. Tarrant is prepared to ascribe to Thrasyllus not merely that tetralogical arrangement, but also the whole of Diogenes Laertius 3. 47-66, which he claims to be part of an εἰσαγωγή written by Thrasyllus as an introduction to a new edition of the whole Platonic corpus, destined soon to dominate the tradition. Since Thrasyllus is men-

tioned by Porphyry (*Vit. Plot.* 20; 21) among earlier 'Pythagoreanizing Platonists', Tarrant also attempts to trace his influence on the Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato's *Parmenides*. A long section of Porphyry's commentary on Ptolemy's *Harmonics*, which contains a long disquisition on λόγος and in which Thrasyllus is cited once for a phrase he used, is also ascribed by Tarrant to Thrasyllus. Finally, a number of places in *Meno* and *Timaeus*, where Tarrant suspects some 'Neopythagorean' interference, are cautiously laid at his door. The long and short of it is that '...we cannot adequately distinguish Thrasyllus from Plato. That was always his [= Thrasyllus'] intention — that Thrasyllus' Plato should be our own Plato too'. (213). Is Thrasyllus, then, such a formidable figure? Should philosophical scholars henceforth call their books *Thrasyllus' Theory of Knowledge* or *Thrasyllus' Socrates*? Not so fast.

I have studied this book in great detail, and it has not been an easy task. Not just that a major part of its theme — ancient arrangements and classifications of the dialogues — is complex in itself and liable to attract much ingenuity and not a little guesswork: the little evidence we have is lacunose, often confused, and seldom clear. It is also that Tarrant's discussion is frequently contorted and often midrashic; it lacks much of the directness and freshness which make his first book — however much one may disagree with its main thesis and much besides — such a pleasure to read. One should admit in extenuation that the subject is much larger, and much more has been written on various parts of it in the last two generations, *ut iam magnitudine laboret sua.* I could have turned my notes on this book into a whole dissertation, an ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος, but space is limited. I shall therefore not argue in detail about Chapters Two and Three (pp. 31-57 and 58-84), except to remark that I find the ascription of Alfarabi's order of reading the dialogues (32-4) to Galen, mainly because the Arabs knew Galen as a Platonist and a pupil of Albinus (34-5), highly speculative. This is not just because the name of an author like 'Jalinus' was hardly likely to be omitted in such contexts, but also because I prefer the far less speculative and far more economical reconstruction of Albinus' own arrangement proposed by Heinrich Dörrie, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, Bd. 2, ed. Matthias Baltes, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990 (to be reviewed in a forthcoming issue of this periodical), 341-4; 513-20, to the one presented in a rather confused way here (44-5). Nor do I find the attempt to reduce the chaotic list ascribed to Theon of Smyrna by the *Fihrist* into tetralogical order (with an abundance of missing dialogues supplied in parentheses) very convincing. That the *Fihrist* claims that Theon was a tetralogist is interesting, but the list provided (not in the same place in *Fihrist*) just does not fit in. The attempt (65-8) to arrange this reconstructed tetralogical ordering in accordance with Philo of Larissa's rather innocent διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφία λόγου of Stobaeus 2.39.20 — 41.26 W, presented here as no less than an 'educational programme' (65-8: cf. 'the well-known theory of Philo of Larissa', 81), needs only to be mentioned.

Nor do I have the time and space to go in detail into Chapter Six (148-77), which ascribes to Thrasyllus a major role in the Neopythagorean interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*. Speculation on this theme began with an article by the young E.R. Dodds in *JHS* 1928, which already relied largely on a passage of Moderatus which *may* have had something to do with Plato's *Parmenides*. Compared with Tarrant's lucubrations, Dodds' article would appear to be a plain statement of self-evident facts. The chapter teems with admissions that there are 'minor points of difficulty... but...' and similar expressions (e.g. 158-9; 161; 172; 174), and sentences like 'seeing that the correspondence occurs in a pas-

sage in which we might not have hoped for any, we have a striking confirmation...' (161), or admissions like 'though the evidence is minimal and purely coincidental...' (176).

Was Thrasyllus the author of the 'philosophical' division of the dialogues into 'zetetic/hyphegetic' and their sub-species, as well as of the 'dramatic' division and arrangement in tetralogies (Chapter Four, 85-107)? Most scholars accept the statement of DL 3.56-7, that the arrangement in nine tetralogies (which we also find in our MSS) is due to Thrasyllus, who was most probably reacting against Aristophanes' trilogies. But how could one reconcile these 'numerologically' neat, and in a number of cases dramatically meaningful, tetralogies with the chaos resulting from the mixture, in the same tetralogy, of 'maieutic' and 'ethical' (tetr. 4), or of 'anatreptic', 'endeictic', 'peirastic' (tetr. 6), or 'ethical', 'political', 'physical' (tetr. 8) dialogues? Tetralogy 8, for example, would make prefect dramatic sense, *Clitopho* hinting to *Rep.* I; *Timaeus* 17cff. referring back to *Rep.* II-IV, and *Critias* continuing *Timaeus*. But 'ethical — political — physical — ethical' makes no sense. Tarrant's theory of the 'satyr-play' arrangement, demanding an 'odd man out' in each tetralogy (71-2; 95-6) reads too much into the words ascribed to Thrasyllus by DL 3.56. From Tarrant's list on p. 95, it appears that the 'odd man out' (= 'satyr-play') can appear in the first, second, third or fourth place in a tetralogy — as if the tragic tetralogy ever had that flexibility. Even if one accepted this, it would still not solve the problem of tetralogies 6 or 8, where one would have to opt for 'odd *two men* out' — that is, two 'tragedies' with two 'satyr-plays' in each tetralogy, *ordine mutato et motu*. The archon would not have stood for that.

Fortunately, the whole issue of Thrasyllus and Diogenes Laertius 3 was treated, about a year after the appearance of this book, by Jaap Mansfeld, *Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (Leiden 1994), ch. 2, pp. 58-107. On pp. 89-105, Mansfeld adduces arguments, most of which I find compelling, for taking the 'character' classification (DL 3.49 = the classification ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος: DL 3. 56; often called 'the philosophical division' in modern scholarship, probably following Grote) as later than the tetralogical one and not commensurate with it.

I wish to add another consideration. Mansfeld (95-7), quoting Dunn, reminds us that terms like 'peirastic', 'elenctic', 'gymnastic' and 'agonistic' are most likely to be derived from Aristotle's *Topics*. (One could add that 'anatreptic' is even later: Aristotle uses ἀνασκευάζω and cognates in this sense.) It took some time for Aristotle's dialectic to percolate after Andronicus' edition. (One adds that Cicero's logic and dialectic are still Stoic, and his *Topics* has nothing to do with Aristotle's). Mansfeld would, therefore, 'tentatively date the original systematic diaeresis around the mid-first century CE...' I doubt whether Seneca's Ep. 58 has much to do with the 'philosophical division' of Plato's dialogues. What is more important, the division as now presented in DL 3. 49-51; 58-61; Albinus 6, is not merely mismatched: it is a hybrid. One ἀνώτατος χαρακτήρ, the 'hypegetic' or 'hyphegematic', is of a 'dogmatic' nature, and is subdivided into the main 'dogmatic' parts of philosophy, physics, logic, ethics-politics. The other is of a more 'sceptical' character, and is divided into methodical, and largely 'negative', sub-groups: even the dialogues in the 'maieutic' group end with no 'doctrinal and positive' result. Our late sources for this division tell us that even these 'zetetic' dialogues are there to help eradicate errors and false methods and to prepare us to learn the real δόγματα of Plato (e.g. Albinus 6). This already sounds like protesting too much: there may be more behind it. The 'sceptical' Academy must have found some 'hyphegetical' dialogues not all that easy to cope with (and I am far from satisfied with what I said on this issue in *Antiochus*

38-47: I wish we had more evidence and could tread on safer ground). In a similar way, the up-and-coming Middle Platonists, working within memory of the 'ephectic' Academics and their traditions, must have found the dialogues we like to call aporetic no less of a stumbling-block. Even the author of the late anonymous Prolegomena to Plato's Philosophy (pp. 204-7H = 21-5W) — or an earlier source for this section — feels a need to defend himself against the charge that Plato was ἐφεκτικὸς καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκός. So does the source of 3. 51-2 and *Anon. Theaet.* 54-5, both answering the claim that Plato οὐδὲν/οὐ δογματίζει. Many a modern philosopher would find no difficulty in extracting epistemology from *Theaetetus* and parts of *Meno*, moral philosophy from *Protagoras* and *Laches*, aesthetics from *Io*, philosophy of religion from *Euthyphro*, and the like. Whoever invented the 'philosophical' division of the dialogues was more careful, and felt the need to separate dialogues of a more 'dialectical' character from the more 'tame', 'expositional' ones. This may well have originated in a compromise which took into account the 'sceptical' tradition of the Academy and 'incorporated' it into a more 'dogmatic' whole. At the time of Cicero, some pupils of the 'sceptical' Academy were still around. In order for an Albinus or an anonymous later writer of an εἰσαγωγή to regard the 'sceptical' tradition still as a threat, one should assume at least that some of their writings were available and influential for a considerable time after the end of the Academy. It would take time for the new *Platonica secta* to build up such a complex amalgam as the three-tiered division we find in Diogenes. One adds that δογματίζω in the sense of 'having positive doctrines' is, to my knowledge, not attested before the sources just quoted (and its Latin equivalent *decerno* is found only in the late glossaries, never in Cicero or Seneca). It is also significant that even the anonymous *Prolegomena*, or its source, still uses ἐφεκτικός, from the old and established Academic ἐποχή, not ζητητικός. Tarrant's attempt (*Scepticism or Platonism?* ... 25-7) to detect ζητεῖν behind *quaerere*, *conquirere* and *exquirere* at Cic. *Acad.* I. 46 and *Luc.* 7; 9 is no proof that the term ζητητικός already existed at that time *and with that technical connotation.* That Plato uses the epithet ζητητικός here and there for a commendable quality *in a person* is, again, irrelevant here. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1265a12) — we are often told — does use ζητητικός of Socrates' conversations — but hold: τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινότομον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν — and the context is that of Plato's *Republic* — and *Laws* (!). Apart from this, we have that epithet once in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata* (910a30-1): καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ ζητητικοὶ ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ εὐέλπιδες. A few lines later, at 33, we have μᾶλλον ἐπιχειροῦσι ζητεῖν, ὥστε καὶ εὑρίσκουσι μᾶλλον — and this is why (26) they are σοφώτεροι: a far cry from the 'zetetic' dialogues. Aroint! I should settle for as late a date as possible, and perhaps even accuse Albinus or Gaios, *aut quemquam de genere isto*, of inventing the 'philosophical division'.

I find the arguments of Tarrant (11-3; 72-6), following Dunn, against assuming that Dercyllides was later than Thrasyllus quite convincing. (To pp. 11-2, n. 22, add that, by a similar reasoning, Aristophanes of Byzantium — DL 3.61-2 — would have been later than Thrasyllus — DL 3.56-61). All that we know of Dercyllides is that he wrote a work or works on Plato, and that (Albinus 4) he had the same first tetralogy as Thrasyllus. He may — if he was later — have followed the whole arrangement of Thrasyllus. He may not. Albinus is not interested in that kind of division and does not bother with details. What is more important is that Albinus does say there, of both, δοκοῦσι δέ μοι προσώποις καὶ βίων περιστάσεσιν ἠθεληκέναι τάξιν ἐπιθεῖναι — which, as Mans-

feld (70-1) reminds us, confirms the assumption that the 'philosophical' division has nothing to do with Thrasyllus. But I would not go as far as Mansfeld (66 and n. 114) and try to restore our trust in the curious statement of Varro, *LL* 7. 37, as it stands in the MSS. That *vir Romanorum eruditissimus*, writing only a few years after the suicide of Cato of Utica, would know nothing of Plato's *Phaedo* is unlikely. From *Ant. Rer. Div.* fr. 26 Agahd (29 Cardauns), it appears that Varro may have had some knowledge of that dialogue. After all, he was an *Antiochius*, and 'he' is made to expound some form of 'Platonism' in Cicero's *Academicus Primus*. This is not to say that the statement he makes at *LL* 7. 37 was taken straight out of Plato's *Phaedo*. He may have found it in a secondary Greek source; and in that case, I find Tarrant's brilliant suggestions (75-6) of what he may have found in his Greek source more convincing than the assumption that Varro, of all people, would refer to *Phaedo*, of all works, as 'Number Four'. Anyway, why assume that there was a 'tetralogist' before Thrasyllus, rather than give Thrasyllus the credit for arranging the dialogues in fours, like tragic tetralogies (which is what he is made to say at DL 3.56), as a literary and dramatic response to Aristophanes' trilogies? After all, once we have rid ourselves of the ascription of the complex 'philosophical' division to Thrasyllus as well, the mere 'dramatic' arrangement is not such a giant task that it would need a few generations of *Vorbereitung*.

What I have already said of δογματίζειν would make it unlikely that DL 3.51-2 is Thrasyllan. Are the σημεῖα and the ἔκδοσις at 65-6 also Thrasyllan, as Tarrant (178-83) would have it ? Mansfeld's note (198-9) is more convincing; but I am still puzzled by the quotation from Antigonus of Carystus at 66. Not that I would opt for Gigante's proposal (rightly rejected by Tarrant, 182, and by Mansfeld ibid.), that the critical signs already existed in some 'Academic edition': if only for Tarrant's reason, that an Academic at the time (even a Polemo, one can add) would have no place for a διπλὴ πρὸς τὰ δόγματα. This would only become relevant when one had to emphasize that there were, indeed, δόγματα, but that not every word uttered by the πρόσωπα of DL 3.52 is a δόγμα: *ergo*, if my previous arguments have any force, much later than Thrasyllus. Why, then, cite the story of the much earlier (in any case) Antigonus at this context? Another unsolved 'wherefore' in Diogenes?

Chapter Five (108-147) tries to support Tarrant's ascription to Thrasyllus of about four pages of Porphyry on Ptolemy's *Harmonics*. (Again, I shall be as economical with detail as I can without making my argument incomprehensible even to the 'initiate'.) A Middle Platonic source for much of this section — but a source much later than Thrasyllus — was already suggested by Heinrich Dörrie in an article of 1981. I shall, for the time being, take on trust Tarrant's note 2 on p. 109 — an impressive list of about thirty terms on these pages which are not found elsewhere in this work of Porphyry. Tarrant would deduce from this and other arguments that the whole of this section (pp. 12.5-14.23; 15.10-28 Düring: I shall continue to cite by Düring's pages and lines, more precise than Tarrant's division into passages) — a disquisition concerning λόγος — was written by a 'Pythagoreanizing Platonist': why not by Thrasyllus (mentioned at 12.21), presenting a λόγος theory all his own? But for a 'Pythagoreanizing Platonist', the scarcity of proper Pythagorean or Platonic expressions is striking. The section ascribed by Tarrant to Thrasyllus begins with various definitions of λόγος, starting with the well-known Aristotelian formula πολλαχῶς δὲ τοῦ λόγου λεγομένου — a formula also used (for various terms, of course, as in Aristotle) by Plotinus and later Platonists, but not much before them. The first sense (12.6-7) is reminiscent of the Stoic σπερματικοὶ λόγοι, but the words used are

σπερματικὴ δύναμις: see Ar. *PA* 651b21. (In general, δύναμις for a basic function, or faculty, of an organic body or its ψυχή is a standard term in Aristotle's 'psychological' πραγματεῖαι). That the second sense is that of the mathematicians is no surprise in a word like λόγος, and should not immediately make us look for Pythagoreans. A Pythagorean would hardly go out of his way to add to the mention of this 'mathematicians' λόγος' the words οἷός ἐστι καὶ τραπεζιτικός. The sense preferred (12.10-13) is introduced as κυριώτατος καὶ πάντων προηγούμενος. This is Aristotle's πρώτως καὶ κυριώτατα and variants, for which dozens of examples can be collected by plain Bonitzing. (Not that the definition itself is Aristotelian; and what follows, ὃν ὥσπερ μεμίμηται καὶ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμός sounds Platonic — or, considering the perfect μεμίμηται and the Aristotelian ψυχῆς λογισμός — 'Neo'-Platonic. I only note that our author is familiar with Aristotelian procedures and their terminology). At 12.18-9, we have ὁ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμὼν θεός, echoing the end of [Plato's] Sixth Epistle. But there, 323d2-3, we have τὸν τῶν πάντων [not the 'demotic' ὅλος in this sense, for which there are very few examples before Polybius, precisely because, in Classical Greek, it was strictly 'demotic'] θεὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων, without any indication of his activities: in our passage, he is using a λογισμός which is τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιός. A similar expression is used by Chrysippus (*SVF* 2.449b) for πνεύματα, and by an anonymous Stoic source (ibid. 1044) for 'the god within matter' — that is, the ἡγεμονικόν. The ἡγεμών of our text has ἱερὰν ... ἐπιστήμην *καὶ διανόησιν*, and Tarrant (112) makes much of this 'discursive thinking'. But see *SVF* 1.50: αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὲ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν; 3.306: τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος αὐτῆς, ὃ καλεῖται διάνοια; or again 2.840: Χρύσιππος ὁ Στωϊκὸς ἔφη τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι λόγου πηγήν. Part of the function of λόγος in our passage is described as κατὰ... τὴν τοῦ παντὸς περιοχὴν τὰ ὅλα διοικεῖται (12.17-8) — and, having mentioned the ἡγεμὼν θεός, our author continues: καὶ καθ' ὃν [δηλ. λογισμὸν] ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ παρέχεται. See *SVF* 2.912 (Chrysippus): φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον; 945: φασὶν δὲ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ἕνα ὄντα καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὑτῷ περιέχοντα, καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς κτλ. The ἡγεμὼν θεός of the Sixth Epistle may not feel entirely happy in such an environment — but there it is.

The words which follow the expression εἰδῶν λόγος (which is the only expression clearly ascribed to Thrasyllus) at 12.22-3 should not greatly surprise the reader of *SVF* 2.743-47. As to τῷ τῆς διανοητικῆς φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας λογισμῷ, one could compare *SVF* 1.374; 2.836; 839(?). The use of the terms is far from clear, but their 'topography' may well have something to do with the Stoics.

Now (12.27 — 13.13) we pass on to distinctly Aristotelian territory: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (12.27) needs no comment; ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος — *Soph. El.* 2, 165b9 (cf. a39); ὁριστικὸς λόγος — *De An.* 2.2., 413a14; *Phys.* 1.3, 186b22-3. As to our 13.2ff., it is largely based on *Top.* 1.8; and 13.6ff. on *Top.* 130a39-b2; 132b32-4.

The 'epistemology' section (13.15 — 14.14) is interesting and strange. Its various elements — αἴσθησις, δόξα, φαντασία, ἔννοιαι — already appear in Ptolemy's περὶ κριτηρίου ch. 2 (where, by the way, we also have at 2.6 the word ἐμβολή — ἢ μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς...: Tarrant 128-30). But the use our author makes of them is far more complex and polyphonous. For αἴσθησις, he also uses ἀντίληψις (13.24-5), and this is contrasted with the ὑπόληψις of the other δυνάμεις (13. 27, and especially 14.6-8). Now, ὑπόληψις — often with καθόλου — is pure Aristotle: the Stoics use it only *in malam partem*, mainly

in defining δόξα, and Plotinus does not use it at all. But ἀντίληψις, for sense-perception, is not attested, I think, before Plotinus, and is not irregular in Plotinus himself: I.4.10.4-10; IV.3.3.18-19; 3.23.8-9; 31; 5.4.40; 5.8.22-3 and many other instances.The φαντασία of 13.29ff. is Aristotelian, with no trace of Stoicism. The ἔννοια of 14.3 is, of course, Stoic. As to 14.3-4, ...καὶ βεβαιωθείσης, ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐγγίνεται διάθεσις, *SVF* 2.90; 95 should be enough (although 93 calls ἐπιστήμη not διάθεσις, but ἕξις). Yet the whole process of cognition has clear Neoplatonic colouring: ὕλη ψυχική (13.16) — Plot. 5.8.3.9 — and the ὑποβεβηκότα and ἐπαναβεβηκότα which explain it (13.16-7) are clearly Plotinian.

These are merely a few preliminary remarks, designed to 'ambiguate' this fascinating piece of text and show how complex and 'eclectic' it is. The 'Neopythagorean elements' which Tarrant finds in it are often arrived at by midrashic methods. I shall leave the reader to enjoy to the full the *Sitz im Leben* midrash developed on pp. 138-41 (Tiberius as model for the all-preknowing king at 15.10ff. — as if it were *Tiberius* who predicted the future by astrological methods) — only to be refuted by Tarrant himself on p. 141. The long and short of it is that we have here a fascinating excursion on λόγος, which Porphyry probably lifted from an earlier source (perhaps adding some Neoplatonic colouring), and which needs a far more open-minded and patient study than we have here.

Assume, however, that Thrasyllus was indeed the great figure we encounter in this book: a Pythagorizing Platonist with his own theory of λόγος and his own interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, who produced an edition with prolegomena of the whole of Plato, which is the source of the Platonic text we have now and of the whole prolegomena-type section of DL 3. One would have expected a great deal of 'ideological interference' with the text of Plato. Tarrant hints to such a possibility (201-2; 206; 213), but he is cautious in 'implementing' it in detail, and offers only three passages of *Meno* (185-193) and three of *Timaeus* (193-9) as his 'suspects'. The *Meno* 'cases of interference' have not convinced me. If we excise 75d7 — 76a7, the sequence of what is left would be somewhat precipitate. Besides, it is not quite correct to say (as Tarrant, 187) that 'Meno understood the term 'colour' in the initial definition': what about 75c4-7? If he did understand, why the contrast at 76d8? (Of course, he does not say that *he* does not understand, but he *does* mention a τις — 75c5, who may say that he does not.) The beauty of 75d7- e6 is that Meno, who has raised objections to χρῶμα/χρόα, is quite happy to swallow far more abstract concepts like τελευτή, πέρας, ἔσχατον — and that, having been given another definition of σχῆμα, he returns, like a child (or like Meno), to his original demand for a definition of χρῶμα. Is that the hand of a 'schoolmaster Platonist' (188)? As for emending 81c9-d2 into ἅτε γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἁπάσῃ συγγενοῦς οὔσης καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, this would put τῆς ψυχῆς under far too much strain and would sound far too awkward for Plato's style. Reading αἰτίᾳ λογισμοῦ at 98a3-4 — as had already been proposed by Tarrant in a 1989 article — would be somewhat useless. It is true that the expression we have, αἰτίας λογισμῷ, is sprung on the reader without warning; but would the emendation improve things? In what sense? 'Some cause for [reason for, responsibility for] calculation binds them' (193)? Of course, that would give us 'calculation', which, as is well known, only a Pythagorean is capable of making. But λογισμός would be there whether we emend or not — and so will the surprise sprung on the reader.

I find the suggestion concerning *Timaeus* 30b (195-8), with its support from Plutarch, more plausible. The same *may* go for 40c (although Cicero *might* have omitted the

phrase, considering the views he expresses *in propria persona* in *De Divinatione*). But the suspected 'interference' at 30a seems dubious. If a Pythagorean had wished to magnify Timaeus' Pythagorean 'ancestors', would he have added a mere παρ' ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος, leaving the reader to guess who these ἄνδρες φρόνιμοι — the whole object of the exercise — exactly were?

This is not to say that Burnet's OCT, or the incipient new OCT — not to mention a translation — could serve as a secure basis for each word, sentence or section being what Plato himself really wrote. In some places, Whittaker, Dillon and Tarrant seem to have detected most likely cases of ancient interference, καὶ τὸ γενόμενον φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατόν in other places. One should go on suspecting cautiously. One suggestion which I have not seen raised is possible 'ephectic' interferences by members of the 'sceptical' Academy, where, for example, Arcesilaus possessed his own edition of all the dialogues (which may or may not have something to do with Antigonus' story in DL 3.66), and Plato was taken to be an 'ephectic' philosopher himself.

I have found much in this book which seems to me far too speculative, or somewhat hasty; and my space for spelling out my arguments for disagreement has been limited (I have also marked some points of agreement on details, and there are more). I hope the reader has seen from places where I have gone into detail what is implied in my criticisms. It is a pity that one has to be so 'uncooperative'. This is the work of a Classical scholar, perfectly at ease with texts in Greek and Latin of various kinds (it even has, at the end, a collection of longer and shorter passages from ancient sources — needless to say, in the original Latin and Greek — taken by Tarrant to constitute the testimonia for Thrasyllus and his works: they include the 'prolegomena part' of DL 3 and the long section of Porphyry, both discussed here in some detail). The author is fully aware of elementary procedures such as that the ancient sources, in the original, should be the scholar's basic and indispensable materials; that Greek and Latin words have their individual contexts and histories; and that the interpretation of ancient philosophical texts should keep as close as possible to the texts, rather than impose upon them modern moulds and fashions. But there is, in this book, too much speculation which seems to me to go beyond the little evidence we have, or even to impose itself on it. Not that one should not, sometimes, be imaginative and make hypotheses; but such hypotheses should be tested far more thoroughly and meticulously, even at the price of admitting that, in the penumbra of early Middle Platonism, very little can be described even as πιθανὸν καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον — not to mention διεξωδευμένον.

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Kazimierz F. Kumaniecki (ed.), *M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia. Fasc. 3: De Oratore*. Editio stereotypa editionis primae (1969). Stuttgart-Leipzig: Teubner, 1995.

This volume is a straight reprint of Kumaniecki's 1969 Teubner edition of *De Oratore*. It was well received when it first appeared: see e.g. the enthusiastic reviews of A. Michel, *REL* 47, 1969, 539-41 and E. Malcovati, *Athenaeum* 48, 1970, 441-3; the absence of reviews in major English-language periodicals must merely reflect an editorial policy of