

question, and returning to the scope of D.'s book, perhaps inclusion of the phenomenon of phatic speech in her discussion of address frequency (4.1), and its ramifications in literary versus conversational registers, would be an interesting dimension to pursue, a dimension introduced in passing in Risselada's discussion of register and work with a dead literary language.

Let me conclude by repeating that it is one of the merits of D.'s book, and particularly of chapters 2 and 4, that questions which do not directly serve to answer the main thrust of her work (chapter 3 which is superlative, and chapter 5) are raised — but of equal importance are the questions Dickey's work stimulate in the reader. I apologize for illustrating how stimulating this book was by overcrowding the review with such questions, many of which would not have been born had I not read the book.

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M.L. Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome: A Historical Survey*, revised and with a new introduction by D.H. Berry, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, 206 pp.

M.L. Clarke's book came out in 1953, and the first edition has a certain look of wartime 'utility'. It was reprinted with corrections in 1966, and many a teacher has recommended it with confidence to students in need of an accessible and interesting introduction to Roman rhetoric in its historical context. It has stood the test of time, and now appears in paperback. It has not been reset or substantially revised. Instead, Dr Berry, who has himself produced a fine commentary on Cicero's *Pro Sulla*, has supplied a new introduction (whose notes give some account of two topics passed over by Clarke, memorisation and prose rhythm), and what was lacking before, a Bibliography. The latter is 'free-standing', and does not reflect any updating of Clarke's notes. It is perhaps a pity that the opportunity has not been taken to direct readers towards the best editions, commentaries and translations of the major rhetorical texts (for instance, Harry Caplan's invaluable Loeb of the *Ad Herennium*). But it is good to see this excellent survey refurbished to take us, as they say, into the twenty-first century. How about a similar injection of new life into S.F. Bonner's remarkable *Roman Declamation*, which came out not long before Clarke's book and makes an admirable companion volume to it?

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Robert Wardy, *The Birth of Rhetoric*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, viii + 197 pp.

*Roman Eloquence*, edited by William J. Dominik, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, xii + 268 pp.

*Dire L'Évidence*, textes réunis par Carlos Lévy et Laurent Pernot, Paris and Montreal: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1997, 448 pp.

Wardy's title, *The Birth of Rhetoric*, gives no very clear idea of what his book is about. In fact, he is concerned to tell, but also to rethink, the familiar story of the early stages of the quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy: the story of how Plato's contempt for the

sophists, and in particular for Gorgias, led to 'discidium illud ... quasi linguae atque cordis' (*De Oratore* 3.61), a split that Cicero thought to heal by uniting in a single person the ability to persuade in public and write philosophical dialogues in private. Wardy looks at all this from a philosopher's angle, and gives it epigrammatic point by dubbing it the 'Gorgias/*Gorgias* problematic'. His book is entertaining, acute, and a little maddening.

The heavyweights who slug it out on Wardy's canvas are less like boxers than well-oiled and slippery wrestlers. Gorgias is seen as reacting to Parmenides both in *On What Is Not* and in the *Helen*. 'The enduring significance' of the former work 'resides in our very uncertainty over whether Gorgias is in earnest ... This vertiginous uncertainty is itself the primary message (better *non*-message?) of the text' (p. 24). Similarly, in the *Helen*, we are told that we can see that its 'joke is on us. When we ourselves are made to pity Helen and execrate Paris, ... we feel in our own souls the seduction of rhetoric' (p. 51). In the other corner is Plato, or rather 'Plato': his dialogue form is to be understood as showing that he 'has no message, no "philosophy" to impart' (p. 53). 'Plato's confrontation with Gorgias takes shape in the opposition of methods, display vs. dialectic, regardless of whether in this particular instance the philosophical method actually yields truth' (p. 85). It is not surprising that more straightforward successors thought the terms of the dispute unsatisfactory. But they get no thanks from Wardy. Aristotle is denied the 'reductive' possibility that the first chapter of the *Rhetoric* was never intended to be reconcilable with what follows; his work is seen as a mass or mess of tensions. Isocrates and Cicero put forward solutions which are damned as anodyne. I imagine that they would have found it difficult to see how Wardy's epilogue entitled 'Does philosophy have a gender?' relates to the problem that had been worrying thinkers since the fifth century.

The book rests on close readings of many passages, and it is worth examining the cogency of a representative section, that on Cicero, brief but self-contained (pp. 97-103). 'The *Gorgias* is overwhelmingly concerned to discriminate between dialectical *logos* and rhetorical display' (p. 86). Cicero, well aware of Plato's arguments, lived in a world where neither dialectic nor epideictic was of importance. He therefore set up the ideal (and goal: cf. *De Orat.* 1.34 'pergite ...') of a practising orator who has wide knowledge, but is prepared to be briefed by experts when his knowledge falls short. His perfect orator, on whose *moderatio* (guidance, not 'moderation') and *sapientia rei publicae salus* depends, does not, for him, look forward, as Wardy would have it, to an empire he never saw, but back to the years of the high republic and to the day when he himself drove Catiline from Rome by (he might have put it) mere force of words. This sensible bringing down of a Platonic extreme to solid Roman ground is for Wardy merely subject for abuse ('middle-brow', 'fantastist'). But it is not clear how any other resolution of the 'problematic' could be reached. Wardy states its poles, but they are not ones that could be joined by a bridge. A *via media* like Cicero's is not absurd.

When we come to the details of Wardy's treatment of the *De Oratore* we meet constant weaknesses. It seems to me quite wrong to suggest that 'omni laude cumulatus orator' in 1.20 presupposes 'an at least equally knowledgeable audience' to provide the praise; apart from anything else, *laus* here means 'merit' rather than 'praise'. These sections clearly contrast a Greek ideal with Roman reality (Wardy does not help himself or us by translating *uero* at 21 'indeed' or by cutting short his quotation before 22, which as a whole makes it clear that it is the Greeks, with their abundant time to spare, who might hope to know 'everything'; I cannot see how Wardy could imagine that Cicero might

have regarded *himself* as 'the suitably gifted man of leisure'. We move to 1.33. Wardy here glosses *hoc* 'viz. rhetoric', then explains that "'this" is, in context, not rhetoric, but our power to converse and express our feelings in language'. True; but in the rest of the sentence, the reference is to a skilled orator being able to outdo other men in the ability that marks *them* off from the beasts. There is no suppression on Cicero's part of the fact that he is talking of the orator, as Wardy suggests, or any covert assumption that 'excelling in language is simply *doing rhetoric*' (my italics: a strange phrase chosen apparently to throw doubt on the worth of practical oratory). Nor does the great orator 'transcend the ordinary human condition', if that is meant to imply some fantasy; he is merely better than his fellows. In the next pages (101-2) Wardy seems to neglect the Greek background since the *Gorgias*; in particular, when Crassus objects to wasting time on a footling verbal matter, the question of whether rhetoric is an art, he is thinking not so much of Plato as of the later philosophers who had interminably discussed the matter to no great purpose (cf. Quintilian 2.17; note especially his remark at §4). And Crassus's sharp words about Gorgias in 1.102-3 are not meant to dismiss the 'problematic', but to ridicule the way in which Gorgias made a point of improvising in public on trivial matters, something to which Plato objected too. Cicero, not unreasonably, saw a difference between Gorgianic improvisation and the carefully crafted oratory he, and the 'perfect' orator, applied to public and practical matters. Wardy ends the section (p. 103) with a musing about whether he has been unfair to rhetoric. He might wonder if he has been unfair to his texts.

The book as a whole is fun, or quite fun, to read. The squeamish will find it marred by polemics one had hoped were no longer in fashion in Cambridge. 'This is remarkably fatuous' (p. 160) is one rebuke directed at words of a living scholar.

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The two other books under review are the sort of collections of essays that are making classics a bibliographical nightmare.

*Roman Eloquence* lacks a unifying theme beyond that contained in the sub-title, 'Rhetoric in society and literature'. Part III, entitled 'Rhetoric and genre', is the most satisfying part, and the essays of S.M. Goldberg and J.J. Hughes on tragic and comic drama are stimulating and informative. Joseph Farrell, on the other hand, seems to get lost in the (unhelpful) terminology of primary and secondary rhetoric, and gives us very little idea what what he calls a 'thoroughgoing "Rhetoric of Epic"' would be like. The seven earlier essays must have been difficult to arrange. N. O'Sullivan's 'Caecilius, the "canon" of writers, and the origins of Atticism' provides a helpful review of the subject, without breaking much new ground. Catherine Connors examines agricultural metaphors in Roman criticism (without citing G. Assfahl's useful *Vergleich und Metapher bei Quintilian*), and Amy Richlin brings the new language to the consideration of sexual metaphor.

In a collection where the editor has failed to impose a firm pattern, it may seem fairest to concentrate on his own contribution. Dominik takes as his topic the interplay of ideas on prose style in Seneca, Tacitus and Quintilian. The essay is so packed with debatable assertions that it may be easiest to list some of them with at the most brief rejoinders. 'The fact that philosophy is the last genre treated by Quintilian [in 10.1] ... is a strong indication ...of his view of its relative importance to the practice of oratory' (p. 53): the

order of genres (in which, it may be remarked, poetry comes before prose, and oratory is the last genre but one) will go back before Quintilian, for it is also found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Quintilian 'even seems to have been influenced by Seneca, for instance in his frequent use of poetic or rare words' (p. 57): no examples are given. 'The style of Seneca ... in its preference for epigrammatic expression ... most nearly resembled [not Asianism but] Atticism' (p. 59): for the 'sententious' type of Asianism see Cicero, *Brutus* 325. 'Even Quintilian did not believe there had been a decline in the standard of oratory' (p. 60). 'Aper argues in the *Dialogus* that there is no real difference between the orators of his day and those of Cicero's' (ibid.). 'The pointed style of [Tacitus's] *Histories* and *Annals* is probably as much a response to the expansiveness of the neo-Ciceronian style employed in his *Dialogus* as it is an exemplification of the style required for a historical work' (p. 64). 'The popularity of the Tacitean style is evident in that it immediately established itself alongside Sallust as a model of historical writing in place of Livy and Caesar' (p. 65): no examples are given of historians influenced by Tacitus (or Caesar).

I add some other points: p. 64: 'Seneca found much of Cicero's style *gradarius*'; Cicero, the slow-pacing horse, rather. p. 75: when Laelia reminds Crassus of Plautus and Naevius, it is not because her language was 'theatrical' but because it was old-fashioned. p. 79: what is said of Quintilian 1.1.16 does not survive consultation of the text. p. 95: the Elder Seneca does not 'depict declamations ... staged as verbal duels among the participants'; elsewhere declamation is equally misleadingly treated (e.g. it is glossed as 'public speaking' on p. 148). p. 104: Richlin cites Quintilian 11.1.55 and asks 'might we here posit that the lawyer stood to the client as active sexuality stood to passive?' The answer is no. p. 159: if a passage in Juvenal is found to correspond to one of the topics recommended in the *de inventione* for the arousal of indignation, that is hardly surprising, as Cicero meant the list to be as all-inclusive as possible. p. 172: I cannot believe that *colores* at Seneca, *Thyestes* 904 would have reminded anyone of the rhetorical technical term. p. 191: someone should not have allowed '*ostentator pecuniosi* ('vaunter of money')' to stay in the text. p. 204: I do not recognise the *Ars Amatoria* as a 'didactic epic'.

There is a useful general bibliography, to which J. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* should be added. It is odd that a chapter on amatory persuasion does not mention W. Stroh's *Die römische Liebeslegie als werbende Dichtung*.

*Dire L'Évidence* starts with a bang. On the front cover, splendidly reproduced from a painting by Jean-Léon Gérôme, the orator Hyperides whisks her dress away to reveal the naked Phryne. She covers her eyes in shame. The judges sit in a quarter-circle, magnificent in their scarlet robes. They will acquit — we know from Athenaeus — out of δεισιδαιμονία. Their θάμβος is interestingly more apparent on the shadowy back benches, where some of the younger judges mimic Phryne's gesture, than at the front, where, at least on the right, the grey beards sit impassive, even hand-dog: they do not like these modern methods of persuasion.

Balancing Phryne, at the front of the picture, is the waterclock: empty, we must assume. Hyperides' words have failed; a tableau convinces. French ingenuity finds the allegory here: 'Depuis l'utilisation rhétorique de la vision jusqu'au problème de l'ineffable et de l'impuissance des mots, le procès de Phryné offre une synthèse des questions antiques sur l'évidence. ... Comment exprimer ce qui se passe de mots, ou paraît être plus fort que les mots? ... pourquoi et comment *dire l'évidence*?' (p. 8). An interdisciplinary conference was the only answer. And, as Lévy and Pernot describe, not without melodrama, it

turned out that the occasion was able to celebrate, quite by chance, the 2050th anniversary of the day on which Cicero coined the word *evidentia*.

There is of course much here that goes beyond the bounds of a review that focuses on rhetoric. A great deal comes under the two philosophical headings, 'L'évidence, obstacle ou accès à la connaissance' and 'L'ineffable'. What remains is patchy. Some contributors are in conference mood, ready to turn a piece on quite a different topic into something that fits the theme (I think, for instance, of Aldo Setaioli's piece on Servius, *ad Aen.* 6.703) or Perrine Galand-Hallyn on the *Heroides*). The most interesting contributions for me form a solid centre to the book. Ruth Webb and Sandrine Dubel, in complementary pieces, throw much light, as is only proper, on *enargeia* and *ekphrasis*. In particular, Dubel alertly investigates the implications of the word περιηγηματικὸς in the progymnasts' definitions of ἔκφρασις. On Longinus 26.2, which comments on the future second persons in Herodotus' description of the Nile, she comments: 'au moment où l'exposé semble perdre de sa validité ... le discours pallie l'absence d'*opsis* par un surplus d'*enargeia*, le narrateur fait voyager à sa place le narrataire' (p. 262). In fact this is true of the passage as abbreviated by Longinus, not of the original, where the second persons start well beyond Elephantine, the last point seen by Herodotus. Colette Nativel interestingly discusses the theory of painting put forward in Franciscus Junius's *De Pictura Veterum* (1637), which exploits literary theory for a new medium, and leads on to celebrated remarks by Poussin. Indeed it might be added that, when Poussin says that 'la nouveauté en peinture ne consiste pas principalement en un sujet jamais vu, mais en une bonne et nouvelle disposition et expression, et ainsi, de commun et vieilli, le sujet devient singulier et nouveau', there lies behind his words not Tasso (p. 282) but Horace: 'notum si callida uerbum / reddiderit iunctura nouum'.

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*L. Annaei Senecae Naturalium Quaestionum Libros* recognouit Harry M. Hine (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1996, li + 331 pp.

Harry M. Hine, *Studies in the text of Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones*, Stuttgart and Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1996, 130 pp.

A. Gercke, who did so much for the *Natural Questions* (work that culminated in his Teubner of 1907), knew something of the Geneva manuscript lat. 77 (Z), but not enough to recognise its importance. P. Oltramare (Budé, 1929) knew much more, but did not have the courage of such convictions as he had when it came to drawing a stemma. It was left to Professor Hine, in a fundamental article in *Classical Quarterly* 30 (1980) and his splendid edition of Book ii (New York, 1981), to see it for what it is, the sole complete witness to one branch of a bifid tradition, and to exploit it accordingly. Now his new Teubner, accompanied by a very helpful volume of *Studies*, completes the revisionist task. It benefits too from his re-thinking of the interrelationships of the many manuscripts that form the other branch (Ψ). His work is marked by critical acumen of a high order, and rests on a profound knowledge of the very varied subject matter and of the style of