Aristotle, *Topics* 122a27-30 and Related Issues

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Εἰ οὖν ἡ βάδισις μήτ' αὐξήσεως μήτε μειώσεως μήτε τῶν
ἄλλων κινήσεων μετέχει, δῆλον ὅτι τῆς φορᾶς ἂν μετέχοι·
ὥστ' εἴη ἂν γένος ἡ φορὰ τῆς βαδίσεως.

μήτ' αὐξήσεως om. Λᵀ ἄλλων om. C, suppl. C²
μετέχοι: μετέχῃ Μ

Text and apparatus: Brunschwig;[1] but the text itself is identical in all modern
editions, and the minority readings in the apparatus make no difference to it.[2]
Yet is this what Aristotle wrote? The whole section, 122a19-30, argues that, in
order to show that the γένος of βάδισις is φορά, it is not enough to say ὅτι
κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ βάδισις, since there are εἴδη κινήσεως other than φορά:
κίνησις is thus not the εἶδος (or proximate γένος) of βάδισις but the γένος of
its εἶδος/proximate γένος.[3] What one has to show is (25-7) ὅτι οὐδενὸς
μετέχει ἡ βάδισις τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν εἰ μὴ τῆς φορᾶς· ἀνάγκη
γὰρ τὸ τοῦ γένους μετέχον καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν τινος μετέχειν τῶν κατὰ τὴν

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[1]   Aristote, *Topiques*, Tome I, Livres I-IV, ed. Jacques Brunschwig, Paris (Budé)
      1967, 86-7.

[2]   The same applies to Boethius' translation (Aristoteles Latinus V. 1-3, *Topica...*,
      ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello, adiuvante Bernardo G. Dod, Brussels and Paris
      1969, 69): *si ergo ambulatio neque augmentum neque diminutionem neque alios
      motus participet, manifestum quoniam lationem participabit, quare erit genus
      latio ambulationis.*
         Should one, perhaps, consider reading διότι for ὅτι at 122a29? W.J. Verdenius
      ('Notes on the *Topics*', in *Aristotle on Dialectic, The Topics*, ed. G.E.L. Owen
      Oxford 1968, 22-42, esp. 42), has argued for retaining διότι for ὅτι 'when it is
      read by all, most, or the best manuscripts'. One of his instances is 122a23, and
      there διότι is adopted by Brunschwig. Boethius' translation itself is older than
      our Greek MSS, and all its numerous MSS read *quoniam*, not *quod*, at 122a29.
      As to the sense — as Verdenius (ibid.) remarks — it would make no difference:
      but it may be what Aristotle wrote.

[3]   Every γένος — apart from the two highest ones, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν — is an εἶδος of
      the γένος above it and a γένος for the εἴδη, or individuals, below it. Thus, φορά
      is γένος βαδίσεως, but an εἶδος of the γένος κίνησις.

πρώτην διαίρεσιν.⁴ One would now expect to have an enumeration of εἴδη κινήσεως other than φορά. Every student of the *Physics* knows that there are three such εἴδη κινήσεως (an expression first used at 224b11): ἀλλοίωσις (κατὰ τὸ ποιόν), αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν), φορά (κατὰ τόπον): 226a23-b1. In our passage as it stands, we have αὔξησις and μείωσις (for φθίσις), two opposites within the same εἶδος — but no ἀλλοίωσις, which is the only εἶδος κινήσεως other than φορά still left. If we emend μειώσεως to ἀλλοιώσεως, we would have all three εἴδη κινήσεως where we expect them to be.

One may object that, at 121a30-3, Aristotle has done a similar exercise: he has φορά, ἀλλοίωσις and τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων, rather than mention also αὔξησις and complete the list. After all, *Topics* is an acroamatic work, and a καὶ τὰ λοιπά formula is perfectly natural in an oral exposition. We shall return to this point.

There is, however, a more serious issue. Generally in Aristotle, the opposite of αὔξησις, in contexts dealing with εἴδη κινήσεως, is not μείωσις, but φθίσις: simple Bonitzing would be enough for anyone who doubts this. To the best of my knowledge, we have only two places in the Aristotelian corpus where μείωσις appears together with αὔξησις. At *Cat.* 14, 15a14; 16 and 15, 15b20-3, μείωσις is indeed the opposite of αὔξησις in the context of εἴδη κινήσεως; but the last chapters of *Categories* — the so-called *postpraedicamenta* — have often been regarded as of dubious authenticity: on which anon. At *GC* 1.5, 320b30, we read: ἡ γὰρ αὔξησίς ἐστι τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φθίσις μείωσις. But it is clear that μείωσις is here no more a technical term than is ἐπίδοσις: it is **τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους** μείωσις, and this is merely an explanation, necessitated by the context, of the proper technical term φθίσις.⁵

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4   At 25-6 Brunschwig reads κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν τῇ φορᾷ, and from the evidence in his apparatus, he is almost certainly right. I have cited the 'traditional' reading, as printed by Maximilian Wallies (Teubner 1923), Sir David Ross (OCT 1958), and previous editors — essentialy a *lectio difficilior* — since it is still more widely known. Either reading would not affect the argument. What applies to the 'traditional' reading would apply, *a fortiori*, to Brunschwig's reading, which makes the point clearer.

Even if the 'traditional' reading is correct, there is still no need for Immelmann's and Wallies' emendations, cited in Wallies' apparatus to 122a29-30. The preceding sentence — even if we accept the 'traditional' reading — refers back to 121a28-30, which makes things clear; and its context (see esp. 121a30-36) is, like ours, that of εἴδη κινήσεως.

5   Ingemar Düring, 'Aristotle's Use of Examples in the *Topics*', *Aristotle on Dialectic...* (n. 2), 202-29, esp. 210 n. 1, merely remarks that 'In the *Categories* and *Topics* he [= Aristotle] uses μείωσις instead of φθίσις, 15a14, 15b3, 122a28'.

In having φθίσις as the counterpart of αὔξησις, Aristotle merely follows what appears to be the established philosophical usage of his time. Plato never uses μείωσις.[6] He has φθίσις as the regular opposite of αὔξησις or (his commoner form) αὔξη: *Phdo.* 71b3; *Phlb.* 42d1; *Rep.* VII, 521e4; *Legg.* X, 897a6; and φθίνω as the regular opposite of αὐξάνω and αὔξομαι: *Phdo.* 71b3-4; *Thtt.* 155a8; *Parm.* 156b8; 157b2-3; *Symp.* 211a1-2; *Phdr.* 246e2-3; *Rep.* VII, 546b7; *Tim.* 41D3; 81b5; *Critias* 121a5-6; *Legg.* X, 893e6-7; [*Epin.* 979a3-4]. We also have the contrast between these verbs at Epicharmus B 2.7 DK and Empedocles B 26.2 DK — and there may have been more of the same in lost works. All this makes it unlikely that our passage of *Topics* would be the only place in his undisputed acroamatic writings where Aristotle would use μείωσις, rather than φθίσις, as opposite of αὔξησις.

Alexander of Aphrodisias is not mentioned in the apparatus to our passage of *Topics* — rightly from an editor's point of view: as we shall see, he offers no certain *varia lectio*. But Alexander sometimes offers some clues which are hidden beneath the surface. His comment on our passage is on pp. 311.19-312.1 of Wallies' edition.[7] His lemma consists only of the opening words of Aristotle's section, εἰ δὲ τὸ [sic] ἁπλῶς ὑπάρχειν ἀμφισβητεῖται (122a 19-20); but in the course of his comments, he spells out the various εἴδη κινήσεως a few times, and the full list — twice over (311.24-5; 28-9W) consists of φορά, ἀλλοίωσις, αὔξησις, μείωσις, γένεσις, φθορά.[8] Since such lists appear quite

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6   And only once, a form of its verb: μειοῦσθαι at *Crat.* 409c5.
7   *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (henceforth: *CAG*) II.2, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo Commentaria... edidit Maximilianus Wallies, Berlin 1891.
8   More often than not, Alexander does not count γένεσις and φθορά among εἴδη κινήσεως — as one would expect from a commentator on the *Physics*, whose familiarity with the relevant discussions there — especially 225a20-b5 — will be pointed out soon. Sometimes, he slips — as in *In Topica* (n. 6) 96.16-21W (τοπικὴ κίνησις. φθίσις); 111.3-5W (φορά. μείωσις); 162.10-11W (φορά. μείωσις); 303.12-23W (φορά: 21. μείωσις: 22.23). But at 303.17-18W, he is cautious: κείσθωσαν γὰρ νῦν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ κινήσεις εἶναι. In *In Metaphysica* (*CAG* I, ed. Michael Hayduck, Berlin 1891), 331.31-33, he is even more explicit: ἡ γὰρ κίνησις <ἢ addidi> ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἢ ἡ κατὰ ποιότητα ἢ ἡ κατὰ ποσότητα οὔτε κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβολὴ οὔτε μεταξὺ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.
     I have noted, in my first four examples, the words used for spatial movement and for decrease, since in all these examples, the list consists of ἀλλοίωσις, αὔξησις, μείωσις (and once φθίσις), γένεσις, φθορά, φορά. This may appear, at first sight, like the list of six εἴδη κινήσεως in *Categories* 14; but the consistent use of φορά (and one φθίσις) shows that the list is taken from *Physics* Γ 1, 201a9-15 (with μείωσις substituted for φθίσις: but this, after all, is one of the problems we are dealing with). There — as in the examples above — we

often in Alexander's commentaries, whenever he has an opportunity to enumerate Aristotle's εἴδη κινήσεως, we cannot tell what he read in his text at 122a28; but he does have μείωσις, not φθίσις, twice in his comment on our passage. This is hardly promising.

If we had only Alexander's comment on this particular passage of Aristotle, we might have had to conclude, *faute de mieux*, that he was most likely to have read μείωσις in his text. We do, however, have his commentaries on some Aristotelian πραγματεῖαι in full — and as I have just said, he is fond of listing the various εἴδη κινήσεως whenever he feels the need to remind his reader of them. In most of these lists, the opposite of αὔξησις is indeed μείωσις: *In Top.* 111.3-5W; 162.10-11W; 303.20-22W; *In Metaph.* 242.20-22H; 401.9-10H; 546.32H; *In Meteorologica*[9] 59. 21-2; 22-3H — as well as twice in his comments on our passage of *Topics*. But he also uses, with similar frequency, φθίσις as the opposite of αὔξησις. To cut things short, this happens wherever Alexander is commenting on, explicitly refers to, or clearly echoes, passages of Aristotle where φθίσις, or φθίσις and αὔξησις, are mentioned. Here is the list of such passages of Alexander, with their Aristotelian counterparts:[10]

In Topica 96.19-21W (Ar. *Metaph.* H 1, 1042a26-b8, with Alexander's comments, *In Metaph.* 546.12-547.15H).

In Meteorol. 59.26-9H: αὔξησις/φθίσις 26; αὔξησις/μείωσις καὶ φθίσις 26-7; αὔξεταί τε καὶ φθίνει 28-9 (At 21-2, we also had μείωσις; but our lines, 26-9, refer in particular to Aristotle's 351a26-35, where, at 31-2, we have αὔξεται καὶ φθίνει).

In Metaph. 546.34-6H: τὸ αὐξόμενον καὶ φθῖνον 34; αὐξήσει καὶ φθίσει 35 (but αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως 32. At 33-4, Alexander has ὡς ἐν τῇ περὶ

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have φορά, which is the normal technical term in *Physics*, but never appears in *Categories*, where (15a14; b3; 10) it is consistently called κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή. In the only one of my four examples from Alexander where it is not φορά, it is τοπικὴ κίνησις (*In Topica* 96.20W) — an expression which appears only once in the Aristotelian corpus, in the spurious and mediaeval *De Plantis* (815b240). Since in the same passage (ibid. 21) Alexander also has φθίσις as the opposite of αὔξησις, it is clear that there, too, he is dependent on *Physics* Γ 1, not on *Categories* 14 (where the opposite of αὔξησις is invariably μείωσις). We shall soon see that this whole passage of *In Topica* echoes Ar. *Metaph* H 1, 1042a26-b8, where we have ὕλη τοπική at b6; κατὰ τόπον [μεταβολή] at a34; αὔξησις at a35; ἀλλοίωσις at a36; γένεσις καὶ φθορά at a30; b2; [b6]. The subject of a32-b8 is τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς (a33-4). The significance of Alexander's independence of *Categories* will be seen later.

9   CAG III.2, ed. Michael Hayduck, Berlin 1899.

10   I cite only places where either a full enumeration of εἴδη κινήσεως appears, or where we have αὔξησις/φθίσις clearly as parts of an εἶδος κινήσεως.

γενέσεως, and his reference is to *GC* 1.3 — e.g. 318a9-10 and context — and especially 1.5 — e.g. 320a9-10; 14; 19-20; 24-5; 27-9(bis) etc. — where αὐξάνω/φθίνω and αὔξησις/φθίσις are the rule. It is true that at 320b30-1 we have μείωσις [del. τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους] as part of the explanation of φθίσις: this *may* have made it easier for Alexander to slip in, unawares, μείωσις in his comment).

Ibid. 547.19-20H. (Alexander is about to refer, at 24-5, both to *Phys.* (E 1, 224b35-225b5) and *GC* (1.3). But we hardly need this reference, since his context for comment here is *Metaph.* H 1, 1042a26-b8 — on which see n. 8 above, *fin.*)

Ibid. 603.39H: αὐξήσεως φθίσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (At 37-8, Alexander has ἐν τῷ Θ τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως. The reference, as Hayduck reminds us, is to *Phys.* Θ.7, where we have at 261a35 αὐξήσει δὲ καὶ φθίσει).

Ibid. 672.12-3H: αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν (Alexander is quoting directly from the passage he is commenting on: Λ 1; 1069b11-2).

In De Sensu[11] 78. 6; 8-9; 23; 25W: αὔξησις/φθίσις (Alexander is using the terms of the passage he is commenting on, 441b30-442a1; but at 78.18, we have αἱ αὐξήσεις τε καὶ αἱ μειώσεις creeping in).

Before we draw any conclusions, some observations:

1. Alexander is well aware of *GC* 1.5 — indeed, he refers to it a few times, as we have just seen. As the author of a commentary (no longer extant) on *De Generatione et Corruptione*, he knows that there, μείωσις is *not* used as a synonym for φθίσις and the opposite of αὔξησις. Wherever he refers to *GC* 1.5, he uses φθίσις — not μείωσις — as the opposite of αὔξησις — with the partial exception of *In Metaph.* 546.32: see my comments on that passage.

2. Even where Alexander does use μείωσις as the opposite of αὔξησις, other terms in his context show that his source is not *Categories* 14.[12]

3. Alexander's commentary on *Categories* is also lost. But from an examination of the indices of *loci Aristotelici* in the various Alexander volumes of *CAG*, it appears that he was not aware of our chapter 14. The last passage of *Cat.* he refers to in one of his extant commentaries (*In Metaph.* 209.36f.H) is 14b4, which means that he already had our chapter 12 or part of it. Since chapter 14 discusses εἴδη κινήσεως — and in a manner and terminology somewhat dissimilar to that of the other πραγματεῖαι — one would have expected Alexander, not only to use its terminology, at least occasionally, when he enumerates such εἴδη, but also to refer to that chapter (if only by naming the work in which it appears: Alexander, after all, had no chapters or Bekker pages), along with his references to [sections of] *Physics* and *De Generatione et*

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11   *CAG* III.1, ed. Paul Wendland, Berlin 1901.
12   See n. 7 above.

Corruptione, in some of these places. Alexander's text of *Categories*, it appears, broke off somewhere in our ch. 12 or 13.[13]

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[13]   Sextus, a rough contemporary of Alexander, appears to be quoting *Cat.* 14, 15a13ff. in two parallel passages: *PH* 3.64 and *M* 10.37 — or so we are told by Mutschmann in his apparatus to these passages. (At *M* 10.37, Sextus introduces this list with ὁ μὲν 'Αριστοτέλης ἓξ εἴδη κινήσεως ἔλεγεν ὑπάρχειν; at *PH* 3.64 with φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ κινήσεως διειληφέναι). Both Sextus and *Cat.* 14 have a list of six εἴδη κινήσεως, which are in their essence the same; but is Sextus using *Cat.* 14, *in the form we have it*, as his source? In both Sextus passages, we have τοπικὴ μετάβασις for κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή of *Cat.* 14, 15a14; b3; 10, and μεταβολή (*M* 10.37), or φυσικὴ μεταβολή (*PH* 3.64) for Aristotle's ἀλλοίωσις (both in *Physics* and *Categories*). Of course, in a way every ἀλλοίωσις is a μεταβολή — but so is any κίνησις: πᾶσα κίνησις μεταβολή τις, μεταβολαὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ εἰρημέναι (*Phys.* E 1, 225a34-5, referring back to 7ff.) — and κίνησις itself, the γένος of ἀλλοίωσις, is only part of one of these three μεταβολαί. Sextus' source is not even close enough in his terms to *Cat.*14 — not to mention the other πραγματεῖαι. It is true that μεταβάλλειν and μεταβολή are used by Aristotle in his central discussion of the proper εἴδη κινήσεως, *Phys* E 2, 226a23-b8 — but only in *describing* the three εἴδη, not in *defining* them (and even in these descriptions, it is always a specific and delimited μεταβολή). *Cat.* 14 is closer to proper Aristotelian terms than Sextus.

   What is common to Sextus and *Categories* 14 is the enumerations of *six* εἴδη κινήσεως as against the *three* of the physical πραγματεῖαι. Alexander, wherever he lists these εἴδη κινήσεως, has either the three of *Phys.* E 2, 226a23-b8 (using the 'categorical' expressions κατὰ τόπον, κατὰ ποσόν, κατὰ ποιότητα: e.g. *In Top.* 331.31-2W; *In Metaph.* 292.27-8H), or the four of *Phys.* Γ 1, 200b33ff. (esp. 200b33-4); 201a9-15 — as he does in the examples cited at the beginning of n. 8 above, where the terminology is that of *Physics* 201a9-15, not of *Categories* 14: see that note. Had he known of the way in which the author of *Cat.* 14, or his source, or a source common to him and Sextus, had turned the three or four into six, one would have expected him, as the author of a commentary on *Categories*, to refer to it and attempt to deal with the differences between it and the *Physics*, just as we have seen that he is aware of the difference between the two lists in *Phys.* E 2, 226a23-b8, and Γ 1, 200b33ff.; 201a9ff., and on two occasions gives preference to 226a23-b8 (rightly, of course, in view of 225a20-b5). After all, later commentators, who did have our *Cat.* 14, did note and discuss some discrepancies: see, e.g., Philoponus, *In Cat.* (*CAG* XIII, I, ed. Adolf Busse, Berlin 1898), 198.23-199.24B, esp. 199.9-24B; Simplicius, *In Cat.* (*CAG* VIII, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, Berlin 1907), 427.13K-428.13K, esp. 428.3-13K; Olympiodori *Prolegomena* (*CAG* XII, ed. Adolf Busse, Berlin 1902), 23.14-20B; Simplicius, *In Physica* (*CAG* X, ed. Hermann Diels, Berlin 1895), 824, 20-26.

   If Alexander was unaware of our *Categories* 14 (and perhaps also of parts of 12 and of 13), this seems to reopen the question of the authenticity of the *postpraedicamenta*, to say the least. To the best of my knowledge, the

4. Alexander uses μείωσις as the opposite of αὔξησις whenever he is not close to an Aristotelian text which has φθίσις in it — that is, when he is speaking *in propria persona*. This happens *a fortiori* — as one should expect — in the few cases where he speaks of this contrast in his *Scripta Minora*:[14] The opposites of αὐξάνομαι and αὔξησις are μειοῦμαι and μείωσις: 15.23-16.3B (*Quaestio* VII. *quinquies*); 58.5 (*Quaestio* XIII); 238.6-7 (*De Mixt.*).

The picture should now be clear. Whenever Alexander is close to a text of Aristotle — whether he is directly commenting on it, or citing it in his comments, or is clearly reminiscent of it — he uses φθίνω/φθίσις as the opposites of αὐξάνω/αὔξησις — and even here, as we have seen, μειοῦμαι/μείωσις sometimes creep in. Left to his own devices, he invariably uses μειοῦμαι/μείωσις.

We have seen that φθίνω/φθίσις as opposites of αὐξάνω/αὔξομαι and αὔξησις/αὔξη are normal Platonic (and probably Presocratic) usage — and normal Aristotelian usage. But φθίνω and cognates soon — probably quite early in the Κοινή — became 'antiquarian' and poetic words, and φθίσις came to be used (as it is used today) only of the disease called by that name. In mediaeval and modern Greek, μείωσις (Dem. μείωση) is an everyday word, and in the same sense of 'decrease, diminution, reduction' and the like: only the other day, I heard on a Greek news broadcast a discussion (in relation to the Cyprus problem) of μείωση τῶν στρατιωτικῶν δυνάμεων. Even in Ar. *GC* 1.5, 320b31, we have μείωσις [δηλ. τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους] as part of an explanation of the

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controversy has been dormant since Isaac Husik's 'The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories', *The Journal of Philosophy* 36, 1939, 427-31, followed by the enthusiastic rejoinder offered by Sir David Ross, ibid. 431-3. Ingemar Düring, *Aristoteles, Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens*, Heidelberg 1966, 55 n. 15, regards the controversy as closed after the exchange between Husik and Ross, unless fresh arguments are produced. He seems to be unaware of L.M. de Rijk, 'The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories', *Mnemosyne* 4, 1951, 129-59 (who, in his turn, is unaware of Husik and Ross) — whose arguments for the authenticity of the *postpraedicamenta* are based on the fact that later commentators knew them: the only other arguments he produces (153-7) show only that ch. 11 is likely to have been known quite early, and may be genuine. Christian Rutten, 'Stylométrie des *Catégories*', *Aristotelica, Mélanges offerts à Marcel de Corte*, Brussels-Liège 1985, 313-36, uses statistics of the frequency of adjectives, pronouns and the like in sections of *Categories*, *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, without checking the context and history of such words. The whole issue is too large for my discussion here, and I hope to deal with it at greater length, and also from other aspects, elsewhere. Suffice it here to have shown one reason for rethinking this issue.

14   *Supplementum Aristotelicum* II.II, ed. Ivo Bruns, Berlin 1892.

more philosophical (and more ancient and poetical, especially through its connection with the Homeric φθίω) φθίσις. By Alexander's time, μείωσις was most probably the standard 'Demotic' word. Sextus has αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις only in one place (*M* 9.79), where his context is reminiscent of Aristotle, *GA* 4.9 which has σελήνης...φθίσεις at 777b21. Elsewhere — and I have counted twelve places in Janacek's Index (*), omitting parallels and the two 'references' to *Cat.* 14 — he invariably uses μείωσις as the opposite of αὔξησις. More than two centuries later, Proclus' usage is the same. In his *Timaeus* commentary (ed. Ernst Dihl, Teubner 1903; 4; 6) and in his commentary on Euclid's *Elements* (ed. Gottfried Friedlein, Teubner 1873), φθίσις never appears, while αὔξησις/μείωσις appear five times in each (see indices). Such examples can be multiplied. I shall only bring (without citing texts this time) examples of a practice similar to that of Alexander from one commentary by a later commentator: Philoponus on *De Generatione et Corruptione*.[15] Philoponus has αὔξησις/φθίσις in two places, where his context is Aristotelian: 71.21-2V (Context: *Physics* θ 7 — mentioned at 71.7-8V — where at 260b14 we have αὐξανομένου καὶ φθινομένου); 292.6-7V (Comment on *GC* 2.10, 336b8ff., where at b18 we have φθίσις).[16] Three times (30.10-11V; 69.10V; 70.27-8V),[17] he has αὔξησις/μείωσις: in two of which (69.10V; 70.27-8V) the Aristotelian text he is commenting on is concerned with εἴδη κινήσεως and has αὔξησις/φθίσις and cognates. Examples from other late commentaries and commentators could be multiplied again.[18] The phenomenon of an author attempting to be an Attic, or at least a δόκιμος, writer, but slipping in unawares 'Demotic' expressions from his everyday language is not uncommon and should not be surprising.[19] Our case is somewhat more complex: not that μείωσις is ἀδόκιμος *in any of its senses*: it is an Attic word; but it is not the proper Aristotelian term. At the same time, it is the word Alexander and other later

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15   *CAG* XIV.I1, ed. Hieronymus Vitelli, Berlin 1897.

16   86.29V is irrelevant, since Philoponus is commenting on 320b 28ff., and is citing b30-1 in this line.

17   86.29Vb; 87.4V are also irrelevant, since they echo 320b30-1. Yet both they and 86.29Va *are* evidence — if we need any — that, when echoing the immediate Aristotelian text, one uses Aristotle's terminology.

18   And, as one would expect, later commentators on *Categories* almost invariably use μείωσις, even when they speak (in their comments on *Cat.* 14) of the εἴδη κινήσεως in *Physics*. After all, they have in the text before them the word they use, in any case, in their own Greek. Some of them even use μείωσις in their comments on passages of *Physics* where the word before them in Aristotle's text is φθίσις. This can hardly be ascribed to the overpowering effect of *Cat.* 14.

19   For examples from Philo of Alexandria, see John Glucker, 'Critolaus' Scale and Philo', *CQ* 42, 1, 1992, 142-6, esp. 146; id., 'Piety, Dogs and a Platonic Reminiscence...', *ICS* 18, 1993, 131-8, esp. 137.

writers would use in their own Greek in the same sense as that of the Aristotelian φθίσις.

Aristotle, then, wrote at 122a28 μήτ' αὐξήσεως μήτ' ἀλλοιώσεως. The corruption to μειώσεως would be easy enough from the palaeographical point of view alone, and even easier for a scribe who already used the contrast αὔξησις/ μείωσις in his own spoken language (and probably had it already in some written philosophical texts later than Aristotle). But did Aristotle add the words μήτε τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων? Since, by the time he reached this sentence, he already had the three εἴδη of the γένος κίνησις — αὔξησις, ἀλλοίωσις, φορά — there was no need for this addition. It is tempting to think that these words were added by a learned scribe after ἀλλοιώσεως had already been changed into μειώσεως — perhaps even a scribe familiar with a list similar to what we now have in *Categories* 14, who may have also felt that γένεσις and φθορά are missing as well. The formula καὶ τὰ ἄλλα and variants is not rare in the commentators on Aristotle: e.g. Alexander, *In Top.* 293.1-2W; *In Metaph.* 603.39H. Aristotle himself uses such formulae — but usually when it is not essential to be precise and complete. At *An.* 1.1, 402a23-5, Aristotle says: πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν. But here, this is merely a formula: other categories would hardly fit ψυχή,[20] and Aristotle never examines that possibility in the rest of the work. *Topics* Δ 1, 121a27-35 is nearer home, and it does deal with εἴδη κινήσεως — and here (31-3) we have εἰ μήτε φορὰ μήτ' ἀλλοίωσις ἡ ἡδονὴ μήτε τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων μηδεμία. Could Aristotle not have saved himself the trouble by saying μήτ' αὔξησις instead of the κτλ. formula? He would then have had all three εἴδη κινήσεως. Now it is true that in *EN* 10. 3-5 (esp. 3, 1174a19ff.), Aristotle argues that ἡδονή is not a κίνησις. But at *Rhet.* 1.11, he takes it as his 'dialectical' starting point that it is (1369b233-4: ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς) — and *Topics* is closer to *Rhetoric* than to *Ethics*. At *EN* 10.5, 1175a30-1, we have συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή. At the time of writing *Top.* 121a27-35, Aristotle might have felt that ἡδονή may have something to do with αὔξησις — and αὔξησις is precisely the εἶδος he omits in our passage of *Topics*. But this has already become a somewhat speculative ἐνθύμημα, and one should not insist: παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

We are left with another question related to our passage, but going beyond it. If, at 122a19-30, the εἶδος of βάδισις is φορά, why then, at 122b25-36, is this

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[20]   See the comments ad loc. of Paulus Siwek, S.J. (ed. and comm.), *Aristotelis Tractatus de Anima, Graece et Latine...*, Rome 1965, 246 n. 27.

position refuted? Alexander was already aware of this difficulty, and he tried to resolve it (*In Top.* 316.1-17W). He also reminds us (ibid. 15-17) that ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῆς φυσικῆς εἰπὼν [= ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης] ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν φορὰν αὐτὴν ὀνομάζει. The reference is to E 2, 226a32-b1: ἡ δὲ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἀνώνυμος, ἔστω δὲ φορὰ καλουμένη τὸ κοινόν· καίτοι λέγεταί γε ταῦτα φέρεσθαι μόνα κυρίως, ὅταν μὴ ἐφ᾿ αὑτοῖς ᾖ τὸ στῆναι τοῖς μεταβάλλουσι τὸν τόπον, καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινεῖ κατὰ τόπον. This is a more accurate formulation than what is said of φορά at *Top.* 122b33-5: σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκουσίως τόπον ἐκ τόπου μεταβαλλόντων λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων συμβαίνει. But is this merely a matter of the 'more mature Aristotle' compromising on a Platonic term which 'a younger Aristotle' had rejected?[21] Even if this were the case, it would still not sort out our problem of the relations between 122a19-30 and 122b25-36.

Here, a consideration of what Aristotle's *Topics* is about is in place. There is, of course, nothing wrong in saying that 'dialectic must be distinguished from the sciences in that it does not work with any set view of reality... it should not embody any view of reality... neither a correct one... nor an incorrect one...'[22] This may be sufficient for a philosopher interested in meta-dialectic and meta-science in the Aristotelian corpus. But could a 'treatise on dialectic' include contradictions? Not if *Topics* were merely 'a treatise on dialectic'. But it is not just that, or mainly that. Most of it is a collection of κοινοὶ τόποι, arranged under the headings of συμβεβηκός, γένος, ἴδιον, ὁρισμός,[23] ταὐτὸν-ἔτερον and similar general categories, for the benefit of an ἀνασκευάζων and a κατασκευάζων. What matters is not consistency among the various individual τόποι, but the effectiveness of each argument (and its opposite) within a single τόπος for the purpose of the dialectical question-and-answer discourse. The contradiction we have pointed out is one among many in such a work. Take, for

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21   *Topics* is no longer regarded as an early and less mature work than *Analytics* or the 'more scientific' works. Articles published in the 1950s and the 1960s by Eric Weil and G.E.L. Owen, as well as the third Symposium Aristotelicum in Oxford, whose proceedings were published in *Aristotle on Dialectic...* (n. 2 above), began the reaction against this view. J.D.G. Evans, *Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic*, Cambridge 1977, places *Topics* firmly within the thought of the mature Aristotle: see esp. 1-6.

22   Evans (n. 21), 5.

23   *Topics* Z begins with τῆς δὲ περὶ τοὺς ὅρους πραγματείας... (139a24), but ends with τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς περὶ τοσούτον εἰρήσθω (151b24). In a forthcoming article, Ivor Ludlam shows that Aristotle was extremely unlikely to confuse the more generic ὅρος with its sub-species ὁρισμός: the distinction between the two is made by Aristotle himself. Whenever Aristotle speaks of 'definition', one should therefore read ὁρισμός, or emend ὅρος to ὁρισμός.

example, the treatment of the claim that ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις ἡδέος ἐστιν. At 140b27-31, this is refuted under one τόπος (εἰ ταὐτὸν πλεονάκις εἴρηκεν: 27). At 146b11-12 (the τόπος now is πρός τι: 146a36), it is merely corrected: ἡδονῆς, not ἡδέος. At 146b36-147a5 (τόπος: εἰ μὴ πρόσκειται τὸ φαινόμενον: 146b36), the claim ὅτι ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις ἡδέος is suddenly accepted as if nothing has been said against it so far: all that matters now is *what sort of* (ὅ τι) ἡδύ: real or seeming. Such examples could be multiplied. In a book of topics, one should not be surprised.

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