

## DEBATE

### The ‘Original Text’ of D.L. 7.137-8

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In a previous issue of this periodical, Aryeh Finkelberg appears to attempt a reconstruction of the ‘original text’ (p. 25) upon which a part of Diogenes Laertius 7.137-8 is based.<sup>1</sup> The ‘original text’, he suggests, ‘must have looked like this’ (p. 25-6):

λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον [τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε] τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν, ὃς δὴ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, δημιουργὸς ὧν τῆς διακοσμῆσεως, κατὰ χρόνων ποιᾶς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. [καὶ αὐτὴν <κατὰ> δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν [τῶν ἀστέρων <τῶν τὴν γῆν περιφερομένων>] κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι [καὶ τρίτον] τὸ συνεσθηκὸς ἐξ [ἀμφοῖν] <αἰθέρος καὶ ἀστέρων κατὰ περιοχὴν καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ζώων καὶ φυτῶν>.

I have underlined the modifications to make it easy to see at a glance how they are distributed. Both the meaning of the passage in Diogenes Laertius and the meaning of Finkelberg’s reconstructed ‘original text’ will be discussed in detail later. Here it will be sufficient to observe that the ‘original text’ contains two senses of κόσμος while the received text of Diogenes Laertius contains three senses.

Finkelberg’s abuse of a notation usually associated with textual emendation in his construction of the ‘original text’ (note the excised supplement, ‘[...<τῶν τὴν γῆν περιφερομένων>]’ — an original text indeed!) might give the impression that the ‘original text’ is intended to be none other than the emended text of Diogenes Laertius himself, an impression strengthened by the fact that mention of an ‘original text’ is made only on p. 25, while the article begins with a concern for the text of Diogenes Laertius itself (p. 21). I myself had assumed on a preliminary reading that Finkelberg wished to emend the text of Diogenes Laertius; but I am now satisfied that this is not the case. In addition to his use of the phrase ‘original text’ on p. 25, Finkelberg suggests explicitly that Diogenes’ report is ‘produced by expanding’ the original two definitions to three (p. 24) and that ‘Diogenes’ report is a result of the mechanical addition of the sense of ‘heaven’ of the word κόσμος ...’ (p. 26). That is to say, according to this side of Finkelberg’s argument, the original two definitions precede Diogenes’ report of three senses of κόσμος, since Diogenes’ report is the product or the result of the ‘original text’.

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<sup>1</sup> A. Finkelberg, ‘Diogenes Laertius on the Stoic definitions of κόσμος’, *SCI* 17, 1998, 21-6.

Furthermore, Finkelberg's argument for the alleged expansion from an original two to Diogenes' three definitions requires that the three definitions be treated in strict isolation from the rest of Diogenes Laertius' text, and hence assumes a stage before Diogenes' text existed (see my step 1 below). Thus, whatever Finkelberg intended, his article does not in fact argue for emending the text of Diogenes Laertius, but must be seen as an exercise in source criticism, with the aim of reconstructing the 'original text' from which Diogenes Laertius 7.137-8 is derived. It follows that despite expressing concern for the state of the text in Diogenes Laertius, Finkelberg does not emend it, although this may have been his intention.

Finkelberg does not mention the context in which D.L. 7.137-8 is to be found, nor does he take the context into account in his argument. I shall indicate the results of this isolationist approach to D.L. 7.137-8 during the course of my examination of Finkelberg's argument. But first, a few words on the context.

The seventh book of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives and Opinions of People Well-Reputed in Philosophy* is arguably our most important source for the general exposition and development of early Stoic philosophy. The significance of this second century C.E. compiler is not in what he says, but in what his sources say. His own contribution to the exposition of Stoic philosophy is in the arrangement of his selections and the few words he adds here and there to smooth the transition from one account to another. By his method of compilation he has preserved for us several earlier doxographic accounts whose differences, and whose reports of differences in their sources, have allowed scholars in the field to make some progress in tracing the development of Stoic thought from the third century down to at least the first century B.C.E. This is especially true with regard to the general division of Stoic philosophy (D.L. 7.39-42)<sup>2</sup> and more particularly of Stoic logic (42-8+83; 49-54; 55-82).<sup>3</sup> The expositions of ethics (84-131) and physics (132-60) are less revealing with regard to the development of Stoic thought in their respective fields, but they must still be ranked among the fullest and most reliable sources that we now have for Stoic ethics and physics.

The reconstruction of an original text upon which a part of the report in Diogenes Laertius is based is a worthy aim rarely achieved. This is because Diogenes Laertius copied from a limited number of doxographers who in turn summarized and interpreted for their own ends what they discovered in their sources, and so on back to many original works. To identify a possible original source (a particular work of a particular Stoic) not already mentioned by Diogenes and trace the transmission from

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, P. Hadot, 'Philosophie, discours philosophique, et divisions de la philosophie chez les stoïciens', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 45, 1991, 205-19; K. Ierodiakonou, 'The Stoic Division of Philosophy', *Phronesis* 38, 1993, 57-74; I. Ludlam, 'Antipater of Tarsus: A Critical Edition with Commentary on the Testimonia for his Life, Works and Logic', Tel Aviv 1997 (diss.), 200-24.

<sup>3</sup> See especially J. Mansfeld, 'Diogenes Laertius on Stoic Philosophy', *Elenchus* 7, 1986, 295-382 (= *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy*, Assen 1990, 343-428); also J. Mejer, 'Diogenes Laertius and the Transmission of Greek Philosophy' in *ANRW* II.36.5, 1992, 3556-602, esp. §5. 'The Stoics: 7.38-160', 3579-82; I. Ludlam (n. 2), 226-50.

that source down to Diogenes is usually the best one can hope for, and even this is a rare achievement. To reconstruct an original text, even of two definitions only, is rare indeed, and would be of great value were the proper methods employed in its reconstruction.

The passage from D.L. 7.137-8 is to be found in the exposition of physics, or more precisely, in that part of the exposition of physics dealing with the κόσμος.<sup>4</sup> The received text reports that the Stoics use κόσμος in three senses, which we may call here A, B, and the composite of A and B. Finkelberg argues that the 'original text' reported that the Stoics mean by κόσμος A and Z (where Z is a new sense borrowed by Finkelberg from Philo). Since Finkelberg regards the received text at D.L. 7.137-8 to be the result of addition (p. 26, as already noted), it is apparent that Finkelberg does not see the change from [A, Z] to [A, B, A+B] as having occurred during the transmission since the writing of Diogenes Laertius' text. He must regard it as having happened at some time between the writing of the 'original text' and the writing of Diogenes' text (there are factors which militate against the possibility that Finkelberg regards Diogenes himself as the culprit, as we shall see below). Finkelberg, then, appears to be concerned not with correcting a serious corruption in the text of Diogenes Laertius, but with reconstructing an earlier text which bears strikingly little resemblance to the received text supposedly based on it.

My reply will not be completely negative. I shall take the opportunity to propose an alternative explanation for the text at D.L. 7.137-8 which is based on Stoic philosophy, and I shall ponder a few issues concerning Stoic physics, Stoic physical terms, and source criticism.

Finkelberg's dense argument needs to be teased apart in order to examine its various claims and methods. I shall present the main points of Finkelberg's argument in a number of steps, with my remarks following each step. Page references are to Finkelberg's article:

1. The introduction: The text at D.L. 7.137-8 offers three definitions of the term κόσμος. The third is a composite of the first two (p. 21).

Here we have our three formulations of κόσμος, A, B, A+B. This at least seems simple enough; but a non-specialist reader might easily assume that only three senses of κόσμος are reported by Diogenes Laertius.<sup>5</sup> This is because only the first three of a

<sup>4</sup> One division of physics reported at the beginning of the exposition is into six parts which do not correspond with the exposition itself. The second division of physics reported there is into three parts: on the κόσμος; on elements; on aetiology (D.L. 7.132, elaborated in 133). This more closely reflects the exposition. The discussion of the term κόσμος would be a natural topic within an exposition concerning the κόσμος. The reference to aetiology indicates that this particular division is Posidonian; see I. Ludlam, 'The God of Moses according to Strabo', *Tarbiz* 66, 1997, 337-49, esp. 347-8 (Hebrew).

<sup>5</sup> *SVF* 2.526 gives only the first three formulations, and these are all that the reader will find (in English) in the first volume of Long and Sedley (*The Hellenistic Philosophers*, edd. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Cambridge 1987: Vol. 1 *Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary*), 44F (p. 270). It is true that the next three

list of six Stoic formulations of κόσμος reported here by Diogenes Laertius are mentioned by Finkelberg throughout his argument preceding the presentation of the 'original text'.<sup>6</sup> The six formulations appear within Diogenes' discussion of κόσμος, and it is not insignificant that the definition following that list is of οὐρανός (the outer sphere of the κόσμος), with which the Stoic κόσμος in one of its aspects could be identified. Diogenes Laertius must have been aware of the seven formulations since he wrote them all down together in a list; he did not treat the first three senses of κόσμος in isolation. It is extremely unlikely, therefore, that with this list in front of him, Diogenes would have been the one who added τριχῶς ('three ways') and τρίτον ('third') to stress that the Stoics had (only) three senses of κόσμος. Yet, according to Finkelberg's reconstruction presented above, these words are not part of the 'original text', which means they were added to the 'original text' by someone else. This person would need to be someone who had access to the (three definition) corrupt version of the (two definition) 'original text', and only this corrupt text (since he could see only three definitions), before its inclusion in Diogenes' text. Hence we must posit an intermediate source between the 'original text' and Diogenes Laertius. The alternative and worse interpretation — that Finkelberg means by 'original text' the emended text of Diogenes Laertius — would need to be rejected on this point alone: no one reading Diogenes' text — corrupt or not — would have added the words τριχῶς and τρίτον, when the list clearly contained five or six different definitions.

It should also be added here, since this concerns the issue of treating the first three senses in isolation, that neither Diogenes nor anyone later would have had trouble recalling the word οὐρανός, a Stoic definition of which comes immediately after the six formulations of κόσμος. Finkelberg will argue later that the person who expanded the first two senses to three was unable to use the word οὐρανός because it did not appear in his source (step 18 below). The less implausible interpretation of Finkelberg's position would again be to understand that the person who expanded the first two senses to three did not have access to all the material available to Diogenes Laertius.

To sum up the argument so far: Finkelberg's 'original text' is best interpreted as a source from which D.L. 7.137-8 is derived. The alternative interpretation — that the 'original text' is D.L. 7.137-8 itself after emendation — must be rejected immediately due to the problems arising, as we have just seen, from considering the passage

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formulations appear (in smaller print) in the Greek version of 44F in the second volume of Long and Sedley (id., Vol. 2 *Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography*), and that Finkelberg refers to this place in n. 3 (p. 21), but he refers to it on another matter, and not in order to indicate that there are in fact more than three formulations of κόσμος in this passage.

<sup>6</sup> The fourth and fifth definitions of κόσμος are mentioned — indeed quoted — in n. 22, p. 26, once the 'original text' has been reconstructed and presented, but Finkelberg does not make the point even there that these are further Stoic formulations of κόσμος. The fifth definition in D.L. 7.138 is quoted in n. 10, with wrong reference to D.L. 7.137, and without mentioning that it is ascribed there to Posidonius or that it is the fifth definition in D.L.'s list.

in context. Since Finkelberg nowhere makes the process clear, I shall assume that the ‘original text’, containing two definitions of κόσμος, served as a source for someone who expanded it into three senses of κόσμος. To this expanded text was added, either at the time of the expansion, or by a later copyist, the information that the Stoics understood κόσμος in three senses (τριχῶς, τρίτον). This expanded text itself then became one of the sources for the compiler of the list of six definitions of κόσμος and the οὐρανός definition — be it Diogenes Laertius or one of his sources. I trust that I do not do Finkelberg an injustice, therefore, when I say that he is not concerned with emending the text of Diogenes Laertius but with reconstructing the ‘original text’ — a source at two removes at least from Diogenes Laertius.

2. The problem: The first Stoic sense of κόσμος is a peculiar individual of some sort<sup>7</sup> comprising the whole of substance (οὐσία), and the second sense of κόσμος is the arrangement of the stars. The third sense of κόσμος presents a difficulty because it appears to propose a combination of the first two senses, ‘an impossible notion’. Von Arnim’s ‘solution’, the excision of ‘of the stars’, is ‘difficult’ (p. 21).

Finkelberg expresses dissatisfaction with von Arnim’s excision of ‘of the stars’, which is an emendation aimed at solving a problem in the text of Diogenes Laertius itself.<sup>8</sup> Is Finkelberg intending to propose a better solution? This is the alternative we have had to reject, in an attempt to save what can be saved of Finkelberg’s argument (see step 1 above). We must assume that Finkelberg does not propose an emendation to the text of Diogenes, although this does at first sight appear to be his intention. Let us imagine that he is simply pointing out that the argument as it stands in Diogenes Laertius is corrupt, as a preliminary to reconstructing the ‘original text’. Finkelberg and I both agree with von Arnim’s apparent decision that ‘of the stars’ is a textual problem in this passage, but Finkelberg may share my hesitation to emend the text of Diogenes.<sup>9</sup> All the same, I would not go so far as Finkelberg as to throw out the

<sup>7</sup> An ‘individual of some sort’ is my translation of ποιός in this technical Stoic sense. For my reasoning, see step 4 below.

<sup>8</sup> Von Arnim, *SVF* 2. 526. Von Arnim does not explain in what is after all only a collection of testimonia why he excised, but it is clear from his apparatus criticus that the excision is his.

<sup>9</sup> That ‘of the stars’ appears to be an addition to a previously coherent text is evident. κόσμος in the first sense is god, who is described as the δημιουργός of the διακόσμησις with no qualification (god is the active aspect of the διακόσμησις). The second sense points to the passive aspect of the same thing, διακόσμησις itself (see the continuation of my text), and not the διακόσμησις of anything in particular. Furthermore, the second formula stresses that it is the διακόσμησις *itself*, and the construction would be strange if the phrase ‘διακόσμησις itself’ were further qualified by ‘of the stars’. Von Arnim surely regarded his excision as a satisfactory solution to the textual problem, and would not have seen it as a ‘solution’ to the novel philosophical problem Finkelberg raises (step 3 below). The phrase ‘of the stars’ certainly did not appear in the ultimate Stoic source, but I would hesitate to excise it from the text of Diogenes since I do not know who made this addition — Diogenes’ source, Diogenes, or a later copyist. To excise is to indicate that the phrase did not appear in Diogenes’ text, implying that it was a later addition. Long and Sedley follow von Arnim in excising. The editor of the Loeb edition, R.D. Hicks, does not excise

argument concerning the Stoic three senses together with the offending phrase in a reconstruction of the 'original text'.

The main difficulty with Diogenes' report for Finkelberg is the composite achieved by the union of the first and second senses of κόσμος. Before continuing with Finkelberg's argument to determine where exactly the difficulty lies, I should point out that this particular composite would not be a difficult notion for Stoics. As Diogenes Laertius reports it, the first sense of κόσμος is 'God himself, the peculiar individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance, who indeed does not pass away or come to be {*qua* god}, while-he-is (ὄν) the creator (δημιουργός) of the orderly-arrangement (διακόσμησις), periodically consuming into himself the whole of substance and again begetting<sup>10</sup> it out of himself'. The second sense (without 'of the stars') is 'the orderly-arrangement itself'. The third sense of κόσμος, then, being the combination of the first two senses, is the composite of the creator and the created, the arranger and the arranged.

How could the Stoic god and his creation be seen by Stoics as a composite? One could do worse than look at Diogenes Laertius' report on this very point just three paragraphs earlier, at the beginning of the exposition of the κόσμος (D.L. 7.134). Even if one does not read one's Diogenes Laertius, this passage is hard to miss in von Arnim's collection of Stoic testimonia. It heads the physics section devoted to the founder of the Stoic school (Zeno: *SVF* 1.85), heads the physics section devoted to his pupil and so-called successor (Cleanthes: *SVF* 1.493), and is the second testimonium in the physics section devoted to the so-called second founder of the Stoic school (Chrysippus: *SVF* 2.300<sup>11</sup>). The passage is also the twelfth testimonium in the small collection devoted to one of the later Stoics (Archedemus: *SVF* 3. *Arch.* 12 [263.21-6]). Here is my translation of the passage: 'They (the Stoics) believe that there are two principles (ἀρχαί) of all things: the active and the passive. The passive they believe is unqualified substance (οὐσία) {i.e.} matter (ὑλη); the active is the λόγος in it, {i.e.} god (θεός). For being eternal, the latter (they believe) creates (δημιουργεῖν) each-and-every thing throughout the whole of it {i.e., matter}'.<sup>12</sup>

In other words, god, the eternal active aspect of everything, creates (δημιουργεῖν) all the things of this world by intermingling with, and qualifying, the passive aspect of everything, the notionally unqualified substance that is matter.<sup>13</sup> The qualifier and the qualified are aspects of the same thing, substance (οὐσία). God and matter are necessarily coextensive.<sup>14</sup>

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it. As far as Finkelberg is concerned, it is sufficient for his argument to say that the phrase was not part of the 'original text'; and indeed, we find that the phrase is excised by him from his reconstructed 'original text'.

<sup>10</sup> The imagery is sexual. See D.L. 7.136.

<sup>11</sup> Where 139 is a misprint for 134. The first testimonium in the section is from the same paragraph, D.L. 7.134.

<sup>12</sup> DL 7.134: δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὑλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν· τοῦτον γὰρ αἰδίων ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Ludlam (n. 4), 338.

<sup>14</sup> See *SVF* 2.527-8.

Let us now return to D.L. 7.137-8. Diogenes' first sense of κόσμος is god, and he is described as the creator (δημιουργός) of the orderly-arrangement (διακόσμησις). We may now see that this means he is the active aspect of the orderly-arrangement. While it is also the case for most Stoics that god is the eternally active aspect, whether during a period of orderly-arrangement or during the conflagration between two different orderly-arrangements, and that this is mentioned in the explanation of Diogenes' first sense of κόσμος, the point is that god is κόσμος when, and only when, he is the active aspect of an orderly-arrangement. It would make no sense to talk about a κόσμος (an orderly-arrangement of all things) in the conflagration when god and matter are at their most undifferentiated, i.e., when there are no things but substance in its 'purest' form.<sup>15</sup>

Diogenes' second sense of κόσμος is the orderly-arrangement itself — i.e., what is arranged, the passive aspect, all matter qualified in a certain way.

Diogenes' third sense of κόσμος may now be seen to be quite naturally the composite of the active and the passive aspects of the διακόσμησις or orderly-arrangement of the universe. The composite of eternal god and transitory world-order is therefore far from being a difficult notion for Stoics.

Finkelberg's difficulty is next to be considered.

3. The difficulty: The term διακόσμησις is one of two alternating arrangements, the other being ἐκπύρωσις ('conflagration'). As such, the eternal individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance cannot combine with διακόσμησις to create a third notion of κόσμος. The combination 'is scarcely a tenable notion which furthermore adds nothing to Diogenes' second definition...' (p. 22).

Finkelberg appears to view διακόσμησις and ἐκπύρωσις as the two possible dispositions of the individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance (= god). The difficulty perceived by Finkelberg arises when the various senses of κόσμος in Diogenes Laertius' text are understood as follows: 1. the eternal individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance alternating between both dispositions; 2. an individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance disposed as one particular orderly-arrangement; 3. a composite of the eternal individual of some sort comprising

<sup>15</sup> The eternally active element in cosmic cycles is god or λόγος, but only god in relation to the orderly-arrangement is the active κόσμος. It seems to me that the notion of an eternal κόσμος in a cosmic cycle that includes conflagration is a misapprehension in some of our later sources probably caused by the conflation of accounts drawn from more detailed arguments. A factor adding to the confusion may have been a hiatus during the second century B.C.E. when Stoics such as Panaetius could not accept the idea of the conflagration on strictly physical grounds. Without a cosmic cycle, this κόσμος would have been considered eternal, with god and the active κόσμος becoming interchangeable terms. Posidonius (I argue elsewhere) solved the physical problem which had cast the idea of conflagration into abeyance, and reinstated conflagration. The attribution of eternity to the active κόσμος may have become so ingrained by then that it survived the reintroduction of the conflagration by Posidonius. For more details on the hiatus, see Ludlam (n. 4), 339 and n. 9 there. The same hiatus may also be discerned in connection with related subjects, such as the eternal soul; see J. Glucker, 'A Platonic Cento in Cicero', *Phronesis* 44, 1999, 30-44, esp. 33-5 with notes to bibliography there.

the whole of substance alternating between conflagration and orderly-arrangement, and that same individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance, but disposed only as one particular orderly-arrangement, which is indeed scarcely tenable.

We have already noted, however (step 2 above), that the passive arrangements are arranged by an active god, and it is that god who is the eternal individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance. God and the arrangements are not the same thing, but exist as two aspects of a composite. Furthermore, the first sense of κόσμος is god, but this is god as κόσμος, as the δημιουργός of the διακόσμησις, when he is the active aspect of the orderly-arranged οὐσία, and not the active aspect of the οὐσία altogether, whether arranged or not. That is to say, Diogenes' report regards only god as eternal, while the κόσμος, which is a disposition of god, is transient. God as κόσμος does not alternate between two dispositions.<sup>16</sup>

4. The testimony of Clement *Strom.* v. 104 '(= *SVF* ii 182.6)' is adduced to confirm Finkelberg's claim that the third definition is wrong. The composite would be of two things essentially the same: the ἰδίως ποιός comprising all substance; and that same thing (i.e. the ἰδίως ποιός comprising all substance) disposed in a certain way. Finkelberg doubts 'that the Stoics would have approved of such a notion' (p. 22).

The Stoic technical terminology will be explained shortly. Before that, we should consider Finkelberg's reasons for mentioning Clement at all in a discussion concerning the 'original text' underlying D.L. 7.137-8. Two possible reasons suggest themselves: that there is a common source for Diogenes and Clement, or that the Stoics all held the same beliefs.

To take these in order, there is no reason to assume that a common source lies behind the reports of Diogenes and Clement. Such an assumption is permissible only when the history of the transmission of the testimonia is known and justifies the assumption, or when the similarities between the testimonia are such that no other explanation could suffice. Since in this case the history of the transmission is not known, and there is little similarity between Diogenes and Clement,<sup>17</sup> this I presume is not Finkelberg's reason for citing Clement.

<sup>16</sup> In Diogenes' formulation, god as the individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance is indeed imperishable and uncreated, whereas he is κόσμος only while being — at certain periods — δημιουργός of one διακόσμησις or another. While god is the eternal individual of some sort, the κόσμος is the eternal individual of some sort *disposed in a certain (transient) way*. I take ὅς δὴ in our sentence to be almost concessive: while the individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance *is indeed* [in himself] imperishable and uncreated, he is κόσμος *only* when he creates (that is, penetrates through and supervises) one or other (passive) διακόσμησις. I take ὡν in our sentence to be temporal or relative: 'while he is a δημιουργός' or 'in his capacity as δημιουργός'. There are times when god is not κόσμος (i.e., there is no κόσμος) — during periods of the ἐκπύρωσις, when god and matter are one and the same, and there is nothing to arrange.

<sup>17</sup> Diogenes reports various Stoic senses of κόσμος ultimately drawn from Stoic texts. Clement, in our passage, is reporting a Stoicizing speculation about Heraclitus, whose main point is not to define κόσμος, but to show that Heraclitus — who actually believed that there was only one eternal κόσμος (Fr. 30DK = 51M) — was really a good Stoic. Although Heraclitus did not mention his belief in a perishable κόσμος (runs the

As for the second possible reason, let us assume for the sake of argument that all the Stoics adhered to a rigid monolithic belief system and shared the same opinions. Even were we to grant this, there is no reason to assume that any testimonia using Stoic terms would present that hypothetical position. One should always look at the context and at special difficulties in each text. Diogenes' context is at least a report of Stoic doctrines, and if it presents any difficulty (as in the case of 'of the stars'), this is a problem of textual transmission. Clement, on the other hand, is not reporting Stoic doctrines but merely using some Stoic terms in a wide-ranging discussion concerning the belief of some pagan philosophers that the κόσμος was imperishable.

Clement's report clearly derives from a context quite unlike that which was the source for the report in Diogenes Laertius. It may derive from a source no earlier than the first century B.C.E.<sup>18</sup> In Clement's report, Heraclitus is said to have approved of the notion that one particular κόσμος is eternal, while another particular κόσμος is perishing, because he knew (we are told) that the one 'according to the orderly-arrangement' (κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν) is nothing other than the eternal κόσμος disposed in a certain way (πῶς ἔχων).<sup>19</sup> Now, the κόσμος 'according to the orderly-arrangement' seems to me to have two senses in Stoic philosophy, but probably not in the same system, and almost certainly not in the same argument where such a phrase used in two senses would only cause confusion.

In one sense, this formula could distinguish the (active) κόσμος according to the orderly-arrangement from the (passive) orderly-arrangement itself.<sup>20</sup> In the other (probably later<sup>21</sup>) sense, the formula would distinguish the κόσμος according to the orderly-arrangement from the κόσμος according to the conflagration, or the κόσμος throughout its cycle; all these latter κόσμοι are viewed from the same aspect, be it active or passive.

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argument), he knew that this perishable κόσμος was none other than one disposition of the eternal κόσμος. Since this Stoicizing report countenances an eternal κόσμος at all, while at the same time accepting a perishable κόσμος, the report must be late and confused. Only Stoics from the second century B.C.E. could have countenanced an eternal κόσμος (see n. 15 above), but then they would not have accepted a perishable κόσμος.

18

See n. 15 above.

19

See nn. 16 and 17 above, and n. 22 below.

20

I understand this peculiarly Stoic usage as follows. The active aspect of the οὐσία is *per se* uniform and indivisible, just as the passive aspect *per se* is uniform and indivisible. We observe manifestations of the ὄλη (the passive aspect of the οὐσία) as it is qualified by the active element; it follows that the active element, which is simply the other aspect of the οὐσία, may also be regarded in different ways, i.e., as different προσηγορίαι (e.g. λόγος, κόσμος), by referring to that which is qualified by it. It is only by reference to different manifestations of the qualified οὐσία that the active aspect may be regarded as λόγος, κόσμος and so on. In a similar fashion, the aspects of these different manifestations of the active element can be considered by reference to aspects of the different manifestations of the οὐσία qualified by them. Thus, for example, we find that the 'λόγος according to philosophy' is notionally divisible into three, just as philosophy itself is divisible into three. On the Stoic 'division' of the λόγος into 'aspects' by reference to the 'partition' of the qualified thing into 'topics', see Ludlam (n. 2), 212-16.

21

See n. 15 above.

To sum up the difference, the active/passive distinction is between two coexisting κόσμοι, while the cosmic cycle distinction is between κόσμοι existing one after the other alternately, or between one of these temporary κόσμοι and the eternal κόσμος of which it is a part.

Let us now return to Clement's report and the more technical terminology. Heraclitus is said to have approved of the notion that one particular κόσμος is eternal, and this is identified as the ἰδίως ποιός of the whole of the οὐσία ('substance'). The ἰδίως ποιός is normally translated in the secondary literature as the 'peculiarly qualified [individual]'. Since only substance is what is, the things in the κόσμος are explained by the Stoics as 'bodies' which are manifestations of substance. A body is that which can affect or be affected, which means that both the active and the passive aspects of the same thing are bodies (two or more bodies can occupy the same space in Stoic philosophy). The passive aspect of substance, namely matter, is qualified by the active aspect of substance, namely god or *logos*. The body which is the whole of the passive aspect of substance qualified by the whole of the active aspect is necessarily peculiar, or one of a kind, and might indeed be regarded as a peculiarly qualified individual. However, to translate ποιός as 'qualified individual' wrongly precludes reference to the active aspect ('qualified' is passive), as if only the passive aspect has characteristics. To take but a few examples: god; (the active) *kosmos*; and *logos* — these are all manifestations of the active aspect of substance, the aspect which is not qualified but does the qualifying. These manifestations are just as much ποιοί — bodies with qualities — as matter is. A better translation of ποιός therefore might be 'an individual of some sort' (ποιός as an interrogative asks the question 'what sort?'). The phrase ἰδίως ποιός would be better translated as 'a peculiar individual of some sort' (the adverb ἰδίως qualifies the substantive ποιός — an adjective is required in English). It seems to me that both the passively qualified substance and the active aspect with regard to the passively qualified substance are both notionally ἰδίως ποιοί — notionally, because they are in reality inseparable aspects of the same substance — and, presumably, the composite *qua* composite may also be seen as an ἰδίως ποιός. Which of these three options Clement's 'Heraclitus' is intended to be referring to — the active, passive, or composite peculiar individual of the whole substance — is unclear, but in fact his argument does not suffer from this ambiguity.

The report continues that Heraclitus was able to view the κόσμος as perishable because he knew that the perishable κόσμος according to the orderly-arrangement was none other than the eternal κόσμος disposed in a certain way.<sup>22</sup> The phrase

<sup>22</sup> Finkelberg correctly points out (p. 22) that Clement's report distinguishes the eternal κόσμος from the κόσμος according to the orderly-arrangement by means of two of the Stoic genera (ποιός, ποιός πως ἔχων — 'an individual of some sort'; 'an individual of some sort disposed in a certain way'), but is wrong to assume that these genera must be applied in the same way to the received text of Diogenes Laertius as well. The δημιουργός of the orderly-arrangement and the orderly-arrangement itself could, for example, both be conceived as ποιοί πως ἔχοντες ('individuals of some sort disposed in a certain way') with regard to god as eternal. If the eternal god is not being referred to, they could, each in isolation, be regarded simply as ποιοί ('individuals of some sort'). Finally,

'κόσμος according to the orderly-arrangement' is used here by Clement in the second of the ways discussed above, to distinguish between two κόσμοι, one a temporary disposition of the eternal other. That there could be an eternal κόσμος which involves conflagration in the cosmic cycle suggests that Clement's source is late and confused.<sup>23</sup> God is eternal, whatever the disposition of the matter, but, strictly speaking, he is κόσμος only with respect to the orderly-arrangement, which is considered by early Stoics to be transient.<sup>24</sup>

All this has little bearing on the argument underlying the three Stoic senses reported in Finkelberg's passage taken from D.L. 7.137-8. The phrase 'κόσμος according to the orderly-arrangement' does not appear there, but if it did, it would have been used in the first way discussed above, to distinguish the active κόσμος from the passive κόσμος which is the orderly-arrangement itself.

5. The search for a solution begins: Philo provides the first clue (*De incorrupt. mund.* ii 488 Mang.) by giving three definitions of the κόσμος, the third of which is attributed explicitly to the Stoics (pp. 22-3). Finkelberg pairs these three definitions off with the definitions in D.L. by a process of elimination. Having paired off two definitions of each list, he assumes that the remaining definition in Diogenes' list 'should correspond' with the remaining definition in Philo's list (p. 23).

Why does Finkelberg pair off the three Stoic senses of κόσμος in Diogenes Laertius with three miscellaneous definitions of κόσμος in Philo (a list clearly made by Philo himself)? A partial answer may be gleaned from the end of Finkelberg's article, where it would seem that Finkelberg regards only the first of the three definitions in Diogenes Laertius as peculiarly Stoic (p. 26). While this goes some way to explaining why it is the definition Philo calls Stoic which is paired off with the definition acknowledged by Finkelberg as Stoic in Diogenes Laertius, the mere fact that the two definitions are apparently Stoic does not make them essentially identical. Certainly, the two other definitions in Philo are not thereby essentially identical with the two other definitions in Diogenes Laertius. That both lists of three definitions are miscellaneous in the same superficial way is therefore insufficient reason for pairing off the definitions in the way that Finkelberg does. There has to be a further reason.

Finkelberg's process of elimination might indicate that he assumes there are only three possible senses of κόσμος, no matter how they are formulated, with one definition Stoic, and two not peculiarly Stoic. This, however, is clearly not the case. We see more Stoic senses immediately after the first three definitions in the text of Diogenes Laertius 7.137-8. In contrast to the six Stoic formulations of κόσμος in Diogenes Laertius, even the definition which Philo does claim is Stoic may not be authentic — see step 5c below. Furthermore, non-Stoic definitions of κόσμος number more than two. To take an example close to hand, Philo (an Alexandrian Jew who regarded Plato's account of a created κόσμος with approval), intends to concentrate his discussion on the Peripatetic arguments for the position that the κόσμος is

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the composite of both is also a ποιός — or a ποιός πως ἔχων, with reference to the eternal god.

23 See again n. 15 above.

24 See n. 16 above.

uncreated and imperishable. He presents three definitions of κόσμος just to make clear which sense of κόσμος concerns him in this treatise, and states that he will deal with the κόσμος in the first sense — the composite of οὐρανός and stars and earth and the animals and plants on the earth (*De Aet. Mund.* 4). This first sense is intended to be Peripatetic. The second sense of κόσμος ('just ouranos') does not cover all the remaining senses of κόσμος which are not peculiarly Stoic. Even Finkelberg is aware of more than three Greek meanings of κόσμος,<sup>25</sup> suggesting that we must find another reason for Finkelberg's treatment of the two lists as essentially identical.

A common source appears unlikely: while Diogenes' list, according to Finkelberg, is a corruption of an 'original text', Philo does not seem to have formulated his own list from one unique source — and in any case, such a unique source would have had to be the 'original text', which, according to Finkelberg, had only two definitions, while Philo's list has three. How, then, are we to justify a comparison of the two lists in the way Finkelberg has done? If there is to be a connection between the two lists at all, it may be rationalized as follows. Philo or a Philonian tampered with the 'original text', and the two definitions of Finkelberg's 'original text' became three under the influence of Philo's list of three definitions. The first — Stoic — definition of the 'original text' remained unaltered, since it agreed with Philo's 'Stoic' definition, while the second definition of the 'original text', which was not peculiarly Stoic in any case, was transformed into two definitions not peculiarly Stoic, and made to conform with the other two definitions in Philo's list. Perhaps this is what Finkelberg had in mind. At least, this would justify the comparison he makes between the two lists.

As we shall now see, whatever the rationale for the comparison may have been, Finkelberg's pairing of the formulae in Diogenes and Philo is forced:

5a. D.L.'s first (and Stoic) definition (the eternal god) corresponds with Philo's third (and Stoic) definition (οὐσία τις ἢ διακεκοσμημένη ἢ ἀδιακόσμητος — 'a certain *ousia* either arranged or not arranged');

It might seem at first sight as though this pairing is correct. Philo's third definition is the 'Stoic' one in his selection. Philo's 'οὐσία τις whether arranged or not arranged' appears to be the eternal οὐσία, and would correspond with Diogenes' eternal god. In fact any correspondence is illusory.

Firstly, Philo's formula is not couched entirely in Stoic terms. The οὐσία τις ('a certain being/entity') is not to be confused with the Stoic οὐσία ('[the whole of] substance') but is Philo's Platonic translation of ποιός ('an individual of some sort'). Finkelberg's 'a certain substance' (p. 26) does not reflect Stoic usage: the οὐσία is the one substance in Stoic philosophy, and it cannot be qualified as 'a certain substance' (οὐσία τις); τις is a general term used to denote any individual of some sort, or any other body. This fact alone, that 'a certain substance' does not reflect Stoic

<sup>25</sup> Finkelberg knows of at least four meanings of κόσμος: the Presocratic 'arrangement' (he stresses that the Presocratics do not mean 'world-arrangement'); then later, οὐρανός in the sense of 'heaven'; οὐρανός in the sense of 'world'; and finally, any region or sphere of the world. See A. Finkelberg, 'On the History of the Greek ΚΟΣΜΟΣ', *HSCP* 98, 1998, 103-36.

usage, militates against Finkelberg's contention that Philo's is 'the correct report' (ibid.) — or that it is even Stoic (cf. *SVF* 2.329-35).

Secondly, Philo's 'certain entity' is 'arranged or not arranged' — passive. The Stoic god is active (arranging or not arranging, as the case may be).

Thirdly, the backgrounds for the two definitions paired by Finkelberg are quite different. The context in which Philo found his definition may be deduced from his observation in the presentation of his third sense of κόσμος that Stoics *define time as the measurement of change of this κόσμος* (this definition is indeed attributed to early Stoics: cf. *SVF* 2.510), a κόσμος which may be arranged or not arranged. Somewhat later in the treatise, the same observation is made, but this time in its proper context. There, Philo has presented the Peripatetic view that time and change are mutually dependent, which means that time and the present κόσμος must always have existed, since neither can exist without the other. This conflicts with the Stoic view of a cosmic cycle in which the present κόσμος must have come into being and will pass away. Philo posits an argumentative Stoic who might say that *time — the measure of change in the κόσμος* — exists also in the conflagration (the conflagration would therefore be the unarranged κόσμος Philo refers to when he uses this definition in his introduction — and the usual, transient, κόσμος would be the arranged κόσμος). This argument would break the mutual dependency between time and the present transitory κόσμος, with the consequence that the argument from time would no longer prove that the present κόσμος always was and always will be. Philo knocks down this straw man by pointing out that there is no change or movement in the conflagration, and hence no time during the conflagration (*De Aet. Mund.* 54). This unreal Stoic eternal κόσμος is introduced by Philo as a piece of hypothetical polemic, and I am not sure that the original author (if not Philo himself) was Stoic. At any rate, it seems to me that the notes Philo took in order to write up this argument also served him in the introduction (ibid. 4) where he brings this hypothetical Stoic κόσμος as one of the senses of κόσμος which will not be the subject of his treatise. As I have already mentioned, he even adds in the introduction the point about time which is not strictly necessary for the distinction he wishes to make in that context. The report we find in Diogenes concerning the three aspects of κόσμος as active, passive and composite does not derive (as Philo's does) from an argument concerning the perishability of the κόσμος. It appears to derive from a solid Stoic argument, probably in an exposition of Stoic physics.

5b. D.L.'s second definition, the arrangement of the stars, 'seems to correspond to Philo's second sense, *μόνος οὐρανός*';

It might seem quite plausible that Philo's 'heaven alone' would correspond with Diogenes' 'orderly arrangement [of the stars]'. However, the phrase 'orderly-arrangement of the stars' is not a Stoic conception of οὐρανός, as indeed Finkelberg is aware (see step 10 below, and compare the Stoic definition of οὐρανός at D.L. 7.137-8, immediately after the list of six Stoic senses of κόσμος). It is only here that Finkelberg accepts without demur a reading which he elsewhere rejects as corrupt. I might add in support of rejecting this reading, that anyone wishing to

identify κόσμος with οὐρανός would have done so by using the word οὐρανός — just as Philo manages to do.<sup>26</sup>

Even were we to join Finkelberg in accepting temporarily the reading of Diogenes' second definition, 'the arrangement of the stars', we could not accept that it corresponds with Philo's μόνος οὐρανός. The word μόνος in the phrase μόνος οὐρανός in Philo's second definition is clearly there to distinguish this οὐρανός from the σύστημα of οὐρανός together with other things — one of which is the stars — in Philo's first definition. μόνος οὐρανός, therefore, does not include stars; hence it refers only to the outer sphere. 'The arrangement of the stars' and 'the outer sphere alone' are mutually exclusive.

5c. 'If so' (i.e., having eliminated two of the three definitions in each list by pairing them off as if identical), D.L.'s third definition, the composite of both, 'should correspond to Philo's first sense', the σύστημα of heaven, stars, earth, etc. (p. 23).

'The composite of both' — that is, of the active and passive ἀρχαί of the whole of substance — does not in fact remotely resemble the σύστημα of heaven, stars, earth, etc.<sup>27</sup> Note that Finkelberg's conclusion is reached by a process of elimination: two senses of κόσμος from each list have been paired off; therefore, the remaining senses must correspond. Such an argument is shaky at the best of times, but is particularly fragile when one of the earlier pairings rests upon the acceptance at face value of a reading acknowledged by Finkelberg to be false (5b). Finkelberg's conclusion, as I have argued above, does not of course follow unless one assumes that the two lists of three definitions share a common source, or that there are only three possible senses of κόσμος, or that the 'original text' was tampered with by Philo or a Philonian. We have already seen that the backgrounds to the two lists are very different, that κόσμος has more than three senses, and that in any case the pairings do not hold up under examination. A Philonian tamperer with a very bad memory is still a remote possibility.

6. (Finkelberg's step 5c) is supported by the fact that 'the composite of both' in D.L. 'resembles Philo's description of the differentiated world as σύστημα of its main components...' and many examples of the Stoics' predilection for a σύστημα of heaven, earth and all spheres in between are adduced in his note 10 (p. 23).

The Stoic system is such that it can accommodate commonly accepted concepts — not least, that the κόσμος is the sum of everything that there is (see the fifth definition in Diogenes' list [D.L. 7.138] and parallels in *SVF* 2.527ff.). The composite of 'both', however, is hardly the same as the composite or system of οὐρανός, earth and the other spheres of elements in between. The active and the passive ἀρχαί of

<sup>26</sup> Not to mention Plato's Timaeus who manages the same feat in one of the most widely read texts in the Hellenistic-Roman period, at *Tim.* 28b2-3. Finkelberg himself is not unaware of this passage, as is clear from his article on the history of κόσμος; he suggests there that Plato is the first to use the term κόσμος as a synonym for οὐρανός in its sense of 'world' (*ibid.*, 128).

<sup>27</sup> On Stoic σύστημα definitions see esp. step 12 below.

substance as a whole are not to be confused with the elements, the spheres of the elements, or bodies made from these elements.

7. But D.L.'s third definition, the composite of both, indicates that the second definition, the arrangement of the stars, is corrupt, since it contains no reference to the earth (p. 23), as, according to Finkelberg, it should do.

Even the composite of 'both' — of stars and earth, as later proposed by Finkelberg — would still be insufficient as a definition of κόσμος, not only for the Stoics, but also for the Peripatetics, Philo, and most well-educated Greeks. A cursory glance at the examples Finkelberg adduces in his note 10<sup>28</sup> would indicate that οὐρανός and earth are only two of the several components of the κόσμος when treated as the sum of its parts. They constitute the inner and the outer spheres, but one should not forget the spheres of water and air in between, without which there is no σύστημα.

8. Hence the minimal supplement to the second definition, τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων <τῶν τῆν γῆν περιφερομένων> (presumably intended to mean 'the arrangement of the stars <which revolve around the earth>') (p. 23).

Since Finkelberg requires 'both' to refer to stars and the earth, he proposes to add a reference to the earth in the second definition, while, apparently, retaining the second definition as a parallel to Philo's οὐρανός *alone*. Note that the reference to earth is treated as a supplement: 'We should assume, then, that the Greek is corrupted' (p. 23). Let us grant that the Greek is 'corrupted', but the Greek of which text? Once again it is not clear whether Finkelberg has in mind the text of Diogenes Laertius or the 'original text' from which the three definitions in Diogenes are supposed to derive. What is clear from Finkelberg's presentation of the 'original text' is that this supplement (τῶν τῆν γῆν περιφερομένων) is not part of the 'original text' (we have already observed that Finkelberg excises this, his own, supplement [p. 26]), and we know that it is not part of the text of Diogenes Laertius. Let us understand, then, that our 'Philonian' tamperer originally wrote something like the formula Finkelberg has suggested here, and that much of it dropped out at a later stage. Why he should have stressed that there are stars which revolve around the earth, or why this essential information later dropped out, is not explained by Finkelberg.

9. The third definition (the composite of both) is now understandable (p. 23).

That is to say, the third definition now means 'the composite of stars and earth' of the second definition, and not 'the composite of the first two definitions'. It seems to me that 'the composite of stars and earth' is almost as faulty and incomprehensible — albeit for different reasons (step 7) — as Finkelberg's interpretation of the third sense of κόσμος as it stands in the received text of Diogenes Laertius: 'the composite of an eternal individual of some sort and that same eternal individual of some sort disposed in some way' (step 3).

10. The second definition is still problematic. The Stoics use διακόσμησις ('orderly-arrangement') as 'a *terminus technicus* for world-arrangement and as such is a synonym of κόσμος in the sense of "world". Consequently, [...] [the second definition,

28 Including the fifth definition in Diogenes' list — see n. 6 above.

i.e., the arrangement of the stars <which revolve around the earth>] is of foreign provenance' (p. 23).

The second definition referred to is not to be found in Diogenes Laertius or in Finkelberg's 'original text'. According to Finkelberg's argument, the culprit responsible for inserting the definition in this form lacked a familiarity with Stoic terminology (which would be true); but he required a definition which would correspond with οὐρανός because he was influenced by the three definitions in Philo (step 5 above). The 'Philonian' tamperer would seem to fit Finkelberg's argument here very well.

11. On the other hand, the first definition is Stoic and the third definition 'alludes to the σύστημα definitions well instanced in the Stoics' (p. 23).

Diogenes' first definition is most certainly Stoic. As for the third definition, 'a composite of both', this is hardly an allusion to the σύστημα definitions of the κόσμος (see next step). Note that Finkelberg treats the third definition as referring to the two elements of his supplemented second definition, which he ascribes neither to the 'original text' nor to Diogenes Laertius.

12. '[The second] definition being omitted, our passage resembles a number of reports on the Stoics' contrasting of the eternal and the perishable κόσμοι — there follow four testimonia which contrast the eternal and the perishable κόσμοι (p. 24).

Finkelberg's supplemented second definition, which he ascribes neither to the 'original text' nor to Diogenes Laertius (steps 8-9), allows the third definition, 'the composite of both', to be regarded — with difficulty — as a reference to the transitory orderly-arrangement. Two of the four testimonia adduced by Finkelberg mention the σύστημα and only serve to show up the difficulty with Finkelberg's interpretation of 'both', since the σύστημα in these testimonia is not of heaven and earth alone, but of other spheres as well. Finkelberg does not explain why the second (supplemented!) definition in Diogenes Laertius should now be omitted; but when the second definition is omitted, it will be observed that the third definition, 'the composite of both', would not be able to refer to it. The third definition in its present form, therefore, according to Finkelberg's argument, cannot be earlier than the second definition in its supplemented form.

13. 'The parallels suggest that Diogenes' report was produced by expanding a text which described the Stoic distinction between the two senses of κόσμος, that of the eternal god and that of the transitory world-arrangement, by adding the third sense of the word, namely, "heaven"' (p. 24).

I have quoted this sentence in its entirety because it is central to our understanding of Finkelberg's argument. Firstly, the testimonia he has just adduced (step 12) are now treated as parallels to the first and third definitions in Diogenes Laertius' report. They cannot be parallels, however. The third definition is 'the composite of both', which is now meaningless without the second definition (whichever interpretation one wishes to adopt). Secondly, I should like to point out again that it is the text of Diogenes Laertius which Finkelberg believes contains three senses of κόσμος, while the 'original text' has only two. It is not clear from Finkelberg's account whether the culprit who added the third definition is Diogenes Laertius himself, his immediate source, or

an earlier source, but Finkelberg appears to imply elsewhere, as we have seen, that whoever did it was influenced by Philo's list of three definitions (step 5). Thirdly, we are required to believe that the οὐρανός definition is added between, and not after, the two standard Stoic definitions of κόσμος distinguishing between an eternal and a transitory κόσμος. Perhaps we are expected to believe that this is because οὐρανός is the second sense of κόσμος listed by Philo.

14. A compiler (I take this to be the same one who expanded the text) failed to discover a suitable Stoic definition of κόσμος in the sense of 'heaven', since the usual Stoic term for 'heaven' is οὐρανός. He 'therefore was compelled to create it by himself' (pp. 24-5).

There would have been nothing simpler for anyone wishing to add this sense of κόσμος than to write that κόσμος has the sense of οὐρανός (or even μόνος οὐρανός, as Philo puts it — step 5b above). The interpolator is, after all, not required to define οὐρανός, but merely to indicate that οὐρανός is one of the senses of κόσμος. As I remarked at the beginning of this article, οὐρανός itself is actually defined immediately after the six definitions of κόσμος at D.L. 7.138. Finkelberg's failure to mention this definition at all is one of the indications that he is treating the first three senses of κόσμος as an independent text which served as a source for Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes himself cannot be regarded as the interpolator, since he had a good Stoic definition of οὐρανός at his fingertips, and used it. It follows from Finkelberg's argument, therefore, that the interpolator precedes Diogenes, is no earlier than Philo, is indeed influenced by Philo, yet fails to recall the word οὐρανός, not to mention Philo's phrase, μόνος οὐρανός.

15. A compiler availed himself of the peculiarly Stoic term διακόσμησις ('orderly-arrangement') 'in a non-Stoic sense', adding to it as he does the words 'of the stars which revolve around the earth' (my translation). The term διακόσμησις must therefore have appeared in the compiler's source, in the phrase κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν 'which in the parallels cited above is regularly used to introduce the sense of "world-arrangement"'. Since the compiler also uses the terms ἀστρα ('stars') and γῆ ('earth'), these terms must have appeared in the source as well (p. 25).

The Stoic διακόσμησις refers to the orderly-arrangement of the οὐσία, and not to the orderly-arrangement of various components of the arrangement. It is for this reason that expressions such as 'διακόσμησις of the stars', or 'διακόσμησις of heaven and earth', must be seen as non-Stoic: the Stoic word for the orderly-arrangement of the components, as the citations in Finkelberg's own n. 10 make clear, is σύστημα.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, Finkelberg needs to explain the appearance of διακόσμησις in the interpolated second definition: he concludes that it was originally part of the final

<sup>29</sup> The διακόσμησις is the orderly-arrangement of the whole of substance in terms of the four elements: see, e.g., *SVF* 1.102 τὴν τοῦ ὄλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας..., 2.616 διακόσμησιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν. This is to be distinguished from σύστημα, which is an orderly-arrangement of the components of a whole; see Finkelberg's own n. 10, and cf. other collections of components of a whole, e.g., *SVF* 2.93 τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμασμένων..., 2.235 εἶναι δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς.

definition. Not only that, but it must have appeared in the phrase ‘according to the orderly-arrangement’, which is ‘regularly used’. If we look at the four testimonia adduced by Finkelberg (p. 24), however, we find that the third testimonium gives διακόσμησις as the *subject* of a subordinate clause. We may conclude, if only from the examples Finkelberg himself adduces, that the Stoic διακόσμησις did not always appear in the one phrase ‘according to the orderly-arrangement’ (cf. my comments on step 4). It is not explained in any case why ‘a compiler’ should have used διακόσμησις in his interpolated second definition simply because it originally appeared in the next definition in his source, nor why he should have removed διακόσμησις from the next definition. Did he think that the second definition of the ‘original text’ was in fact two definitions and did he have trouble reading it? He certainly seems to have had no trouble reading ‘stars’ and ‘earth’, according to Finkelberg’s argument.

We are told on the final page that the second definition of the ‘original text’ was not peculiarly Stoic but common (p. 26). This does not sit well with Finkelberg’s assumption that this common sense of κόσμος included the peculiarly Stoic phrase ‘according to the orderly-arrangement’, or even the peculiarly Stoic term ‘orderly-arrangement’ alone.

16. Now, the compiler ‘adapted the original σύστημα definition to the new design of the report’ (i.e., once the two definitions had been expanded to three). Since he has mentioned stars and the earth in the second definition, he shortens what has now become the third definition to ‘a composite of both’ — i.e., of the stars and the earth (p. 25).

A ‘Philonian’ interpolator would have known that κόσμος in one sense is οὐρανός and in another sense is the σύστημα of several spheres of elements. According to Finkelberg, the interpolator, having interpolated the second definition, would still have seen a complete σύστημα definition in his source on which to draw for his third definition. It is not the case — as Finkelberg now claims — that the σύστημα definition ‘is basically binary with the earth and the heaven as its two principal components’ (cf. steps 6-8). There is no reason why the interpolator, having made his interpolation, would not continue copying the text of his source or at least summarize more intelligently.

A more serious point concerns the term σύστημα which is painfully absent from both the ‘original text’ and the text of Diogenes Laertius. What Finkelberg reads in both is τὸ συνεσθηκός, which is not quite the same thing. Had the ‘original text’ boasted a σύστημα definition, it would have contained the word σύστημα, and the ‘compiler’ would surely have used the word, if he is the sort of person who would use the word διακόσμησις simply because it was there (and cf. step 17). It seems to me that the appearance of τὸ συνεσθηκός in Diogenes Laertius is not insignificant. While σύστημα denotes a whole composed of parts, with no action involved, τὸ συνεσθηκός denotes the thing resulting from the act of putting together — in this case (as I have argued), the putting together of the passive and active aspects of the οὐσία by any Stoic who notionally separates them.

17. The original σύστημα definition in D.L. must have been almost identical to Philo's first definition of κόσμος. But Philo's definition mentions οὐρανός as one of the components of the transitory world-arrangement. The original σύστημα definition in D.L. could not have included οὐρανός — witness the 'peculiarity of a compiler's couching the notion of heaven as ἡ διακόμησις τῶν ἀστέρων instead of the more natural διακόμησις τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, or simply οὐρανός...' (p. 25).

Finkelberg's compiler is able to use only those words which appear in his source, while at the same time he is perfectly willing to turn two definitions into three senses of κόσμος. In this he is influenced by Philo although he cannot remember the word οὐρανός (or the phrase μόνος οὐρανός). Since he cannot even remember Philo, it is perhaps not surprising that he cannot remember Plato's *Timaeus* 28b2-3.

18. The original σύστημα definition in D.L. must have had αἰθήρ instead of οὐρανός to stand for heaven. 'If in the original definition αἰθήρ stood for 'heaven', a compiler could not utilize the word for his definition of the sense of 'heaven' of κόσμος: καὶ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι would not yield the meaning demanded' (p. 25).

Finkelberg's 'σύστημα' definition which is the long supplement in his 'original text' is lifted from Philo (see step 5 above), with one minor alteration: he substitutes for Philo's οὐρανός the element αἰθήρ, out of which the οὐρανός is made when considered in one of its aspects, the hot, airy outer sphere of the κόσμος. The reason why Finkelberg substitutes the one term for the other is because our Philonian interpolator could not find the word οὐρανός to use in his interpolated second sense of κόσμος as οὐρανός. That a Greek would not know the word οὐρανός is implausible enough in itself, but that αἰθήρ and not οὐρανός appeared in Diogenes' σύστημα definition is unwarranted speculation. All the examples of σύστημα definitions that we have use οὐρανός, and not αἰθήρ, and there is a good reason for this: the σύστημα definitions refer to the spheres of the κόσμος; οὐρανός is the outer sphere, and αἰθήρ is only the element out of which this sphere is composed. It is true that αἰθήρ appears in the third of the four testimonia which Finkelberg adduces (step 12), but the testimonium does not present a σύστημα definition — it presents a διακόμησις, where the four elements and their regions are required. Finkelberg goes to great lengths to explain why he replaces οὐρανός with αἰθήρ in the definition he has lifted from Philo, but he does not explain why this second definition of κόσμος in his 'original text' should otherwise be exactly the same as the one in Philo.

19. The 'original text' contained two senses of κόσμος: one Stoic (the eternal god); and one common (the transitory world-arrangement). 'They were anxious to distinguish' the first, Stoic, sense 'from the common use of κόσμος in the sense of 'world' while stressing the primacy of the former over the latter, for κόσμος in the sense of 'world' is, to borrow Clement's words, not other than the eternal κόσμος ὁ κατὰ τὴν διακόμησιν λεγόμενος'.<sup>30</sup> (p. 26)

Finkelberg's closing remarks are as confusing and confused as the preceding argument. To mention but three problems. The second sense of κόσμος in the 'original

<sup>30</sup> This is not quite what Clement says; cf. Finkelberg, p. 24, where the passage is adduced.

text', were it really common and not Stoic, would not have contained Stoic technical terms such as *κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν* and *συνεσθηκός*. The reconstructed Stoic *συνεσθηκός* definition of *κόσμος*, which Finkelberg regards — wrongly — as a *σύστημα* definition (step 16 above), would not in any case be common, but would refer to something peculiarly Stoic. Finally, a Stoic would not be stressing the primacy of one thing over another by indicating that they are the same thing in different aspects.

We have now come to the end of our analysis of Finkelberg's argument which may be summarized as follows: there was an 'original text' containing two senses of *κόσμος*: one Stoic (the eternal god); and one common (the transitory world-arrangement). The former is completely preserved as the first sense in D.L. 7.137, while the latter, which was almost identical to the first (non-Stoic) definition in Philo *De Aet. Mund.* 4, has been transformed into two completely different formulae — the second and third sense, in D.L. 7.138 — with the third sense being a degraded version of the original definition. The three senses in D.L. 7.137-8 can now be paired off with Philo's three definitions. Finkelberg concludes that 'the correct report is Philo's'. The Stoics wished to distinguish their eternal *κόσμος*, alternating between orderly-arrangement and conflagration, from 'the common use of *κόσμος* in the sense of 'world' while stressing the primacy of the former over the latter', the latter being the former disposed in a certain way. This binary distinction is surely applicable not to Philo and his three definitions ('the correct report') but only to Finkelberg's 'original text', the only text to have two definitions.

My own interpretation of D.L. 7.137-8 and its sources is decidedly different. It seems to me that the origin of the report on three Stoic senses of *κόσμος* can be traced back beyond a summary made by a non-Stoic ('[The Stoics] say...') to an actual Stoic exposition of physics in which the argument would have run very much as we now have it in Diogenes Laertius, although perhaps in much more detail, as may be inferred by the amount of information packed into the explanation of the first sense. Traces of this exposition may be discerned elsewhere in Diogenes' account of Stoic physics and, perhaps, in passages such as *SVF* 2.527-8. The analysis of *οὐσία* into active and passive aspects, for example, with the eternal active aspect 'creating' (*δημιουργεῖν*) all things (D.L. 7.134; see step 2 above), accords well with the discussion of the three senses of *κόσμος* at D.L. 7.137-8.

This 'original text' (as distinct from Finkelberg's 'original text') cannot be reconstructed word for word from the evidence now available, but the general argument is clear. The uncreated and imperishable god is the active aspect of the *κόσμος* when regarded in his capacity as *δημιουργός* of the orderly-arrangement, and only when regarded in that capacity. There is no indication that this argument portrayed the active aspect of the *κόσμος* existing during the conflagration as well. The passive aspect of the *κόσμος* is the orderly-arrangement itself. The active and passive aspects of the *κόσμος* are distinguishable only by the intellect, but inseparable in reality. The intellectual act of reconstituting these two aspects results in the composite *κόσμος*, which is the third Stoic sense of *κόσμος*.

The argument as I have interpreted it may have been offered by any Stoic, whether he supported the notion of cosmic conflagration or not, since the κόσμος is not coextensive with the conflagration. It is consequently difficult to attribute the argument to a Stoic of a particular period, but it is certainly attributable to a Stoic, and not to an eclectic like Philo.

I shall not summarize all the problems in Finkelberg's argument here, but a few of the main points may be briefly mentioned. The argument underlying the three Stoic senses of κόσμος in D.L. 7.137-8 — once 'of the stars' has been excised — is thoroughly Stoic and coherent. It has nothing to do with the distinction between three senses of κόσμος in Philo, where only one sense is said to be Stoic, and even that has been shown to be a confused definition with some half-understood Stoic concepts in it. Little about Finkelberg's proposed 'original text' is clear, apart from the fact that Diogenes Laertius could not have written it. Only one of the two senses of κόσμος in the 'original text' is supposed to be Stoic, while the other is supposed to be common; but both are formulated in peculiarly Stoic terms and fit neatly (if wrongly) together as different aspects of the same thing. It is not explained why the 'original text' has λέγουσι ('They [= the Stoics] say') twice — once for each definition, although the second definition is supposedly not Stoic. The presence of λέγουσι indicates that the 'original text' itself is a doxography. A doxography deals with the *doxai* of the school or person under discussion, and does not include a *communis opinio*, even if it is meant to be shown to be inferior to the *doxa* of the school or person under discussion. At least, I know of no such case.

Concerning the transformation from the 'original text' to the received text of Diogenes Laertius, the explanation offered falls on philological and philosophical grounds and suffers from numerous internal inconsistencies. The context of none of the testimonia adduced is considered, with the result that all the testimonia are treated as of equal worth. Not only is the significance of the context of Diogenes Laertius 7.137-8 overlooked, but the context itself is ignored, with the far-reaching consequences I have felt obliged to address in the analysis above.

Ramat Gan

### **Diogenes Laertius on the Stoic Definitions of Kosmos Again: On I. Ludlam, 'The "Original Text" of D.L. 7.137-8'**

**Aryeh Finkelberg**

I am very pleased that my short and unambitious piece 'Diogenes Laertius on the Stoic definitions of κόσμος', published in the previous issue of *Scripta Classica Israelica*, should have attracted the critical attention of Dr. Ludlam. As a self-conscious scholar I am well aware of the fallibility of my arguments and highly appreciative of professional criticism as a major help in the improvement of my skills and expertise. I am grateful to the Editors of *Scripta Classica Israelica* for inviting me to respond to Dr. Ludlam's critical review of my article.

## I.

It goes without saying that one's success in appraising an argument is proportional to one's clarity as to its goal and intrinsic logic. However as the following quotations seem to indicate Dr. Ludlam finds some difficulty first in making out my goal and then in not losing sight of it:

I myself had assumed on a preliminary reading that Finkelberg wished to emend the text of Diogenes Laertius; but I am now satisfied that this is not the case (p. 251). ... Thus, whatever Finkelberg intended, his article does not in fact argue for emending the text of Diogenes Laertius. ... It follows that ... Finkelberg does not emend it, although this may have been his intention (p. 252). ... Finkelberg, then, appears to be concerned not with correcting a serious corruption in the text of Diogenes Laertius, but with reconstructing an earlier text ... (p. 253). ... I trust that I do not do Finkelberg an injustice, therefore, when I say that he is not concerned with emending the text of Diogenes Laertius but with reconstructing the 'original text'. ... We must assume that Finkelberg does not propose an emendation ..., although this does at first sight appear to be his intention. Let us imagine that he is simply pointing out that the argument as it stands in Diogenes Laertius is corrupt ... (p. 255). ... Let us grant that the Greek is 'corrupted', but the Greek of which text? (p. 265).

Dr. Ludlam seems to be prepared to discuss Diogenes' report only in terms of emendations and feels perplexed about my line of approach. And when, though admitting that I am 'pointing out that the argument as it stands ... is corrupt', he nevertheless remarks that '... Finkelberg accepts without demur a reading which he elsewhere rejects as corrupt' (p. 263; cf. a similar comment at 264), it becomes clear that he never entirely succeeded in sympathetically reading my argument and cannot help thinking of it as a confused attempt at emending Diogenes' text. In consequence, some of Dr. Ludlam's critical comments seem to be misdirected — I mean first of all his repeated complaints about my failure to take into account the context of Diogenes' report. Since Dr. Ludlam never disputes my, or rather the common, assumption of the distinct source of our report, and in so far as he eventually acknowledges that I am concerned with this hypothetical source, he could see that his demand that we consider this source in the context of Diogenes' compilation amounts to demanding that we treat what are supposed to be chronologically different layers of the text as synchronous. Dr. Ludlam's lack of clarity as to my argument comes into the open also in his comments on the logic of my procedure. Thus, for example, he seems to confuse cause and effect when he states that 'Finkelberg's argument ... requires that the three definitions be treated in strict isolation from the rest of Diogenes Laertius' text, and hence assumes a stage before Diogenes' text existed' (p. 252). Because of this occasional lack in precision in following my argument Dr. Ludlam's rendering of my claims does not always accurately represent my position,<sup>1</sup> whereas

<sup>1</sup> Thus, for instance, Dr. Ludlam invariably translates my 'resembling', 'similar', and 'parallel' into 'essentially identical', or 'exactly the same'. Or again, my suggestion that 'a compiler ... presumably wished to account for ... the Stoic use of κόσμος in the sense of

some of his critical comments may suggest that he has not always read my paper attentively.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps because of his uncertainty about my reasoning, along with a good polemical temper, Dr. Ludlam's critical comments are not focused predominantly on the crucial points of my argument but are evenly distributed between all the nineteen 'steps' into which he divides my argument, each 'step' being usually met by a number of objections. This results in a wealth of critical comments, a systematic review of which would be impracticable here.<sup>3</sup> Fortunately Dr. Ludlam indicates clearly what he sees as the crucial point of my argument. In discussing my comparison of Diogenes' report with Philo, *De incorrupt. mund.* ii 488 Mang. he observes: 'Finkelberg's conclusion ... does not ... follow unless one assumes that the two lists of three definitions share a common source, or that there are only three possible senses of κόσμος, or that the "original text" was tampered with by Philo or a Philonian' (p. 264). Having shown to his satisfaction that the two former assumptions must be mistaken<sup>4</sup> and hence that I do not maintain them, Dr. Ludlam saddles me with the assumption of a Philonian tamperer, which is no less mistaken but which seems to him to suit me better, and then takes prolonged pleasure in discussing at length all the absurdities this involves.

It may be observed, however, that Dr. Ludlam's reluctance to admit that 'there are only three possible senses of κόσμος ... with one definition Stoic, and two not peculiarly Stoic' (p. 261) does not entirely accord with the list of the cosmological uses of the word as recorded in the entry κόσμος in *A Greek-English Lexicon* by

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"heaven" he represents as: 'According to Finkelberg's argument, the culprit responsible for inserting the definition ... lacked a familiarity with Stoic terminology' (p. 266).

<sup>2</sup> I do not mean that Dr. Ludlam is deliberately negligent of my argument. Such an allegation would be as malicious as it is certainly untrue: 'There, Philo has presented the Peripatetic view that time and change are mutually dependent [Dr. Ludlam probably wished to say 'time is a concomitant of change' — A.F.], which means that time and the present κόσμος must always have existed ... [this obviously does not follow; what follows is that change cannot cease, and this only on the unmentioned assumption that time is ceaseless — A.F.]. This conflicts with the Stoic view of a cosmic cycle in which the present κόσμος must have come into being and will pass away [not with this, but with the supposed unchangeability of god in the periods of the conflagration — A. F.]; etc' (p. 263).

<sup>3</sup> The large number of objections Dr. Ludlam puts forward sometimes affects the quality of his reasoning. For example: 'It might seem quite plausible that Philo's "heaven alone" would correspond with Diogenes' "orderly arrangement [of the stars]". However, the phrase "orderly-arrangement of the stars" is not a Stoic conception of οὐρανός, as indeed Finkelberg is aware' (p. 263). Thus: 1) were Diogenes' 'orderly-arrangement of the stars' Stoic, it would correspond with Philo's non-Stoic 'heaven alone'; 2) Diogenes' 'orderly-arrangement of the stars' is not Stoic; ergo 3) it cannot correspond with Philo's non-Stoic 'heaven alone'.

<sup>4</sup> A common source is refuted as follows: 'Philo does not seem to have formulated his own list from one unique source ['unique' stresses 'one'] — and in any case, such a unique source ['unique' in its strong sense of 'solitary in type'] would have had to be the "original text" — but the latter, 'according to Finkelberg, had only two definitions, while Philo's list has three' (p. 262).

H.G. Liddel, R. Scott, and H.S. Jones.<sup>5</sup> Considering that it is improbable that in shaping his argument Dr. Ludlam failed to consult this valuable book, his failure to take it into account seems to indicate his disagreement with it on the issue in question. The reasons for his dissenting opinion can be gathered from his arguments against the only three possible senses of κόσμος in Philo's report and in favour of an indefinite number of Stoic as well as non-Stoic uses of the word. Apart from the unfortunate appeal to another paper of mine, which he has misread to a painful degree,<sup>6</sup> and one aborted argument,<sup>7</sup> Dr. Ludlam's semantic claims boil down to the following.

'We see more Stoic senses immediately after the first three definitions in the text of Diogenes Laertius 7.137-8' (p. 261). What we actually see, however, are not 'senses' but definitions, and as a matter of fact Dr. Ludlam uses, both here and elsewhere, 'meaning' and 'sense' interchangeably with 'definition' and 'formulation'. This seems to indicate that he does not distinguish between the denotative meaning of a term and its connotative meaning or rather the verbal expression of the latter in a definition. Thus mistaking different formulations of the connotative meaning of κόσμος for its different 'senses' he speaks loosely of more than three senses of the term, more than two non-Stoic senses, and so on. But the confusion goes deeper than this. Objecting to my claim that κόσμος as used by the Stoics with reference to the developed world exhibits its common use<sup>8</sup> he remarks: 'This does not sit well with Finkelberg's assumption that this common sense of κόσμος included the peculiarly Stoic phrase "according to the orderly-arrangement"' (p. 268; the argument is repeated on p. 270; cf. p. 271). Considering that sense cannot 'include phrases' (or 'contain terms' — p. 270), and recalling Dr. Ludlam's confusion between the term's

<sup>5</sup> Section iv: (1) world-order, universe; (2) the firmament; (3) of earth, as opposed to heaven, or as opposed to the underworld, or of any region of the universe. Since the uses of the type (3) are obviously irrelevant here, there remain two and only two possible senses of κόσμος save the peculiar Stoic terminological use reflected in Diogenes' first definition and amply testified to in other sources.

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Ludlam (n. 25) refers to my 'On the History of Greek κόσμος' (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 98 [1998], 103-36) to prove that 'Finkelberg knows of at least four meanings of κόσμος'. I can assure Dr. Ludlam that I know more than four but I never argued that there are more than three cosmological uses of the word. Further, I never made the nonsensical claim that κόσμος means 'οὐρανός in the sense of "heaven"' and 'οὐρανός in the sense of "world"'. Finally, I never asserted that κόσμος means 'any region or sphere of the world'; rather I disputed the meaning 'any region' and argued for 'any of the concentric spheres' instead.

<sup>7</sup> 'He [Philo] presents three definitions of κόσμος ... in the first sense — the composite of οὐρανός and stars and earth and the animals and plants on the earth. ... The second sense of κόσμος ("just οὐρανός") does not cover all the remaining senses of κόσμος which are not peculiarly Stoic' (p. 262). Since the argument suddenly stops here, just before the proof — the examples of the 'remaining senses' — is adduced, the truth of Dr. Ludlam's claim still does not seem to be firmly established.

<sup>8</sup> Considering that the use of κόσμος for the developed world is amply exemplified in Plato and Aristotle, Dr. Ludlam's reluctance to admit that this sense is not peculiarly Stoic may seem somewhat eccentric.

denotation and its definition, one should probably understand 'is defined by means of the peculiarly Stoic term "orderly-arrangement"'. Yet διακόσμησις is not here (as indeed it is not elsewhere) part of the definition but occurs in the phrase which specifies the term's reference (in its cosmological application κόσμος is ...).

Still, this is not Dr. Ludlam's only line of approach. Indeed he contends that since Philo's first definition of κόσμος ('a system made up of heaven and the stars all around it and earth with the animals and plants on it') allegedly belongs in his discussion of the Peripatetic arguments for the eternity of κόσμος, this definition must be a Peripatetic 'sense' of the term (p. 262). Considering that the definition in question is practically identical with one of Diogenes' Stoic definitions ('a system made up of heaven and earth and the natures in them', vii 138), it appears that Dr. Ludlam is prepared to take identical definitions (which by his previous approach must amount to identical 'senses' of the term) as different 'senses' because 'the backgrounds for the two definitions ... are quite different' (pp. 263, 264). That is to say, he is prepared now to distinguish his 'senses' not by the defining formulae nor even by their immediate linguistic surrounding, but by a broad non-linguistic 'background'.<sup>9</sup>

Dr. Ludlam's two positions, though mutually exclusive, agree on one point — they both differ from the more conventional linguistic approach which is adopted in *A Greek-English Lexicon* and to which I adhere. If this approach is adopted, the κόσμος can have here only three meanings, two common and one Stoic. Inasmuch as Dr. Ludlam professes to concede that my conclusions will follow if this condition is satisfied, I at least continue to feel that my conclusions do follow.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> It may be noted that according to one of Dr Ludlam's positions 'the author of "Symposium"' and 'the author of "Phaedo"' will be two different persons, while according to another of his positions each of these will again be two different persons depending on whether the definition is found, say, in a book on Greek literature or on Greek philosophy. I am concerned not so much with the logical side of the problem, which should be left to logicians, as with the practical inconvenience which all this may cause to Platonic scholars.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Ludlam's semantic confusions do not seem to be restricted wholly to his somewhat uncommon view of linguistic meaning, for he also seems to make no clear distinction between a word's primary sense and its terminological use. Indeed, he argues that 'it would make no sense to talk about a κόσμος (an orderly-arrangement of all things) in the conflagration ...' (p. 257). This line of approach would require him, for example, to deny the title 'Doctor' to anybody who is not engaged in teaching activities. Among many examples that do not support his opinion is Aristotle *De Caelo* 1.10.280a20, where the term designates the universe whether arranged as the world or unarranged. It is unfortunate that this semantic confusion lies at the root of Dr. Ludlam's argument which supports his interpretation of Diogenes' report. Sometimes, however, Dr. Ludlam's semantic confusions are less academic: '... one of the two senses of κόσμος in the "original text" is supposed to be common'. But 'a doxography deals with the *doxai* of the school or person under discussion, and does not include a *communis opinio*' (p. 271). This seems to indicate that Dr. Ludlam understands my claim that in this period the use of the term κόσμος for the developed world was common to the effect that the term κόσμος was a *communis opinio*.

## II.

It is a merit of Dr. Ludlam's paper that he does not confine himself to criticizing his opponent's argument, but proposes an alternative explanation which, as he emphasizes, 'is based on Stoic philosophy' (p. 253). Unfortunately Dr. Ludlam seems to have missed the philosophical side of my point concerning the difficulty of Diogenes' report.

Diogenes tells us that the Stoics used the term κόσμος of: [a] 'the eternal god, the peculiarly qualified individual made of the whole substance who is imperishable and ungenerated, being the creator of the world (διακόσμησις) and at certain periods of time consuming into himself the whole substance and again creating it from himself'; [b] 'the arrangement (διακόσμησις) of the stars'; and [c] 'the composite (τὸ συνεσθηκός) of both', viz. of [a] and [b]. The report as it stands is patently wrong, and von Arnim excises 'of the stars' from [b] (hereafter I refer to the emended version of [b] as [b<sub>1</sub>]). My point is that even after the excision, 'the composite' of [a] and [b<sub>1</sub>] remains a difficult notion. Indeed, the Greek τὸ συνεσθηκός, suggesting as it does a compound made of disparate parts, is patently inappropriate as a description of the way in which the Stoic god is related to the world. To make this even more apparent I proposed phrasing Diogenes' report in terms of the Stoic genera citing Clement, *Strom.* v 104 (= *SVF* ii 182.6) where the transient κόσμος (Diogenes' [b<sub>1</sub>]) is rendered as πῶς ἔχον (the 'disposed') of the eternal god. Accordingly, Diogenes' third sense of κόσμος would be 'the composite of the peculiarly qualified individual made of the whole substance and its [being] disposed [in a certain way, namely] as the developed world'. It seems that no Stoic could possibly describe a thing as 'a composite' made of the ἰδίως ποιός and its πῶς ἔχον, and more generally as a compound made of the genera.

I cite Clement mainly for rhetorical purposes, for, god being classified as a 'peculiarly qualified individual' (the second Stoic genus), no confirmation by Clement is needed indeed to see that the developed world which god periodically creates out of himself must be classified as 'disposed' (the third Stoic genus) of the 'peculiarly qualified individual'. Dr. Ludlam's attack against the unfortunate Clement might seem to indicate that he underestimates the importance of close familiarity with the Stoic genera.

Having failed to see where the difficulty lies, Dr. Ludlam proposes another difficulty instead, which he labels 'the novel philosophical problem Finkelberg raises' (n. 9):

The difficulty perceived by Finkelberg arises when the various senses of κόσμος in Diogenes Laertius' text are understood as follows: 1. the eternal individual of some sort<sup>11</sup> ... alternating between both dispositions [viz. διακόσμησις and ἐκπύρωσις]; 2. an

<sup>11</sup> 'Individual of some sort' is Dr. Ludlam's translation (which he argues for on mistaken philosophical grounds) of the Stoic genus ἰδίως ποιός which is usually translated as 'peculiarly qualified individual'.

individual of some sort ... disposed as one particular orderly-arrangement; 3. a composite of the eternal individual of some sort ... alternating between conflagration and orderly-arrangement, and the same individual of some sort ... disposed only as one particular orderly-arrangement, which is indeed scarcely tenable (pp. 257-8).

The supposed difficulty is a well-known logical fallacy — the confusion between what is usually called essential and accidental predication.<sup>12</sup> Having thus produced the difficulty and being unaware of its causes Dr. Ludlam seeks to solve it by eliminating one of the god's two dispositions, namely ἐκπύρωσις, from Diogenes' report. Since the difficulty is Dr. Ludlam's own creation, his argument designed to resolve it need not concern us here. This argument is indistinguishably blended with another one purporting to establish what Dr. Ludlam believes to be the correct understanding of Diogenes' report, an understanding according to which Diogenes' [c] — 'the composite of both' — refers to the unity of the Stoic passive and active principles, matter and god/*logos*. Unfortunately this interpretation has two disadvantages: 1) it does not solve the difficulty of τὸ συνεσθηκός and 2) it has nothing to do with Diogenes' report.

1) The unity of the active and passive principles, viz. *logos* and matter, cannot be described as τὸ συνεσθηκός. The Stoic term required would be κρᾶμα. Indeed, the interaction of the two principles is a mingling (κρᾶσις) in which the active principle 'pervades' (the Greek verb is usually διήκω) the passive one, and Dr. Ludlam himself speaks here of 'intermingling'. Consequently his belief that he has reconstructed the Stoic 'συνεσθηκός' definition of κόσμος' (p. 270) seems to be ill-advised; I should recommend to him that he reconsider his assessment of this highly problematic expression, which in addition seems to be a *hapax legomenon* in our sources, as 'a Stoic technical term' (ibid.)

2) Considering that Dr. Ludlam seems to feel occasional difficulties with the Stoic genera,<sup>13</sup> I owe him a preliminary clarification.<sup>14</sup> The Stoic ontological scheme begins with 'something' (τί) which includes bodies as well as incorporeals and fictional entities, and not, as Dr. Ludlam thinks 'a general term [he spells it as τίς] used

<sup>12</sup> The two alternating dispositions are the god's properties and do not belong in his definition (his genus and differentia). God is not the alternation between the two dispositions but is an entity of a certain nature which has two alternating dispositions.

<sup>13</sup> I do not wish to suggest that this is his only difficulty with the Stoic doctrines. Thus he confuses the Stoic notional unqualified substance (οὐσία) with body (σῶμα): 'Since only substance is what is, the things in the κόσμος are explained by the Stoics as "bodies" which are manifestations of substance' (p. 260); the κόσμος with the πᾶν which includes both the world and the external void: 'the κόσμος is the sum of everything that there is' (p. 264); the universe in the physical state of conflagration and the notional ὕλη: '... the conflagration ... when there are no things but substance in its "purest" form' (p. 257), etc.

<sup>14</sup> Since I have never claimed to see myself as an authority on Stoic philosophy, in my subsequent account of the Stoic genera I follow closely the standard textbook: A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Cambridge, 1987, i, 162-79. Of course Dr. Ludlam's disagreement with these scholars, distinguished as they are, does not prove that he is necessarily wrong, but the pinpointing of the differences will show in the most economical way where and to what extent Dr. Ludlam's position is independent.

to denote any individual of some sort' (his translation of ἰδίως ποιός, viz. the second genus which refers only to corporeals) (p. 262). As far as body is concerned, the first aspect under which it is viewed is 'substrate' (ὑποκείμενον); 'substrate', the first genus, is usually equated with 'substance' — οὐσία which is unqualified matter (ἄλη), and not, as Dr. Ludlam thinks, an entity which can be analyzed into ἄλη (n. 270) and god, or *logos* (p. 260; cf. 264, 270, etc.).<sup>15</sup> When the matter is taken as imbued with a quality which, considered in abstraction, is 'god' or 'logos', it is classified as 'qualified' (ποιός), the second genus, where it is viewed as having certain qualities, and not, as Dr. Ludlam claims, having also 'manifestations of the active aspect of substance [which are] ... just as much ποιόι — bodies with qualities — as matter is [sic]' (p. 260). When the 'qualified' is viewed as having the quality which identifies it as a unique individual, it is classified as the 'peculiarly qualified individual'; this is what the Stoics call ἰδίως ποιός, and not, as Dr. Ludlam believes, 'both the passively qualified substance and the active aspect with regard to the passively qualified substance ... and, presumably, the composite *qua* composite' (p. 260). The third genus, 'disposed' (πῶς ἔχον), classifies the already qualified thing from the standpoint of its further qualifications, and therefore cannot apply, as Dr. Ludlam thinks, to both 'the δημιουργός of the orderly-arrangement ... and the orderly-arrangement itself' (n. 272). The fourth genus, 'relatively disposed', covers things which are characterized by an extrinsic relation. I do not know what Dr. Ludlam thinks it is, for he does not refer to it in his paper.

Now the crucial fact about Diogenes' report is that its definition [a] classifies god as a 'peculiarly qualified individual' (the second genus), and this demands that we take [b<sub>1</sub>], the διακόσμησις which he periodically creates out of himself, as the third genus, 'disposed'. Hence Diogenes' [c], 'the composite of both', is supposed to embrace the second and the third genera. Dr. Ludlam's understanding of [c] as referring

<sup>15</sup> Dr. Ludlam's mistake is due to his somewhat imprecise rendering of arguments, a disadvantage which I already noted above (n. 2 and *passim*): 'Here is my translation of the passage: "They (the Stoics) believe that there are two principles (ἀρχαί) of all things: the active and the passive. The passive they believe is unqualified substance (οὐσία) [i.e.] matter (ἄλη); the active is the λόγος in it, [i.e.] god (θεός). For being eternal, the latter (they believe) creates (δημιουργεῖν) each-and-every thing throughout the whole of it [i.e., matter]". He proceeds now to account for the passage: 'In other words, god, the eternal active aspect of everything, creates (δημιουργεῖν) all the things of this world by intermingling with, and qualifying, the passive aspect of everything, the notionally unqualified substance that is matter. The qualifier and the qualified are aspects of the same thing, substance (οὐσία)' (p. 256). Now Dr. Ludlam's 'the qualifier' renders the 'god' of the translated passage, 'the qualified' renders the 'substance', whereas his 'substance (οὐσία)' of which 'the qualifier and the qualified are aspects' is his own notion which stands for nothing in the passage but which he apparently takes to be the same as the 'substance' he has already rendered as 'the qualified'. In this way the Stoic substance (οὐσία = the notionally unqualified matter, the first genus) becomes a body constituted by matter and *logos*, i.e. what the Stoics classify as 'qualified' (the second genus). This and some other minor terminological imprecisions create needless disparity between his reasonings and the Stoic doctrines.

to the unity of the passive and active principles, i.e. οὐσία and ποιός, which are the first and the second genera, is a confusion.

Considering, however, that Dr. Ludlam's use of the terms οὐσία, ἰδίως ποιός, and πῶς ἔχον does not precisely fit their Stoic uses — thus, for instance, he speaks of the διακόσμησις as both the disposition of god (the third genus) and the 'passive aspect of the οὐσία' meaning the Stoic matter (the first genus), neither I, nor, it seems, Dr. Ludlam, can know for certain for which Stoic genera, if at all, these terms stand in his paper. This being so, it seems advisable to consider his argument again, this time on Dr. Ludlam's own, rather than the Stoics', assumptions as to the meaning of the terms.

Dr. Ludlam begins with the Stoic distinction between the passive (ἄλη, οὐσία) and active (god, *logos*) principles. Proceeding from the confusion of the Stoic first genus, οὐσία — by confounding it with the Peripatetic οὐσία (see above, n. 15) — with the second genus, ἰδίως ποιός, he renders the two principles as follows (I use Dr. Ludlam's terms here only for the purpose of the argument): 'the passive κόσμος' (= the world, world-arrangement itself) vs. 'the active κόσμος' (god in his relation to the world, god as δημιουργός) = a 'passive peculiarly qualified individual comprising the whole of substance' vs. an 'active peculiarly qualified individual comprising the whole of substance', the unity of these being a 'composite peculiarly qualified individual comprising the whole of substance'. This works as follows: '... the passive arrangements are arranged by an active god, and it is that god who is the eternal individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance. God and the arrangements are not the same thing, but exist as two aspects of a composite' (p. 258). Accordingly: 'Diogenes' first sense of κόσμος is god ... the active aspect of the orderly-arrangement ... [the] second sense of κόσμος is the orderly-arrangement itself ..., the passive aspect, all matter qualified in a certain way ... [the] third sense of κόσμος [is] ... the composite of the active and the passive aspects of the διακόσμησις or orderly-arrangement of the universe' (p. 257).

But the claim that 'it is that god [i.e. 'the active aspect of the orderly-arrangement' = the active peculiar individual comprising the whole of substance] who is eternal individual of some sort comprising the whole of substance' is either tautology or fallacy. If 'that god' is the active aspect of the substance and if 'the whole of substance' is the whole of the active aspect of the substance, this is but a tautology. If 'the whole of substance' is the whole of the passive aspect of the substance = the 'passive διακόσμησις' of Diogenes' [b<sub>1</sub>] as Dr. Ludlam explains, god cannot comprise it, for it is contrary to his definition as the 'active διακόσμησις'. But if, *per impossibile*, he comprises it, he, contrary to the definition, will be a 'composite peculiar individual'. Again, according to our report, 'that god' periodically consumes the whole of substance into himself, which is the conflagration. This would mean that the active peculiar individual periodically consumes the passive peculiar individual, which sounds slightly nonsensical. This consumption would result either in the active peculiar individual's turning into a composite peculiar individual, which however must be the state of the developed world rather than that of the conflagration, or in the active principle's annihilating the passive principle, which is contrary

to Dr. Ludlam's primary assumption of the two ultimate principles. One could carry this exercise on for several more pages, but this will suffice.

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As I have already observed, Dr. Ludlam seems to be rather insensitive to both philosophical and scholarly argument. Had not Dr. Ludlam regarded von Arnim's fundamental work *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* as 'what is after all only a collection of testimonia' (n. 8), had he rather studied it more carefully, he would probably have noticed that this distinguished philologist and student of ancient philosophy printed the emended text of Diogenes' report on three Stoic uses of κόσμος in small letters in the section entitled 'Duae notiones vocabuli κόσμος' (*SVF* ii 168); Dr. Ludlam would then probably have been less confident that 'von Arnim surely regarded his excision as a satisfactory solution ...' (n. 9). Had Dr. Ludlam paid attention to the title of the section and had he read the testimonia collected there with care, he would in all likelihood have spared us his bold claim that 'This binary distinction [between the eternal and transitory κόσμοι] is surely applicable ... only to Finkelberg's "original text", the only text to have two definitions' (p. 270). And had he thus realized that Diogenes' report on three Stoic uses of κόσμος is unparalleled in our sources and seems difficult in itself even after the excision of the apparently absurd 'of the stars', he would perhaps have read my explanations of this difficulty more thoughtfully. This, in turn, might have prompted him to give more consideration to my claim that the report must be fundamentally distorted, and to focus his critical attention on the solution I propose. This criticism could have been of great value indeed in that it might have helped to improve my doubtless imperfect solution or to replace it with a better one. And this would have been a real contribution to our understanding of extant evidence on Stoic philosophy and, by means of this, of Stoic philosophy itself — the only thing that is relevant in the present context. It is a pity therefore that this as well as certain other deficiencies of Dr. Ludlam's article render his rich critical commentary less helpful than it might otherwise have been. But what is regrettable beyond all this is that Dr. Ludlam has chosen to phrase his paper in an unpleasantly dismissive language which does little honour to the profession, and argues in a way which may on occasion strike the less sympathetic reader as simple malice. It is, alas, all too easy to give the uninformed reader the impression that what purports to be detached scientific precision is in reality no more than the expression of personal animus.

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