what we know of this Stoic position. On pp. 216-18 Bruns (and indeed, throughout what is extant of *De Mixtione*), he offers far more subtle and analytical arguments against the Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις. Some of these arguments are even reminiscent in their structure of Zeno of Elea's arguments against motion.

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Lynette G. Mitchell and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece*, London: Routledge, 1997. xiii + 232 pp. £45. ISBN 0 415 14752 2.

The *polis* is one of those phenomena so characteristically Greek: one may identify it all over the Archaic and Classical Mediterranean, and yet no detailed definition may apply fully to more than one singular case. Thinking in terms of *Idealtypen* (as Moses Finley urged us to do) and then looking for idiosyncrasies and peculiarities is sometimes helpful, yet runs the danger of diachronic simplification, overlooking regional differentiation and teleological thinking. How may one approach the issue? Victor Ehrenberg's seminal article, 'When did the *Polis* Rise?' (*JHS* 1937), placed the correct emphasis on terminology and chronological examination of the evidence, looking especially at expressions of political collectivity, such as the '*polis*' in the Dreros decree (600?). But this was only the first step: about a half century after its publication, when a group of scholars convened in Durham (1995) for the symposium that constituted the basis for this book, John K. Davies reminded us that we are now facing a wider spectrum than ever with regard to the question 'Where should we be looking?' There are new applications of archaeological evidence and new categories of thinking, such as the 'microstate' (his suggestion, but I can hardly think of an ancient Greek who would have welcomed it). We have all become aware of legitimating social, genealogical and political 'charters', with their attendant 'inventions' (although certain scholars, happily not represented in this volume, sometimes forget that traditions are not necessarily lies). Similarly, throughout the volume, we are consistently warned against Athens-based, fourth-century anachronisms (an age-old *Philologie* here). The major issue underlying our thinking remains that of a meaningful interrelationship between categories — social organization, property, fighting, magistracies, religion and cults, law-making and more — that created a 'convergence' (Davies' excellent point) that metamorphosed a *laos* into a political community, a *polis*.

Although published by Routledge, the volume is basically another instalment in the series published by the Copenhagen *Polis* Center (usually under the auspices of the Royal Danish Academy). The academic community owes a significant debt to the work of Mogens Herman Hansen, the director of the *Polis* Center, for his initiative to research, catalogue and assess ancient *poleis*. Having examined the inventory of places called *polis* in ancient sources, and having confronted these with various interpretative categories, his own contribution in this volume amounts to a claim that urbanism is almost *de rigueur* for the ancient *polis*. With all the evidence sifted through, with the difference between denotation and connotation clarified, the *polis*

emerges as a *city*-state. This claim runs counter to some accepted opinions, and early, un-urbanized Corinth and Sparta still pose a problem for Hansen's new emphasis, whereas new foundations (or 'colonies', 'founded', not 'evolved') eminently support it. Is all this surprising or counter-intuitive? Not really, but perhaps we should be satisfied that the term 'city-state', to which we have grown accustomed, now seems to be justified and valid as a general concept.

Walter Donlan's writing about the 'Dark Age(s)' seems to be getting more concise with each new publication. Here we get an excellent summary of his socially-oriented reconstruction of 'pre-state and early state polities': the *polis* emerging not through a violent break with the past but evolving from communities of free farmers (eventually the basis of 'citizen rights') led by chiefs with traditional 'authority' ('the faculty of getting another man's assent') and little enforcing power. Authority is also grounded in religious legitimacy (Zeus ordaining and sustaining the *basileus*). Nireus of Syme, for example (*Iliad* 2. 671-5), was rightfully the leader of his contingent, but he was a 'weak man and few people followed him'. Donlan here complements Finley's analysis of 'rule by might' (*iphi*), bringing the idea into a clearer perspective. Later, with the rise of the 'early state', the charismatic quality of leaders will be abstracted and attached to the laws. Aristocrats would be proud to be *chrestoi* (useful) to their communities. The transition to the *polis* is somehow dependent on 'middle groups' (cf. Ian Morris' forthcoming book on the 'middling' tendencies in ideology and social reality). But these elusive *mesoi* need further explication.

'Commoners' are important for Kurt Raaflaub who relies on the recent shattering of the concept of the 'hoplite revolution' (assemblies and mass fighting in Homer were not insignificant, in spite of their poetic image). Also, new kinds of armor did not cause the transition to mass fighting (*contra* Snodgrass), but military needs dictated the kind of armor people looked for. This is an acceptable methodological guideline, although the history of the interrelationship between technology, fighting and social status is bound to be debated with contradictory claims. Raaflaub correctly insists that the famous, expensive hoplite equipment could have been acquired by means other than buying (note in a later period the stipulation in the Athenian Empire for subject states to donate panoplies, presumably for use by Athenian citizens, implying that a high economic standard was not of the utmost importance. Yet this neglects a major issue: what was expensive was the free time a hoplite needed for training. Raaflaub's historical outlook is interactive and process-oriented, similar perhaps to Davies 'convergence': for him the major developments are to be found in the interrelationship of phalanx, land ownership and the concept of territory, and the related aristocratic developments. I fully agree, yet feel unease with a conclusion that really sets the terms of the question — not the answer. The point, after all, is to risk more than a claim that things are interrelated; they usually are. It is the nature of the connection, its priorities and dominant elements, and the temporal contexts that are crucial. Otherwise why produce the archaic *polis* rather than, say, Icelandic farmsteads and the Althing?

When tyrants broke the back of the aristocracies, the citizens became more truly citizens, claims John Salmon. Tyrants manipulated the existing system in order to

rise to power; once there, they created a new system. Quite unlike their notorious image in later sources, tyrants probably presented themselves (e.g., Delphi and Kypselos) as bringing the rule of *dike* against the arbitrariness of Hesiod's *basileis*, as reorganizing society by reshuffling it into new tribes (Corinth, Sikyon), and enhancing collective identity through public works and other means. In short, tyrants (sometimes in spite of themselves) were creative forces, transforming a *basileis*-oriented, aristocratic society into a political community. This re-evaluation makes excellent sense, especially when we consider how closely tyrants tried to appear to conform to that amazing Greek phenomenon of the communal arbitrator: the great reformers, such as Solon (*diallaktes*) or Demonax (*katarthister*), and city founders (all three — tyrants, reformers, oikists — in a similar relationship to Delphi. (See my discussion in *Metis* 4 [1989]129-53).

The role of the Lawgiver is itself the subject of Robin Osborne's beautifully construed analysis. Following a principle of interdependence and connectedness (long ago advocated by Louis Gernet), he assumes that individual laws presuppose both a system and procedure, a point that leads him also to reassess much that had been cast aside as fictitious in the biographies of ancient Lawgivers. Osborne is right to accept many of the details concerning laws as authentic (add: the very term 'Lawgivers'), but not the biographical coloring of certain attributions to particular Lawgivers. Osborne's discussion casts in a new light the question of 'the unity of Law' and 'law codes'. What is further needed is an amplification of the difference between *ad hoc* law-changes and comprehensive reforms involving a refoundation of the social order either by transforming the state (e.g., the 'Great Rhetra', Demonax and Cyrene) or by founding a new one (oikists as Lawgivers).

Everyone is familiar with the concept of the 'Spartan mirage' but few are in agreement as to what to do with it. Stephen Hodkinson presents here one of the best evaluations of the validity of early Spartan history, arguing with sophistication against a simplistic application of the idea that Spartan history was 'invented' in the Classical period. There is no reason to privilege this period; inventions probably occurred in earlier periods as well. Hodkinson may want to confront the question when an accepted story becomes so widely accepted and symbolically charged that manipulating it can only go so far. The main thrust of the article is to distinguish between 'the structure of the Spartan system and particular institutions and practices through which it was articulated' (p. 86), concentrating on 'principles behind the emergence of the structure'. This leads to the encouraging result that we can responsibly analyze military, social, economic, political and ritual systems. Sparta emerges as characteristic of other *poleis* but 'distinct in the pervasiveness of its collectivity and the application of state control'. In other words, a Spartan *Sonderweg*, not a *Sonderstadt*. There remains the nagging historiosophical doubt: if the 'way' is so special, does it not make Sparta really different?

Solon's Athens is significantly represented in three articles. Edward Harris presents a brilliant new interpretation of the Seisachtheia: 'abolition of debts', he argues, is an anachronistic interpretation of the removal of the *horoi*. This is really a metaphor for the fight against *stasis*, and, more concretely, the abolition of payments of dependency to local magnates. Later, the tyranny of Peisistratos, with its reduced

payments, was a 'bargain'. What remains unclear is precisely the transition from conventions of reciprocity ('gifts') to fixed payments, but this is hardly Harris's fault: we know too little. What remains untreated, in the final analysis, are the debts: whether the *horoi* allude to them (they do, in later periods) or not, was there no such problem at all? Were the people whom Solon is proud to have restored to Attica driven away for reasons other than debts? These questions remain to be treated if all the implications of Harris's thesis are to be taken into account.

Anyone who has ever taught an undergraduate course on 'Athenian democracy' faces the problem of horizontal thinking: students are enthusiastic about the tribes, the *boule*, the law courts, the assembly — yet quickly forget the vertical dimension, that of the property classes and the varying property assessments upon which the eligibility for office depended. Lin Foxhall goes a long way to correct this image, looking at the Solonian *tele* ('a view from he top') as perhaps the more prominent feature of his reform. She does this by contextualizing Athens among 'agricultural economies' and assessing 'what exactly the *polis* might have been in the late seventh century' (a surprisingly rare effort in this volume whose *raison d'être* is the *polis*). There follows an incisive review of modern scholarship and a fair warning against simplistic anthropological analogies that lean too heavily on societies of tropical environment, often connected with global systems through colonization and empire (Foxhall is a prominent expert on anthropological and agricultural matters). By contrast, Foxhall regards 'the *poleis* of Archaic Greece (as) ... little more than a stand-off between the members of the elite who ran them', with 'magistracies ... a little more than a means by which the elite took turns at power'. Accordingly, Solon's reforms gave a new basis to this system of taking turns. The foundation of the elite (the first three *tele*, all quite rich) was wealth in the form of private landholdings, which had always been there (*contra* the notion of public lands). Hence the *tele* represent also a 'formalization of access to land ... circumventing any dependency relationships'. All this leaves the *thetes*, in spite of her best efforts, rather elusive and the *demos* in general pushed to the background. The vertical *tele* system seems to me ingenious precisely because it had to find a place in the new (re-ordered and horizontally oriented) reforms in the structure of the Athenian state. In this context, the rich may have been convinced of 'the view from the top', but I am not sure that everyone in Athens shared it.

A similar approach underlies Lynette Mitchell's writing: her Solon is conservative, 'looking backwards to the maintenance of an older form' (p. 137). Her examination, however, takes a different path: studying the concepts of *arete* and *agathos* (Theognis, too, comes into the picture, although how comparable his society was to that of Athens needs arguing), she notes the transition to acquiring *arete* through new wealth and the inclusion in the *tele* of the *nouveaux riches* (p. 141). But essentially Solon wanted to create *eunomia* from *dysnomia*, and restoring order was his primary aim. This primacy is possible, although divining intentions from effects is notoriously imprecise. Mitchell concludes that the *agathoi* kept their status (the term 'social order', p. 144, is inappropriate), whereas the (rich) *kakoi* now partook of political power. This is a very Theognis-oriented interpretation, and quite probable in some

respects. Personally, my impression is that Solon's broad outlook indicates a rather different approach from Theognis' snobbish bickering.

The *arete* of the citizen opens George Robinson's paper, rightly stressing the difference between the *arete* of the Homeric sacker of cities and the honor and splendor that accompany a defender of the *polis*. Robertson examines the difference between public epigrams and symposion poetry, sensibly claiming that the two co-existed and interacted. How, precisely, this interaction worked (considering especially, as he points out, that no patriotic epigrams commemorating falling for one's country exist from before the Persian wars), is a topic that remains somewhat undeveloped.

If religion was the key to expressing communal belonging in the *polis*, its representation here consists in (only) two very different articles. Emma Stafford presents an original paper on 'Themis: religion and order in the Archaic *polis*', and examines various aspects of Themis (Themis and Gaia, Rhamnous, Delphi, Athens and Gaia) in a somewhat disjointed and unintegrated manner: she obviously knows too much about Themis. Her case for the primacy of Themis over Gaia should certainly make one re-think some accepted categories. Rhamnous may be seen as liminal (p. 165) either from the Athenian acropolis or from a modern library desk, but perhaps not to the people of Rhamnous (proud, for example, to have participated in the Lemnos campaign) — another instance of the ubiquitous fallacy of looking for the 'geometry of religion' (see my comments in *Boreas* 24 [1996] 75-81), as if center and periphery are self-evident. Otherwise her reconstruction of the relationship between Nemesis and Themis is entirely probable. With Delphi, the role of the oracle in supporting constitutive action and restoring order could have been better articulated, especially since it supports her case. In sum, this is a very good case for regarding Themis' cult as one of civic order. How Gaia came to be associated with her in Athens remains unclear and in the state of the evidence is hardly likely to become any clearer.

Catherine Morgan, an amazingly prolific and interesting scholar, asks about sanctuaries and *ethne*. She is right to do so in such a book, not because she wants to learn from the *polis-ethnos* contrast, but because the discussion of the role of cult in the 'creation or representation of group identity' should not be dominated by the *polis*. Moreover, *ethne* and *poleis* seem to have developed concurrently; Morgan convincingly argues against the *ethnos* as a survival of tribal systems, a *Stammstadt*. But to what extent were *ethnos* sanctuaries (e.g., Aitolian Thermon with Polybius 5.7-8) the center for *ethnos* meetings in the Archaic period? Morgan treads carefully, providing an excellent case-by-case discussion and emphasizing regional idiosyncrasies. Here she concentrates on Pherai, Kalapodi (see now Jeremy McInerny, *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis*, Austin 1999) and Arkadia (for the latter see Morgan's own discussion in *Defining Ancient Arcadia*, Th. H. Nielsen and J. Roy [eds.], Copenhagen 1999, 382-456). Morgan's basic approach is to study localities and their interconnections, on the assumption that 'politicization' comes later, manipulating the significance of cults, and involving the invention of symbols and charters as if they originated in a more ancient past. She is probably right in many cases, but since our evidence for explicit charters is almost always late, there is a danger here of arguing from silence. Finally, contrasting *poleis* and *ethne*, Morgan somewhat skeptically refers to the common assumption that the *polis* articu-

lated its identity through religion. If *poleis* were unitary, she says, then 'one might expect their domestic religious organizations, and codes governing access between *poleis* (*xenia*) and between *poleis* and inter-state sanctuaries, to have been relatively simple. *Ethne*, by contrast, are multi-tiered'. 'Simple'? I wonder. Religion, after all, had other functions besides the expression of identity.

Confronting particular kinds of communities may elucidate major aspects of the *polis*, which is what John-Paul Wilson tries to do in his examination of *emporia* and *apoikiai*. Wilson nicely illustrates the difference between Athens' fourth-century *emporion* of the Piraeus (a very good analysis; add to the late classical desire to separate functions in the *polis* the calls for two kinds of *agora*) and archaic *emporia* whose status is less clear. The terms applied to the latter (e.g., by Herodotus) are function-, not status-oriented. The same place may be called either an *emporion* or a *polis* according to what the historian wishes to say about it. In short, any settlement (*apoikia*, *polis*) involved in commercial activity could have been called an *emporion*. This is a good and convincing observation. From here one should proceed (but this is outside the scope of Wilson's article, although he should have mentioned the issue) to distinguish among archaic *emporia*, a term that includes 'enclaves' of Greeks (e.g., Gravisca), non-Greek *emporia*, and others.

The book closes with a comparison between Servius Tullius and Cleisthenes by Christopher Smith, who starts with a clear-headed discussion of the emergence of the *polis* in Central Italy, seeing Greek influence more in terms of stimuli than as models for precise copying. He reminds us of Carmine Ampolo's formulation of Italic 'open society': 'society at the top level was permeable'. As for Rome, Smith accepts the essential historicity of sixth-century events (unlike eighth-century ones). He sees the relationship between *pagi* and tribes as essential, especially with a view to the military aspects of the reforms, both in Athens and in Rome. The issue of 'comparability of a Greek and Italian experience of urbanization' may be in need of further discussion, but this is an excellent starting point for such a project which needs to be applied, as Smith rightly says, to the entire ancient Mediterranean.

Rhodes and Mitchell have given us a very good, well-edited collection of essays. Most of the papers could have been equally well placed in academic journals, and the question remains, why do we have all this in book form? True, we are dealing here with aspects of the *polis*, but not with any particular theme. However, since many scholars find themselves committed more and more to publishing articles in specialized volumes, perhaps this has simply become the dominant trend of publication.

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Jeremy McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos, Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999. xvi + 391 pp. + 8 maps + 20 b/w plates. ISBN 0 92 75229 6.

'Clearly "ethnicity" ... has taken the place of "nationality" as a historian's tool for interpreting Greek history and trying to understand how Greeks saw themselves'.