

Herodotus' language, are important for an appreciation of ancient philology's treatment of the text. Rosén sketches the series of events that led to the conception of a single 'vera Herodotea forma' rather than a recognition of the fluctuation within Herodotus' language, which, he believed, cannot be doctored to fit the epigraphical evidence of a specific locale. This sort of appreciation has affinities with C.'s interpretation of the survival of fluctuation in the text of Aristophanes and the concept of dialect.

Stephen Colvin is to be warmly praised and congratulated for so illuminating the complex material of Aristophanic dialect. We await further, innovative application of sociolinguistic interpretation of Greek literary texts based on the very solid and scrupulous philological methods of Colvin typified in this book.

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Heinrich Dörrie, *Der Platonismus in der Antike. Grundlagen — System — Entwicklung*. Band 1, Die geschichtlichen Wurzeln des Platonismus, aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben von Annemarie Dörrie, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann and Holzboog 1987. xvii + 557 pp. ISBN 3 7728 1153; Band 2, Der hellenistische Rahmen des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus, aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Matthias Baltes unter Mitarbeit von Annemarie Dörrie und Friedhelm Mann, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann and Holzboog 1990. xvi + 531 pp. ISBN 3 7728 1154 X; Band 3, Der Platonismus im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert nach Christus, herausgegeben von Matthias Baltes, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann and Holzboog 1993. xix + 440 pp. ISBN 3 7728 1155 8.

These three volumes are the first half of what Heinrich Dörrie regarded as his life's work; a collection of texts, with translations and a commentary, illustrating the various aspects of Platonism in the period between the first appearance of what is now commonly called Middle Platonism, in the first century CE, and the rise of what is called Neo Platonism in the middle of the third century. In her *Geleitwort* to vol. 1 (pp. XV-XVII), his widow, Annemarie Dörrie (known to scholars as Annemarie Lueder, author of an important dissertation on Antiochus of Ascalon published in 1940), describes in dispassionate terms the passionate adventure of her late husband's life. As soon as Heinrich Dörrie completed his academic studies, he decided that his life's work was to consist in studying and writing the history of Middle Platonism. What he planned, already in those remote years, was not a 'book about' Platonism (something like Paul Moraux' *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*), but an annotated collection of basic texts. While the project was in its first steps, D. was called up to active service in 1939. In 1944, he was dispatched to the Russian front, and he spent the years 1944-1953 in a Russian camp for German prisoners of war. In the few hours he was allowed to spare from hard labour, he went on working on his project. Friends in Germany supplied him with materials, and fellow-prisoners encouraged him to continue his studies and to lecture to them on some of the results. Returning to Germany in 1953, he spent the remaining thirty years of his life (he died in 1983)

attempting to bring this vast enterprise to as perfect a completion as possible. In the course of his preparation, he published as *parerga* dozens of articles dealing with various *Einzelprobleme* in the history of Platonism and its influence on early Christianity. Only a small portion of these articles was collected in his *Platonica Minora* of 1976. By 1983, he had collected most of the basic texts and written much of what is now vols. 1-2. He was hoping to complete the project within a few years.

*Dis aliter visum*. What we now have is volume 1 virtually as D. left it, published by Annemarie Dörrie; vol. 2, edited by D.'s former pupil and successor Matthias Baltes, in cooperation with Mrs. Dörrie and another former pupil, Friedhelm Mann; and vol. 3, which is virtually written by Professor Baltes. This would explain some of the differences between the three volumes. In vol. 1, the commentary consists almost entirely of an analysis of the relevant texts, with some references to ancient authors, but relatively little discussion of secondary literature, and no bibliography. One does not know whether D. intended to supplement such *desiderata*; but the volume is printed as D. left it, as an act of *pietas*. In vol. 2, the editors have considerably expanded the commentary and the footnotes (including their additions in double parentheses [[]]), to account for recent developments in research and interpretation, and added a substantial bibliography (pp. 521-31). Vol. 3, where the commentary is largely the work of Professor Baltes, has even more extensive references to recent editions and works of scholarship, and an even more detailed bibliography (pp. 395-440).

D. gives us the detailed plan of the whole work — parts, chapters and sections — on pp. 54-61 of vol. 1. The present three volumes constitute the first part of the whole project, *Kulturgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Gegebenheiten des Platonismus*. The second part, *Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus*, as well as the detailed indices, occupy the other volumes, to which I shall not refer in this review.

Although this work contains some fragments and testimonia, this is decidedly not a collection of fragments, but rather a source-book on the model of such works as Greenidge and Clay's *Sources for Roman History*, 133-70 B.C. (select passages without comments), or de Vogel's *Greek Philosophy* (select passages with comments). This renders the issue of selection and arrangement all the more acute. An editor of fragments and testimonia, however much he uses his judgement and taste, is limited by the amount of genuine quotations from his author or authors and of summaries and reports of various degrees of credibility on what the author/s did and wrote. The editor of a source-book like this one, excerpting from extant authors like Cicero, Philo, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry, Proclus, and others, as well as presenting his own selection from the more fragmentary evidence of authors like Numenius and Harpocration, is constantly using his judgement both in the selection of passages to be included (and excluded) and in the choice of the main issues to be discussed as illustrating his general theme and in the arrangement of these issues. The choice of issues, of course, also determines the choice of passages and much in the nature of the commentary.

One way of performing this task is to discuss Platonism historically, dealing with the various stages in its development as they are represented, in chronological order, by its various exponents and their schools and followers, from Antiochus of Ascalon

(a dubious Platonist: but he has been depicted as such by some great scholars) to Apuleius, Galen and Numenius. This is the method adopted by John Dillon in his *The Middle Platonists* of 1978. D. was aware of this method — and of Dillon's work — but he consciously decided to organize his materials differently, since, as he says, too many of the ideas of Platonism and our sources for such ideas have been preserved anonymously, and some ideas reappear in different periods as part of the Platonic tradition (vol. 1, p. 47 n. 1; p. 51 n. 1). He has therefore arranged his materials under general headings such as 'Die geschichtlichen Wurzeln des Platonismus'; 'Platons Ansehen außerhalb der Akademie'; 'Platon und die Weisheit des Ostens', and the like. Each of these sections is composed of one or more *Bausteine*, and each *Baustein* consists of one or more texts relating to some theme, such as 'Platons Vorlesung über das Gute'; 'Um die Einheit der Akademie: war Platon Dogmatiker?', or 'Die Tätigkeit der Kommentatoren — ὑπομνηματισταί' — and the like.

At least one reader has not found that these divisions and headings, and the manner in which they are organized in various parts of these three volumes — always make adequate sense. Why, for example, should the attacks on Plato by his younger contemporary, the rhetor Alcimus, be included, as *Baustein* 3, in a section named 'Nachwirkungen altakademischen Philosophierens auf die Erörterungen der frühen Kaiserzeit' (vol. 1, pp. 74-135), while the attacks on Plato by another contemporary, the historian Theopompus, appear as part of *Baustein* 36 (36.1-5, vol. 2, pp. 2-6), in a section called 'Die Polemik gegen Platon' (ibid. pp. 2-11), as part of 'Der hellenistische Rahmen des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus' (the title of the whole of vol. 2)? Or why should 'Legendarisches und Wunderbares in der biographischen Überlieferung über Platon' (*Bausteine* 58-61, vol. 2, pp. 154-64) appear in this second volume? Presumably because our immediate sources for such stories are 'Hellenistic-Roman', and even early Christian: Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Seneca, Apuleius and others. But then, most of our sources for the section 'Nachwirkungen altakademischen Philosophierens auf die Erörterungen der frühen Kaiserzeit' (vol. 1, pp. 74-135) are also late: Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Themistius, Proclus, Augustine, Simplicius and the like. After all, we have hardly any complete texts related to the history and biography of ancient philosophy and philosophers before the philosophical works of Cicero, and much of what we have in the later sources contains — beside 'Hellenistic' fictions and accretions, much which is derived from earlier sources.

Some *Bausteine* appear to consist of heterogeneous materials. *Baustein* 37, 'Der Vorwurf des literarischen Diebstahls' (vol. 2, pp. 12-20), has passages referring to 'proper' accusations against Plato of plagiarizing from works by Aeschines, Protagoras, Zoroaster and others, beside passages 'accusing' Plato of 'borrowing' the dialogue form from Sophron, Aleximenes and Zeno of Elea: as if Plato ever claimed that the dialogue form was his own invention. Indeed, the whole issue of the philosophical dialogue — and especially the Socratic dialogue, of which Plato could not possibly have claimed to be πρῶτος εὐρέτης — as a literary form, deserves at least a few *Bausteine*, if one also deals with issues like Plato's style (vol. 2, pp. 110-50), or with the legend of Plato's divine birth (ibid. 150-56).

Other *Bausteine* appear to me to be superfluous. Why have a whole *Baustein* (4, vol. 1, pp. 94-101) on the problem of the τέλος in the old Academy, merely to show that the views on this issue ascribed by later sources to Xenocrates and Polemo do not seem to fit in with a passage in the First Alcibiades? In any case, the whole issue of the τέλος was clearly formulated as such by Aristotle, and came into prominence in the philosophy of the Athenian schools in the 'Hellenistic' period. The same applies to *Baustein* 11 (ibid. pp. 144-52), on 'the Criterion of Truth' ascribed by later sources (mainly Sextus) to some members of the Old Academy. The formulation of this issue of 'the Criterion of Truth' was part of a 'Hellenistic' controversy between 'sceptics' and 'dogmatics' as they came to be called, and grafting it on to earlier philosophers was somewhat anachronistic. In any case, this issue is far from prominent in Middle Platonism, except when authors of general introductions to Plato written while this issue was still being debated attempt to offer their own view of the Platonic 'Criterion', to satisfy the curiosity of contemporary readers. Gisela Striker's 'Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας', Nachr. Akad. Gött., Phil.-Hist. Kl. 1974, 2, pp. 47-110 (to which I find no reference here or elsewhere in these three volumes) would have helped. Should one have a whole *Baustein* (28, vol. 1, pp. 238-44) on various echoes in Cicero, Philo and Seneca of a well-known expression in *Timaeus* 47b? or another one (30, ibid. pp. 249-52) on Cicero's expression *errare cum Platone*?

D.'s overall view of the essentials of Platonism is cautiously summed up in a *Skizze* in vol. 1, pp. 16-32. Being well aware of the varieties of Platonic experience, he offers this as an attempt at presenting some of the more general common denominators. This is a clear and sensible survey as applied to late Platonists like Numenius and to most Neo Platonists; but the emphasis on the unity of philosophy and religion and on the religious nature of philosophy itself might not have entirely appealed to some of the earlier Platonists.

D. is careful, in his introductory chapters, to make it as clear as possible that the Platonism he describes is not the philosophy of Plato himself, but the outlines of a picture of Platonic philosophy current among Platonists of the first three centuries of the Christian era. Yet many of his comments on the 'sceptical' Academy of Arcesilaus and his followers makes it quite clear that he regards their philosophy as a 'fortschreitende Abkehr vom Platonismus' (vol. 1, p. 398), or a 'Zerstörung der legitimen διαδοχή', an 'Einbruch in die διαδοχή' (ibid. p. 411). Indeed, D.'s whole concept of διαδοχή is somewhat confused. He seems to identify διαδοχή with *traditio* (ibid. p. 414), or with Überlieferung (ibid. p. 390), or describe it as 'die didoché des Wahren und Richtigen' (ibid. p. 395). But διαδοχή is merely the orderly succession to the headship of an organized institution: in our case, to the headship of a philosophical school; from the second century CE onwards, to an established and maintained chair in philosophy or rhetoric. A διάδοχος is successor, and διαδοχή is *successio*. The Greek for *traditio* is παράδοσις. The only author known to me who uses διαδοχή in the sense of the tradition of a school's *dogmata* is Numenius of Apamea (fr. 24, 12 des Places), and Numenius is not always absolutely faithful to the technical terminology of his sources, especially when it applies to such remote Athenian institutions.

Indeed, the whole section on the 'sceptical' Academy (*Bausteine* 12-18, vol. 1, pp. 152-87) is incomplete and considerably biased. The *Bausteine* concerning Arcesilaus (12-15) are immediately followed by a passage concerning a 'seminar' on Plato's *Gorgias* taught by Charmadas (*Baustein* 16, p. 168), and by two *Bausteine* on Philo of Larissa (17-18) — as if Carneades and his immediate pupils had no relevance here. In the commentary (pp. 418-19), D. admits that Arcesilaus regarded his own way of doing philosophy as in line with the true spirit of Plato's dialogues — but the reader has already been told more than once that the 'sceptical' Academy constituted a break with proper Platonism. On p. 436, we are told: 'Seltsamerweise, gibt es bisher keine wissenschaftliche Auswertung der wenigen Zeugnisse, die von Philon von Larissa erhalten sind'. Even if one forgets some sections dedicated to Philo in Rudolf Hirzel's old (but still interesting and thought-provoking) *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, one may note that *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (1978) had been available for nine years before our vol. 1 (1987) came out. A study of pp. 64-88 of *Antiochus* might have shown that some such 'wissenschaftliche Auswertung' — for what it is worth — had been attempted. Indeed, a study of the whole of that rather long work might have made D. realize the importance of Seneca, NQ 7.32.2 (*Baustein* 19.7) for the issue of the continuity of the Academy after Philo and Charmadas, and might have spared us the Zumptian statements of the 'Plato to Justinian' variety on pp. 398; 458; 544 — and in the whole section of the commentary dedicated to the property of the Athenian Platonic school and to Justinian's decree (vol. 1, pp. 550-2).

As I have already hinted, much of vol. 2, officially dedicated to the 'Hellenistic' period, contains biographical materials on Plato many of which have their origin, at least in part, in contemporary or near contemporary sources; and materials concerning some criticisms of Plato by contemporary and near-contemporary sources. In general, I am still baffled by the organization of many of the materials included in this volume; but I take comfort in the far more thorough work done by the editors in updating the commentary and adding and discussing numerous references to sources and to contributions to the various debates made in recent (and sometimes not all that recent) scholarship.

In all these respects, I find vol. 3 the most satisfactory. The organization of the materials — from the institutionalization of philosophy in Athens in the second century CE, through the lists of various second and third century Platonists, to the evidence we have of Middle Platonic commentaries on various dialogues, Platonic lexica and concordances, and general works on Platonic philosophy and its various aspects — all this makes some logical and historical sense. Here, many of the materials are indeed fragments and testimonia, and often all we know of a commentary or a general work is its title. But the number of Platonists of whom we know little or nothing, and of commentaries still available to readers like Proclus (and occasionally even Photius) is impressive, and it demonstrates the extent of renewed interest in Plato's writing during this period, and gives us some measure of the extent of our loss.

I add in parentheses that some of the titles may not belong with certainty in a work on Platonism. Plutarch's lost work *περὶ εἰμαρμένης* (94.1) may well have been

a polemic against the Stoics, but not necessarily from a Platonist's point of view. His lost work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* (88.1) may again have been a general work of doxography, not necessarily from a Platonist's point of view. We have no fragments clearly assignable to these two lost works. In a section of *Antiochus* — pp. 257-80 — I have shown that Plutarch was hardly a 'pure' Middle Platonist; he was not only well aware of the 'sceptical' nature of much of the historical Academy, but he also makes a number of statements of adherence to this 'sceptical' approach. Whether he held two confused views of the nature of Platonic and Academic philosophy, or held the 'sceptical' and the 'dogmatic' views in various periods of his life, is a subject which awaits further investigation. However, it may be better to have such materials included in this collection, as long as the reader is duly warned.

Be that as it may, Professor Baltes has done an outstanding work of selection and organization, and his commentary is as full and up-to-date as one can expect in such a complex field. If one should treat vols. 1-2 with great caution, and keep searching for more materials and more works of scholarship — and indeed, for issues not adequately discussed or mentioned there — vol. 3 can serve as a reliable basis for further work on much of the Middle Platonic literature now lost to us.

Not that vols. 1-2 are entirely without their value. A collection of materials — any collection of materials, however incomplete it may be — is always good for reference. D. has usually been cautious and judicious, and this makes some sections a great improvement on much of the more recent literature. His comments on 'Platons Vorlesung über das Gute' (vol. 1, pp. 277-95) are an excellent antidote to much of the literature on *Die ungeschriebene Lehre Platons*. His presentation (supplemented by Baltes and Mann) of the stages in the history of the ancient editions of Plato's dialogues and their divisions into various groups (vol. 2, pp. 84-6 and 511-20) is excellent, and can serve as a corrective to some of the wild speculations of Harold Tarrant in his *Thrasyllan Platonism* (reviewed in this periodical, XVI, 1997, pp. 271-8): Many detailed observations in various parts of the commentary are circumspect, wise and sensitive. But as indicated above, some choices and some comments should be read with much caution and scepticism. This is no more than saying that no collection of passages and no commentary is always right and 'authoritative'. Scholars will know this anyway from their own experience.

The faults I have discussed are not entirely, or chiefly, to be laid at the door of Dörrie and his editors. True, a more historical arrangement of the materials — even only of the same materials we have in these volumes — might have helped to make the picture somewhat clearer. But the real problem, it appears, is that this whole field of Middle Platonism has become far too large to be 'covered' by one collection of select passages, however large that collection may be. The bibliography in vol. 3 is so daunting that only a thorough and diligent scholar like Matthias Baltes can be trusted to have read it all. What is more, even a superficial reading of this bibliography would reveal that some items are missing. Considering the growing industrialization of scholarship in the last two or three generations, no one should be blamed for not reaching perfect *Vollständigkeit* even in a bibliography on such a limited field. Besides, a source-book is, after all, only an anthology, representing the choices, views, tastes and horizons of an individual anthologist. The conscientious reader will

use it and refer to it whenever the need arises, being always aware of its limitations, and making use of its notes and references — and even of the passages included — to go beyond it to other texts and more secondary literature.

The volumes are beautifully produced by Frommann and Holzboog. Proper hard covers; clean, strong and white paper; large print; wide margins — and the passages are printed, according to Dörrie's own wish, *per cola et commata*, which makes them easier to read. Dörrie's German is clear and precise, a pleasure to read, and it gives the lie to the malicious myth that academic German is by its very nature long, contorted, and hard to follow. Dörrie's wise observations on the corruption of the German language by the intrusion of political jargon and pseudo academic terminology (vol. 1, pp. 70-1) apply to most modern languages, and should be read carefully by all those who are still concerned for clarity and precision. Dörrie has managed to write with a clarity and precision which please as well as instruct.

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Gretchen Reydam-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence. Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato's Timaeus*, *Monothéisme et Philosophie*, Collection dirigée par Carlos Lévy, Brepols: Turnhout 1999. 297 pp. ISBN 2 503 50656 9.

This book is based on a 1994 Berkeley dissertation. The author has also consulted in the meantime an impressive array of leading scholars in seven countries and two continents (7). Yet much of it still has the appearance of a doctoral thesis, slightly edited and probably cut down to some expected size. The result — despite a considerable number of new interpretations, some of which are convincing — is not entirely satisfactory.

The title itself is somewhat misleading. Most of this work deals with issues such as the first principles (*ἀρχαί*) of the universe; the world-soul in relation to the human soul; and with fate and necessity far more than with providence. Indeed, one is surprised to read (78) that for the Stoics, 'the rationale inherent in the universe, its given structure, does not necessarily entail the notion of a conscious agent, which does seem to be required in order to talk about Providence, as an actively intervening structural factor'. As if Cicero had not written *ND* 2 and von Arnim had not assembled the testimonia in *SVF* 2.1106-86. But *Principles, Soul and Fate* would be a less attractive title than *Demiurge and Providence*. We also have catchy titles like 'Posidonius, off to Rhodes and Back to Plato?' (Ch.2); and mottoes taken from Pablo Neruda (41); Rainer Maria Rilke (85); Husri (135); Thomas Mann (167); and Immanuel Kant (207) — all of which are, in the best case, only tenuously related to the subject matter of the chapters which they adorn.

There is also some dubious handling of Greek<sup>1</sup> and Latin,<sup>2</sup> and some strange philology.<sup>3</sup> Texts are sometimes discussed without a reference or a cross-reference.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> p. 54: ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ is not 'he also likes the idea'; and τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν is not 'drawing his version of the previous tradition from