use it and refer to it whenever the need arises, being always aware of its limitations, and making use of its notes and references — and even of the passages included — to go beyond it to other texts and more secondary literature.

The volumes are beautifully produced by Frommann and Holzboog. Proper hard covers; clean, strong and white paper; large print; wide margins — and the passages are printed, according to Dörrie's own wish, *per cola et commata*, which makes them easier to read. Dörrie's German is clear and precise, a pleasure to read, and it gives the lie to the malicious myth that academic German is by its very nature long, contorted, and hard to follow. Dörrie's wise observations on the corruption of the German language by the intrusion of political jargon and pseudo academic terminology (vol. 1, pp. 70-1) apply to most modern languages, and should be read carefully by all those who are still concerned for clarity and precision. Dörrie has managed to write with a clarity and precision which please as well as instruct.

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Gretchen Reydams-Schils, *Demiurge and Providence. Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato's* Timaeus, Monothéisme et Philosophie, Collection dirigée par Carlos Lévy, Brepols: Turnhout 1999. 297 pp. IBSN 2 503 50656 9.

This book is based on a 1994 Berkeley dissertation. The author has also consulted in the meantime an impressive array of leading scholars in seven countries and two continents (7). Yet much of it still has the appearance of a doctoral thesis, slightly edited and probably cut down to some expected size. The result — despite a considerable number of new interpretations, some of which are convincing — is not entirely satisfactory.

The title itself is somewhat misleading. Most of this work deals with issues such as the first principles (ἀρχαί) of the universe; the world-soul in relation to the human soul; and with fate and necessity far more than with providence. Indeed, one is surprised to read (78) that for the Stoics, 'the rationale inherent in the universe, its given structure, does not necessarily entail the notion of a conscious agent, which does seem to be required in order to talk about Providence, as an actively intervening structural factor'. As if Cicero had not written *ND* 2 and von Arnim had not assembled the testimonia in *SVF* 2.1106-86. But *Principles, Soul and Fate* would be a less attractive title than *Demiurge and Providence*. We also have catchy titles like 'Posidonius, off to Rhodes and Back to Plato?' (Ch.2); and mottoes taken from Pablo Neruda (41); Rainer Maria Rilke (85); Husri (135); Thomas Mann (167); and Immanuel Kant (207) — all of which are, in the best case, only tenuously related to the subject matter of the chapters which they adorn.

There is also some dubious handling of Greek[1] and Latin,[2] and some strange philology.[3] Texts are sometimes discussed without a reference or a cross-reference.[4]

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1 p. 54: ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ is not 'he also likes the idea'; and τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν is not 'drawing his version of the previous tradition from

Quotations from ancient sources are usually given in English translation, with the Greek or Latin (but no apparatus) relegated to the footnotes — and on one or two occasions not even that.[5] References to sources are sometimes rather peculiar.[6] Cross-references are rare, and often to sections rather than to pages.[7] The same author is sometimes discussed in two separate sections, with little or no indication of this χωρισμός.[8] The writing itself is not always very clear, and many sections include materials which properly belong in other sections.[9] Altogether, this is hardly a 'reader-friendly' book, and it could have done with considerable rewriting, recasting, and editing.

But — I shall be asked — what about the ideas? The long and short of the — often somewhat tortuous — general argument seems to be as follows. The two Stoic ἀρχαί, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, were taken from Plato's *Timaeus*, with some interference from Aristotle and Theophrastus — but they constitute a more economical version of these predecessors' 'principles'. (Ch. 1). Posidonius' Platonism was exaggerated by later Platonists like Galen and Calcidius, and his departures from Stoic

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Plato'. p. 63: 'deriving from (a) "διὰ τοῦ σώματος ..."' is a solecist manner of quoting. p. 98: 'ἡ φαντασία λογική': no comment. p. 155: ὡς καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ... [emphasis mine] is not merely 'implying that the cosmos ...'.

2 p. 124: *restant Stoici* is not 'No Stoic need apply'; p. 126: '... for the sake of its dignity (*nominis dignitatem*)' is another solecist quotation.

3 Words and phrases supplied by scholars are called simply 'emendations': pp. 54; 91; 95: 'emendation (supplementation)'. At 148 we have 'the square brackets are mine', with no comment. Passages from extant texts are called 'fragments': p. 56 n. 45 (DL 7.134); p. 60 n. 62 ('the fragments which Plutarch quotes from Crantor'); p. 157 ('the following fragment' for a quotation from Philo's *Heres*); pp. 155; 232, for passages of Calcidius.

4 pp. 91-4 (where a cross-reference to p. 192 would have helped); p.100: '... elsewhere attested by Galen' — but no reference; pp. 147-8; 183; 188; 196 n. 85; p. 211: 'we have already examined' — with no cross-reference to pp. 91-4.

5 E.g. pp. 191; 194.

6 p. 95: 'transl. Kidd, modified; *Commentary* 374= *De Sequela* ... 2.36 ed. Müller'. But on p. 374 of his commentary, Kidd provides only the original Greek; and if it were a translation, why should it 'equal' (=) Müller's Greek text? p. 101, n. 37: '*Scholia in Homerum*' — with no reference. (In fact, it is a scholion on *Il.* 12.386, just like the comment of Eustathius mentioned immediately after it — but this is not made clear.) p. 218, n. 30: 'Waszink ... note 79' (should be 'Waszink's note on 79.9-14'). But the worst of it all are the references to Calcidius, which are sometimes to chapters and sometimes to page and line in Waszink's edition. This is reflected in the Calcidius entry in the Index, pp. 269-70, where we have first the chapter references (each preceded by 'ch.'), and then page and line references to Waszink's text, with no explanation.

7 E.g. pp. 90-4, (esp. p. 93, n. 20), which are referred to on p. 192 only as 'in the second chapter (2.1)'. On pp. 90-4 themselves, there is no reference to p. 192.

8 See last note, and also the discussion of Plutarch on pp. 193-6, in a section on the Διδασκαλικός. The discussion of Plutarch proper is on pp. 167-71.

9 See last note. Examples of the style appear in a few sentences quoted in this review. I add another one from pp. 240-1: 'The problem of punishments going to the just, and in reverse of rewards befalling bad people, is the starting point of Plato's *Republic* [no reference], and the prime historical example is, of course, Socrates himself'.

cosmology are not all that many or significant. (Ch. 2). Antiochus, despite his professed adherence to the *veteres* (of his own making), is mainly a Stoic in his physics. (*Interlude*). Philo, Galen, Alcinous and Calcidius were all influenced, in their allusions to, and interpretations of, Plato's *Timaeus*, by the Stoic doctrine of the two ἀρχαί, and by some aspects of the Stoic doctrine of fate — even where they try to refute it. Each of them also adapted *Timaeus*, and the Stoic elements he incorporated into it, to his own needs: Philo to his belief in an incorporeal, all-powerful, transcendent creator God; Galen to his analysis, as a medical man, of physiological phenomena; Calcidius to his own ideas of fate and freedom.

Much of this general outline is hardly surprising. For five centuries and more — well into the 'Neo Platonic' age — Stoicism dominated the language and modes of thought of most educated people. It was quite natural that even some Πλατωνικοί, in both senses of this term, would absorb such basic Stoic doctrines as that of the two ἀρχαί, and try to fit them into their understanding of Plato — especially since Aristotle (*Metaph* 1.988a 7-14, quoted here, 46) had already ascribed to Plato two causes, and so did Theophrastus. Using one's own terminology and modes of thought in interpreting earlier philosophers anachronistically is not unique to modern times. It is also well-known that in Middle Platonism — and in much of the Prolegomena literature well into late antiquity — *Timaeus* occupied a place far beyond its size and importance in the Platonic corpus taken as a whole.[10] The one issue on which — despite the views of some leading scholars cited frequently in this book — I would still cling to my ἐποχή, is the theory that the two Stoic ἀρχαί are a shorter and more economical version of Timaeus' Demiurge, Ideas and World Soul as against his Receptacle/Space/Nurse — aided and abetted by some Aristotelian concepts. The Stoics may have borrowed the προσηγορία of their δημιουργός from Plato's *Timaeus*, and some concepts like ὕλη and ἀντικείμενον from Aristotle through Theophrastus. They may even have borrowed the concepts of ποιεῖν — πάσχειν from Plato and the early Academy and Peripatos. The philosophical context into which they inserted such concepts, however, is so different from that of the *Timaeus* story and the Aristotelian causes, that I should be quite content to remain in my present state of ἀκαταληψία as to the precise origin and ingredients of Stoic cosmology.[11]

My main problem is not with most of the wider and more general assumptions underlying this book, but with much of its declared method and its practical execution. The method is stated mainly on pp. 37-9; 83; 178-9; 209-10; and 247-9. Much of what is said there is neither very new or very promising. One should emphasize 'the influence of *thinkers* on each other' rather than the 'connections between *texts*'

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10 I have given some details in an article, based on a lecture in a non-Classical symposium: 'Images of Plato in Late Antiquity' in Sabetai Unguru (ed.), *Physics, Cosmology and Astronomy, 1300-1700: Tension and Accommodation* (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 126), Dordrecht/Boston/London 1991, pp. 3-18.

11 In any case, the borrowing of concepts from an earlier tradition may not always be very instructive concerning their place and significance for the borrowers. Spinoza's Attributes may well have originated, as a concept, in the various προσηγορίαι of the one Stoic god — but this would not help us much in assessing their function in Spinoza's cosmos.

(37; italics in the original). But how are we to learn of the influence of ancient thinkers, or of their ideas, if not through our only means of communicating with them: a painstaking analysis of their texts (an analysis which is, indeed, not infrequently conducted in this book)? The 'assimilation of ideas' even from sources one is hostile to (83) is a common phenomenon in the history of philosophy. The fashionable concept 'discourse' (247-9) is probably no more and no less ambiguous and misleading than the Greek λόγος. To call scholars who have worked on *Quellenforschung* 'modern doxographers' (e.g. 37-9; 210) is to ignore the profound difference between the two preoccupations. The average ancient doxographer is not all that interested in the history of ideas: his task is to provide his readers, under general headings and as painlessly as possible, with the views (δόξαι, ἀρέσκοντα) of various philosophers and schools of thought on the 'great philosophical issues'. The modern source-critic is a philologist and historian, trying to establish, through a minute study and comparison of early sources, exactly that "influence of *thinkers* on each other" which the author seeks to discover. That a lot of rough and ready *Quellenforschung,* carried out too hastily in the nineteenth century, has given this discipline something of a 'bad press' is no reason to discard this central philological discipline, or to place Bernays, Hirzel, Diels, Wilamowitz, Blass, von Arnim, Kidd and Mansfeld — to name but a few — in the same category as Aetius and the *Vetusta Placita.*

In fact, some of the better parts of this book are good precisely because they practise good old *Quellenforschung.* So is the chapter on Posidonius, relying heavily on the meticulous work done by Edelstein and Kidd (but, for some reason, totally ignoring Theiler); or the "Interlude" on Antiochus, refreshing in its acceptance of the ancient verdict concerning his Stoicism in matters of physics and dialectic.[12] Some brief individual discussions are also convincing — e.g. on Philo's "discourse" (140-1; 145; 147; 155), or on Stoic σῶμα (194-5 and n. 83). But where the new method is followed, chaos often results. The discussion of καθ' ὁρμήν in a passage of Galen (177-81) is an example. A number of scholars have pointed out that, by the time of Galen, ὁρμή, which was probably first made into a strictly technical term by the early Stoics, had become commonplace: Galen, therefore, does not necessarily employ it in its Stoic sense. The author writes (178): "This assumes that terminology can be divorced from the larger framework in which it originally belonged, without the original meaning having any effect on the new context. It seems quite without foundation to posit that certain concepts in this later period have become commonplace and that therefore they may be divorced from their philosophical origin". I do not know from which general theory of discourse this argument is derived. Such an argument might, perhaps, apply to terms which were either newly coined by the Stoics, such as προηγμένα or ἰδίως ποιός, or to older — but still not very common — words which became central to Stoic terminology, such as εἱμαρμένη or κατάληψις.

12 This is especially important as an antidote to a recent book, Ludwig Fladerer, *Antiochos von Askalon, Hellenist und Humanist* Graz/Horn/Vienna 1996, in which the author attempts to reduce to the bare minimum (and sometimes even below the bare minimum) the Stoic elements in Antiochus' thought, and to interpret as much of it as possible as being of Academic and Peripatetic provenance.

But ὁρμή is in no way like these words. It is a common Greek word, attested in all types of literature from Homer onwards. Even LSJ can direct us to Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 566, where we have exactly Galen's expression : οὕτω καθ' ὁρμὴν δρῶσιν. One only has to look up ὁρμή in Cicero's philosophical works and in *SVF* 3. 169-77, to see that, by the first century BCE, this word had, in philosophical contexts, many different meanings — most of which, by the way, are far from that of "voluntary action", the translation which the author adopts in that passage of Galen.[13]

Most of the discussions in this book — as is often the case these days with many dissertations and monographs — take their cue from the most recent and 'up-to-date' secondary literature. This does not always leave much room for the close and meticulous examination of the ancient texts in their full contexts.[14] Two examples will suffice.

On p. 56, n. 47, and on p. 196, the author interprets 'Varro's' words at Cicero's *Academicus Primus* 24, *sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam nominabant* as "... with body and quality on a par ..." (56) or "note that body and quality are on the same level" (196). Had she studied the materials assembled by Reid in his notes on *corpus* and *qualitatem* on pp. 125-6 of his edition (which is in the bibliography, p. 251), she would have been alerted to the Stoic ποιόν and to the confusion between it and ποιότης in some of our sources.[15] *SVF* 2.376-95 would have shown her that often in our Stoic sources ποιά or ποιότητες are equated with σώματα. But of course, we are not speaking here of qual*ities*, but of qual*ified* (material) τινά.

The discussion of bodies (in this particular case, τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον) penetrating each other (57; 130) could have benefited from a study of *SVF* 2.463-81, a section called by von Arnim σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖ. (In our particular issue, this is κρᾶσις διόλου). On p. 57, n. 49, the author mentions that "the problem [of two bodies occupying the same space at the same time] is hinted at in *SVF* 2.310". That passage — like many passages in the *mixtio* section — is taken from Alexander's *De Mixtione*, most of which is an attack on the Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις in its various aspects. Alexander does not *hint* at the problem of two bodies occupying the same space at the same time, nor would he have regarded that basic position in itself as an objection to the Stoic doctrine of space. After all, Alexander is our source for most of

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13 I doubt if even in this passage of Galen, cited on p. 176 (Greek in note 27 there), καθ' ὁρμήν should be translated (*pace* Larrain) as "voluntary action". This is, in any case, not the main Stoic sense of ὁρμή since Chrysippus; and Cicero tends to translate this word, in Stoic as well as other contexts, as *impetus* or *impulsus*.

14 The tendency to call passages from extant works 'fragments' (see n. 3 above) may well derive from the growing habit of reading passages as they are cited and discussed in works of secondary literature, without always bothering to check the full context in which they appear.

15 Probably aided and abetted by the need to translate into Latin. In Greek, one can have τὸ ποιόν and ποιόν τι, which the Stoic would call ἰδίως ποιόν. Latin has no article, and even *quale quoddam* would sound peculiar. One way out is to use the noun.

what we know of this Stoic position. On pp. 216-18 Bruns (and indeed, throughout what is extant of *De Mixtione*), he offers far more subtle and analytical arguments against the Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις. Some of these arguments are even reminiscent in their structure of Zeno of Elea's arguments against motion.

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Lynette G. Mitchell and P.J. Rhodes (eds.), *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece*, London: Routledge, 1997. xiii + 232 pp. £45. ISBN 0 415 14752 2.

The *polis* is one of those phenomena so characteristically Greek: one may identify it all over the Archaic and Classical Mediterranean, and yet no detailed definition may apply fully to more than one singular case. Thinking in terms of *Idealtypen* (as Moses Finley urged us to do) and then looking for idiosyncrasies and peculiarities is sometimes helpful, yet runs the danger of diachronic simplification, overlooking regional differentiation and teleological thinking. How may one approach the issue? Victor Ehrenberg's seminal article, 'When did the *Polis* Rise?' (*JHS* 1937), placed the correct emphasis on terminology and chronological examination of the evidence, looking especially at expressions of political collectivity, such as the '*polis*' in the Dreros decree (600?). But this was only the first step: about a half century after its publication, when a group of scholars convened in Durham (1995) for the symposium that constituted the basis for this book, John K. Davies reminded us that we are now facing a wider spectrum than ever with regard to the question 'Where should we be looking?' There are new applications of archaeological evidence and new categories of thinking, such as the 'microstate' (his suggestion, but I can hardly think of an ancient Greek who would have welcomed it). We have all become aware of legitimating social, genealogical and political 'charters', with their attendant 'inventions' (although certain scholars, happily not represented in this volume, sometimes forget that traditions are not necessarily lies). Similarly, throughout the volume, we are consistently warned against Athens-based, fourth-century anachronisms (an age-old *Philologie* here). The major issue underlying our thinking remains that of a meaningful interrelationship between categories — social organization, property, fighting, magistracies, religion and cults, law-making and more — that created a 'convergence' (Davies' excellent point) that metamorphosed a *laos* into a political community, a *polis*.

Although published by Routledge, the volume is basically another instalment in the series published by the Copenhagen *Polis* Center (usually under the auspices of the Royal Danish Academy). The academic community owes a significant debt to the work of Mogens Herman Hansen, the director of the *Polis* Center, for his initiative to research, catalogue and assess ancient *poleis*. Having examined the inventory of places called *polis* in ancient sources, and having confronted these with various interpretative categories, his own contribution in this volume amounts to a claim that urbanism is almost *de rigueur* for the ancient *polis*. With all the evidence sifted through, with the difference between denotation and connotation clarified, the *polis*