office to a few citizens, mainly the affluent, suspension of all payments to public officials, and imposition of penalties for not attending meetings of the council. Its typical agenda included putting restraint on certain freedoms, particularly on the right to address the public at political gatherings (23-8).

With Plato, Ostwald's discussion enters a philosophical plane, albeit in a very concise manner, and without many references to secondary literature. In the schemes of three dialogues, Plato differentiates constitutions according to ideal principles (the degree to which they aspire to the 'real' good of the governed [*Republic*], or transgress the laws that realize the injunctions of the ideal expert ruler [*Statesman*]). Oligarchy is not held in high regard by Plato: it is either grouped alongside tyranny and (bad) democracy, and opposite the three constitutions which adhere to the laws — kingship, aristocracy, and (good) democracy (*Statesman*) — or it is placed at the lowest end of his list, following tyranny, kingship and democracy (*Laws*). It seems that Ostwald finds all these classifications rather idiosyncratic, and offering little consideration of real constitutions or systems of government (34-5).

Aristotle, however, is regarded not only as an individual thinker, but also as a person who exemplified what the Greeks thought about the rule of the few. According to Ostwald, Aristotle 'gave us the most coherent picture we have of what "oligarchy" meant to the Greeks' (12), presumably because he did not have recourse to any ideal or transcendental rule, but looked at actual governments (37). Aristotle's analysis of oligarchy is mainly scattered throughout his *Politics*. But Ostwald does not follow his line of argument. Assuming that Aristotle's discussion is consistent (41), he prefers another presentation, via the elucidation of several concepts, and the connections between them: citizenship and property (44-9), types of property (45-8), and its evaluation (50-2), the economic groups of the well-to-do (*euporoi*) and the indigent (*aporoi*) (53-9), their political status, and their relationship with the wealthy (*plousioi*) and the poor (*penetes*) (60-8), and oligarchy and the rule of law (70-1). The key passage in Aristotle's profound treatment envisages oligarchy as the rule of the wealthy, and only incidentally as the rule of the few (*Politics* 4.4 1290a30-b3). The possession of substantial (landed) property furnished the resources (*euporia*) to exercise active citizenship, in terms both of a qualification to vote and of eligibility to hold high office in oligarchies. Since the indigent were not provided with payment in order to enable them to participate in public affairs instead of worrying about their livelihood, authority rested in the hands of the affluent. Furthermore, Aristotle treats oligarchy as one of the constitutions that are governed in the interest of the rulers, in this case the well-to-do. Oligarchy, therefore, impresses one as a government by the wealthy and for the wealthy.

But the truly opulent will be the readers of this essay, thanks to the abundant wealth of information furnished by Ostwald, the richness of detail that he gives, his plentiful deep insights coupled with the original texts in Greek, and the many resources he provides for an understanding of the rule of the few.

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Mark Joyal, *The Platonic* Theages. *An Introduction, Commentary, and Critical Edition.* Philosophie der Antike 10. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000. 335 pp. ISBN 3 515 07230 6.

Joyal (henceforth = 'J.') has produced an admirably sound and sober edition of the pseudo-Platonic *Theages* which includes a detailed introduction (9-172), critical text, and commentary (195-294).

J. is convinced that BTW are the only primary witnesses for the *Theages*.[1] Because these mss. appear to change their affiliations from dialogue to dialogue (164), and sometimes even within a single dialogue (*RHT*, 1 n. 3), one cannot generalize from this to any other Platonic work. All three, he thinks, descend independently from a single 9th century minuscule supplied with variants and glosses (contrast D. Murphy, *CW* 95, 2001, 93f.). He also claims to have distinguished the various correcting hands of B: not only the corrections introduced by the scribe (John the Calligrapher) and those of a second contemporary hand (usually thought to be that of Arethas; 160 n. 3), but some later hands as well (*RHT*, 4-6), including the 10th-11th century hand (vet. b) noted by Allen. Unfortunately, J. has not stated the criteria by which these hands have been distinguished, though this question has been subject to controversy.[2] The text is based on a fresh collation of all the available evidence. All three primary witnesses, plus several others, were examined in their entirety both *in situ* and by photograph, while all of the other manuscript evidence known to J. was collated by photograph (*RHT*, 3 n. 12). Given the problems with Burnet's reporting — especially of W, where Burnet relied on the faulty and incomplete collations of Král — such efforts are valuable.[3] This statement of which manuscripts have been collated and how, thus relegated to a footnote in a supplementary paper, calls attention to a point of real importance. A great deal of effort has been expended over the past 15 years (and more) on the study of the manuscript tradition of the Platonic corpus. While some of these studies are excellent and have much intrinsic interest, the fact remains that they have added very little to a proper understanding and appreciation of Plato's thought. As Shorey said long ago, in reacting to the excesses of Wilamowitz, when it comes to Plato, textual criticism is a game that is played (though admittedly it *has* to be played) largely for its own sake.[4] Indeed, it is highly unlikely that many entirely new readings will be found, and those variants which we *do* possess cannot, in any event, be evaluated mechanically since the tradition as we have it is certainly contaminated and the archetypes themselves were probably supplied in most cases with scholia, glosses, variants, and the like.[5] But what is of

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1 M. Joyal, 'The Textual Tradition of [Plato], *Theages*', *RHT* 28, 1998, 1-54 is supplementary and should be consulted together with the relevant section (159-72) of J.'s book. For what follows, see W.A. Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica* (Baltimore, 1896), 53-6; J. Souilhé, *Platon. Oeuvres complètes.* T. 13.2, Dialogues suspects (Paris, 1930), 129-60.

2 Cp. A. Carlini, *Studi sulla tradizione antica e medievale del Fedone* (Roma, 1972), 153 n. 7; L. Tarán, *Gnomon* 48, 1976, 767f. (= *Leonardo Tarán, Collected Papers [1962-1999]* [Leiden, 2001], 289); D. Murphy, 'The Manuscripts of Plato's *Charmides*', *Mnem.* 43, 1990, 317f.; C. Brockmann, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Platons Symposium* (Wiesbaden, 1992), 42; E.A. Duke — W.W. Hicken, et al., *Platonis Opera*, T.I (Oxford, 1995), xi n. 17; S. Martinelli Tempesta, *La tradizione testuale del Liside di Platone* (Firenze, 1997), 8f.

3 For Burnet's reporting of W (which he never collated or even saw), see H. Klos — L. Minio-Paluello, 'The Text of the *Phaedo* in W and in Henricus Aristippus' Translation', *CQ* 43, 1949, 126f.; R.S. Bluck, *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge, 1964), 133 n. 1; cp. M. Menchelli, 'Collazione dell' *Ippia Maggiore*', in *Studi su codici e papiri filosofici. Platone, Aristotele, Ierocles* (Firenze, 1992), 96 n. 3; Martinelli Tempesta, 132 n. 51. The poor quality of Král's collations of F (bemoaned by Dodds and others) has recently been confirmed by S. Tsitsiridis, *Platons Menexenus* (Stuttgart und Leipzig, 1998), 93 n. 181.

4 P. Shorey, *Plato. The Republic* (Cambridge, 1935-1937; rev. ed.), I: xlvf.; also rev. Robin, *CP* 21, 1926, 265 (= *Selected Papers*, ed. L. Tarán [New York, 1980], I: 465).

5 Even papyrological finds, often indispensable for the study of other authors and other genres (not least for their ability to 'confirm' the conjectures of later scholars; see, e.g., G.J. De Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* [Amsterdam, 1969], ad 245C5 ἀεικίνητον / αὐτοκίνητον; also 251A5-6), will have a somewhat more limited value for the study of Plato, since the papyri undoubtedly preserve an inferior and more popular text as compared with that of the medieval manuscripts, which latter far better reflect the Academic school tradition: see De Vries' notes *passim*, and Tarán, 764ff. (= *Coll. Pap.*, 284-7); also J. Irigoin, *Tradition et critique des texts grecs* (Paris, 1997), 73f. [orig. 1971-1972]; S.R. Slings, 'Remarks on Some Recent Papyri of the *Politeia*', *Mnem.* 40, 1987, 31f.; Martinelli Tempesta, 248f.,

permanent value — because it is still lacking in so many cases — and what later generations will appreciate most, are sound and thorough collations of all the existing manuscripts, especially of those primary witnesses of which we are certain.

The question of *spuria* is an important one, and there can be no doubt that judgments tend to be made on purely subjective grounds (see Shorey, *Sel. Pap.*, II: 267). Heidel complained about the dialogue's 'eclectic character' (53), its clumsy handling of quotations ([*Thg.*] 127E-128A —> *Apol.* 19E2-20A2; J. 37 n. 63) and of other Platonic or pseudo-Platonic material (*Theaetetus*: Souilhé, 140f.; J. 82ff.; [*Alc. I*]: J. 154f., 225f.). Certainly, purely linguistic considerations, as J. rightly notes, are of limited value for determining the authenticity of a dialogue whose Greek is actually quite elegant (cp. Souilhé, 141: 'Le style est bien attique et imite assez heureusement celui de Platon'; J.'s defense against Shorey of the opening sentence [121A1-3], however, is forced: it is a peculiar feature of this otherwise excellent book that the author more than once [15 n. 17, 27, 115f.] indulges in a surmise regarding Demodocus' interior state of mind). But the dialogue's claim that Socratic education proceeds best by means of physical contact, a notion condemned in the *Symposium* (cp. [*Thg.*] 129E-130E, esp. C7-E4, with *Symp.* 175CE; J. 92-6, 289 ad D5-E4), is thoroughly unplatonic, as is also the treatment of τὸ δαιμόνιον which occupies so prominent a place in the architecture of the dialogue (see Souilhé, 130-7, which is still valuable; also J. 65-103, 128-30). In the *Theages*, the Socratic δαιμόνιον (though apotropaic) predicts the future, directs the activities of others apart from Socrates, and reduces Socrates to the role of a mere intermediary — features commonly associated with Xenophon's δαιμώνιον, but which J. (100) would himself refer to a common source. But the decisive feature for J. (82ff., 130) is the dialogue's misinterpretation of the μαιευτική of the *Theaetetus* and its unplatonic identification of τὸ δαιμόνιον with ὁ θεός which (J. believes) turns Plato's vaguely undefined and often ironical (67 n. 7) δαιμόνιον into the personal daemon of traditional piety, and which thus anticipates, and is actually formative of Middle Platonic demonology (102f.). It is not simply a question, then, of a few unplatonic elements scattered about here and there; rather, the whole conception of the δαιμόνιον is unplatonic (99ff.). And this is more than enough to condemn the dialogue as spurious.

J. places the dialogue firmly within the opening years of the Old Academy. Noting the absence of Stoic and other hellenistic material (139ff.), J. thinks that the dialogue's preoccupation with demonology points in the general direction of Xenocrates (141-4), while certain literary peculiarities (such as the heavy use of biographical anecdote; see Souilhé, 134ff.; J. 264f.; also Pease ad Cic. *de Div.* I.54 [I: 316f.]) points to the post-platonic dialogue and to the likes of Heraclides Ponticus (144-7, with n. 52). Then, rejecting any possible allusion to the career of Alexander (147-50), J. dates the *Theages* to c. 345-335 (at the latest; 154f.). Many will no doubt suspect that this is still too early.

Far more problematic is the intricate and lengthy discussion of the unity and purpose of the dialogue (9-63). J. claims that a preoccupation with questions of authenticity has prevented scholars from appreciating the quality of the work itself. Although the author uses Platonic and other material, the *Theages* is hardly a cento, and it is not sufficient simply to list the *topoi*; one must evaluate why these *topoi* have been used and how they are woven into a conceptual or literary whole. This is sound advice, but it must be said that the specifics of J.'s argument — while often ingenious, and always learned — are sometimes forced. The dialogue falls into two unequal parts (121A1-128C8 and 128D1-131A10). But this division, and the sudden, seemingly abrupt introduction of Socrates' appeal to the erotic arts (128B1-6), are not signs of faulty composition. Rather, 128B stands as the carefully prepared transition (see 125D10-E3, where τὰ τυραννικά, used in connection with Kallikrate, is taken [30f.] as a reference to *erotic* tyranny) between these

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with n. 172; for specifics regarding the Platonic papyri, one may now consult the relevant sections of the *Corpus dei papyri filosofici greci e latini* (CPF) I.1 (Firenze, 1999).

two unequal parts. While the opening section of the dialogue shows that neither sophists nor politicians can render Theages σοφός, the final section gives as an alternative Socratic συνουσία, which — working not with dialectic, but simply by proximity and contact — can at least *improve* him (i.e., make him ὡς βέλτιστος). This is accomplished, as we saw, largely through the operations of τὸ δαιμόνιον, which works independently of Socrates' will and which (as in the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines [fr. 11 Dittmar; J. 42f.]) is closely connected or even identical (97n.80) with *Eros*. As such, Socrates (in contrast with his sophistic rivals, who accomplish nothing) is the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνήρ (11) 'concerned for the welfare of his young associate[s]' (cp. *Phdr.* 248D3f. and 249A1-2 ἡ [sc. ψυχὴ] τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας, not cited by J.). In other words, the dialogue is not really 'about' the divine sign in any strict sense at all; it is primarily concerned with education.

Despite the criticisms offered above, this is certainly an important book and will be of enormous interest to students of Plato, regardless of their views on *Theages*. The commentary in particular contains an astonishing wealth of valuable material on various Platonic idioms. If J.'s edition thus offers any hint of the future of Platonic studies (especially in the English-speaking world), then students of the dialogues can count themselves quite fortunate indeed.

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Vanessa B. Gorman, *Miletos, the Ornament of Ionia. A History of the City to 400 B.C.E.* Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001. viii + 304 pp., 7 maps. ISBN 0 472 11199X.

The rise and fall of a great city of the Classical world remains a fascinating topic — in spite of the warning by the late Sir Moses Finley that any attempt to write what I might call A Tale of One City — that is, a self-contained history of an *individual* ancient town — is bound to lead into a '*cul-de-sac*, given the limits of the available (and potential) documentation'. Finley passed a harsh verdict on what he described as the 'spate of pseudo-histories of ancient cities and regions' and their 'anachronistic antiquarianism' which necessarily created nothing but 'a morass of unintelligible, meaningless, unrelated "facts"'. As a consequence of their 'lack of conceptual focus or scheme' and their 'descriptive and positivistic' approach, which Finley called the 'tell-all-you-know technique', just 'everything known about the place under examination' would appear 'to have equal claim — architecture, religion and philosophy, trade and coinage, administration and "international relations"'.[1]

Despite Finley's equally eloquent advocacy of a systematic and comparative study of 'ancient urbanism', that is the 'closely interlocked town-country unit of the city(-state)' as the 'pivotal' institution of the Graeco-Roman world,[2] his warning was rejected as grossly overstated or simply ignored — and the book under review here is no exception. In fact, many studies of individual cities and regions of the ancient Mediterranean published in the 1990s do have some sort of

1 M.I. Finley, 'The Ancient City' (1977), in *idem*, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, ed. by B.D. Shaw, R. Saller, London 1981, 3-23, at p. 20; *idem*, *Ancient History. Evidence and Models*, London 1985, 61ff., esp. 61, 63, 65 and 108.

2 The present state of the discussion is now fully documented in *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures*, ed. by M.H. Hansen, Copenhagen 2000. Interdisciplinary approaches were also (successfully) put to the test in *City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, ed. by A. Molho, K. Raaflaub, J. Emlen, Stuttgart 1991; *The Archaeology of City-States. Cross-Cultural Approaches*, ed. by D.L. Nichols, Th.H. Charlton, Washington etc. 1997.