

consideration certain themes or aspects of history *in* that may help to achieve that goal? An obvious example is the Roman Empire, under which the Mediterranean was for the only time unified and formed an entity in many ways. It may well be profitable to test systematically the applicability, and hence degree of validity, of a large number of this book's assumptions, notions and ideas concerning unity, connectivity and continuity to the Roman Empire, which admittedly extended far beyond the littoral countries of the Mediterranean but whose core was almost always identified with or considered embedded in the *mare nostrum* and its immediately adjacent regions.

My second comment has to do with the Holy Land, the Land of the Bible, the Land of Israel, Judaea, Syria-Palaestina, Regnum Hierosolymitanum, Palestine, Israel, or whatever other term has ever been used, or one may wish to employ, to refer to that not easily definable region. In the present volume it is conspicuous by its almost total absence, and on the three occasions when it does appear, under the names Holy Land and Palestine (pp. 77, 139, 187), it is not once mentioned for its own sake; this holds true for Jerusalem as well (pp. 353, 458). H & P are familiar with Y. Shavit, 'The Mediterranean World and "Mediterraneanism": The Origins, Meaning, and Application of a Geo-Cultural Notion in Israel', *MHR* 3 (1988), pp. 96-117; although they regard it as an important and interesting paper, they merely state the extent of their agreement and disagreement with his notions (p. 530), and never bring up Israel in their discussions. No mention at all is made of the Holy Land, or Jerusalem for that matter, in the account of pilgrimage, which is strange in view of the considerable importance of the religious, political and economic aspects of the massive movements of Jews, Christians and Muslims into the Holy Land over the last two millennia. This omission is also puzzling because Palestine is one of the rare examples of a small country that connects two continents, and probably the only one where such ecologically different microregions coexist in close proximity. Various other reasons could be enumerated why this Mediterranean country is significantly relevant for the problems tackled in *The Corrupting Sea*, but it is to be hoped that this omission will be rectified in Volume II, to whose publication so many readers will be looking forward with eagerness.

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Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland*. Historia Einzelschriften, Heft 131. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999. 343 pp. ISBN 3-515-06928-3.

The tiny communities that made up Dark Age Greece had no laws, legislative authorities or enforcement agencies. This did not, however, mean that they existed in a condition of complete disorder or anarchy. Some degree of order and regularity was ensured by *themis*, a term loosely translatable as custom, tradition, mores, folk-ways, mutually understood rules, or simply 'the proper procedure'. *Themis* applied to a wide spectrum of behaviour, marking out conduct deemed just and proper from conduct deemed unjust and improper. Despite being largely implicit, unarticulated and essentially unenforceable, *themis* was, in Finley's words, 'as binding upon the individual as the most rigid statutory law of later days'.¹

During the 7th and 6th centuries BCE an extraordinary evolution took place: the development of *nomos*, which intruded upon *themis* and overrode some of its primeval powers. This law, which was to lie at the heart of civic existence, had three features that were normally absent from *themis*: it was recorded in written form (making it explicit and to some extent immutable), it was made public (and was thus easily accessible), and it was enforceable (so that anyone who disobeyed it risked incurring clear-cut, pre-defined sanctions, inflicted by formally appointed community

¹ M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, Harmondsworth 1978.

agencies). The upshot was that the members of the *polis* (*politai*) found themselves controlled by a regime consisting of restraints that were stricter than any previously imposed upon any social type. Classical authors had no doubt that this amounted to a veritable revolution in mores. Plato and Aristotle postulated a connection between the quality of a state and that of its laws, good laws making a state moral and *vice versa*.² Demosthenes assumed a correlation between the degree of humanity of one's behaviour and the law's restraining influence (25.20).

Credit for the initiation of these salutary developments was normally given to a few outstanding individuals who were entrusted with the uneasy task of conflict resolution during the seventh and sixth centuries BCE. Designated as arbitrators, conciliators or mediators (imprecise renditions of the Greek *diallaktai*, *katartisteres*, and *aisymnetai*), and invested with special powers, men of the stamp of Androdamos, Charondas, Demonax, Pittacus, Pheidon, Philolaus and Zaleucus³ enjoyed enormous prestige both in their lifetimes and in the hundreds of years to come. Looking back from an age when the saying 'the law is the king of all' rolled off everyone's tongue, classical writers tended to credit them not only with accomplishing the difficult tasks to which they had been elected, but also with promulgating rational law codes whose three complementary aspects embraced almost all departments of life and became the foundation of the entire civic order: the consolidation of state power (at the expense of pre-*polis* self-help), the regulation of relationships between citizens (in domains such as inheritance, marriage and landholding), and the checking of aristocratic extravagance. Hand in hand with that assumption went a perception of these extraordinary office-holders as lawgivers (*nomothetai*), pioneers of legal theory and sages of outstanding originality and foresight. The question that Hölkeskamp (H.) sets out to answer in this book is whether or not this view, adopted almost without question by modern scholars, is warranted.

In this lucid, carefully researched and systematic study, H. argues convincingly that it is not. He does so by applying a novel research strategy. The traditional image of these lawgivers' activities was arrived at by combining direct scrutiny of known seventh- and sixth-century laws with examination of their image as filtered through the perception and experience of classical writers. It would now appear that this was a self-serving method that ended up confirming what it set out to reveal. H. proposes that these two types of evidence should instead be compared critically, checking classical views about archaic arbitration and mediation against the direct evidence on this subject that has come down from the archaic period itself (or against classical-age evidence freed as far as possible from later idealisation).

The picture that emerges from this way of looking at the evidence, already known in outline from a succession of articles published by H. over the last decade, reveals a considerable discrepancy between what classical authors believed was going on in seventh- and sixth-century Greece with respect to arbitration/law-giving and what actually happened. H.'s long Chapter III, in which he assembles and analyses the relevant epigraphical and literary sources from 53 Greek communities (from Argos to Zancle, Athens and Sparta being excluded), leaves little doubt that the arbitrators/lawgivers of these smaller communities aimed not so much at the promulgation of rational law codes intended to embrace every single department of life as at the solution of specific (and as a rule new) problems that arose as their communities moved slowly on the tortuous route from pre-statehood to statehood. This finding sheds an interesting light both on the character of these archaic arbitrators/lawgivers and on the issue of norm control in the fully fledged city-state.

The former appear to have been not so much abstract theorists groping towards formulae for the establishment of ideal states in the future as practical-minded social reformers whose instinctive choices of short-term solutions resulted incidentally in long-term benefits. With regard to norm control, H.'s findings may suggest that even in the classical city-state fewer areas of life

² This issue is discussed in Chapter II of the book under review.

³ It should be noted that some were active in communities other than their own.

were subject to legal restraint than is normally assumed, and that consequently the 'unwritten laws' had a more important part in regulating behaviour than is generally thought. This, however, remains to be established, requiring careful research to map out the fields of activity that were subject to legislation and those that were not. In the areas of archaic arbitration, law-giving and codification, H.'s own book will remain a necessary starting point for many years to come.

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L. Giuliani, *Bild und Mythos. Geschichte der Bilderzählung in der griechischen Kunst*. Munich: Beck, 2003. 367 pp. ISBN 3-406-50999-1.

Ever since Lessing's *Laokoon* of 1766, German scholars have pioneered discussion of the relationship between art and text. Carl Robert's *Bild und Lied* of 1881 established the terms of modern debate. Luca Giuliani's book echoes Robert's title and stands firmly on his foundation. In the face of a slew of works from the United States, in particular Mark Stansbury-O'Donnell's *Pictorial Narrative in Ancient Greek Art* (Cambridge, 1999) and Jocelyn Penny Small's *The Parallel Worlds of Classical Art and Text* (Cambridge, 2003), G. puts German scholarship back at the centre of the argument. All future study of the subject will have to begin from the pleasures of his text.

Three clear virtues set G.'s book apart. First, it sets the discussion of scenes related to myth in Greek art into the wider context of discussion of the relationship between art and text; that is, it goes back to Lessing's issues and not merely to Robert's, and it registers where recent art theory (e.g. the work of W.J.T. Mitchell) has left those issues. Second, it has both methodological and substantive theses to argue. G. insists that pictures may relate to stories as a whole, not illustrate the words of a particular textual instantiation of a story. And G. makes the case, already canvassed by him in a number of articles (in particular in *SCI* 20 [2001] 17-38), for a marked change from relating to stories to relating to texts occurring at the end of the fourth century. Third, G. takes seriously the importance of other images in shaping an artist's choice of presentation and, in the way that François Lissarrague, above all, has taught us to do, reads images in series.

G. writes for the general reader (and it is very much to be hoped that his work will be translated and made available to the anglophone general reader). In consequence the polemical edge of the book is buried (and takes some excavation, even from the book's footnotes). I detect two main targets for G.'s fire. G.'s chief enemy is the hyper-literalist, for whom the presence in an image related to some myth of details discrepant with a particular textual instantiation of that myth means that the image cannot be related to that text. G. delivers a powerful response here to Snodgrass's *Homer and the Artists. Text and Picture in Early Greek Art*, demolishing in advance Small's *Parallel Worlds* which appeared at the same time as his own book. But if G. is opposed to the minimalism which results from thinking that texts are merely the sum of the words that they use, he also has his sights on those who would impose a mythological identity on figures in a scene simply because those figures are compatible with a myth. G. both wants to insist that the use in an image of names different from those that appear in a text does not mean that the image has no relationship to that text, and to insist that where no names are given, particular names should not be too readily imposed (so G. takes a line on geometric figure scenes very different from that taken by G. Ahlberg-Cornell's *Myth and Epos in Early Greek Art. Representation and Interpretation* [Jonsered 1992], and a line on the identification of the figures involved when one heavily armed soldier carries a dead comrade off the battlefield which will surprise those who happily read Aias and Achilles there).

The six central chapters trace issues of the representation of myth from the eighth to the second century B.C. They are framed by preface, introductory chapter and conclusion. The preface