

War and State-Building in Roman Republican Times

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Ancient authors handed down to us the history of the Roman republic as a record of uninterrupted warfare. According to these sources most of the wars recorded were fought inside the territory of the various enemies. Very often, the wars led to the subjection and/or the annexation of rival cities or tribes. Consequently, many modern students saw a penchant for war and aggressive behavior as a peculiar trait of the Roman republic and its institutions. The concept of imperialism was often used to characterize the overall tendency of the republic's policies. Without claiming that the 'imperialistic interpretation' of Roman republican politics is fundamentally wrong, we propose to offer a heuristic framework that in our view is more fruitful for the understanding of Roman expansionism. Rejecting the idea that the republic's aggressive behavior was, by comparison with most other states, in any way peculiar except for its very success (which was indeed extraordinary), we propose to interpret Roman expansionism and the organizing of the vanquished peoples into a commonwealth as a rather typical *state-building process*.

In Section 1 we present some historical data that serve to underline the high intensity of warfare in republican times. In Section 2 we state our doubts regarding the usefulness of the concept of 'imperialism' in dealing with Roman expansionism mainly of the mid-republican era. We give an outline of the characteristic elements of common state-building processes in Section 3. It is our aim to lay out the main forces at work when small or proto-states (which have no advanced institutional apparatus at their disposal) develop into full-grown states which are equipped with an organizational apparatus destined to bind together a huge society which transcends by far the level of personal interaction. We should like to stress that although state-building processes have (of course) taken many different forms in different areas or ages, we are not concerned here with those differences but with the characteristics which most of these processes have in common and may therefore be described as their abstract substance. In the following paragraphs we turn back to Roman Italy, examining how the state-building process in the case of the Roman republic materialized. Three aspects that in our opinion deserve special attention will be treated in Sections 4-6. In Section 4 we deal with the role of the Roman forces (citizen as well as allied) as producers of the centripetal effects that brought about Italian unification. Section 5 is focused on the interrelationship of coercion and extraction. In Section 6 we discuss the zoning of the Roman sphere of power. Although we are mainly concerned with the state-building process inside Italy, we will deal with certain aspects of the Roman subjection of non-Italian cities and tribes as well, because expansion was an ongoing process and because the resources extracted in the provincial periphery had a deep impact on the Italian state-building process.

The aim of this article, therefore, is a reevaluation of Roman military aggressiveness in republican times. Although this reevaluation we hope will have consequences for our

understanding of various fields of Roman republican history, we will not be able to trace all of them in this article. Needless to say, it not our purpose to rewrite the history of the Roman republic. The development of political institutions, the details of political decision-making, the religious and ideological foundations of Roman politics, etc., will not be dealt with in this paper. Although all of these structures and phenomena are certainly related to Roman expansionism, in our view it is only within the general framework of Roman political development, which we are about to set out, that the variously correlated institutional fields just mentioned contributed to the aggressive behavior of the republic. As these contributions have been dealt with amply and admirably by students of republican history we shall not focus on these topics in this paper.

1. Rome at War

Whenever Rome enjoyed complete peace, the gates of the temple of Ianus were closed. In republican Rome this happened only once,¹ reportedly in the consulship of T. Manlius Torquatus and C. Atilius Bulbus (235 B.C.).² A few months later, the republic was at war again and the gates of the temple were reopened.³ During the Second Punic War, Rome fielded regularly more than ten legions, and more than fifteen, at times up to 23, after 215 B.C. But even after the heyday of that struggle for supremacy in the western Mediterranean, up to the end of the Third Macedonian War, more than eight legions saw active duty every year; until the end of the century, in times better known for inner unrest and political divisions than for major wars against external enemies, an average of six legions were still fielded each year.⁴ The relentless warfare in various theaters put a heavy strain on that part of the Roman population that was liable for service.⁵ The numbers of conscripts were bound to go up in the decades to come, as civil wars broke out and ambitious generals pushed for conquest on a hitherto unknown scale. It is impossible to establish with certainty how long an average Roman citizen served in the army. The figure of 16 (?) years in service given by Polybius,⁶ though there are examples of even longer service, may represent an ideal or a legal norm that was hardly ever fulfilled in reality.⁷ Arnold Toynbee compiled the evidence for the years of the Hannibalic war; he came to the conclusion that six to seven years of active duty might have been an

¹ Cf. *RGDA* 2, 42. The second closing mentioned there seems to belong to the reign of Numa Pompilius (Plut. *Num.* 20, 2).

² Liv. 1, 19, 2; Vell. 1, 38, 3; Varro *L.L.* 5, 165.

³ Zon. 8, 18; *Act. Triumph.* 76f. (Degrassi).

⁴ Cf. P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, Oxford, 1971, especially 404.

⁵ Liv. *Per.* 48, 54f.; Pol. 35, 4, 1-9; App. *Lib.* 273ff.; 334ff.; 363ff.

⁶ Pol. 6, 19, 2. See F. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, Oxford, 1957, I 698, on the figure of 16 years which cannot be read in the manuscripts with certainty but seems to be the most likely emendation.

⁷ The well-known Sp. Ligustinus may serve as an example: Liv. 42, 34, 6ff.; Sall. *ad Caes.* 1, 8, 6 speaks of thirty years of service some unlucky soldiers had to endure. See Brunt (n. 4), 395; 399ff.; N. Rosenstein, 'Marriage and Manpower in the Hannibalic War: *Assidui, Proletarii* and Livy 24, 18, 7-8', *Historia* 51, 2002, 163ff. for further material and some plausible hypotheses.

approximate average.⁸ Whatever the truth in this matter, the ordinary propertied citizen spent a substantial time of his adult life in the army. While *proletarii* usually⁹ did not serve in the heavy armed infantry, they certainly saw duty as well.¹⁰ The percentage of men active in the fighting forces was higher than in other pre-industrial political systems¹¹ and Romans probably served for longer periods of time.¹²

While war played an important role in the life of every ordinary Roman, it was of even greater importance for the members of the Roman élite. The one major qualification that every member of the top inner circle of the Roman aristocracy needed to display was the capacity to command troops in the field. Purely civil achievements could not promote a member of the social élite to the consulship before the first century B.C. and even then such a career as Cicero's was a clear exception to the rule. Most of the consuls who are more than mere names to us owe their fame to their military record. Triumphs,¹³ buildings erected from the spoils of war,¹⁴ or coin inscriptions referring to victories¹⁵ are indicators of the warlike attitude of the Roman power élite in republican times.¹⁶

⁸ *Hannibal's Legacy*, London, 1965, II 79. Cf. Brunt (n. 4), 400f.

⁹ For exceptions to the rule cf. Cato, *ORF*² 158 no. 152; Gell. 16, 10, 1; Cassius Hemina, *HRR* 21 (= H. Beck/U. Walter, *Die frühen römischen Historiker I. Von Fabius Pictor bis Cn. Gellius* [Texte zur Forschung 76], Darmstadt 2001, 24, 267); Oros. 4, 1, 3; Aug. *CD* 3, 17; Liv. 8, 20, 4; 10, 21, 4; 22, 11, 8; 27, 38; 28, 10, 11; Per. 74 (mentioning the service of freedmen); cf. 23, 14, 3f.

¹⁰ Pol. 6, 19, 3; Cato, *ORF*² 77 no. 190; Liv. 22, 11, 8; 26, 2, 15; 40, 18, 7; 42, 27, 3; 43, 12, 9; cf. 32, 23, 9.

¹¹ As has been noticed in a recent study on warfare in medieval Europe, the average inhabitant of Europe in the Late Middle Ages, despite internal strife, revolts and outright warfare, still thought of peace as the normal state of affairs: N. Ohler, 'Krieg und Frieden am Ausgang des Mittelalters', in H. Duchhardt / P. Veit (eds.), *Krieg und Frieden im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit. Theorie-Praxis-Bilder* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz; Abteilung für Universalgeschichte; Beihefte 52), Mainz 2000, 1ff. The thesis of M. Kostial, *Kriegerisches Rom? Zur Frage von Unvermeidbarkeit und Normalität militärischer Konflikte in der römischen Politik*, Stuttgart, 1995, who advances a view similar to that of Ohler, remains in our opinion unproven and completely unconvincing.

¹² See for example K. Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves. Sociological Studies in Roman History*, Cambridge, 1978, 11; 31.

¹³ C. Auliard, *Victoires et triomphes à Rome. Droit et réalité sous la république*, Paris, 2001.

¹⁴ C. Ampolo, 'Aspetti dello sviluppo economico agli inizi della repubblica romana', in W. Eder (ed.), *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Politik*, Akten eines Symposions Berlin 1988, Stuttgart, 1990, 482ff.; M. Aberson, *Temples votifs et butin de guerre dans la Rome républicaine*, Rome, 1994.

¹⁵ M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*, Cambridge, 1974, II 712ff.; 919, general index s.v. 'victory'.

¹⁶ On this topic see W.V. Harris, 'Roman Warfare in the Economical and Social Context of the Fourth Century B.C.', in W. Eder (ed.) (n. 14), 494ff.; 503ff.; Hopkins (n. 12), 27; J. Lendon, *Empire of Honour. The Art of Government in the Roman World*, Oxford 1997, 191; J. North, 'The Development of Roman Imperialism', *JRS* 71, 1981, 1ff.; B. Bleckmann, *Die römische Nobilität im ersten Punischen Krieg. Untersuchungen zur aristokratischen Konkurrenz in der Republik* (Klio Beihefte 5), Berlin, 2002, 77; K. Raaflaub, 'Born to Be Wolves? Origins of Roman Imperialism', in R.W. Wallace/E.M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to*

Constant warfare was endemic to most of the central European chiefdoms or political systems of the millennia before the arrival of Rome. What makes the Roman republic special is not its structural affinity to warfare or the high number of years it was involved in actual fighting — all of these traits are more or less typical for ancient city-states, Italian as well as Greek¹⁷ — but rather the success the Roman republic enjoyed in this field, as it conquered the whole of Italy and eventually the whole Mediterranean world (and much more than this world in the proper sense of the word in the principate). Starting from an area of 250 square kilometers or so around 450 B.C.,¹⁸ it controlled a territory of up to five million square kilometers at the time of Trajan.¹⁹ This success impressed ancient observers like Polybius and continues to attract the attention of students in the various historical disciplines.²⁰ But although all related topics have been the subject of long and vivid debates, there is no general agreement either on the inner dynamic of this continuous warfare nor on the degree of correspondence between structures and day-to-day political strategies. In spite of these uncertainties, the consensus about the proper *term*, namely ‘imperialism’, for the overall phenomenon seems to broaden.²¹ As has already been pointed out, military aggressiveness is hardly a phenomenon peculiar to the *res publica Romana*. To investigate it a comparative approach seems to be the method of choice. In every comparative study, the level of analysis has to be chosen with great care to avoid reductionist traps. In this paper we will present a hermeneutic framework which in our opinion Roman military aggressiveness and expansionism fits much better than those currently used in academic research.

2. The Roman Conquest of Italy: Terminological Problems

Roman expansion in Italy and the Mediterranean basin has been termed ‘imperialism’ by many scholars.²² Initially, the term and the concept did not even seem to deserve an

Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian, Norman et al., 1996, 273ff.; 278f.; K.-J. Hölkeskamp, *Die Entstehung der Nobilität. Studien zur sozialen und politischen Geschichte der römischen Republik im 4. Jh. v. Chr.*, Stuttgart, 1987, 208f.

¹⁷ K. Raaflaub, ‘Expansion und Machtbildung in frühen Polis-Systemen’, in W. Eder (ed.) (n. 14), 511ff.; 512ff.; id., ‘The Conflict of Orders in Archaic Rome: a Comparative and Comprehensive Approach’, in id. (ed.), *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, Berkeley et al., 1986, 29ff.; B. Bleckmann, ‘Rom und die Kampaner von Rhegion’, *Chiron* 29, 1999, 123ff.; 128.

¹⁸ A. Alföldi, *Early Rome and the Latins*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1963, 303.

¹⁹ F. Vittinghoff, ‘Gesellschaft’, in id. (ed.), *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte in der Römischen Kaiserzeit*, Stuttgart, 1990, I 161ff.; 163.

²⁰ See e.g. C.J. Rogers, ‘The Military Revolution in History and Historiography’, in id. (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Boulder, CO et al., 1995, 1ff.; 5; A. Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800*, New Haven, 1995.

²¹ Raaflaub (n. 16), 275.

²² See e.g. T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*, London et al., 1995, 364ff.; Raaflaub (n. 16), 275; L. Perelli, *Imperialismo, Capitalismo, e rivoluzione culturale nella prima metà del II secolo a.C.*, Torino, 1975, I; R.J. Rowland Jr., ‘Rome’s Earliest Imperialism’, *Latomus* 42, 1983, 749ff.; C. Nicolet, ‘L’impérialisme romain’, in id. (ed.), *Rome et la conquête du*

explanation or a definition. In his stimulating book on the subject, William V. Harris²³ declared: 'As to the word "imperialism", its use in this context should need no defence. It is current usage, and its meaning is reasonably clear. We can define it as a behavior by which a state takes and retains supreme power over other states or peoples or lands'.²⁴ As Harris has pointed out, whenever one war came to an end, the republic immediately started a new one. In Harris's view, the specific military constellation that led to the outbreak of one particular war, or the concrete political goals that the Roman power élites pursued in starting a particular war, were of secondary importance. What mattered was that war went on. Whereas that might seem acceptable to a majority of scholars — the factual base Harris has accumulated has hardly been disputed in the last two decades — the question of terminology in our opinion cannot be glossed over in the way Harris did. Expansionism there was. But is expansionism equivalent to imperialism? War can be considered a universal phenomenon in the history of humankind.²⁵ Military and political expansion is a corollary of military engagement on a state level. If, by definition, every political system which tries to expand at the costs of its neighbors is to be considered an imperialist state, almost every historical political system can be deemed imperialist.²⁶

monde méditerranéen, II: *genèse d'un empire*, Paris, 1978, 883ff.; D. Baronowski, 'The Roman Awareness of their Imperialism in the Second Century B.C.', in E. Hermon (ed.), *Gouvernants et gouvernés dans l'Imperium Romanum*, Quebec, 1991, 173ff.; J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate*, Rom, 1988. But cf. the thorough discussion in J.D. Mattingly (ed.), *Dialogues in Roman Imperialism. Power, Discourse, and Discrepant Experience in the Roman Empire* (JRA Suppl. Ser. 23), Portsmouth RI, 1997 and by J. Webster, 'Roman Imperialism and the "Post Imperial Age"', in ead./N.J. Cooper (eds.), *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives*, Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Leicester 1994 (Leicester Archaeology Monographs 3), Leicester, 1996, 1ff.

²³ W.V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 BC*, Oxford, 1979, repr. with add. 1991.

²⁴ Harris (n. 23), 5.

²⁵ A strong current in recent scholarship claims that pre-state societies engaged in warfare for various reasons, but not to gain political control over their neighbors. See e.g. S.A. Gregg, *Between Bands and States*, Carbondale, IL 1991; K. Otterbein, 'The Origins of War', *Critical Review* 2, 1997, 251ff. The rise of small chiefdoms, usually dominated by a male warrior élite, in central Europe has been attributed to the second millennium B.C. in recent years: S.J. Shennan, 'Central Europe in the Third Millennium B.C.: An Evolutionary Trajectory for the Beginning of the Bronze Age', *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 5, 1986, 115ff.; id., 'Settlement and Social Change in Central Europe, 3500–1500', *Journal of World Prehistory* 7, 1993, 121ff.; K. Kristiansen, *Europe Before History*, Cambridge, 1998. This means that, even if one goes along with the chronological framework set out above (and the definitions it implies), warfare resulting in expansion of the winning side in Central Europe still has a history of more than three thousand years.

²⁶ We would like to anticipate a possible objection to our own point of view offered in this paper. It is true that we, too, make use of a universally applicable terminology to describe ubiquitous phenomena. But, in the first place, it is exactly our aim to prove that the Roman state-building process was by no means an extraordinary development, whereas the 'imperialistic model' in fact seeks to single out imperialism as a peculiar trait of Roman history. On

Singling out one particular political system (in our case the Roman republic) and diagnosing it as imperialist, then, obviously lacks heuristic value.²⁷

Contrary to Harris's statement cited above, the word 'imperialism' seems to defy any easy definition. The term has been used to describe historical facts and developments from antiquity to the twenty-first century.²⁸ In 1986, Michael W. Doyle²⁹ offered a synopsis of often conflicting descriptions and explanations of what 'imperialism' is supposed to be; since then, this field of study has blossomed even more. Whereas it might be possible to filter out certain tendencies, there is certainly no consensus about what imperialism is or was. As Doyle has pointed out, many of the relevant studies even avoid testing whether the assumed 'imperialism' actually led to the postulated outcome — empires.³⁰ Such an approach is clearly unsound in principle. In the case of Rome, the arch-empire and cognitive role-model for later imperial political systems,³¹ it might seem unnecessary to prove that expansionism resulted in an empire. But to identify the Roman word *imperium* with the modern word Empire clearly begs the question. Even though the modern term derives from the Roman one, there are major semantic differences between the two words and concepts. That is true for all phases of Roman history, and certainly for republican usage.³² From the point of view of comparative sociological analysis, the Imperium Romanum is certainly not simply the Roman Empire. Harris's comment seems to imply that the factual and intellectual substratum of his concept of imperialism lies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and this may be the most common usage of the terms empire and imperialism. Empires, in this sense, bind together different and

the other hand, we believe that neither the concepts we make use of nor the terminology we apply are self-evident (in the sense Harris has proposed). Quite the contrary, the explanation of our terminology is at the very core of our article.

²⁷ Cf. also P. Freeman, 'British Imperialism and the Roman Empire', in J. Webster/N. Cooper (eds.), *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives, Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Leicester* (Leicester Archaeology Monographs 3), Leicester, 1996, 19ff. In fairness to Harris, it has to be admitted that his approach was primarily directed against older studies which — for a variety of reasons, but often because of ideological assumptions (cf. K. Kristiansen, 'Prehistoric Migrations', *Journal of Danish Archaeology* 8, 1989, 211ff.; J. Carman, 'Introduction: Approaches to Violence', in id. (ed.), *Material Harm: Archaeological Studies of War and Violence*, Glasgow, 1997, 1ff.) — denied that the Roman republic showed any signs of military aggressiveness. Cf. e.g. E. Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*², Oxford, 1968. These older views so obviously lack any foundations in our sources that they can now be dismissed out of hand. See North (n. 16). Cf. M. Errington, 'Neue Forschungen zu den Ursachen der römischen Expansion im 3. und 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr.', *HZ* 250, 1990, 93ff.; 100.

²⁸ For the renaissance of 'imperial language' in political analysis in recent years see e.g. *International Herald Tribune*, Tuesday, April 2, 2002, No. 37 035, 1 and 9.

²⁹ M.W. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca, NY et al., 1986.

³⁰ Doyle (n. 29), 33.

³¹ G. Woolf, 'Inventing Empire in Ancient Rome', S.E. Alcock et al. (eds.), *Empires. Perspectives from Archaeology and History*, Cambridge, 2001, 311ff.; 312.

³² M. Awerbuch, 'Imperium. Zum Bedeutungswandel des Wortes im staatsrechtlichen und politischen Bewußtsein der Römer', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 25, 1981, 162ff.; J.S. Richardson, 'Imperium Romanum: Empire and the Language of Power', *JRS* 81, 1991, 1ff.

formerly independent states.³³ ‘Imperialism’ can be considered the behavior of states or power élites that leads to the creation of empires. Does this narrowing of the conceptual framework solve the problem, and make the concept ‘imperialism’ compatible with the developments in Italy and the Mediterranean basin in the centuries before the start of the new era? We do not think so. First of all, even with respect to European imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a common denominator has yet to be found: neither the motives of the various power élites, nor the techniques used by the different states to conquer or otherwise integrate formerly independent territories into their realm nor the results of that European expansion and domination can easily be described by one single concept. More important, to define the European expansion in Asia and, especially, the scramble for Africa in the same words or concepts as the Roman establishment of a hegemony in middle Italy is clearly disproportionate.

Roman expansion in Italy started at the latest in the fourth century.³⁴ Many of the Italian communities at that time were poor, small and lacking in general organization. ‘Political organization’ comprised essentially a market-place and storehouses, sometimes the management of such cultural techniques as irrigation schemes. Most of these communities lived off scarce resources. Between these ‘states’ there was vivid and sometimes bitter competition, often ending in the incorporation or destruction of one of these cities or tribal organizations by a successful rival. These phenomena have almost nothing in common with the European partitioning of whole continents in modern times, a problem Harris tried to cope with by using the term ‘imperialism’ in a very broad sense. This weakness has been recognized of course by scholars who reacted to Harris’s book. Since 1979 many sophisticated studies have been published which, by selectively adapting various modern theorems, tried to integrate Roman and European expansion in one *single* conceptual framework.³⁵ However, none of them has given enough thought to the obvious disproportion between modern world imperialism and the Roman expansion inside Italy from the fourth to the second century. Moreover, many of the more abstract approaches to European imperialism use a whole set of political, economical and cultural data which sources of classical antiquity simply do not provide. Because of the sheer lack of data, historians of ancient Rome have to create and use non-quantifying models. It is our intention to present such a model that will help to gain better insight into the dynamics of Roman expansionism.

3. Expansionism and the State-Building Process in Historical Perspective

Instead of ‘imperialism’ we choose the concept of the ‘*state-building process*’ as our main term of reference in explaining the nature of Roman expansion. The word and the concept of ‘the state’ are fraught with controversy. There has been much discussion in recent decades over whether ancient *poleis* should be considered stateless societies or city-states. There are certainly good reasons not to reserve the term state exclusively for

³³ Pagden (n. 20), 12f.

³⁴ For some discussion of possible starting-dates see Harris (n. 16), 495.

³⁵ Cf., for example, St. Podes, *Die Dependenz des hellenistischen Ostens von Rom zur Zeit der römischen Weltreichsbildung. Ein Erklärungsversuch zum römischen Imperialismus aus der Sicht der Geschichte als historische Sozialwissenschaft*, Frankfurt, 1986.

the political systems of the modern age.³⁶ Edward Van der Vliet³⁷ has argued that the Roman republic at its very beginning was an early state, but his characterization heavily depends on his definition of what an early state was and therefore did not raise many eyebrows. Certainly, typical elements of a state can be traced back to the early days of the *libera res publica*,³⁸ and by the middle republic the city of Rome had developed *all* the characteristics of an ancient ‘city-state’. But Rome in the third century B.C. was no longer a mere city. It had subjected other cities under its rule, had incorporated many former enemies in its population, and had forced nearly all of Italy into its alliance. The *res publica Romana* obviously underwent a far-reaching transformation. What we will try to show in this paper is that this transformation was a rather typical *state-building process*, that, starting from an embryonic (‘proto-’) state, brought into being a much more developed and bigger political entity.

We have taken as our starting point a set of basic assumptions about the general nature of states *and the way states behave, especially in their emergent phase*. Our assumptions are mainly inspired by the work of Charles Tilly,³⁹ Frederic C. Lane,⁴⁰ Margaret Levi⁴¹ and a few others.⁴² Even though the models of Tilly, Lane and Levi differ in a number of aspects, their approaches overlap to a significant degree. The evidence presented in these studies stems from societies widely differing with regard to their stage of development, cultural background and type of organization. The sample of societies analyzed includes, for instance, medieval Italian city states, historical empires (such as the Chinese or the Ottoman Empire), early modern monarchies, failed states, mercenary companies from medieval times up to the present, or postcolonial ‘new’ states all over the Third World. For obvious reasons, we shall not deal here with the details of the historical material or all the ramifications of the models just mentioned. Rather, it is our purpose to condense the slightly differing models and the extant historical material into one coherent scheme. The basis of the approaches of Tilly, Lane and Levi may be

³⁶ U. Walter, ‘Der Begriff des Staates in der griechischen und römischen Geschichte’, in Th. Hantos/G.A. Lehmann (eds.), *Althistorisches Kolloquium aus Anlaß des siebzigsten Geburtstags von J. Bleicken*, Stuttgart, 1998, 9ff.

³⁷ ‘Early Rome and the Early State’, in W. Eder (ed.) (n. 14), 233ff.

³⁸ J. Martin, ‘Aspekte antiker Staatlichkeit’, in W. Eder (ed.) (n. 14), 220ff.; Hölkeskamp (n. 16), 247. Cf. the more cautious view of W. Eder, ‘Der Bürger und sein Staat — Der Staat und sein Bürger’, in id. (ed.) (n. 14), 12ff.; 26, who stresses the dominance of the forces of the society as opposed to purely statist dynamics and structures.

³⁹ ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in P.B. Evans et al. (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge, 1985, 168ff.; id., *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, Oxford, 1990.

⁴⁰ *Profits from Power. Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises*, New York, 1979.

⁴¹ ‘The Predatory Theory of Rule’, *Politics and Society* 10, 1981, 431ff.

⁴² M. Mann, ‘States, Ancient and Modern’, *Archives of European Sociology* 18, 1977, 262ff. Much useful historical material is to be found in P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, New York, 2003, especially 19–70; for a collection of essays concerned with the present cf. D. Azzelini, B. Kanzleiter, *Das Unternehmen Krieg. Paramilitärs, Warlords und Privatarmeen als Akteure der Neuen Kriegsordnung*, Berlin u.a., 2003.

described as a combination or fusing of the behavioral assumptions of microeconomics with macrohistorical and sociological data. By combining these approaches we are able to construe a multiplex model into which are integrated different layers of historical experience and theoretical thinking.

Our focus is on the question how societies that form embryonic states grow and how they alter their nature by growing, i.e. by incorporating neighboring societies. As Charles Tilly stressed, nearly every state or state-like society *tries* to expand at the cost of its neighbors, thereby evolving institutions which are aimed at stabilizing the process of incorporation. 'Successful', i.e. expanding, state-societies strive to build into their corporate fabric the manpower of conquered societies. As the anthropologist Richard B. Lee put it in regard to the !Kung San, a tribe situated in south-east Angola: 'As human societies have evolved from bands (like the !Kung) to tribes and chiefdoms, each step up in the level of sociocultural integration has reduced the problems of violence at the previous level of integration, *but has opened up new forms of violence at the new level*'.⁴³ The kind of domino effect outlined by Lee is termed by us the state-building process, by which larger violence-controlling organizations grow out of smaller ones by way of incorporation. State-building processes have happened all over the world thousands of times, thereby reducing in the course of five millennia or so the number of states or state-like organized societies from many millions to about 200. At an early stage of their trajectory of development, emerging states are basically organizations that struggle to control 'the concentrated principal means of coercion within delimited territories, and (to) exercise priority in some respects over all other organizations acting within the territories'.⁴⁴ As Tilly has convincingly argued, mercenary companies or gangs of bandits may easily evolve into legitimate states if they manage to monopolize the means of coercion in a given territory. In times of dynamic state-building processes many violence-controlling organizations such as mercenary companies repeatedly changed their status from legitimate power-holders to hunted bandits.⁴⁵ As far as the ancient Greco-Roman world is concerned, the cases of e.g. the Mamertines,⁴⁶ the men of Eunus⁴⁷ or Viriatus,⁴⁸ Spartacus, Titus Curtisius,⁴⁹ Bulla Felix⁵⁰ come to mind. Many others could be mentioned in

⁴³ R.B. Lee, *The !Kung San. Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society*, Cambridge, 1979, 399.

⁴⁴ Tilly (n. 39), 5. The quotation gives Tilly's principal definition of every state.

⁴⁵ It may be noted that the basic mechanisms described by historians of former ages still hold true for the present day. Wherever the fabric of modern states is rent, private actors are ready to take upon themselves tasks which in stabilized states are prerequisites of sovereign power (such as the monopolizing of violence, control over the financial system[s], eliminating of rival powers). Private actors who function in that way may be deemed terrorists or gangsters if unsuccessful, or may gain the stature of respectable statesmen if acknowledged by established power-holders as successful. Cf. the literature cited in n. 42.

⁴⁶ Pol. 1, 7ff.; Diod. 21, 16; App. *Samn.* 9; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 23f.

⁴⁷ Diod. 34.

⁴⁸ App. *Iber.* 60-75; Cass. Dio *frg.* 73, 77f.; Liv. *Epit.* 52-54.

⁴⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 4, 27, 1.

⁵⁰ Cass. Dio 77, 10.

what might easily become a very long list.⁵¹ The Romans themselves, more cynical and veracious than their modern admirers, saw as their eldest *maiores* a gang of bandits flocking together from places all over Italy. It depended mainly on the decision of already-established powers whether the newcomers were suppressed as outlaws or accepted as legitimate new rivals. This second possibility, however, by no means excluded violent aggression against the new member of the club of established political systems.

Emerging states as historical phenomena are characterized by the way they *acted*. We are focusing here exclusively on the core activities of emerging states, i.e. activities which are characteristic for almost *every* historical 'state'. These core activities are (1) war-making; (2) monopolizing of power; (3) protection; and (4) extraction.⁵² *War-making* is the chief means to procure and maintain a territory against power-rivals from outside by eliminating or neutralizing these rivals. By *monopolizing of power* we understand the process by which rivals inside a territory maintained by war are eliminated or neutralized by one single power-wielder. *Protection* denotes the elimination or neutralization of the enemies of the power-holders' clients. By *extraction* we understand the process by which the means of carrying out war, state-making and protection are obtained.⁵³

Until recently in European history,⁵⁴ by far the greatest amount of resources extracted by power-holders from their subjects has been spent on making war. Corresponding thereto, making war was almost the only reason for extracting money accepted (albeit reluctantly) by subjects as legitimate. This basic constellation gave rise to a specific kind

⁵¹ Cf. especially the instructive narratives of Diodorus 16, 15 (on the state-building process of the Bruttii) and of Cassius Dio 36, 20ff. (about the growing power of the pirate-fleets in the Mediterranean Sea in the first half of the first century B.C.).

⁵² Cf. Tilly (n. 39), 172.

⁵³ Before these basic notions are developed further into a more coherent theory, some words of caution are perhaps in order. The views expressed here might seem to some readers cynical and somehow coloured by a certain penchant for social Darwinism. Our answer to this is that we have tried to represent the world as it is and not as we wish it to be. We are aware of the fact that many people look on European states and especially the Roman state as civilising powers and bearers of cultural values. In fact, the overwhelming majority of our sources show European states (as well of the ancient as of the modern world) as violent enterprises using all possible means but most often brutal force to expand their territories, to extract capital from their subjects and to use the means extracted for carrying expansion further as long as they are allowed to do so.

⁵⁴ The importance of war-making as an activity of *some* states has decreased only recently to a certain degree, as indicated by the increased weight of budgetary items other than military. This tendency, however, should not be overstated. On the whole, the number of great power wars (involving at least two major powers) dropped significantly during the last few centuries (from 34 in the 16th to 15 in the 20th century; cf. J.S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, Lexington, 1983, 88ff.; E. Luard, *War in International Society*, New Haven, 1987). On the other hand, wars, albeit of shorter average duration nowadays (1.6 years in the 16th century; 0.4 years in the 20th century), took an ever-increasing toll of human casualties and material losses since 1500 B.C. If every type of war is included, the number of wars fought in the whole world is, anyway, increasing (18th century: 50 wars; 20th century [to 1987]: 213 wars). Tilly (n. 39), 70ff. has the basic secondary sources.

of circular process with cumulative effects, as power-holders promoted war-making persistently in order to create the conditions for legitimately levying taxes and calling up recruits. These resources, in turn, were used to enhance the coercive capacities of the rulers. But extraction, depending on the productive powers of the population and the territory controlled by rulers, cannot be carried out unlimitedly. As long as power-holders did not want to kill their sheep but to shear them, they had, principally, two options: expanding their territories further or enhancing the productive potential of their territory. Of course, these options are not exclusive but might rather evolve into tendencies that mutually reinforce each other. In the short run, resources needed for continuous war-making are acquired by conquest and expropriation of the conquered. 'In the long run, the quest inevitably involved (power holders) in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their spheres of control'.⁵⁵ The range of extraction types extends from simple looting to highly regulated forms of tribute-taking or taxation. In the long run, power-holders try to establish comparatively cheap methods of tax collection. As a consequence the renting out of taxes was usually preferred to direct tax-collecting. For similar reasons the levying of taxes on trade was preferred to the levying of taxes on land (which the conditions of transport in pre-industrial societies made expensive to collect). Typically, the more regular forms of extraction evolved over a more or less extended period of time out of direct and more brutal forms of appropriation. As an obvious (but by no means necessary) consequence of the inner logic of the process that leads from looting to taxation, it is more often the inner sphere of an expanding territory that is subject to more regulated forms of extraction (an inner core may even become entirely exempt from any duty to pay taxes), whereas irregular tribute-taking or looting is more often practised in the regions which lie towards the peripheral areas or outside the boundaries of the territory. While coercion was the usual means by which control over populations and their resources was exercised, in some regions, which were characterized by a high degree of commercial activity and urbanization and may be termed *capital intensive regions*, mere coercion was of little use for the extracting power, at least if sustainable extraction was aimed at. Rural populations, on the other hand, usually oppose any pretension of state apparatuses (or their authorized agents) to their property and/or working power.⁵⁶ Under these conditions sustainable extraction is only achieved by means of a high degree of coercion, higher in any case than that which was recommendable to power-holders in the case of capital intensive regions, where value reproducing assets might be destroyed by extractors or be withdrawn by capital holders. Accordingly, inducements and the creation of favourable conditions for capital reproduction suggested themselves as more promising for the extracting power than the use of force. As a rule, power-holders or state apparatuses, which extract resources

⁵⁵ Tilly (n. 39), 117. Of course, the term 'capitalists' is not to be taken here in the Marxist sense of the word, denoting, that is, a class of people who usurp the surplus value extracted out of hired labour. Here the term simply signifies people who control a significant amount of wealth and the means of its reproduction.

⁵⁶ This idealized typological situation should be translated into the terms of the ancient world by replacing the monarchical apparatus by the dominant city and by taking the term 'peasant subjects' as referring to the subject peasant population of conquered cities.

predominantly from capital intensive regions, tend to be less authoritarian than rulers whose territories lack such regions.

Legitimacy of state power originates when the use of violence in a given territory is monopolized by one power-holder (be it a singular power-wielder or a dominant class of people or an institution). The process by which the monopolization of violence inside any given territory is rendered legitimate is mainly driven by pressure exerted from without, that is, from external competing powers. Somewhat paradoxically, external power-holders are in a position of enhancing the legitimacy of a rival by recognizing him. Acceptance of a power-holder (as, for instance, a dominant *civitas*) as a legitimate ruler by his/its subjects (or subject cities) tends to develop *as a secondary effect* of the successful elimination of rivals inside a territory by a victorious aspirant to power and his subsequent recognition by external power-holders. In construing legitimacy, then, 'the person *over whom power is exercised* is not usually as important as *other power holders*'.⁵⁷ Rivalry between potential power-holders creates a situation in which the power-holder is in the position to impose himself as protector of a group of clients. This basic constellation can be found in different contexts, as the part of the power-holder may fall to single persons, groups of persons, a dominant class or full-scale states, whereas clients may be individuals, groups of persons or client states. To fulfil their task protectors demand the means of protection (money, manpower, foodstuffs, means of transport and so on). To maintain their position, power-holders need those resources and therefore the maintenance of the external threat. Power-holders, then, 'are in the business of selling protection to people' and of demanding the price for their services and they are wont to do this '*whether people want it or not*'.⁵⁸ It can be considered as axiomatic that people under normal circumstances are very reluctant to give up their money, goods and working power to someone who poses as authority. This holds especially true for traditional rural societies with a high percentage of subsistence farmers. An atmosphere of mutually created threats made extraction seem inevitable, thereby significantly lowering the costs of levying taxes and recruiting manpower. It was therefore in the common interest of all power-holders that this atmosphere of constant threat never cease. In this respect power-holders, at least in the early stages of their career, are comparable to 'racketeers', 'who create a threat and then charge for its reduction'.⁵⁹ The spectrum of people in this business includes the mercenary company operating single-handedly as well as, at the other end of the scale, an emperor and his staff who command the armies of a whole continent.

That competition between providers lowers the costs for customers is a commonplace. To enterprises that sell protection and violence, as mercenary companies, 'racketeers', or full grown states, this law of market economy applies — *mutatis mutandis* — as well. To quote Lane: 'In the use of violence there were obviously great advantages of scale when competing with rival violence-using enterprises or establishing a territorial monopoly. This fact is basic for economic analysis of one aspect of government: the violence-using, violence-controlling industry was a natural monopoly, at least on land. Within territorial limits the service it rendered could be produced much more cheaply by

⁵⁷ A.L. Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories*, New York, 1968, 150.

⁵⁸ Tilly (n. 39), 175 (our italics).

⁵⁹ Tilly (n. 39), 171.

a monopoly'.⁶⁰ In the long run, then, the dynamics of violence-controlling enterprises led to (albeit precarious) monopolization of the means of coercion inside successful states all over the world.⁶¹ The monopolization of power inside territories with more or less precisely defined boundaries corresponds to the second stage of state evolution within the evolutionary scheme of Frederic Lane,⁶² the first stage being a phase of mere plunder and of *bella omnium contra omnes*. A power structure which has reached the second stage of development may be described as a kind of simple protection-selling enterprise, attracting 'customers' (whether they want it or not) and granting protection to them against external powers and rivals who aspire to lead the enterprise in their turn. Of course, holders of economic interests may profit from monopolized power structures and territorial expansion, for example, if they are provided with escorts along maritime routes infested by pirates (that is: rival power-wielders) or if freed from customs levied by outward powers or simply in consequence of the pacification of commercially attractive regions. A third stage, however, is reached when subjects who have the appropriate means at their disposal, e.g. bankers, owners of large landed property, or merchants, invest massively in the state enterprise expecting protection rents and interests as their profit. (The fourth stage of Lane's evolutionist framework, 'a period in which technological changes surpassed protection rents as sources of profits for entrepreneurs',⁶³ need not concern us here.) Protection rents⁶⁴ are the surplus gains accruing to merchants or their capital lenders out of protection measures (including integration and pacification of territories) taken by governments. If access to a certain market is assured to a merchant (A) by his government⁶⁵ at a significant lower price (or: taxes, custom dues, leasing rents) than the merchant's foreign competitors (B) pay to their governments, then the difference between the two prices accrues as gain or 'protection rent' to merchant A. Moreover, as takers of credits from 'capitalists' the power-holders pay interest which may be regarded as rents accruing to the capital lenders.⁶⁶ As a consequence, tightly knit symbiotic relationships between power-holders and their state apparatuses on the one hand and capital lenders on the other came into being; these relationships bore in

⁶⁰ Lane (n. 40), 51.

⁶¹ Tilly (n. 39), 175.

⁶² Lane (n. 40). Cf. Tilly (n. 39), 177f.

⁶³ Tilly (n. 39), 177.

⁶⁴ See esp. Lane (n. 40), 56ff. Cf. 57: 'A simple example in a modern context will clarify what I have in mind. If two producers of copper sell at prices set by the London market and have the same costs of extracting, refining, and transporting ore, but pay different tariffs on the way to market, the one that pays lower tariffs receives protection rent. (...) I propose 'protection rent' in order to have a term to apply to profits arising from differences in the whole range of costs incurred in using or controlling violence. These included convoy fees, tribute to the Barbary pirates, or higher insurance for voyages into pirate-infested waters, bribes or gifts to customs officials or higher authorities, and other kinds of smuggling costs. It included (...) the dispatching (of) an army for the defense or even the conquest of a colony'.

⁶⁵ E.g. by granting escorts to him or by pacifying certain sea-routes.

⁶⁶ Cf. the so-called *rentes sur l'Hôtel de Ville* from the times of François I (E.J. Hamilton, 'Origin and Growth of the National Debt in France and England', in *Studi in onore di Gino Luzzato*, Milan, 1950, II 254).

themselves incentives to carry on war-making on ever bigger scales. As making war is a costly business, power-holders have found themselves often at a loss to repay their creditors if their soldiers did not turn out to be successful on the battlefield. Starting fresh wars with the aim of conquering booty-rich territories and of profiting by taking the opportunity of legitimately raising taxes and gaining access to new sources of credit was usually regarded by governments as the shortest way to obtain new money and to meet their old liabilities. The main source of profit for 'capitalists' who invested in government enterprises lay, however, as was stated above, in the opening up of new areas of commerce by governments, thus making sure that a greater protection rent accrued to merchants and capital lenders.

It is not our aim to demonstrate that the model outlined above applies in every single instance to the history of Roman expansion in republican times. It is in our view self-evident that the major traits of the model are recognizable in the sources that deal with Roman republican times. For instance, Rome functioned as a 'protection-selling enterprise' for client states in Italy against real or supposed threats that came from inside or outside Italy, as against the Celts, Samnites, Carthaginians, Macedonians and so many others. It 'sold' its protection to clients, 'whether they wanted it or not'. Of course, in the majority of cases they did not want it and were pressed into the patron-client relationship by decades of warfare and by means of the utmost violence as it was experienced by the neighbors of Rome, the Latins, the Hernici, Volscians, Etruscans, Samnites or Umbrians. By suppressing the resistance of the *superbi* the Romans created a virtual monopoly of violence inside Italy. Rome's status as legitimate ruler over her clients was enhanced by outside rival powers as, for instance, the Macedonian or Ptolemaic kings, the Greek republics or the Parthian monarchy, who recognized Rome as the power-holder in Italy and, later on, in the western Mediterranean basin. Rome extracted the resources it needed for the process of power monopolization and the enlargement of the perimeter wherein this monopoly was in force from her clients in the form of manpower, working power, foodstuffs and money. People who had the appropriate means, such as the *publicani*, invested heavily in the 'violence-selling enterprise' of Rome. *Mercatores* realized protection rents, for example, because Italy became a pacified zone without inland customs frontiers in the period after the Hannibalic War.

In view of these facts it should be recognized that the ascent of Rome to a dominant position in Italy and the integration of the Italian tribes and cities into her power system were part of a fairly common state-building process. For example, nearly every European nation-state of the present age came into being by a quite similar process.⁶⁷ Of course, there were structural differences that we do not wish to pass over in silence. The most obvious of these is that almost every core region that functioned as the integrating force on the way to the full-grown modern nation states of Europe (like Brandenburg-Prussia for Germany or the Île de Paris for France) was ruled by monarchic power-holders whereas Rome was an aristocratic republic. But as we have stressed above, the components of the state-building process (expansion, monopolization of power, coercion and

⁶⁷ See in addition to the works cited (especially Tilly [n. 39]) e.g. R. Bean, 'War and the Birth of the Nation State', *Journal of Economic History* 33, 1973, 203ff.; J. de Vries, *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750*, Cambridge, 1976; D. Gerhard, *Old Europe: A Study of Continuity, 1000-1800*, New York, 1981.

extraction, protection selling, granting of protection rents and others) occurred in various forms. The integration of ancient Italy and parts of the Mediterranean world by the republic of Rome formed one variety by which the process of state-building materialized in history.

4. Coercion and State-Building: Centripetal Effects of Warfare

That war was a constituent part of the European state-building process has been widely acknowledged in recent decades. The necessity of extracting the means of war was probably the single most important stimulus that led to the creation of the central organizational structures of modern states. As taxes constituted the basic resource of most states before the industrial revolution, extensive tax-gathering machineries had to be built up. The struggle over scarce resources with neighboring states, traditional élites who opposed centralization, and the many parts of the population who more than anyone else had to shoulder the burden of ambitious military policies of the various power-holders, contributed further to the growth of the centralizing administrations that are the hallmark of the modern state. In a sense, the modern state created itself.⁶⁸ Of course, the process of state-building differed in every single territory to a certain degree, but typical patterns can be established. As we have pointed out above,⁶⁹ the direction in which an early modern state headed depended very much on its ability to raise money. In capital intensive regions power élites were able to extract their financial needs with more subtle means, less repression, and therefore a smaller military and administrative apparatus. Lack of capital meant that the necessary resources were harder to come by and therefore more rigorously fought for: regions that were lacking in resources tended therefore to become more coercion intensive. The dichotomy outlined provides us with a useful heuristic tool which can be transferred to the analysis of other historical constellations; at least, such a hypothesis is worth testing. In Italy in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. the regions differed widely, not only ethnically, but also in respect to their prosperity. The south was dominated by various Greek cities, some of which possessed a (by the standards of Greece proper) huge territory. Tarentum and Neapolis in particular were populous and rich.⁷⁰ Locri alone could pay 11,240 silver talents to Pyrrhus.⁷¹ Up to the Roman takeover these cities dominated the region.⁷² Far from being homogeneous, Italy

⁶⁸ H. Krüger, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*², Stuttgart, 1966, 82; H. Heller, *Staatslehre*⁶, Tübingen, 1983, 151.

⁶⁹ See above at n. 54.

⁷⁰ Cf. E. Lepore, 'Parallelismi, riflessi e incidenza degli avvenimenti del contesto mediterraneo in Italia', in *Crise et transformation des sociétés archaïques de l'Italie au V^e siècle av. J.-C.* (CEFR, 137), Rome, 1990, 289ff., 296.

⁷¹ P.R. Franke, 'Pyrrhus', *Cambridge Ancient History* VII 2², Cambridge, 1994, 456ff.; 471f. Cf. A. De Franciscis, *Stato e società in Locri Epizefiri. L'archivi dell' Olympieion Locrese*, Naples, 1972, 126; R. Panuccio, 'Per una nuova collocazione cronologica di alcune delle tavolette bronzee di Locri Epizefiri', *RIL* 108, 1974, 105ff.

⁷² N. Purcell, 'South Italy in the Fourth Century B.C.', *Cambridge Ancient History* VI¹, Cambridge, 1994, 381ff.

north of Magna Graecia was certainly later and much less intensively monetized.⁷³ Some of the Etruscan cities were clearly rich and thriving.⁷⁴ But although some cities may have had a rich income from agricultural production and/or piracy,⁷⁵ only few of them could rival the more prosperous south in wealth. Other regions, especially the more mountainous parts,⁷⁶ clearly had fewer resources at their disposal than the thriving coastal city states of *Magna Graecia* and Etruria.⁷⁷ In these communities a complex social organization was slow to develop; in fact, in almost every single case, social organization was much less sophisticated than it was in the more prosperous regions of the ancient world. Coercion for that reason played a much bigger role in the ongoing process of social construction in these political systems.⁷⁸ The Roman republic will serve as a suitable example for this thesis.⁷⁹

Forming communities in the Mediterranean world was a process that usually took place on the level of a tribe, a village, or a city. Social cohesion was initially achieved in

⁷³ N.F. Parise, *Struttura e funzione delle monetazioni arcaiche di Magna Grecia. Appunti per un riesame dei dati e degli orientamenti attuali, Economia e società nella Magna Grecia*, Naples, 1973, 87ff.; K. Rutter, 'South Italy and Messana', in *Le origini della monetazione di bronzo in Sicilia e in Magna Grecia*, Rome, 1979, 193ff.

⁷⁴ Still, compared to Magna Graecia, monetization was clearly lagging behind considerably: H. Zehnacker, 'Usage du bronze et hiérarchie sociale dans la Rome archaïque', *Monnaie et financement* 13, 1983, 3ff.

⁷⁵ See e.g. the various contributions to *Civiltà del Lazio primitivo*, Palazzo delle Esposizioni, Rome, 1976.

⁷⁶ But see J.-P. Vallat, *L'Italie et Rome 218-31 av. J.-C.*, Paris, 1995, 20; 45ff., who stresses the fact that differences in the agricultural productivity of Italy were only relative, a conclusion we gladly adhere to.

⁷⁷ J.-M. David, *The Roman Conquest of Italy*, Oxford, 1994, 13ff., with bibliography. Cf. the contributions to S. Keay/N. Terrenato (eds.), *Italy and the West. Comparative Issues in Romanization*, Oxford 2001; E.T. Salmon, *Samnum and the Samnites*, Cambridge, 1967, 14ff.; Toynbee (n. 8), passim; A.-M. Adam/A. Rouveret, 'Les cités étrusques et la guerre au V^e siècle avant notre ère', in *Crise et transformation des sociétés archaïques de l'Italie au V^e siècle av. J.-C.*, *CEFR*, 137, Rome, 1990, 327ff.; D. and F.R. Ridgway, *Italy before the Romans. The Iron Age, Orientalizing and Etruscan Periods*, London et al., 1979.

⁷⁸ The word 'coercion' does include asymmetrical types of compulsion but is not exhaustively defined by reference to them. It rather denotes collective and reciprocal forms of constraint as well.

⁷⁹ For the economic hardships suffered by the average Roman citizen up to the early third century (and occasionally of course beyond that date, cf. S. Oakley, 'The Roman Conquest of Italy', in J. Rich/G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*, London et al., 1993, 9ff.; 13; M. Elster, *Die Gesetze der mittleren römischen Republik. Text und Kommentar*, Darmstadt, 2003, 63ff.; K. Raaflaub, 'Politics and Society in Fifth-Century Rome', *Bilancio critico su Roma arcaica fra monarchia e repubblica*, Atti dei Convegni Lincei 100, Rom, 1993, 129ff.; id., 'From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the Conflict of the Orders', in id. (ed.), *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, Berkeley et al., 1986, 210ff.; Hopkins (n. 12), 19ff.; Cornell (n. 22), 265ff.; 281ff.; Hölkeskamp (n. 16), 159ff.; 200; C. Virlouvet, *Famines et émeutes à Rome*, Rom, 1985, 11ff.; P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, Cambridge, 1988, 168ff.; H. Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge, 2001, 134ff.

the basic units of social life, such as the family, clans, or some aggregate of these, such as the *gene*, *phratries*, *curiae*, etc. As most ancient political systems never ceased to be societies based on personal, face-to-face contact, the mechanisms active in such groups were effective on the central political stage of the various polities as well, which in a sense were conceptualized as agglomerations of the basic units.⁸⁰ But when a community transcended the level of face-to-face interaction, these mechanisms became increasingly difficult to maintain. The concept of ethnic coherence could of course be adapted and transposed by means of a socially accepted fiction into a bigger political framework. Still, it was not an abstract concept, to be changed at will when necessary. Rome had doubled in size by incorporating Veii sometime in the early fourth century and did not cease to grow. Likewise, the number of citizens was constantly on the rise. Under these circumstances social cohesion must have been badly strained. Some citizens living on the periphery probably visited the center only infrequently. How was the collective identity perceived or its image transported, if the mechanisms which were effective in a face-to-face society were hampered? The most important medium for construing such an identity was evidently the army. Most healthy male Romans spent a considerable span of time in the armed forces.⁸¹ The republican army — unlike the military in the first two centuries of the principate — was primarily a fighting force. In spite of this, the individual soldier learned much more in the legions than just to handle his sword. Above all, he was socially disciplined. A rigid discipline ensured not only that the soldiers obeyed their superiors. Many soldiers must have perceived these officers as the personalized equivalent of Rome itself, with the consuls representing or even incarnating Roman power. For many of the Roman troopers, the army *was* Rome. To be sure, the hierarchical chain of command in the army mirrored the social pyramid. But for many Romans in the army, it did more than lend support to the social hierarchy: it actually created it. That may have been true from the beginning, as warfare probably was the single communal enterprise that necessarily forged some kind of formal organization in which the whole body of citizens was somehow integrated, crossing the boundaries of family- and clan-ties. Whereas the civic administrative machine was embryonic throughout the history of the Roman republic, the fighting forces always had a dominant position in Roman organizational life. This must have been true especially for Romans without protracted contact with the center. Even more were the various allied forces kept together by the one common enterprise — war. For those cities and tribes who had preserved their internal autonomy, the Roman army was the glue that held them together, and fighting under Roman command, as well as the combat experience alongside Roman troops, gave life and substance to the treaties with the conquering power.⁸² It was in the army where allied soldiers got used to Latin, not only as a medium of communication but also as the one language of power. Obviously, then, the army developed centripetal effects in the system of the Roman alliance. These centripetal forces grew stronger with every year the alliance was in place and with every victory it achieved. Throughout ancient history it

⁸⁰ See the discussion of these phenomena with regard to Greek societies by A. Eich, 'Probleme der staatlichen Einheit im antiken Griechenland', *ZPE* 149, 2004, 83ff.

⁸¹ Brunt (n. 4), 399ff.; but cf. Rosenstein (n. 7).

⁸² See the remarks by S.C. Humphreys, 'War, Imperialism and the Early State', in W. Eder (ed.) (n. 14), 293ff.; 299; cf. Raaflaub (n. 17), 539.

proved to be very difficult to integrate conquered communities into a single, at least to a certain degree unitarian political framework. The Roman army (citizen and allied forces) served as the most important instrument in the process of integrating the various allied or conquered communities in the Roman commonwealth. Of course, the army was forged with the primary task in mind to subject real or imaginary enemies. The success of the Roman conquest of Italy has often been attributed to the successful exploitation of allied manpower by the victorious Romans.⁸³ But it was not only the fighting capacity of their allies that the Romans absorbed. By incorporating them in a single, clearly structured, centralized organization, the Romans integrated their allies gradually in a political structure as well: the army shaped the Roman commonwealth; fighting for or alongside the Romans eventually led to accepting the political status quo.

While the army was the spinal column of the Roman alliance, other institutions came into being either as immediate spin-offs of military action or at least as ultimately derived from the fighting forces and their activities. This holds true already for substantial parts of the original set of structures the republic built up. Many of the offices created later on, which had at least some civil assignment, originated as purely military posts. Much of the operational staff of the Roman governors, for instance, was military in origin.⁸⁴ The legates who served in a variety of duties, including administrative posts, originated as army-officers.⁸⁵ The same holds true for the prefects who filled many of the gaps in the Roman structural framework; they were and always remained primarily military officers.⁸⁶ The Italian quaestors were, at least originally, commissioned for military purposes as well.⁸⁷ In other institutional fields the connection is even more obvious. As the number of Roman units grew and as the arrangement of the troops became increasingly dispersed, more and more personnel were needed to guarantee the food supply of the military. Logistical tasks were fulfilled by a highly diversified spectrum of agents, ranging from army officers and office-holders of the various communities in the Roman commonwealth to private business men and petty traders.⁸⁸ But from the third century onward, a growing number of tasks was outsourced by Roman officials to *societates*

⁸³ See e.g. Cornell (n. 22), 366, with further references.

⁸⁴ Consuls, praetors and promagistrates were all of course first and foremost generals; their jurisdiction only derived from their activity as military commanders in the field. Eder (n. 38), 12ff.; 26, rightly stresses the importance of the creation of offices with purely or primarily civil competence for the development of a civil concept of the state in Rome.

⁸⁵ B. Schlessner, *Die Legaten der römischen Republik. Decem legati und ständige Hilfsgesandte (Vestigia 26)*, Munich, 1978, 118f.; 204f.; 213.

⁸⁶ J. Suolahti, *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period. A Study on Social Structure*, Helsinki 1955, 198ff. See *ibid.* for other junior officer posts. Cf. C. Ferone, 'Appiano, Samn. 7, 1 e la tutela dell'ora maritima a Roma nel III sec. a.C.', *Klio* 83, 2001, 327ff.

⁸⁷ W. Kunkel, *Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen Republik II: die Magistratur (HdAW X 3, 2, 2)*, Munich, 1995, 529ff.

⁸⁸ See generally P.M.M. Erdkamp, *Hunger and the Sword. Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264–30 B.C.)*, Amsterdam, 1998, who rightly stresses the important role local administrative institutions played in provisioning the army. On the other hand, Erdkamp completely downplays the role of *publicani* and merchants in the army logistics (108ff.), a view in our opinion not compatible with the evidence.

publicanorum, private business agencies, who by working exclusively for the state acquired a semi-official status. All of these agents certainly served to render Roman power ever more present in the commonwealth and the adjacent regions. Outside Italy, in many regions *publicani*, *negotiatores* and *mercatores* must have been the most visible and active representatives of the *res publica*, with their unofficial status fading from the minds of all concerned sooner rather than later.⁸⁹

The dominant position of the Roman power élite in the political system of Roman society was as much a result of their informal clout as of their control of the few formalized institutions. In a sense, magistratures or membership in the senate functioned as addenda to institutions of personal subordination⁹⁰ which can be defined broadly as variants of political clientelism.⁹¹ But clientelistic ties existed not only inside the Roman community; a whole network of such ties kept the Roman alliance together. Every tribe or city in the Roman commonwealth was represented by a Roman patron in the center.⁹² As a rule, the patron-client relationship was forged after Rome had won a decisive victory against its new 'partner'. These clientelistic ties, which were obviously spin-offs of Roman victories in the field, clearly served as addenda to institutions of a more formalistic type (e.g. a military alliance based on a treaty).

In nearly all political systems universally accepted symbols serve as a means of constructing social cohesion. Nowadays, flags and hymns are used as tokens of collective identification. As the ethnic bases of most political systems in pre-modern times were heterogeneous, power élites often imposed such symbols on a partially reluctant population. In Rome, like elsewhere, a set of such tokens was developed in due course. The consul with his trappings and followers came to be regarded as symbols of Roman power.⁹³ The sources describe the awe-inspiring aura that surrounded the spectacle of the appearance of the higher magistrates.⁹⁴ A threat was inherent in this spectacle, embodied in the lictors carrying the fasces which symbolized the coercive powers of the magistrate. Outside the city gates, the threatening character of this drama became even more

⁸⁹ E. Badian, *Zöllner und Sünder. Unternehmer im Dienst der römischen Republik*, Darmstadt, 1997; R. Schulz, *Herrschaft und Regierung. Roms Regiment in den Provinzen in der Zeit der Republik*, Paderborn et al., 1997, 132ff.; 141f.; A. Garcia y Bellido, 'Los mercatores, negotiatores y publicani como vehículos de romanización en la España preimperial', *Hispania* 26, 1966, 497ff.

⁹⁰ T. Johnson/C. Dandeker, 'Patronage: Relation and System', in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society*, London et al., 1989, 219ff.

⁹¹ L. Roniger, 'Modern Patron — Client Relations and Historical Clientelism. Some Clues from Ancient Republican Rome', *Arch. Europ. Sociol.* 24, 1983, 63ff.; P. Eich, *Zur Metamorphose des politischen Systems in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Die Entstehung einer 'personalen Bürokratie' im langen dritten Jahrhundert (Klio Beihefte N.F. 9)*, Berlin, 2005, 67ff. Clientelism in this sense is of course a modern term. The Roman terminology was much more diversified. See e.g. R. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*, Cambridge, 1982, 7ff.

⁹² Cf. e.g. App. *Civ.* 2, 14, 4.

⁹³ A.J.E. Bell, 'Cicero and the Spectacle of Power', *JRS* 88, 1998, 1ff., 10ff.

⁹⁴ K.-J. Hölkeskamp, 'Krieg, Konkurrenz und Konsens: die Expansion in Italien und die Entstehung der Nobilität', in id. (ed.), *Senatus Populusque Romanus. Die politische Kultur der Republik – Dimensionen und Deutungen*, Stuttgart, 2004, 11ff., 20.

obvious, as the lictors put on military dress and mounted the axes in the bundles of rods.⁹⁵ These best-known symbols of the Roman republic clearly showed the close connection between social cohesion and coercion.

In Roman Italy, power of course did not operate through just one channel. The most important building-block of Roman domination was obviously the colonization of the peninsula. That the network of colonies, both Roman and Latin, served first and foremost military purposes is common knowledge.⁹⁶ These colonies, too, added some muscle to the bare bones of the Roman political framework.⁹⁷

5. The Army and the Extraction of Resources

Differentiation between essential and accidental structures is fundamental to every study of political systems. Political analysts of all times have agreed that the procurement of the necessary resources, by connecting a whole range of different components (which are typical for all complex societies), is the one fundamental field, 'the common denominator of all (...) services which supplies them with that which permits them to function'.⁹⁸ This field, which for ease of exposition one may call 'finance',⁹⁹ has been an integral part of our model outlined above. In more developed premodern societies which had already built up an institutional framework, taxes constituted the basic resource of the power élites. Roman taxation, then, should give us some clues to how the Roman political system worked.

Our sources link the first levying of the *tributum* with the introduction of military pay in 406 B.C.¹⁰⁰ Although dates from and narratives about the fifth century can hardly ever be verified, and the report about the levying of a property tax in the premonetized society of late fifth-century Rome is almost certainly anachronistic,¹⁰¹ some kind of correspondence between the imposition of a tax (in kind?) and payment of *stipendia* can be considered plausible.¹⁰² The introduction of major taxes and military pay were closely

⁹⁵ A.J. Marshall, 'Symbols and Showmanship in Roman Public Life: The *fasces*', *Phoenix* 38, 1984, 120ff.

⁹⁶ That was true even at the early stages of the process of colonization in Italy: E. Hermon, 'Le *lapis satricanus* et la colonisation militaire au début de la république', *MEFRA* 111, 1999, 847ff.

⁹⁷ For the relationship between the colonies and the center see J. Bleicken, *Die Verfassung der römischen Republik. Grundlagen und Entwicklung*, Paderborn, 1995, 231ff.; H. Galsterer, *Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republikanischen Italien*, Munich, 1976, 41ff.

⁹⁸ G. Ardant, 'Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations', in Ch. Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, NJ, 1975, 164ff.

⁹⁹ Ardant (n. 98), 164.

¹⁰⁰ Liv. 4, 59, 11-60, 8; cf. Diod. 14, 16, 5.

¹⁰¹ For discussion see P. Marchetti, 'A propos du *tributum* romain: impôt de quotité ou de répartition?', *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique*, Coll. CNRS 936, Paris, 1977, 107ff., 117ff.; H. Zehnacker, 'Rome: une société archaïque au contact de la monnaie (VI^e-IV^e s.)', in *Crise et transformation des sociétés archaïques de l'Italie au V^e siècle av. J.-C.* (CEFR 137), Rome, 1990, 307ff., 319ff.

¹⁰² See M.H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic*, London, 1985, 22f.; Cornell (n. 22), 187, both of whom accept the traditional date.

interconnected in many European states.¹⁰³ Direct taxes stemmed in most of the European monarchies from one-time extraordinary war contributions. Further similarities may be found. As late as the sixteenth century, direct taxation was considered an expedient in times of emergency, to be replaced as soon as possible by other types of revenues.¹⁰⁴ Here again, the Roman *tributum* shows some structural affinity to European types of direct taxation. First, it was levied only in wartime. Moreover, taxpayers expected that, if possible, at least a part of the contribution would be paid back out of the *praeda*.¹⁰⁵ Peace, then, would not only have stopped the flow of booty to Rome. The collection of direct taxes would at least have needed another socially accepted reason, and may even have come to a standstill in peace-time. War, then, in a more abstract sense, indeed fed war. But, obviously, it did more. It produced the surplus that was needed by the Roman power élites for a variety of reasons. Certainly Roman aristocrats required resources to preserve and display their status. Impressive constructions like porticoes or temples served to give Rome the visible outlook of a capital and in this way had a centralizing effect.¹⁰⁶ But building a Roman commonwealth of course was not only about the conspicuous consumption of the social élite. As already stressed in the preceding paragraphs, much of the organizational structure of Rome consisted of the army or of institutions directly dependent on or deriving from the army. Without booty and taxes the Roman state would have lacked the resources to uphold this apparatus.¹⁰⁷ Standstill in war, then, was not only not desirable, it would have led to contraction in a short span of time: Rome was almost by definition a state at war — it could survive as a *dominant* factor in peace-time only for short periods of time.

While in the previous paragraph the focus has been laid on the power élite, that does not mean that the *plebs Romana* was only the passive object of the political maneuvers of the élite. The submissiveness of the *populus Romanus* has frequently been noted.¹⁰⁸ However, such an attitude is not enough to explain why the common people engaged in warfare almost perpetually. There surely was at all times a number of Romans who were

¹⁰³ Cf. P. Eich (n. 91), 20ff.

¹⁰⁴ F.K. Mann, 'The Sociology of Taxation', *The Review of Politics* 5, 1943, 225ff.; 225.

¹⁰⁵ C. Nicolet, *Tributum. Recherches sur la fiscalité directe sous la république romaine* (*Antiquitas* 1, 24), Bonn, 1976, 19ff., especially 26; K. Buraselis, 'Vix aerarium sufficeret. Roman Finances and the Outbreak of the Second Macedonian War', *GRBS* 37, 1996, 149ff., especially 163.

¹⁰⁶ F. Coarelli, 'Public Building in Rome between the Second Punic War and Sulla', *PBSR* 45, 1977, 1ff.

¹⁰⁷ Cf., for instance, the figures compiled by Tenney Frank for the years 200-157 B.C. (which is, as far as figures are concerned, a comparatively well-documented era). Frank gives 550,000,000 *denarii* as the total amount of state expenses for that span of time. Of this total, 472,000,000 *denarii*, according to Frank, were earmarked for the military apparatus. See T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, I: Rome and Italy of the Republic*, Baltimore, 1933, 145 (cf. 228 with regard to the period 150-90 B.C.). The proportion is even more strongly in favor of military expenses according to Crawford (n. 15), II 697.

¹⁰⁸ L.A. Burckhardt, *Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten römischen Republik* (*Hist. Einzelschriften* 57), Stuttgart, 1988, 24ff.; G. Laser, *Populo et scaenae serviendum est. Die Bedeutung der städtischen Masse in der späten Römischen Republik* (*BAC* 23), Trier, 1997, 231ff.

keen to fight in the legions; the personal interest of this group in the Roman conquest has been established beyond doubt in recent years.¹⁰⁹ This constellation hardly comes as a surprise. Every state functions to a certain extent as an enterprise.¹¹⁰ Profits were mostly taken by various élites, but broader strata usually participated in some way; both groups were integrated in interdependent networks. Interaction between the élites and the many parts of the population consisted at least partially in negotiating on surrogate markets;¹¹¹ trading of this kind was hardly ever a one-way street. The participation of the masses in the wars was obviously indispensable. They invested their fighting strength and, at least for some time, their money¹¹² in the common enterprise of war; they expected profits from this undertaking.¹¹³ Movable booty¹¹⁴ and land (distributed to either a group or an individual) were the prizes to be won in the constant wars.¹¹⁵ At least in some cases, considerable wealth was redistributed among broader strata.¹¹⁶ Sometimes, on the other hand, especially in the Spanish wars, profits must have been rather low. Therefore, it

¹⁰⁹ Harris (n. 23), 101ff.

¹¹⁰ See e.g. A. Maczak, *Der Staat als Unternehmen* (Schriften des historischen Kollegs Vorträge 10), Munich, 1989 and the studies of Ch. Tilly and F. Lane dealt with in Section 2.

¹¹¹ For the model cf. A. Breton/R. Wintrobe, *The Logic of the Bureaucratic Conduct*, Cambridge, 1982, especially 162.

¹¹² This is not only true for the professional investors like the *publicani* or military privateers, but also for the wealthier members of the fighting force proper. Cf. Nicolet (n. 105), 46ff. For military privateering in the service of the Roman republic cf. Bleckmann (n. 16), 205ff.

¹¹³ In 187 B.C. the Roman state had reserves worth 25,000,000 *denarii* or 4,250 talents of silver at its disposal (Pliny *NH* 33, 55). This cannot be considered a very impressive sum for the dominant military power of the Mediterranean basin. In contrast, Roman citizens owned taxable goods worth one thousand million *denarii* roughly around the same time according to the estimate of G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* III 2: *L'età delle guerre puniche*, Florence, 1916, 623 (on the basis of Livy 39, 7; cf. Frank, Rome [n. 107], 125). This proportion gives us a clue to who were the real beneficiaries of the Roman expansion.

¹¹⁴ According to Frank (n. 107), 141, the worth of the booty acquired by Roman armies in the years 200-157 B.C. amounted to 18,250 talents. This figure does not include the income from the Spanish mines that is estimated at 8,333 talents for the period from 178 to 157. Cf. Frank, l.c. 230f.; Crawford (n. 15), II 634ff., for additional estimates regarding later epochs.

¹¹⁵ E.T. Salmon, *Roman Colonialization under the Republic*, Ithaca, 1970; Oakley (n. 79), 18ff.; E.S. Gruen, 'Material Rewards and the Drive for Empire', in W.V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome* (Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome 29), Rome, 1984, 59ff.; D. Musti, 'Aspetti economici ed aspetti politici dell'espansione romana nella storiografia polibiana', *ibid.* 35ff.; E. Gabba, 'Il consenso popolare alla politica espansionistica romana fra III et II sec. A.C.', *ibid.*, 115ff.; A.M. Eckstein, *Senate and General. Individual Decision-Making and Foreign Policy, 264-194 B.C.*, Berkeley et al., 1987, 308ff.; A. Aymard, 'Le partage des profits de la guerre dans les traités d'alliances antiques', in *id.*, *Études d'histoire ancienne*, Paris, 1967, 499ff.; Y. Garlan, 'Le partage entre alliés des dépenses et des profits des guerres', in A. Chastagnol et al. (eds.), *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique*, Paris, 1976, Paris, 1977, 149ff.; M. Willing, 'Ökonomische Aspekte des 1. römisch-karthagischen Krieges', in P. Kneissl/V. Losemann (eds.), *Imperium Romanum. Studien zur Geschichte und Rezeption*, Festschrift für K. Christ zum 75. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 1998, 784ff.

¹¹⁶ Nicolet (n. 105), 19ff. Redistribution of considerable sums among the members of the emperor's staff was evidently considered a matter of course (Crawford [n. 15], II 697).

comes as no surprise that there was at all times, and particularly before dangerous campaigns, a group of people who tried to evade fighting.¹¹⁷ While this problem may have concerned usually just a few isolated cases, at times greater parts or even the majority of the people seem to have become restive. Only once do the sources tell us that the *populus Romanus* had to be bullied into voting for war, and that happened immediately after the protracted and bloody Second Punic War.¹¹⁸ But Livy reports that the success of M. Terentius Varro in 217 B.C. was due to anti-war slogans.¹¹⁹ This kind of conduct was perhaps exceptional, but our authorities note complaints about the hardships of campaigns at different times, giving the impression that the perpetual military action met at least sometimes with widespread resentment among citizens.¹²⁰ That was, for obvious reasons, even more true for the allies, who had less to gain from campaigns and probably saw more of the serious fighting, as Roman generals tried to protect the citizens from exceptionally high casualties.¹²¹ The reports about complaints raise the question how the Roman power élites legitimized the constant fighting. This of course is where the whole religious apparatus belongs.¹²² But, more important, most Romans will have joined the army because of patriotic feelings: presumably they believed that Rome fought only to defend herself, that there was a constant danger to their homes and families. This belief was not wholly unfounded. As has been stressed before, Rome was not the only aggressive power, but only followed a typical pattern of the age rather more successfully. But whatever the behavior of the other cities and tribes of Italy, Rome, and especially the senate, had a hand in most of the wars fought in Italy and (later on) in its vicinity from the fourth to the second century (and thereafter as well). Thus the citizens got pressed into wars or were lured into fighting under the pretext of dangers that were, in a sense, very often created by Rome itself. Doubtlessly, many Romans harbored a genuine feeling of being surrounded by dangerous neighbors. But by the same token, many neighbors of Rome must have considered the Latian metropolis a constant menace. This reciprocity in the rousing of fear created a spiral of mutual violence that was very difficult to stop.

There was something of the dynamic of a *perpetuum mobile* at work in regard to the tax-collecting system as well. This is true not only because the continuous warfare made a continuous stream of resources to the center necessary. As the legitimacy of levying the *tributum* was closely linked with a situation of actual warfare, there was a real danger (or, at least, the élite will have perceived the possibility as a danger) that the right to tap the resources of citizens or allies might fall into abeyance during a period of peace. In the late forties and thirties of the last century B.C. the triumvirs actually found out that

¹¹⁷ Brunt (n. 4), 391f. See the relevant sources in K. Bringmann, *Krise und Ende der römischen Republik*, Berlin, 2003, 128ff.

¹¹⁸ Liv. 31, 5ff. Cf. e.g. A. Giovannini, 'Les antécédents de la deuxième guerre de Macédoine', in R. Frei-Stolba/K. Gex (eds.), *Recherches récentes sur le monde hellénistique*, Actes du coll. int. org. à l'occasion du 60e anniversaire de P. Ducrey 1998, Frankfurt, 2001, 97ff.

¹¹⁹ Liv. 22, 34, 3ff.; cf. 38, 6.

¹²⁰ Brunt (n. 4), 393; 396ff.

¹²¹ On the percentage of allies in the Roman army see Brunt (n. 4), 677ff. Appendix 25. On their complaints see especially Vell. 2, 15, 2; Pol. 12, 5.

¹²² See the paradigmatic remarks by Polybius, 6, 56, 6ff.

after 140 years, in the course of which the *tributum* had not been collected, it was very difficult to reintroduce the practice.¹²³

6. Extraction and Geography: The Center-Periphery Relationship

War, then, enabled the Romans to extract additional resources, resources that were hard to come by in peacetime. For some Roman peasants or craftsmen, a victorious campaign added valuable extra gains. Members of the élite could use war-booty to enhance their status. Originally, predatory incursions into hostile territory were the usual way of acquiring additional resources.¹²⁴ As conquest continued, the methods of profit-taking became more sophisticated. Expeditions made for plunder were obviously always a possibility (although there was some refinement in the terminology¹²⁵). Raids were of course a phenomenon that occurred mainly in the peripheral zones of the empire. Inside the pacified perimeter other means of extraction necessarily came into use. We have already discussed the *tributum* and the fact that its very nature created a cyclical dynamic in favor of war. The most important resource Rome drew from the various conquered states were recruits for the common army. It is hard to tell whether this was a deliberate decision to drain potentially dangerous manpower and commit it to a common cause or whether some kind of tribute in money or in kind was considered an unbearable hardship for the conquered party and therefore a likely reason for revolt.¹²⁶ But obviously the creation of such a formidable striking power as the allied forces of Rome became in the third century at the latest committed the Roman power élites to war: the republican army was certainly not a peacetime army such as the army of the principate in the post-Augustan days was to become.¹²⁷ The allied army was forged as a means of attack; action was its most important tool of cohesion. Once again, a circular process was initiated, as the creation of a highly efficient wartime army shaped Roman policy in years in which there was no immediate need for this weapon. The very existence of that army created an environment highly favorable for constant warfare.

The Roman practice of tapping the manpower of their various 'allies' was obviously the surrogate for a tax.¹²⁸ The Romans took from their Italian allies what was there in abundance — men of military age. The legitimacy of the Roman action is another

¹²³ The Roman government actually desisted from collecting the *tributum* after 168 B.C. (but by no means formally renounced its right to collect it). The revenues were substituted by other forms of income (duties, *vectigalia*, *stipendia*); see Nicolet (n. 105), 5ff.; 79ff.

¹²⁴ For the ostentatious display of the booty cf. A. Rouveret, 'Captiva arma: guerre, butin, économie dans les cités de Grande Grèce et de Campanie du V^e siècle à l'expédition de Pyrrhus', in J. Andreau et al. (eds.), *Économie antique. La guerre dans les économies antiques* (Entretiens d'archéologie et d'histoire) Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, 2000, 83ff.

¹²⁵ Cf. e.g. Caes. *BG* 3, 7; *Bell. Afr.* 9, 2.

¹²⁶ For a later parallel, see the discussion of the Augustan policy in Spain by G. Alföldy, 'Das neue Edikt des Augustus aus El Bierzo in Hispanien', *ZPE* 131, 2000, 177ff.

¹²⁷ B. Dobson, 'The Roman Army: Wartime or Peacetime Army?', in W. Eck/H. Wolff (eds.), *Heer und Integrationspolitik. Die römischen Militärdiplome als historische Quelle* (PHF 2), Cologne et al., 1986, 10ff.

¹²⁸ A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom*, Cambridge 1975, 46. The allies had to pay their contingents of the allied forces: Crawford (n. 102), 187.

question. In providing the troops requested, the allies first of all obeyed the orders of their hegemon. Since Roman military power was considered superior, fear suggested compliance with the stipulations of the various treaties. But fear alone could hardly be counted upon to guarantee cohesion. That was especially true in the first years of the Second Punic War, when Rome's power was stumbling and the days of Roman hegemony seemed to be numbered. Still, only a few allies rebelled; this reaction might give us a clue to the problem of why the subjects usually remained loyal. We know that the allies complained more than once of the burden they had to shoulder in the Roman wars. They must have recognized that they were to a large extent responsible for the Roman success, but were unable to capitalize on this success adequately.¹²⁹ In spite of their grievances, the allies year after year provided Rome with the troops the hegemon needed for its expansionistic drive. Most of the cities and tribes involved *must have believed* that these permanent wars were at least in part for the common good. Individual soldiers of course profited from the booty won in enemy territory.¹³⁰ But Rome must also have succeeded in marking its enemies as common enemies whose victory would have a disastrous effect not only on Roman territory but on the whole alliance. In a weakened form the same mechanisms must have become effective as in the Roman population: Fear of something worse to come made the allies comply with the demands of Rome. As it was the Romans who usually started the wars, here again we find a circular process that contributed to the permanency of warfare.

Inside the inner ring of direct Roman rule, extraction of resources *except for recruits* (or veterans, for that matter) was less intensified. Considering the probable input/output relation, it can be seriously doubted that the Roman dominion was self-sustaining in the late fourth and third centuries. Raids into hostile (or simply neighboring) territory always remained an option of course, but income from booty by definition is irregular and precarious. Indemnities from defeated enemies could serve as short-term surrogates for full-scale tributes. The imposition of indemnities was an instrument constantly¹³¹ used by the Roman authorities from 394 B.C., when the payment of an indemnity (by Falerii) is first recorded in our sources.¹³² But incomes from indemnities were bound to terminate sooner or later; considering the small size of most Italian communities and the fact that most of them lost land in a settlement with Rome, the indemnities could have had only a short-term stabilizing effect on Roman incomes in the fourth and third centuries.¹³³ Whenever one of the agreements stipulated after Roman victories expired, there must naturally have been tendencies in Rome to substitute another source of income for the one lost — an aim that could only be achieved by means of a new war. Here again the dynamics of Roman warfare become visible. The resources which the Roman power élites needed to hold together the Roman dominion came in only piecemeal. Without expansion, earnings would have plummeted. This constellation left the Roman power élites in a dilemma: to gain some much-needed stability there was hardly any other

¹²⁹ Brunt (n. 4), 677ff.

¹³⁰ W.V. Harris, 'The Italians and the Empire', in id. (ed.) (n. 115), 89ff.

¹³¹ Frank (n. 107), 426, general index, s.v. indemnity.

¹³² Liv. 5, 27, 15. See more generally Liv. 10, 46, 12.

¹³³ When the expansion of Rome reached its wealthy neighbors outside Italy indemnities rose to enormous heights: see the figures compiled by Frank (n. 107), 127ff.; 230f.

choice but to make use of the dynamics of constant warfare. We are not advocating a scenario in which Roman élites deliberately picked war from a set of possible strategies to maintain their grip on resources. Once the drive for hegemony was established, and that must have been rather soon in Roman history, there was hardly room for conscious decisions whether to go to war or not: by the fourth century, these kind of decisions must have fallen into the category of ‘what goes without saying’.¹³⁴

Roman incomes, then, fluctuated in the period of the conquest of Italy. Outside Italy things were different. Sometime after the First Punic War,¹³⁵ Rome established its first province — whatever that meant exactly in the third century B.C.¹³⁶ — taking over substantial parts of Sicily. Roughly at the same time Sardinia and Corsica were made a Roman province. Ever since then, Sicily and Sardinia yielded important revenues for the center.¹³⁷ In these cases, conquest brought substantial and, what is more, stable profits. The tangible advantages of overseas expansion must have made a strategy of conquering other wealthy peoples enticing.

The territory under Roman control (used here in a broad sense) displays a zoning into spheres of different levels of profit-taking, arranged in a roughly circular manner around the center. Inside the inner sphere of Roman control, *tributum* was collected and manpower recruited; in the pacified perimeter of the alliance extraction concentrated on the recruitment of soldiers and on the calling-in of *munera* like street-building. Food also had to be supplied to Roman armies in the field. In the provincial areas (the periphery of the empire), the republic preferred to siphon off taxes in kind and in money, precious metals and other mineral resources. Merchants and credit lenders profited from the protection rents the republic granted them. For the members of the élite downright plunder remained an option until the end of the *libera res publica*.¹³⁸

To round off the picture we have sketched, it is necessary to stress that the profit-taking was not limited by rigid frontiers like, for example, those of a province. To begin with, the whole concept of a territorially defined ‘province’ was slow to emerge.¹³⁹ The word *imperium* could even in the first century B.C. denote the Roman sphere of influence, a sphere hardly defined by clear boundaries. This vagueness of the concept opened up vast possibilities for profit-taking in enemy-territory.¹⁴⁰ Looting and other crude

¹³⁴ M. Bloch, ‘What Goes Without Saying’, in A. Kuper (ed.), *Conceptualizing Society*, London, 1992, 127ff.

¹³⁵ Cf. T.C. Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, Oxford, 2000, 89ff.

¹³⁶ D. Hoyos, ‘*Lex Provinciae* and Governor’s Edict’, *Antichthon* 7, 1973, 47ff.; A.W. Lintott, ‘What Was the “Imperium Romanum”?’’, *G&R* 28, 1981, 53ff.; R. Kallett-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire. The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148-62 B.C.*, Berkeley, 1995, 18ff.

¹³⁷ Liv. 36, 2, 12f.; 37, 2, 12; 50, 9f.; 42, 31, 8; Cic. *Verr.* 2, 3, 127; 3, 73; Erdkamp (n. 88), 85ff.; 93; id., ‘The Corn Supply of the Roman Armies during the Principate (27 BC-235 AD)’, in id. (ed.), *The Roman Army and the Economy*, Amsterdam, 2002, 47ff., 50; T. Naco del Hoyo, ‘Roman Realpolitik in Taxing Sardinian Rebels (177-175 B.C.)’, *Latomus* 62, 2003, 531ff.

¹³⁸ See e.g. App. *Mithr.* 11, 5; *Iust.* 38, 5, 10. Cf. the behavior of Caesar during his propraetorship in Hispania ulterior 62 B.C. (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 54, 1).

¹³⁹ See n. 136.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. n. 32.

forms of profit-taking might occur outside as well as inside 'provinces'. More important, cities and tribes beyond the borders (however permeable these were) very often came to depend on Roman power. But the Roman army looked for supplies even outside the territories of such allies, siphoning off, incidentally, every kind of profit it possibly could.¹⁴¹ Thus the zoning of the Roman dominion into a center, a semi-periphery and a periphery was reduplicated at the periphery in a slightly different constellation. The province with its *caput* constituted a sub-center. Across the 'border', allied cities, tribes under Roman protection, or friendly kings had to pay irregular but nevertheless often substantial sums (in money or kind) for the privilege of being part of the Roman commonwealth.¹⁴² But even beyond this semi-periphery, the Romans and the allies collectively or individually realized large profits. Italian traders were present in such regions as Gaul on the eve of its subjugation on a massive scale.¹⁴³ Their protection rents increased enormously with the presence of a Roman army. They acted as informants of nearby Roman magistrates and often prepared the way for a more active Roman engagement in the region. It is small wonder that Roman *negotiatores* and *mercatores* were bitterly hated in formally independent regions under Roman influence as in Gaul.¹⁴⁴ Justly or not, they must have been considered the harbingers of direct Roman rule. Frontiers created various possibilities of profit-taking, and the Roman frontiers were certainly not entirely closed even to hostile territories.¹⁴⁵

Subjecting territories outside Italy and former independent states obviously brought tangible advantages for Rome — and this time on a regular basis. Still, a deliberate policy of provincialization was slow to emerge and taxation in some conquered areas,

¹⁴¹ Erdkamp (n. 88), 84ff.; 98ff.

¹⁴² Cf. e.g. D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King. The Character of the Client Kingship*, London et al., 1984. Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* illustrates very well how the zones of center, semi-periphery and periphery *inside* the imperial periphery were interconnected. E.g. the Allobroges were as part of the Narbonensian provincial organization fully integrated into the aggression against *Gallia libera*. The Haedui, an adjacent tribe to the north of the province, were bound by contractual obligations to take part in military operations. The Senones (on the periphery of the periphery) were expected to answer the commands of the Roman general without being formally obliged to do so (*BG* 2, 2, 3).

¹⁴³ R.L.B. Morris, 'Mercatores and the *Bellum Gallicum*', *CB* 66, 1990, 83ff.; Garcia y Bellido (n. 89); A.J.N. Wilson, *Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome*, Manchester 1966.

¹⁴⁴ It is certainly no accident that the great insurgency of Vercingetorix started with the massacre of the Roman *negotiatores* present in Cenabum (*BG* 7, 3). For similar incidents see Sall. *Iug.* 20ff.; Pol. 2, 8, 1ff.; Eutr. 3, 7; App. *Mithr.* 22f.; Plut. *Sulla* 24; Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 22, 9; Val. Max. 9, 2, 4, ext. 3. For the influence of Roman and allied businessmen cf. M.H. Crawford, *Roman Statutes (BICS 64)*, London, 1996, I 231ff. N^o. 12, *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, Cnidus copy, col. II, 1ff. with the commentary on 259; G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* III 1: *L'età delle guerre puniche*², Florence, 1916, 399ff.; E.J. Bickermann, 'Notes sur Polybe III. Initia belli Macedonici', *REG* 66, 1953, 479ff.; 494; Harris (n. 130), 101.

¹⁴⁵ C.R. Whittaker, 'Supplying the Army. Evidence from Vindolanda', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *The Roman Army and the Economy*, Amsterdam 2002, 204ff., 230ff.; see id., *Frontiers of the Roman Empire. A Social and Economic Study*, Baltimore 1994, for full discussion of the evidence.

especially Spain, seems to have been disparate, disorganized¹⁴⁶ and of low intensity. After Pydna, Rome did not take over direct responsibility for Macedonia and exacted only half of the royal tax-yield.¹⁴⁷ This *seeming* lack of interest in taxation has been one of the cornerstones of the critique of the theory that Rome engaged in expansionism for economic advantages.¹⁴⁸ Obviously, Rome did not make use of its victories by carrying away everything it could. But would it have been possible to increase profits in regions freshly conquered without building up a large and effective civil administration and sufficient police forces to protect the tax-collectors? In our opinion, it is highly likely that, in view of its rudimentary administration, Rome got the *maximum* it *could* get under the given circumstances.¹⁴⁹ Nearly all peoples who were later on subjected to the hardships of Roman rule revolted against the victor after the consequences of defeat became clear. Taxes played an important part in these revolts. War, garrisons, and therefore higher costs were the results of these rebellions, which effectively must have decreased Roman income because of destructions, casualties and costs for the garrisons. Hieron of Syracuse, Macedonia and the Illyrian chiefdom of the Ardiaei paid substantial sums to their Roman conquerors without being compelled to undergo formal provincialization.¹⁵⁰ Here the *res publica* received revenues without rendering the appropriate service: in the cases of Macedonia and the Ardiaei, the defeated states had to protect their own borders.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ See J.S. Richardson, *The Romans in Spain*, Oxford, 1996, 70ff.; id., *Hispaniae. Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism 218-82 B.C.*, Cambridge, 1986, 115f.; B.D. Hoyos, *Unplanned Wars. The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 50), Berlin et al., 1998, 262f.; it has to be remarked, however, that our sources are far from being unambiguous.

¹⁴⁷ Plut. *Aem.* 28; Liv. 45, 18, 7; 29, 4. In fact, Rome did not lower the taxes by half but took away half of the taxes formerly paid to the king for itself, reducing at the same time the capacity of the Macedonian republics to collect their share of the total tax volume (for instance, by closing down the mines of the Pangaion).

¹⁴⁸ E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic East and the Coming of Rome*, Berkeley et al., 1984, 423ff.; Hoyos (n. 146), 262; A.N. Sherwin-White, 'Rome the Aggressor?' Review of Harris, *War* (n. 23), *JRS* 70, 1980, 177ff.; cf. Kallett-Marx (n. 136), especially 235ff.

¹⁴⁹ Some well-known figures may illustrate the unprecedented scale of the Roman income in comparison with every other state of the ancient Mediterranean world. National income between 200 and 157 B.C. exceeded 600,000,000 *denarii*, i.e. more than 100,000 talents of silver (Frank, *Rome* [n. 107], 141). Carthage received 1,000 talents of silver *p.a.* after the reforms of Hannibal (Cf. A. Giovannini, 'L'or africain. Un aspect méconnu de l'économie antique et de l'impérialisme romain', in J. Andreau et al. [eds.], *Économie antique. La guerre dans les économies antiques* [Entretiens d'archéologie et d'histoire], Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, 2000, 253ff.; 264). At the height of its power the Delian Alliance had at its disposal 9,700 talents of accumulated wealth. The economically and politically flourishing Rhodes of the early second century B.C. had an annual income of 175 talents: Pol. 30, 31, 12. Roman income *per annum* until 62 B.C. amounted to ca. 50,000,000 *denarii*, i.e. 8,333 talents *p.a.* (Plut. *Pomp.* 45). The Pompeian conquests brought in an additional 85,000,000 *denarii* (Crawford [n. 15], II 695). Caesar's conquest of Gaul added further 40,000,000 HS to the Roman income (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 25, 1).

¹⁵⁰ Hiero: H. Berve, 'König Hieron II', *Abh. Bay. Akad. d. Wiss.* N.F. 47, Munich, 1959, 36; Illyrians: Pol. 2, 12, 3; Liv. 22, 33, 5; Macedonia: cf. n. 147.

¹⁵¹ *V. Hadr.* 5, 3 = *ORF*² fr. 162; cf. Lane (n. 40), 53ff.

The huge, albeit not excessive,¹⁵² war indemnity Carthage had to pay after the Second Punic War in reality came very close to a tribute as well.¹⁵³ Rome did not lack interest in tributes, *it lacked the institutions* to extract resources from conquered states on a regular basis without a certain degree of consent of the subjected enemies. As usual, success depended on the bargaining power Rome had. As M. Levi has put it: 'Given that the ruler [or, in this case, the rulers¹⁵⁴] tends to act like a discriminating monopolist, it can be further hypothesized that he will tax groups and individuals in relation to his enforcement capacity and their bargaining power. The extent to which he depends on particular individuals and groups and can measure and monitor their contribution will determine the amount of taxes they will be requested to pay'.¹⁵⁵ The Roman attitude to tributes in the second century is a case in point. The same argument in principle applies also to the question raised by Erich Gruen¹⁵⁶ why Rome, if it was interested economically in these payments, sometimes renounced parts of indemnities due according to older treaties. But on the assumption that Rome took what it could get without investing too much energy and time, this seems to be logical conduct. A more complex approach is needed to explain why after 168 the *tributum* was suspended.¹⁵⁷ The legitimacy of the tax and the expectations of the many may have been the decisive consideration of the leading senators in accepting this lowering of the income of the *res publica*. The constant flow of resources from the newly conquered territories outside Italy certainly helped the senators to come to terms with such a solution.¹⁵⁸ But there was something to be gained as well by this decision. By lowering the pressure on the people to contribute to the Roman expansion, the power élites at the same time decreased their dependency on the people, while on the other hand the dependency of the people on the power élites became even stronger, as the continuous flow of resources from the provinces to the capital lay outside any immediate control of the Roman people. Rulers at all times tried to maximize *wealth as well as power*. Both were equally important resources for them. A decrease of dependency certainly contributed to the power of the élites.¹⁵⁹ From this point of view any objections against a micro-economic approach to Roman expansionism built on the Roman principles of taxation up to the first century B.C. do not carry much weight. They simply do not take into account the stage of development Rome had reached at this time in its rise to power.

In contrast to the tyrants of Syracuse,¹⁶⁰ or royal condottieri like Alexander the Molossian¹⁶¹ or Pyrrhus,¹⁶² the Romans certainly did not rush the process of integration

¹⁵² Liv. 36, 4.

¹⁵³ Pol. 15, 18; Liv. 30, 37, 1ff.; App. *Pun.* 234ff.

¹⁵⁴ Levi (n. 41), 409; cf. Tilly (n. 39), 176.

¹⁵⁵ Levi (n. 41), 429; cf. 431.; see also Lane (n. 40), 112, on the limits of levying tributes from conquered people etc. set 'by the danger that too high a tribute will stimulate attempts to break the monopoly, i.e. will attract invaders, stimulate smuggling, or provoke insurrection'.

¹⁵⁶ Gruen (n. 115), 59ff.; 63.

¹⁵⁷ Cic. *Off.* 2, 76; Val. Max. 4, 3, 8; Plin. *NH* 23, 56; Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 38; cf. Cic. *Flacc.* 80; Phil. 2, 93.

¹⁵⁸ See the figures presented by Frank (n. 103), 141.

¹⁵⁹ Levi (n. 41), 433.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. the narrative of Diodorus, especially 14, 41ff.

of defeated enemies or *socii* in a new coherent political framework. The Roman commonwealth from the fourth to the second century was a *state in the making*. While the successful Diadochi could build on very old monarchic political systems when they formed their empires, Italy in Hellenistic times was still dominated by cities and tribes. The agglomeration of such units by force did not in itself create durable new states with common institutions, a coherent political framework and a common policy widely accepted as legitimate. Such a process took time, time neither the Syracusan tyrants nor the Hellenistic monarchs, who invaded Italy, were willing or able to invest. The Roman people of the republic acted as an enterprise employing violence. First, the state had to monopolize violence — a process in itself long and difficult.¹⁶³ Physical violence was at the same time used to create profits, first by plundering, which hardly created a durable surplus, then by various forms of taxation, including the tapping of manpower. This manpower gave the Romans advantages of scale in their effort to extort more revenue from their enemies, real, imagined or pretended. Inside a pacified perimeter, the Roman state produced especially one good: protection. Protection was offered also to states that lay outside the inner sphere of control either in need of protection (due to attacks by a third party) or succumbing to Roman threats. In cases like these the republic acted as ‘racketeer’, creating a threat and then charging for its reduction.¹⁶⁴ The monopolizing of violence created further possibilities of profit-taking that were spin-offs of the original enterprise. As for traders, they could make use of the protection the Roman state sold in order to realize various profits. Some of these traders were members of the power élite,¹⁶⁵ but others were not immediately involved in producing violence but operated under the shield of Roman military protection in various regions of Italy or the Mediterranean.¹⁶⁶ The state created another means of profit-taking by contracting out activities to entrepreneurs, especially in the fields of army supply and levying of various taxes. For all of its activities, the Roman state could make do with a very rudimentary organization. The almost complete focus on one business — violence, i.e. repression or protection — rendered a big administrative apparatus almost redundant, thereby minimizing the costs of the enterprise. There was but little administrative penetration of Italy even in the first century B.C. or during the principate.¹⁶⁷ Roman Italy was slow to emerge;¹⁶⁸ the process

¹⁶¹ S. Funke, *Aiakidenmythos und Epeirotisches Königtum. Der Weg einer hellenischen Monarchie*, Stuttgart, 2000, 174ff.

¹⁶² Funke (n. 161), 205ff.

¹⁶³ D. Timpe, ‘Das Kriegsmonopol des römischen Staates’, in W. Eder (ed.) (n. 14), 368ff.; this, again, is a typical feat of premodern states: Tilly (n. 39), 173.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. N. Rosenstein, ‘Republican Rome’, in K. Raaflaub/N. Rosenstein (eds.), *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds — Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe, and Meso-america*, Cambridge, MA, 1999, 193ff., 195.

¹⁶⁵ P. Temin, ‘A Market Economy in the Early Roman Empire’, *JRS* 91, 2001, 169ff.

¹⁶⁶ See the still-useful account of J. Hatzfeld, *Les trafiquants italiens dans l’orient hellénique*, Paris, 1919.

¹⁶⁷ Galsterer (n. 97), 3; 127f.; 135ff.; W. Eck, *Die staatliche Organisation Italiens in der hohen Kaiserzeit* (Vestigia 28), München, 1979.

¹⁶⁸ Raaflaub (n. 17), 512; cf. the various papers in M. Torelli, *The Romanization of Italy*, ed. and translated by H. Fracchia/M. Gualtieri, Edmonton, 1995; I. Aigner-Foresti (ed.), *Die Integration der Etrusker und das Weiterwirken etruskischen Kulturgutes im*

of unification had not finished in the first century B.C.; even the distribution of the citizenship to almost all of Italy after the social war did not mark the final stage of the process.¹⁶⁹ The Roman élite bided their time; either out of political wisdom or out of lack of imagination, they did not create a sophisticated administrative apparatus that would have allowed them to tap the resources of Italy more efficiently and to lay out more detailed guidelines to cities and tribes under their control. They focused on the primary task of states in pre-modern times: the monopolizing of physical violence. By this self-restriction they won the time necessary to stabilize the new political entity they were creating.

Conclusion. War and State-Building: The Case of Rome

In most modern accounts the word ‘imperialism’ is applied to strategies and policies of full-blown states. The European states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries conquered huge, distant territories, usually without incorporating them formally and fully into their political system. As our short analysis has shown, the Roman conquest was quite a different story. The use of the label ‘imperialism’ to describe Roman expansionism therefore seems problematic. This observation served as our starting-point in this paper. To compare the Roman republic of the fourth and third centuries to the European powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is clearly inappropriate; to use the word ‘imperialism’ in a vague sense creates the even bigger problem that the concept loses all its heuristic value. We therefore have presented another model which, in contrast to the older one, is explicitly constructed out of comparative material. The model which we have chosen to explain Roman aggressiveness is the concept of the ‘state-building process’ as developed by modern sociologists and comparative historians for ‘coercion-intensive regions’ in almost all parts of the world. It was our purpose to show that, in spite of a number of deviations from the norm (a fact which in itself is perfectly normal), the Roman republic fits this pattern very well. States in our model emerge from violence-controlling organizations. Typically, embryonic states in coercion intensive regions therefore strive to monopolize violence in a given territory. To achieve that aim, emerging states almost always engaged in continuous war-making to monopolize power, eliminate rivals and extract the necessary resources. We have discussed these various activities with regard to the Roman state-building process in Sections 3 and 4. Obviously, the Roman army was the spinal column of the emerging Roman state which lacked the institutional framework to survive long periods of peace. Moreover, the continuous warfare had centralizing effects on the Roman commonwealth which resulted in an (albeit slow) process of formalization of the political system. By winning almost every war the army at the same time procured the resources necessary to move forward in the state-building process. As the collection of resources was less intensive inside the

republikanischen und kaiserzeitlichen Rom, Wien, 1998; Vallat (n. 76), 9 and passim; O. de Cazanove, ‘Itinéraires et étapes de l’avancée romaine entre Samnium, Daunie, Lucanie et Étrurie’, in D. Briquel/J.-P. Thuillier (eds.), *Sur Tite-Live, Livre IX*, Paris, 2001, 147ff.; H. Mouritsen, *Italian Unification. A Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography*, London, 1998.

¹⁶⁹ R. Stewart, ‘Catiline and the Crisis of 63-60 B.C.: The Italian Perspective’, *Latomus* 54, 1995, 62ff.; R.S. Howarth, ‘Rome, the Italians, and the Land’, *Historia* 48, 1999, 282ff.

pacified perimeter that formed the center of the dynamic Roman community, the Roman search for additional resources was automatically directed to its borders, thereby widening the pacified perimeter and creating new peripheral and semi-peripheral zones at the margins of the Roman dominion.

The Roman success during the third century of course changed the quality of the Roman expansion. The (emerging) 'state' of Rome in the third century cannot any longer be exclusively defined by reference to its territory, population and authority.¹⁷⁰ Various other groups of people and categories of land were included in the commonwealth. By concentrating on the core activities of a historical state in a coercion-intensive region, the Roman power élites merged an ever-growing part of Italy into one political framework. Greg Woolf has remarked that, although there was an institutional nucleus which may be considered a (city-)state, the Romans tended to speak of themselves first and foremost as a people; in this they were of course hardly unique in the ancient world.¹⁷¹ Forging a new, bigger political framework, then, was not only a task of setting up new institutions. In the third century, Rome had broken the limits of a face-to-face society. Under these conditions it must have been of paramount importance to create some social and political cohesion.¹⁷² The continuous wars served as the most important lever for overcoming the restrictions of the political system of the polis-type. The army was the mold by which something new was created. P. Veyne has raised the question 'Comment une hégémonie devient-elle État multinational?'¹⁷³ We have tried to give an answer to this question. The so-called Roman 'imperialism' indeed was a rather typical *state-building process* in a coercion-intensive region. It resulted in a new, bigger and to a certain extent coherent political unit: Roman Italy. That does not mean that the state-building process discussed in this paper came to an end in the first century B.C. Italy in the last age of the Roman republic formed the nucleus of a state, but the process of state-making obviously was an ongoing one. It did not stop at the physical boundaries of Italy and was not completely transformed by the institutionalization of the *principatus*. The shaping of Roman Italy which was to a certain extent coherent certainly was a significant step in this ongoing process. But the temptation to evaluate the Roman performance in state-building on a range of levels, somehow extrapolated from our model, must be resisted. We lack the data to do so and such a scale does not exist, anyway. The state-building process as described in this paper continued in the post-Augustan empire, as the Roman power élites still mainly concentrated on controlling violence and selling protection even in Italy. The pacified nucleus was enlarged as new peripheries were created on a regular basis. Only in the late second century A.D., when the first clear signs of imperial attenuation became discernible, did the attitude of the power élites start to change. The almost constant defensive wars of the third century brought about the creation of a rather typical historical bureaucracy — another significant step in the ongoing state-building process. This step and its consequences have been discussed elsewhere.¹⁷⁴ In the end, the

¹⁷⁰ See Eder (n. 38), 18.

¹⁷¹ Woolf (n. 31), 314.

¹⁷² Eder (n. 38), 20; Martin (n. 38), 229.

¹⁷³ 'Y a-t-il un impérialisme romain?', *Mefra* 87, 1975, 793ff.; 855.

¹⁷⁴ P. Eich (n. 91); A. Eich/P. Eich, 'Thesen zur Genese des Verlautbarungsstiles der spätantiken kaiserlichen Zentrale', *Tyche* 20, 2005, 1ff.

Roman quest for the building of a *Reichsstaat* failed, mainly because of the inability to raise sufficient resources. In this regard, too, the Roman *res publica* was hardly unique.

Passau and Köln