

M. has done valuable service by reediting the texts and reconsidering their significance; in general I am attracted to her new line of interpretation; but I do not think certainty has yet been reached.

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Peter Hunt, *War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes' Athens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. xiii + 317 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-83551-0.

The aim of this clever and thought-provoking book is to elucidate Athenian notions of interstate relations with particular emphasis on those considerations which mostly influenced decision-making (rather than on philosophical theories, for example). Accordingly, the book is based primarily on the evidence of fifteen deliberative speeches and two pairs of opposing forensic speeches by Demosthenes and Aeschines which focus largely on foreign policy matters. While Greek interstate relations were recently treated by P. Low, Hunt's (henceforth H.) main focus is not on these relations as such, but rather on Athenian thought about them. Many of the ideas presented in the book are formulated and argued in the Introduction (1-26). Here, H. contrasts his attitude and methodology 'first with scholarship that portrays Athenian thinking as simple and deplorable and second with *unmasking* methodologies, according to which the stated grounds for war — as found in assembly speeches — only mask the truth and thus need to be stripped away rather than examined' (1, cf. 3). H. insists on taking the evidence of deliberative oratory seriously rather than preferring *a priori* theories or elitist texts like those of Thucydides or Plato. As H. notes, skepticism about the stated grounds of war is mostly applicable to modern conditions with their chasm between public foreign policy discourse and the language of the elite behind closed doors. But in a direct democracy such as Athens, 'decision-making and the appeal to public opinion were one and the same process' (6). While conceding a theoretical possibility of unmentioned or even unconscious motives in Athenian foreign policy, the author still maintains that assembly speeches provide our best opportunity to test various considerations that influenced Athenian deliberations with regard to international relations. If there was a factor in causing a war, it was usually present in the arguments upon which Athenian decisions were based. At the same time, arguments that persuaded the audience can quite precisely be called genuine causes of war or peace (5-7).

Before we proceed, the evidentiary basis of the material should be discussed. The authenticity of the speeches used is considered in Appendix 1. Andocides III (*On the Peace*), perhaps, deserves more detailed discussion. Chronologically, it stands separately and it is the only preserved speech where the Athenians are said to be morally wrong in the war currently waged. The contention of E. Harris (2000) that it is a late forgery based on Aeschines II is rejected by H. in a single sentence with reference to a 1995 edition of Andocides (274).¹ Not surprisingly, Edwards in his edition does not counter the main arguments of Harris' work, published five years later. As Hunt offers no new arguments of his own here, the main points of Harris' thesis remain undiscussed. Yet even if the speech was written by Andocides, it is still possible that it is

¹ M. Edwards, (1995), *Greek Orations*, vol. IV: *Andocides*, Warminster, 107-8, *contra* E. Harris, (2000), 'The Authenticity of Andocides' *De Pace*. A Subversive Essay', in *Polis & Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History, Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday*, 2000, eds. P. Flensted-Jensen, Th. Heine Nielsen, L. Rubinstein, Copenhagen, 479-505.

“subversive”² or, more probably, is a pamphlet disguised as a speech. Neither of these two possibilities is mentioned by H.

While inferences from these speeches are directly applicable only to Athens of the fourth century BCE, and mostly to its third quarter, H. cautiously suggests that some of the attitudes reflected in Athenian speeches were shared by Athenians of other periods and sometimes by other Greeks as well (18-20). The author explains his principles in using other sources, including assembly speeches reported by Thucydides and Xenophon, which are found to ‘present arguments well within the mainstream of Athenian thinking’ (23). This continuity is perhaps somewhat exaggerated: for instance, Cleon’s comparison of the Athenian empire with tyranny (Th. 3.37.2) is never followed in the extant speeches. Athenian thinking about interstate relations is seen as ‘structured and generally coherent, but not rigorously developed or logically consistent’ (13). But then, ‘logically consistent’ foreign policy is perhaps impossible (15, cf. 159). In contrast to reductionist theories of international relations, which privilege either internal or external reasons of interstate behavior, H. finds no single factor of either type behind Athenian foreign policy and argues ‘for a middle and inclusive approach — a position hardly surprising for a historian’ (1, 27-8).

Accordingly, what unites the chapters of this book is not a single overarching thesis about Athenian thinking, but rather the author’s attitude towards this thinking, ‘a charitable and empathetic one’, and his methodological preference for the evidence of assembly speeches (1). Discussing these speeches, H. deliberately puts aside questions of rhetorical and historical context, which allows him to focus on the connection between various arguments and ‘to understand the overall structure of Athenian thinking about war and peace’ (9). For this purpose, H. also draws upon theories and ideas from a variety of fields, such as cognitive psychology, game theory, international relations theory, sociology, anthropology, and comparative history of war and peace. H. believes that the insights from these fields, some of which are regarded with suspicion by ancient historians, are needed if we want not only to describe Athenian thinking, but also to explain it (10). While I find this approach promising, one consequence is that the parallels drawn — though highly relevant and illuminating — are mostly modern, perhaps at the expense of comparisons with other complex pre-industrial societies. Rome, for instance, is absent from the name index of the volume.

After the Introduction, H. begins by discussing ways of thinking that derived from the internal structure of Athenian society, first of all from economics and militaristic culture. In Chapter 2, ‘Economics’ (26-50), H. justly observes that by the mid-fourth century war was not considered a paying proposition. As he notes, modern historians who explain Athenian wars by pursuit of profit are influenced by Plato and other elitist authors, but whereas for Plato luxury is ‘a spur to unnecessary wars, Demosthenes sees it as a hindrance to necessary ones’ (32). Plato is surely tendentious, but I would suggest that the larger part of the war booty was rarely, if ever, deposited in the treasury, and thus, while the financial balance was negative for the state, the war may still have been profitable for many individual citizens who voted for it. Besides, Plato and his modern followers mean not only the plunder, but also, and mainly, the long-term profits of successful wars. And, in Plato’s view, even defensive wars could be more easily avoided by an ascetic polis whose economic conditions would not tempt her neighbors. As for long-term interests, H. is fully aware of Athens’ dependence on grain import. The need to protect grain routes shaped the city’s foreign policy, which could take a form of military actions or of negotiations. As H. reminds us, the grain import, like the supply of petrol today, might have been not only boosted through war, but also jeopardized by it (37-9, cf. 266). H. finds that among the poorer citizens there is a greater tendency to go to war because, in his view, they were more heavily dependent on imported grain

² A. Missiou, (1992), *The Subversive Oratory of Andokides: Politics, Ideology and Decision-making in Democratic Athens*, Cambridge.

(39, 41). Besides, while the wealthy were more concerned about the costs of war which they had to pay, the poor could have looked for financial gain through military service (39-46). Some of these arguments and assumptions (e.g. that most *thētes* were landless while wealthy Athenians were predominantly corn-growing farmers) are debatable, but H. is probably correct in assuming that, other conditions being equal, economic considerations may at times have divided Athenians in their attitudes towards war and peace. But, as H. notes, other conditions were rarely equal, and, at least at the time of Demosthenes, war generally amounted to more sacrifice than gain for rich and poor alike (50).

As for militaristic culture as a factor in Athens' recourse to war, in Chapter 3, 'Militarism' (51-71) H. justly notes that Athens was not particularly militaristic — 'probably by the standards of most times and places' (59), while zero level of militarism, i.e. no value placed on military prowess, is hardly possible as long as war exists (59, 267). Of course, the Athenians valued military service highly (forensic claims of service are collected in Appendix 3), and because of militarism, the war probably appeared more attractive to the Athenians than it would otherwise be (62). While no orator in the Assembly would argue for war for its own sake, the Athenians' view of their history, 'distorted by patriotism' (62-3), may have encouraged excessive optimism and increased their readiness to go to war (63-71). The surprising idea of optimism as a major factor in the outbreak of wars is one of the insights borrowed by H. from the theory of international relations. It should be noted, though, that a similar idea is already expressed by Thucydides (see the relevant passages on p. 63, and cf. 3.45, unmentioned by H.).

Chapter 4, 'Unequal treatment of states' (72-107), argues that, while Athens took other states' nature into account in its relations with them, considerations of ethnicity, religion, and political system played only a limited role in Athenian decisions: A state's actions were considered much more important. The attitude towards intervention in another state's internal affairs was as ambivalent then as it is today (95-7). Here H. differs from P. Low who finds that, of two conflicting principles — the preservation of the sovereignty of the nation-states and the responsibility of the international community to defend human rights within those states — modern international law prefers non-intervention, whereas 'almost the exact opposite was the case in the Greek world'. This difference of conclusions is explained by H. with reference to Low's definition of intervention which covers any participation in a war between other states, whereas it is interference in another state's internal politics that is problematic both to modern and ancient observers (96).

Analogies between the domestic and interstate spheres are examined in the next two chapters. Chapter 5, 'Household metaphors' (108-33), shows how orators evoked relationships within the *oikos* in their arguments about Athenian foreign policy. The Athenians' ideal behavior towards other states was constructed as antithetical to the stereotypical behavior of slaves and women. While this aspect of Athenian thinking may seem strikingly atavistic, 'war rhetoric invoking freedom, manliness, and living up to the ancestors ... is common throughout the world and is far from incomprehensible' (267). However, I doubt that every time "slavery" is invoked as the opposite of "freedom" it is really a 'household metaphor' any more than 'Knechtschaft' in the title of Hayek's famous book. Conversely, the threat of slavery in Dem.10.27 may be quite real (if distant), and not — as H. claims (115) — metaphorical. Chapter 6, 'Defense and attack' (134-53), analyzes the ways in which the individual right of self-defense was applied to interstate relations. As today, even aggression might be justified to prevent a putative future attack.

Types of arguments, more familiar to modern conceptions of international relations, are examined in the next three chapters. It is here that the sophistication and complexity of Athenian thinking mostly comes to the fore. Chapter 7, 'Calculations of interest' (154-84), explores the amoral, pragmatic approach to foreign affairs in Athens. According to H., attacks on appeals to morality in interstate relations were aimed mainly at countering overly emotional policies rather than stemming from an overarching Realist philosophy (163). H. finds a shift in the Realist line of

Greek thinking between Thucydides and Demosthenes, which made the latter's Realist arguments less objectionable both to the average Athenian and to the modern Realist theoreticians (who are likely to reject amorality in internal affairs): 'the distinction between amorality between states and morality within a state became more explicit' (163, cf. 165-6). In any case, it was (and is) difficult to base a foreign policy exclusively on either interest or justice (158). One particular type of calculation well-attested in fourth-century Athens was the notion of a balance of power (168-182). 'This often meant that Realist arguments were in line with the long-standing Athenian ideal of helping the weak and the wronged' (155). Chapter 8, 'Reciprocity' (185-214), deals with the idea that states, like people, need to repay in kind the benefactions or the wrongs they have received. Here, too, the moral and the pragmatic attitudes could coincide: reciprocity was relatively advantageous in the long run, as Game Theory confirms (206-8). Chapter 9, 'Legalism' (215-36), argues that, despite the lack of authoritative sanctions in the international arena, the conception of states as bound by laws played a significant role in Athenian deliberations: many Athenians hoped to duplicate in the Greek world as a whole the success of law in restraining violence within their own society.

Attitudes towards war and peace are considered in Chapter 10, 'Peace' (237-69). Generally, peace was as preferred in classical Athens as it is today, but the ancient Greeks 'never produced the principled and compelling condemnation of all wars seen today in pacifist thinking' (268). Whereas today pacifism is often associated with the Left, ancient anti-militarist pronouncements are mostly attested among wealthy intellectuals critical of democracy. The author reminds us that even nowadays pacifism in the strong sense of the word is far from being the dominant attitude.

This clearly written book, accessible to a wide audience, provides more than its title promises: by comparing interstate attitudes of 'democracies ancient and modern' H. contributes to a more profound understanding of the thinking of the latter as well as of the former.

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Sabine Föllinger, (ed.), *Was ist 'Leben'? Aristoteles' Anschauungen zur Entstehung und Funktionsweise von Leben*. Akten der 10. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 23.-26. August 2006 in Bamberg, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010. 420 pp. ISBN 13: 978-3-515-09244-9.

Aristotle's conception of life, like ours, is a deeply problematic one. The philosophically and scientifically fascinating and still highly relevant issues that revolve around this conception are the subject matter of this volume, edited half in English and half in German by Sabine Föllinger. The volume contains the proceedings of a conference on the same topic held in Bamberg in 2006. The conference, which was part of a series of conferences on Aristotle's natural philosophy funded by the Karl and Gertrud Abel Foundation, brought together eighteen scholars: classicists, philosophers and biologists, from Germany, Italy, Great Britain, the United States and South Korea. Among them some of the most distinguished experts on Aristotle's biology.

The volume is divided into four sections of approximately 100 pages each (with the exception of the 50 pages of section IV): I 'The Soul as Principle of Life', II 'Criteria of Life and the Scala Naturae', III 'Individual and Species', IV 'Reception'. The book represents a valuable contribution to the study of Aristotle's natural philosophy. Its eighteen essays present a great variety of different, partially incompatible, and even heterogeneous, methodological approaches towards Aristotle. I shall very briefly go through the sections one by one.

Section one, which deals with Aristotle's conception of the soul as the principle of life, is not the strongest section of this interesting book. Uwe Voigt's ('Von Seelen, Figuren und Seeleuten', pp. 17-33) main point seems to be that Aristotle solves the problem of conceptual unity of the