

P.S. Butz did not know, and I did not know until after completing this review, C.M. Keesling, 'Rereading the Acropolis Dedications', in D. Jordan & J. Traill (edd.), *Lettered Attica: A Day of Attic Epigraphy . . . 8 March 2000* (Publ. Canad. Arch. Inst. Ath. 3, 2003), 41-54: she discusses the development of the *stoichēdon* style, without committing herself between an Athenian and an Ionian origin, and focuses on texts displaying what she calls 'a consistent pattern of letter alternation' (e.g. Meiggs & Lewis 15. A = IG i<sup>3</sup> 501. A), of which the Marathon casualty list now gives us a conspicuous example. I thank Dr. A. Petrović for this.

P.J. Rhodes

University of Durham

Elizabeth A. Meyer, *Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law* (*Historia Einzelschriften* 208), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010. 167 pp. ISBN: 978-3-515-09331-6.

The *phialai*-inscriptions are fragments from a set of Athenian inscriptions, of the second half of the fourth century, cataloguing instances when a metic, X, had 'escaped' (*sc.* prosecution by) Y, and a *phialē* (shallow dish, here of silver: see the drawing at her p. 67 fig. 1) weighing 100 drachmae was dedicated. The standard interpretation which has been built up since the late nineteenth century is that these were the *phialai exeleutherikai* of IG 2<sup>2</sup> 1469.A.5-6, 15-16, 1480.A.9, dedicated by slaves living apart from their masters after gaining their freedom; that the prosecutions were in *dikai apostasiou* (private suits for desertion) for breaking the conditions of their manumission, and the dedications were a kind of tax or fee for the absolute freedom gained by acquittal in these cases and the publication of the result; and that the prosecutions were fictive, with prosecutor and defendant colluding to establish the defendant's absolute freedom.

Meyer (hereafter M.) notes that that interpretation is open to a range of objections, which she finds cumulatively fatal. In particular, it is only an assumption that these *phialai* were *phialai exeleutherikai*; [*dikai apo*]stasiou is simply a restoration in IG 2<sup>2</sup> 1578.2 (= her 29.2); a fee of the kind supposed is without parallel in Athens and very high compared with such fees elsewhere; there seem to be too many instances of this phenomenon for a few occasions, particularly when we remember that in the fourth century *dikai* (private suits) reached a court only on appeal; the Athenian state was otherwise not normally involved in manumissions; and this seems an unnecessarily cumbersome way to bring about manumissions. In this book she reedits all the fragments (Part II); and sets out the history of the traditional interpretation and the objections to it, and offers a new interpretation (Part I).

In Part II M. has done a very thorough job. She does not add or subtract any fragments, except that she is not sure that SEG 44 68 (= her 33), containing part of one name and a *paragraphos* below it, belongs; but she has nearly 150 new readings, some of them significant. She provides photographs of all the fragments, in many cases for the first time (with captions giving only IG or Agora inventory numbers, not her own numbers). Building particularly on the work of D.M. Lewis, she discusses which fragments belong to the same *stēlē*, concluding (pp. 13-14, in Part I) that twenty of the thirty-three are from five *stēlai* and that altogether a maximum of eighteen *stēlai* but probably fewer are represented. She dates all after c. 335/4, placing earliest IG 2<sup>2</sup> 1560 which refers to a law and 1575. A which can be restored to do so (= her 10 and 25), and latest IG 2<sup>2</sup> 1578 and SEG 25 180, 26 180 (= her 29, 30, 31), which she believes dealt with new *phialai* as they were dedicated (cf. below), and arguing that there is no chronological pattern in the variations in format within and between *stēlai*.

In Part I, after reviewing the traditional interpretation and the problems with it, M. sets out her own interpretation. These prosecutions did reach a lawcourt, presided over by the polemarch (M. accepts the restoration in *IG* 2<sup>2</sup> 1578.1 = her 29.1; the ‘middle court of the new ones’, and the five men of *Ath. Pol.* 66.2 picked from the jury to perform particular duties, are mentioned in *SEG* 25 180.13-19 = her 30.13-19). Those prosecuted are all metics, listed as ‘living in’ a deme, and sometimes identified by occupation (craftspeople, rather than high-ranking); some have names characteristic of slaves but others do not; they can be men or women or sometimes a whole family. M. argues that they are not all ex-slaves, but are all metics prosecuted in *graphai aprostasiou* (public suits for not having a patron) (it is generally accepted that, since there was not an individual injured party, these must have been *graphai* although *Ath. Pol.* 58.3 does not make that clear; *graphai* were still in the fourth century regularly decided in lawcourts): according to Poll. 3.56 that charge could be used for failure to pay the metic tax as well as for failure to take a *prostatēs* (patron), and M., noting that there is little sign of metics’ *prostatai* in the fourth century and citing D. 25. *Aristogeiton* 1. 57, suggests that failure to pay was the more frequent ground for prosecution; Harp. *metiokion* (metic tax) (*m* 27 Keaney) indicates that for this purpose families would have to be treated together. Most of the prosecutors are citizens, about a tenth of them from families in *Athenian Propertied Families* though not from the richest of those families, and some are *koina* of *eranistai*, in whom M. sees partnerships formed to collect the metic tax or part of it; but some prosecutors are metics or *isoteleis* (men granted equality of obligations with citizens), which seems not to be a problem when the defendants are not citizens.

To explain the *phialai*, M. suggests that among the measures adopted to make Athens more welcoming to metics in the third quarter of the fourth century (cf. X. *Vect.* 2.1-7) was a requirement that unsuccessful prosecutors in *graphai aprostasiou* would be subject to a fine of 1,000 drachmae (in general imposed on prosecutors in *graphai* who were so unsuccessful that they failed to obtain a fifth of the votes: e.g. D. 21. *Meidias* 47), and that the *phialai* weighing 100 drachmae were a tithe of that fine. To whom were the *phialai* dedicated? *Phialai*, often of 100 drachmae, are frequent in fifth-century inventories, and can be regarded as ‘a kind of sanctuary currency’, but in these cases Athena would not be the most obvious recipient, and *phialai* of 100 drachmae are in fact rare in fourth-century lists. M. suggests that the recipient was Zeus *Eleutherios* = *Metoikios* = *Sōter*. Where prosecutors can be further identified, the prosopography presents fewer problems if we do not have to suppose that the cases listed together were tried at the same time, and M. argues that we have here not records of the original acquittals and dedications but of a part of the Lycurgan policy of collecting and melting down old dedications so that the metal could be appropriately reused (and that the latest texts record the melting-down of newer dedications as they were received), as the attested *phialai exeleutherikai* are mentioned at the point when they were melted down.

Undoubtedly the traditional view was based on insecure assumptions, and a reconsideration from scratch is worthwhile. M.’s new interpretation does in many ways seem more credible, but there remain problems. Clearly there were *phialai exeleutherikai*, even if M.’s *phialai* were something different: in what circumstances were they dedicated? If we attend to M.’s warning on p. 17 that it was simply a guess that the *phialai* of her lists were *phialai exeleutherikai*, there is no need or justification for her exercise on pp. 53-5 to link her *phialai* with Zeus *Eleutherios* by suggesting that these acquitted metics called themselves *exeleutheroi* and the *phialai exeleutherikoi* were *phialai* ‘brought forth from (*sc.* Zeus) *Eleutherios*’ — which leaves us with no indication of who the original recipient of her *phialai* was (though in view of his association with metics Zeus may yet be the right answer). If in *graphai aprostasiou* a penalty was imposed not only on prosecutors who failed to obtain a fifth of the votes but on all unsuccessful prosecutors, why were these *graphai* made so much more unattractive to prosecutors than others, and (whether that is true or not) why were so many unsuccessful (or hopelessly unsuccessful) prosecutions undertaken?

M. has done valuable service by reediting the texts and reconsidering their significance; in general I am attracted to her new line of interpretation; but I do not think certainty has yet been reached.

P.J. Rhodes

University of Durham

Peter Hunt, *War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes' Athens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. xiii + 317 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-83551-0.

The aim of this clever and thought-provoking book is to elucidate Athenian notions of interstate relations with particular emphasis on those considerations which mostly influenced decision-making (rather than on philosophical theories, for example). Accordingly, the book is based primarily on the evidence of fifteen deliberative speeches and two pairs of opposing forensic speeches by Demosthenes and Aeschines which focus largely on foreign policy matters. While Greek interstate relations were recently treated by P. Low, Hunt's (henceforth H.) main focus is not on these relations as such, but rather on Athenian thought about them. Many of the ideas presented in the book are formulated and argued in the Introduction (1-26). Here, H. contrasts his attitude and methodology 'first with scholarship that portrays Athenian thinking as simple and deplorable and second with *unmasking* methodologies, according to which the stated grounds for war — as found in assembly speeches — only mask the truth and thus need to be stripped away rather than examined' (1, cf. 3). H. insists on taking the evidence of deliberative oratory seriously rather than preferring *a priori* theories or elitist texts like those of Thucydides or Plato. As H. notes, skepticism about the stated grounds of war is mostly applicable to modern conditions with their chasm between public foreign policy discourse and the language of the elite behind closed doors. But in a direct democracy such as Athens, 'decision-making and the appeal to public opinion were one and the same process' (6). While conceding a theoretical possibility of unmentioned or even unconscious motives in Athenian foreign policy, the author still maintains that assembly speeches provide our best opportunity to test various considerations that influenced Athenian deliberations with regard to international relations. If there was a factor in causing a war, it was usually present in the arguments upon which Athenian decisions were based. At the same time, arguments that persuaded the audience can quite precisely be called genuine causes of war or peace (5-7).

Before we proceed, the evidentiary basis of the material should be discussed. The authenticity of the speeches used is considered in Appendix 1. Andocides III (*On the Peace*), perhaps, deserves more detailed discussion. Chronologically, it stands separately and it is the only preserved speech where the Athenians are said to be morally wrong in the war currently waged. The contention of E. Harris (2000) that it is a late forgery based on Aeschines II is rejected by H. in a single sentence with reference to a 1995 edition of Andocides (274).<sup>1</sup> Not surprisingly, Edwards in his edition does not counter the main arguments of Harris' work, published five years later. As Hunt offers no new arguments of his own here, the main points of Harris' thesis remain undiscussed. Yet even if the speech was written by Andocides, it is still possible that it is

<sup>1</sup> M. Edwards, (1995), *Greek Orations*, vol. IV: *Andocides*, Warminster, 107-8, *contra* E. Harris, (2000), 'The Authenticity of Andocides' *De Pace*. A Subversive Essay', in *Polis & Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History, Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday*, 2000, eds. P. Flensted-Jensen, Th. Heine Nielsen, L. Rubinstein, Copenhagen, 479-505.