

Herodotos the Pathographer: Persian and Hellenic Grief Displays*

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I

Persians get “equal time” in Herodotos’ *Investigations*, indeed more space than Greeks.¹ We read less of the policies or passions of Themistokles or Leonidas than of Dareios or Xerxes. The very first and very last scenes of his *Histories* present accounts from Persian *logioi*, oral story-sources for mythical and historical persons such as Io, Priam, and Kyros, King and Father of the Persian Nation. Herodotos admires certain Persian customs, some connected to the administration of justice, others with their efficient rule of subjects. He reports with approval their religious *nomoi*, perhaps *purier* than Hellenic practices and beliefs, at least by implication, since he describes positively, for example, their non-anthropomorphic gods. He praises Persian education, their *paideia*, for three fundamental elements: riding, shooting, and truth speaking (1.131-8). Persian soldiers were brave and worthy opponents for the Hellenes (6.113, 7.211, 9.62-3, 102). His Persians exhibit many admirable qualities, but his *Investigations* also describe Persian, especially “regocentric,” acts of greed, perfidy, thievery, and insane and calculated cruelty, practiced against both Persians and their subject nations.² He delineates the

* Martin Ostwald, my mentor, colleague, reader/critic, and friend for four decades, often discussed Greek history and Herodotos with me, although we approached the behaviors and habits of thought of the Greek historiographers (and the objects of their investigations) from antipodal points of view. Martin emphasized rational and philosophical elements, I focused on the emotional/psychological, irrational and literary elements. Our interests fruitfully intersected with the Herodotean concept of *NOMOS* — prescriptive law and descriptive habit and custom. It was a great honor to be invited by Professor Gabriel Herman to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem event, March 2011, honoring generously and appropriately a model philologist and a gentle man. A symposium (Ohio State University, November 2009) on Aiskhylos’ *Persians* hosted a related paper discussing ethnic behavior displays in different genres. A third audience at Case Western University offered useful suggestions. Remaining faults are mine.

¹ Felix Jacoby (1913), Kurt von Fritz (1967), and Charles Fornara (1966), *inter alios*, have examined the antecedents to the remarkable presentations of ethnicities and conflicts in the largest literary work produced by the late fifth century, ca. 420 BCE, the supposed date of the release of Herodotos’ text. Scholars in the last forty years have explored the impulses and contemporary contexts of Herodotos’ travels, *theoriē* or observant tourism, and reports of memorable events: events, structures, speeches, acts, and gestures deemed worthy of commemoration. James Redfield (1985), François Hartog (1988), Rosalind Thomas (2000), and Rosaria Munson (2001, 2005, 2009) have fruitfully examined the *Histories*’ ethnographic elements.

² Isaac demonstrates (2004, 273) the explicit positives, and Munson (2001, 134-63) lists the numerous negatives.

traditional Solonian and Aiskhylean triad of *koros*, *hybris*, and *atē*, which one might translate into English as: ‘more than enough,’ ‘arrogant aggression,’ and ‘blindness to consequences’.³

The Greeks of Herodotos however, as individuals as well as groups, when they have suitable opportunities, humiliate, stab, stone and persecute their enemies, whether Persian or fellow Hellenes and citizens of their own *poleis* (e.g., 5.87, 95; 6.67, 74-5, 9.37).⁴ Hurt, wound, and trauma populate and energize the pages of Herodotos’ innovative and open-eyed genre.

Nevertheless, Herodotos inevitably, as all observers must, endorses certain values — implicitly or explicitly. Herodotos shows marked sympathy for, and confidence in, a few Greek cultural *nomoi*, institutions, and political tendencies such as open discussion, shared power, and local autonomy (*isēgoriē*, *isonomiē*, and *eleutheriē*).⁵ He criticizes their perceived Persian political analogues such as autocracy, unquestioned one-man policy decisions, dependent judiciaries, and whimsical death sentences. The Greeks had won against the odds, after all, and the researcher needed to explain the path to this outcome, a Greek writing for Greeks.⁶

³ Solon F5, Aiskh. *Ag.* 381-4, 762-71, reprised by Hdt. 1.32.6* (Solon speaks) and 8.77. This last passage offers an oracular paragraph usually excised (Asheri 1993, 63-76 defended it) but one that certainly reflects Herodotean patterns.

⁴ Narratives of a great victory require a substantial and competent adversary, and thus Homer’s Hektor, Priam, and Troy exhibit noble qualities.

⁵ 5.78; 3.80.3 and 142, 5.38 and 92a; 7.135. Martin Ostwald (1969 and 1986) unpacks these crucial terms. Awareness of ethnic particularity and the concurrent desire to record the differences between self and other accompany imperial conquests and their defeats. Ancient and modern imperialists have repeatedly embraced and celebrated hapless victims’ limitless wealth and subordinated exotic “otherness”. Aiskhylos’ Queen Atossa dreams that her son mistakenly yokes two proudly clothed women. These two, Europe and Asia will be his paired horses, but one snaps his chariot’s yoke in two and he falls. This dramatic nightmare, assigned by Aiskhylos, the Athenian combatant and dramatist, to the Persian queen-mother (*Pers.* 181-99; cf. Hall 1993), figures an uneasy relationship between the ruling and unified but compliant Persians and the repeatedly subjected — but repeatedly rebellious — fractious cities of Hellas. Aiskhylos’ play, *Persians*, written and produced shortly after the decisive naval battle at Salamis, defies his Athenian audience’s expectations. This conflict portrays his Persian subjects left behind at Susa, the Queen his mother and King Dareios’ grouching specter, and, eventually, Xerxes’ ragged return and laments.

⁶ Fornara (1966) notes that synchronic elements become subordinate to Herodotos’ diachronic organization. He rejects the idea that Herodotos developed history *despite* the observable, strong ethnographic impulse. On the contrary, it propelled his research agenda. As Herodotos’ understanding of historical causes deepened, his reconstructions of motive and policy became more sophisticated. On the backbone of the history of Persian expansion, he narrates the conquest and the growth, the administrative geography, and the constituent peoples and customs of the unprecedentedly extended Western empire. He developed a critical and revolutionary explanatory presentation of the decisive conflict that stopped westward expansion of the nearly unstoppable military juggernaut. His own fractious tribe, the Hellenes, cooperated briefly to produce this unexpected outcome (Fornara 1966, 25). The *Persikoi logoi* mark a momentous advance. Herodotos delivers not the subaltern’s usual celebratory chronicles of ruling kings and their memorable, always successful deeds, but a

Herodotean ethnologies emphasize, as Claude Lévi-Strauss taught us to expect, particularly different habits and marginal practices, fringe-like from the Hellenic standpoint. “Oddity” is always ethnocentrically focused (Redfield 1985). Herodotos, an Asiatic Greek reporter from the margins of Asia and the Achaimenid Empire, frequently mentions non-Greek foods and eating habits, sexual and family mores, exotic dress, religious customs, and funereal practices. Reported instances of sexual promiscuity, incest, human sacrifice, and allegedly habitual cannibalism (e.g., 4.107, Nippel 1996, 298) arrest and excite his receptive attention.

His detailed descriptions, however, also challenge or debunk Hellenic core values and sentiments of superiority. *Nomoi* can be compared; unexpected affinities emerge below superficial polarities. The curious King Dareios investigates his subjects’ protocols for the disposal of the dead. Greeks must bury their fathers while Indian Kallatai must ritually consume them (anthropophagy, 3.38; cf. 4.103, 1.216). But, for both peoples and the rest, Dareios discovers that ‘custom for all is king’. Herodotos finds ethnographic support for other researchers’ assertions of relativism and affirms them. For instance, the inquirer observes that the Egyptians regard all non-Egyptian speakers as ‘barbarians’ (2.158). Thus, ‘the barbarians have their own barbarians’ (Thomas 2000, 131). The Persian Empire, according to Asheri (2007, 479-84), conquered and administered fifty-seven ethnicities and thirteen territorial districts (*dahyava*). Since, for Medes and Persians, distance matters (1.134), the Hellenes, dwelling on the periphery are disadvantaged. Herodotos shows that there is a certain “translatibility” of symbolic systems, of customs, languages, and even emotions or passions, but mutual misunderstandings crowd his pages, sometimes with comic consequences, sometimes with tragic.

One doubts that Herodotos shared the popular Hellenic misunderstanding of Near Eastern *proskynesis*. Did he view the kowtow to Persian royalty as sacrilegious worship of mere humans, rather than as another community’s hierarchical practice and local royal protocols?⁷ Because he describes *proskynesis* as a habitual form of kiss-throwing, greeting-up in his Persian ethnography (1.134.1), his account of the Spartan heralds’ emblematic refusal to bow low to the King at Susa must underline their own different ethnic “rule”, their ethnographically unsophisticated unwillingness to adjust to another society’s dis-elevation etiquette. Even under the Persian spearmen’s attempted compulsion, Sperkhias and Boulis resist energetically, insisting that such a posture violates *their nomos*: οὔτε γὰρ σφισι ἐν νόμῳ εἶναι ἀνθρώπων προσκυνέειν ... They reasonably reject, like Dareios’ experimental Greeks (3.38), the view that variations in

critical account that records and explains ‘the means by which the Persians took control of Asia’ (1.95) and records the defeat of the Iranians’ ill-strategized but — even so — nearly successful attacks on the Hellenes of Europe (1.5). Herodotos’ decisive step threads diverse political motives and military *erga* into a meaningful sequence, until Xerxes mistakes rational strategy and overestimates his nation’s logistic capacities. An organizational principle — a chronology of conquest with ethnographies subtended — morphs into an account of the poorly known Achaimenids, their accumulation of Near Eastern subjects, and their failures against several peripheral foes (Ethiopians, Skythians, and European Hellenes).⁷ 7.135-7; cf. 1.134, Aiskh. *Pers.* 152, 588: προσπίτνω; Nippel (1996, 289); cf. Hdt. 3.86.2, where thus the bested conspirators salute the new King, Dareios.

nomos among peoples, compels or even advises adopting another group's customs. For the Spartans, as Demaratos later explains to a puzzled Xerxes (7.104.4), *nomos* is a despot superior to any human rule — and more to be feared.⁸ The reporter has it both ways: he can admire Spartan heroism and smile at parochial inflexibility.

Reading without bias proud Xerxes' burdens and that alien Persian⁹ world's 'cultural codes and institutionalised behaviours' (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002, 585) is often impossible. Bisitun's inscription 'confirms' six of the seven named conspirators who overthrew the false Smerdis and many other 'rebels'' identities (Asheri 2007, 467). Persepolis documents confirm Herodotos' identification of Persian generals and naval commanders, subject army battalions too. Herodotos remains our most trustworthy, if hardly infallible, source for early Iranian history.¹⁰

Xerxes' ancestry and predecessors, as well as the nature of the Achaimenid Persian monarchy, limited the young and recent successor's options. These choices Herodotos either understood or reported in the manner of his inherited, Hellenic epic narrative conventions. Fuller understanding would elude any conscientiously fair historian, any researcher limited by language-skills, few predecessors' accounts, scant access to sources, and a new method. Momigliano properly expressed awe for what Herodotos did accomplish. He clearly possessed little or no 'linguistic competency' in the many languages he mentions, including Persian. He had no access to the highest echelons of this dominant culture and government, an aristocratic society understandably indifferent to an insignificant and nosey Greek subject traveling around and writing down details of a conveniently minimized, adventurous campaign.¹¹ Hellenic negative experiences with,

⁸ We mention in summary review the catalogue of Achaimenid military ventures, mostly successful, which entail and justify Herodotos' principal ethnographies: in book I he describes the Lydians (93-4), then the Persians (131-40), and the Babylonians (178-200); in book II, the Egyptians: first their Geography (5-34), and then their Customs (35-98). Following the course of conquest, he provides in book III, the catalogue of Achaimenid tributary areas and peoples in the 20 satrapies of Darius' empire (89-96), including the Indians farthest from Greece and beyond (98-116); and, in book IV, the Skyths (5-82), and the Africans (called Libyans, 168-99). Finally, in books V-IX, readers encounter scattered notices and colorful details, for example, the offensive and defensive military equipment in the ethnic catalogue of the nations sending contingents of soldiers and sailors for Xerxes' expedition of 480 (7.61-98).

⁹ Hellenes are treated to a different kind of ethnography, since the author belongs to his audience's culture (cf. 8.144). He employs these related nascent or proto-genres of genealogy, horography, chronography, foundations (*ktiseis*), geography, and an inscribed constitutional history in order to reconstruct the past and explain the present of the Athenians: 1.56-64, 5.55-66; the Lakedaimonians: 1.65-69, 6.50-72, and other Hellenic ethnic groups and states (e.g., the Ionians and Aeolians [1.142-51], Argos, Corinth, Thera/Cyrene, etc.).

¹⁰ He sturdily disbelieved quirky legends like tales of King Kyros' birth (although he collected four versions: 1.95) and survival from murderous plans. He likewise rejects the account that Pharaoh Rhampsinitos's daughter prostituted herself to all in order to catch an Egyptian thief (2.212).

¹¹ Munson (2005, 27-9, 56-63, 116-17, s.v. languages) lists thirty-two language groups that Herodotos mentions, including several Hellenic dialects. Herodotos names very few individual sources, Greek or non-Greek, but he names the Orkhomenian Thersander. This

and expectations about, Eastern hereditary autocrats shape many royal Persian anecdotes. Consider, for example, both the accounts of Xerxes' disastrous but custom-determined, private promise to hand over his wife Amestris' embroidery to his adulterous niece and his even more momentous, *raison d'état* decision to invade and conquer Balkan Greece (9.109, 7.8, 11, 16-19, 50).

Xerxes sat on a throne of giants and thus filled an office constrained by ritual, precedent, and the expectations of Dareios' mature court officials — *nomos*, he calls this weighty pressure (7.8a, parallels in any royal ceremonials, such as the post-coronation testing of British George VI in 1936 or young Queen Elizabeth II in 1953). These circumstances paradoxically made him less free, not freer, than his meanest subjects to follow his reason or his impulses. So Persian *nomos* compelled him to invade some place — Balkan Greece merely offered the most convenient target and excuse. Did Xerxes, after inspecting his mighty forces at the Hellespont, break down and weep before his prescient uncle Artabanos (7.45-6)? If he did, to Hellenes it would read as a visible sign of confessed, confused unmanliness (cf. Lateiner 2009). To Herodotos, however, it also signifies his heightened, foreboding awareness of his own limitations. To the careful reader of Herodotos' *Histories*, the existential risks mentioned here supplement the sound strategic ones that Artabanos had mentioned earlier in Council (7.8-11).

Herodotos calculates that Xerxes engineered the canal through the Athos peninsula so that he could display his power and leave a memorial words. The historian's words here echo both Dareios' actual inscriptions and his own proem (7.24: δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι: Brosius #45, Dsf; Harrison 2002a, 564 n. 30). Iranologists themselves cannot always distinguish images of Darius from Xerxes (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002, 590), because it is Achaimenid Kingship, not the unique Person, who is central to Royal ideology. Thus Herodotos' *Histories* provide a Greek *psychological* interpretation of the Achaimenians. The Persian images and Old Persian inscriptions, especially the unique narrative of Dareios still legible at Iranian Bisitun, embody official Persian ideology for themselves and for their subjects.¹²

Finally, Xerxes' real personality is irretrievable because of the absence of surviving Persian narratives (if they ever existed!) and the bias of traumatized Hellenic animosity. This is true, even if we think Herodotos had sufficient grounds to assign him the responsibility, or blame, for this imperial miscalculation and the defeat in Europe.

The Persian conquest of the Eastern World is one of the two prerequisites to Herodotos' ambitious *Presentation of his Research, Apodexis Historiēs*. The *Persika* of I-IV or even I-VI minimally mention imperialism as the motive, but the themes of profit and "revenge" become central to the causes, events, and consequences of Xerxes' invasion of mainland Greece in books VII-IX (e.g., 7.5, 8). The Persian Kings — Kyros,

Boiotian reported to him a prophecy uttered by a symposiast companion at the joint Greek and Persian banquet hosted by the Theban Attaginos, a Persian collaborator (9.16; the Mediser was hunted afterwards: 9.86, 88). This unnamed, eminent Persian, just before the battle of Plataiai, allegedly wept and spoke to him in Greek in anticipation of the coming Persian catastrophe.

¹² The Elamite version was carved first, then the Akkadian, and the Old Persian last. The text (iv. 70) suggests that the Old Persian script may have been invented for Dareios' unique OP narrative record. See Kuhrt (2007: fig. 5.3, 151 n.1, 157 n. 115).

Kambyses, Dareios, and Xerxes — all tried to expand beyond their manageable Asian territory (1.108, 209, 3.25-7, 4.1, 102; 6.48, etc.). In turn, they invaded *unsuccessfully* the lands of the Massagetai, the Ethiopians, the other Skythians, and the Balkan Greeks, twice (1.201-14, 3.25-6, 4.83-144, 7-9 *passim*). An odd and fragile coalition of puny and fractious Greeks *poleis* provided the immediate agent for this particular halt of the Persian juggernaut in Europe. This pleasant for Westerners, triumphalist outcome — leading to the “Greek Miracle” and Western Civilization — should not obscure Herodotus’ greater concern and second prerequisite. I refer here to his belief that natural forces and accidents — inherent, internal, and external — *prompt and limit* all imperial ventures and enterprises (7.49.3: αἱ συμφοραί, Lateiner 1989, ch. 6; others would add divine powers). Other royal interlocutors repeatedly mention a reasoned logistical respect for boundaries and barriers,¹³ but Xerxes anxiously tells his councilors that it is a Persian (i.e., Achaemenid “family”) *nomos*, for a new ruler especially, always to expand the frontiers of Persian authority (7.8α).

We return, however, to pathography, the retrospective historico-ethnographical description of emotional displays and their effect on community spirit. Herodotus often presents expressions of grief, emotional reactions to disruptive news. His inclusion of reports of Hellenic and Persian passionate responses provided a precedent that his immediate and less inclusive successor Thucydides deliberately eschewed.¹⁴

II

Grief, like its Latin etymon *gravis/grave*, denotes a *heavy* feeling, mental and physiological sadness, that we describe (too facilely) as an emotion, a psychological state. The Greeks call experiences of this state (and others; cf. Konstan 2006) *pathos*,¹⁵ or more specifically *pathema* or *penthos*. Grievs shade from anguish, sorrow, remorse, and regret, as one distinguishes the severity and nearness of the damaging disruption and the sufferer’s different degrees of responsibility for the grief-producing event. One regularly expresses the internal feeling with visible parts of the communicative body (including subverbal vocal “sounds”), or all the body.

Grief normally produces such verbal and nonverbal expressions of the experienced internal sorrow — articulate laments, despairing gestures, defeated postures, and moaning, shrieking vocalizations. All categories find expression in either informal, spontaneous gestures or ritualized procedures, such as hair-tearing, breast-beating lament, and other mourning customs for the deceased.¹⁶ Certain reported expressions of

¹³ E.g., Bias, Sandanis, Nitocris, Tomyris, the Ethiopian King, the Skythians, in addition to Xerxes’ Uncle Artabanus: 1.27, 71, 185-6, 206; 3.21.2-3, 4.118-19, 7.10, etc.; cf. Harrison (2002a, 556).

¹⁴ Lateiner 1977a examines laughter in Herodotus. Lateiner 2009 surveys, in the major Greek historians, the opposite emotion, weeping. Lateiner 1977b (‘Heralds and Corpses’) treats the exceptional Thucydidean passages.

¹⁵ Herodotus uses this word for a national disaster fourteen times, for a personal calamity another fourteen times, one of which offers a generalized reference to human suffering (5.4.2).

¹⁶ Note the interesting variant, the unexpected but anthropologically paralleled, Trausian lament for *births* (5.4).

grief include nearly universal habits: incoherent cries and shouts, weeping, breast-beating, bowed, or fetal postures, the pulling out of hair.¹⁷ Egyptians, Thracians, Spartans, Persians, however, mourn their dead men and women differently, even (in some cases) formally lamenting their dead animals. The ethnologist observes and records these conventions and habits — eccentric for him and his audiences. Herodotos' examples vary by gender, class, and ethnicity.¹⁸

Members of certain Skythian tribes when mourning will strangle their dead King's cook, cupbearer, messenger, horses, and one unlucky mistress (4.71) to send them to the Otherworld with their otherwise lonely ruler. When Spartan kings die, Spartan females beat kettles, defile their bodies, and pound their foreheads (6.58; cf. Plut. *Lyk.* 27) — violent and emotional expressions otherwise forbidden there in grieving for the dead. Mourners, especially women, rend clothing; men cut or shave hair on their faces and/or skull, or they do *not* cut it. Both genders may scratch, pierce, or slice the communicative skin or remove bits of ears.

A *sondage* into Persian and Hellenic grief, at least into Herodotean and Aiskhylean expressions of it, reveals no major distinction in emotional intensity, but in bodily protocols that communicate it. Persian grief is visibly uncontrolled. Kyros grieved publicly and greatly for his wife's earlier death, and insisted that *all* his subjects follow suit. Kambyses lamented his fatal fratricidal error, and his courtiers ripped their clothes for him as he lay dying (2.1, 3. 64, 66). Dareios experienced grief aroused by the insults to his honor, when the Ionians revolted and the rebels and their allies burnt his Lydian satrapal capital, Sardis. He expressed his consequent anger in ballistic acting-out, shooting arrows to high heaven, requesting mealtime reminders of Athenian perfidy, and mulling plans for retaliation (5.105, 7.1). Nearly a quarter-century later, Xerxes' victory messages sent by express messages to Susa led first to joy in the capital — feasting, incense, celebratory sacrifices, festooned roads — but the later telegrams announcing defeat produced garment rending and extended, anxious lamentation (8.99, Aiskh. *Pers.* passim).

Herodotos admired, as do other representations in the evolving Hellenic tradition by the late Archaic period, self-control — especially male self-control — in grief-displays (van Wees 1998).¹⁹ The historian admiringly reports narratives of emotional self-restraint in mourning the dead. Protagonists include not only Greeks, but also Persians and other exceptional sufferers.

Readers observe the Mede Harpagos suppress his grief (1.114-19) after his King Astyages serves up his own son to him for dinner. We read of the Egyptian Psammenitos' long containment of his sorrow for his son's and his fellows' march to execution (but eventually his spirit too breaks: 3.11-14). We hear that Kambyses' younger sister shed tears of controlled grief for her younger brother Smerdis. Kambyses

¹⁷ He mentions these in his account of Persia's conquest of Egypt. Ruler Psammenitos and other Egyptians there express public and personal grief: 3.14.

¹⁸ E.g., 2.36, 85; humans mourn animals, e.g., goats: 2.46, cats: 2.66; 4.95, 6.58, 9.24.

¹⁹ Earlier phases of Hellenic art, from Geometric *prothesis* and *ekphora* through red-figured mourning scenes, present many violent mourning scenes for the dead (see van Wees 1998). Herodotos never mentions his wise man Solon's regulations concerning funeral *nomoi* and expenses (Plut. *Sol.* 12 and 21).

executed him (3.30-2), and, to prove a point, Kambyses wantonly shot dead the young son of his most trusted agent, Prexaspes (3.34-5). Prexaspes too, in justified fear, maintained superhuman self-control. Demaratos the Spartan shows the extreme of Lakonian self-control when that king suffers harassment and humiliation concerning his paternity, his father's identity, and thus his own royal status (6.67). His royal rival and sneaky successor, Leutykhidas, publicly provoked and insulted him. He keeps silence, does not strike back physically or verbally, and veils his head before departing from Sparta to exile.

The hyper-grieving, ὑπεραχθεσθέντες [hapax], yet still controlled, citizens of the young Athenian democracy fined the playwright Phrynikhos 1,000-drachmas for his historical tragedy, the *Capture of Miletos*. He had driven their manly selves to embarrassingly public tears, displays of grief, when that drama of the 490s showed their "best friend" Ionian cousins as defeated, enslaved, and worse. The production reminded them of their own, Persian-initiated sorrows (6.21: οἰκήματα κακά; cf. J. Roisman 1988).²⁰

Herodotos (and Aiskhylos too) emphasize the two peoples' different polities, perhaps their ideologies, the polarity between deferential/ hierarchical and isonomic/ egalitarian societies. Herodotos contrasts Hellenic, manly and self-contained *andreia* to "womanly" Persian lack of self-control, need for paternal authority, and open emotional displays of fear, grief, and frustration (cf. Xerxes' slur on his "men", 8.88 *fin.*). Aiskhylos also describes elaborate Persian clothes, expressive mourning procedures, and Asia as a female. This Hellenic feminization of the Persian court, the courtiers, even the ruler and the nation (Hall 1993, 107-33) contrasts to familiar archaic Hellenic ideals of hard self-repression, self-control, and subdued self-presentation. In Herodotos, for example, Dareios and Xerxes, leap up in their finery from their thrones in agitation (3.155 [Zopyros], 7.212; cf. the proxy Artabanos' temporary royal outfit, throne, bed: 7.17). One proxemic principle is that elevation and immobility conveys empowerment and comfortable stability²¹ — the lesser party approaches, bows, kneels, etc. The royals' displacement nonverbally exhibits discomfort, grief, and disempowerment. By Greek standards, the cool "loser" Hippokleides or the dishonored but self-contained king Demaratos, by their self-controlled manliness, put to shame the Persian potentates' vivid emotional explosions.²²

This extreme dislocation of the royal person from stable comfort and superiority reflects and betrays the failure of mortal reality to conform to expectations of unlimited royal success. Solon told the autocrat Kroisos that humans are 'all accident' creatures (1.32.4: πᾶν ἔστι ἀνθρώπος συμφορή), but Persian monarchs seem to think they are

²⁰ One apparent barbarian exception to the rule that Herodotos celebrated self-restraint, the Persian wife of Intaphrenes (3.118-19), loudly laments her executed husband before Dareios' palace. However, first, a woman faces different expectations of her gender, and second, she works with a clear purpose and she succeeds: her very public grief-display succeeds in saving two kinsmen, her brother and her eldest son, from the King's executioner.

²¹ Angry Akhilleus too leaves his seat both when the Akhaian embassy arrives and after Priam arrives to ransom his son's corpse (*Il.* 9 and 24). The hero's movements, however, express astonishment without angry disappointment, and so strike audiences as more dignified.

²² 6.129, 7.101-4, 209, 234-8.

accident-proof. Artabanos had told Xerxes about the error of bloated hopes: ‘the end is not apparent in the beginning’ (7.51). Xerxes’ imperial delusions become farce when he perpetrated a fraud on history after Thermopylai. Xerxes’ revisionism reshapes the past, “photoshops” his record. He had buried “off-stage” ninety-five percent of his troops’ corpses. Then he invited the sailors of his fleet to view the scene of “glorious victory”. They see (8.24-5) 1,000 instead of the actual 20,000 casualties. Herodotos reports that the revisionist arrangements were transparent, a ruse ludicrous even to his troops: καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν. Factual or not, Herodotos paints the autocrats as confident that they can reshape ugly outcomes of events (τὰ γεινόμενα) to their wishes.²³ They try to “disappear”, to “photo-shop”, uncomfortable historical facts.

A tragic dimension enriches Herodotos’ *Histories*. Here I refer not to formal, philological, or performative parallels to staged Attic drama, but rather to the Hellenic historian’s *indicia* of grief and happiness as he represents them through characters and narratives to Hellenic audiences. Xerxes, for example, has dramatic stature, good looks, and magnificent clothes (7.56, 187.2). More importantly, he has power and brains, but his family traditions and his personal advantages themselves eventually trap him. He is “Oedipally” challenged in several ways, as royals often are. Despite good advice from competent, grounded advisers such as Artabanos and Demaratos, Xerxes cannot properly measure his notable achievements, his success. He cannot imagine that his advantages in numbers, human resources, and money may not produce decisive victories (1.136, 7.48, 103, 209: οὐκ εἶχε συμβαλέσθαι τὸ ἐόν).²⁴

Xerxes, in fact, built much of Persepolis (remains and inscriptions, e.g. Brosius 2000: Doc. #63, Xpa), but Herodotos does not notice that achievement, great and wonderful, or perhaps this Greek did not travel far enough East to learn of this successful engineering activity and other royal constructions. Rather, he describes in detail the remarkable war preparations, the first and second bridges spanning the Hellespont and the canal cut through the Athos peninsula (7.22-4, 33-7). These huge strategic projects, however, primarily signify for him Xerxes’ megalomaniac (μεγαλοφροσύνη) ignorance of boundary constraints: Asia and Europe, land and sea (cf. the Knidian’s cut, 1.174).

²³ Some Greeks attempt a similar fraud. A decade after the battle at Plataiai, the Aeginetans pay a named Plataian contractor to build a pseudo-tomb for their pseudo-combatants (9.85). Herodotos reports Xerxes’ mistake, rather than deception, when the king misreads Artemisia’s damage to his fleet fighting at Salamis — before his very eyes (8.88.1; cf. Grethlein 2009 on Xerxes as an ‘embedded author’). The potentate sees what he wants.

²⁴ Herodotos offers what little one knows of Xerxes’ psychology or strategy emphasizing this young autocrat’s troubled relationship with women (mother Atossa, wife Amestris, seduced niece Artaynte: 7.3, 9.108-13). Scandals of popular tradition are problematic as historical sources (think of U.S. President Bill Clinton and his assistant, Monica Lewinsky). The power of women and eunuchs (3.77, 6.9, 8.104-5) in the “oriental” palace environment telegraphs to patriarchal Greeks (and their Euro-American intellectual heirs) messages of weakness, shrill voices, sensuality, luxury, and inversion — if not perversion. Herodotos reports but firmly rejects the delicious, Edward Lear-like caricature of capricious, self-absorbed, and defeated Xerxes ordering his storm-tossed, aristocratic companions to abandon ship to enable his survival (8.118-19). Not surprisingly, courtier/“slave” *proskynesis*, the oxymoronic reward & punishment syndrome, and decapitation of the captain embellish the tale well told.

These engineering marvels appropriate divine prerogatives and so violate stable divisions, features of nature. The bridge's construction, subsequent collapse, and humiliating deadly *sequelae* produce an enraged mortal unwisely competing with the natural and supernatural order. After his proxies angrily abuse and scourge, brand, and fetter the Hellespont (7.35), Herodotos characterizes Xerxes' passionate response as 'barbarous and presumptuous'.

Xerxes' own inscription on a Persepolis building describes him as 'The Great King, King of Kings, King of lands containing many men, King of this great earth far and wide' (Brosius #63: Xpa). This formulaic phrasing — cloning his predecessor Dareios' — anticipates the boasts that Herodotos puts in his mouth. There, in a "quoted" speech, he claims that his empire will 'share boundaries with the *aithēr* of Zeus' (7.8γ1).

Dr. Ali Mousavi of UCLA helpfully observed to me (*per litt.*) that the Achaimenids' imagery never exhibits their own grief, only the sorrows of their defeated enemies. The representations transmit Achaimenid ideas of kingship, peace, and world dominion enjoyed by the Achaimenids. Their art eschews violent feeling even when the scenes depict the royal hunter pursuing to death a lion or bull. The holy rock of Bisutun along the Persians' Royal Road depicts panels with expressions of grief, or at least human suffering. The miserable victims, of course, are Dareios' numerous captured enemies. Herodotos' Smerdis, Gaumata in the Persian text of the relief, the worst of the rebels from the Achaimenid point of view, lies trampled under the foot of his successor, the composed and triumphant — 50% larger! — Dareios. Eight other prisoners — captured, allegedly rebel, kings — stand shackled before Dareios the Great. (Herodotos transmits correctly almost all their names; cf. Kuhrt 2007, 141-151, §§ 10-54.) These eight, chained prisoners with hands tied behind their backs have been frog-marched before the king. The charmingly hatted Skythian Skunkha, added later, brings up the rear. Bound Gaumata and the chain gang convey grief or misery — a misery fully earned by their defeat and the excruciating deaths awaiting them. The victorious Dareios in 521 BCE had them mutilated: the appointed officers chopped off their ears and noses; they gouged out their eyes. After further tortures, they impaled and killed them. Finally, the Achaimenid authorities decapitated their sorry corpses. Dareios himself proudly tells us so (Bisitun; see Kuhrt or Brosius #44, 32 DB). Similar crucifixions, impalements, severed heads displayed on battlements, and mutilations are visible on the monuments of other, earlier Egyptian and Near Eastern, autocratic art traditions, especially the Assyrian.²⁵ The *arriviste* Achaimenids appropriated for *Iranian* images at Bisitun this visual identity and ideology of royal authority, divinely granted victory, and awful punishments for the enemies and the disobedient. Propagandistic art of glorified brutality finds no room for even momentary disappointment or grief, much less for victorious tears. Bisitun uniquely displays defeated enemies in Achaimenid art.

Herodotos spoke with few Persians but may have had access to other Persian oral traditions. His historical agenda gladly included what he could find of "the Persian

²⁵ Ashurnasirpal and Ashurbanipal boast in words and palace images of their flayings, ruthless impalements, ripped out tongues, and mutilations other than mere slayings. Kern (1999, 68-85) discusses mass beheadings, mass enslavements, mass baby head-bashings, and gang rapes after successful sieges. Lewis (1985, 106) describes Xerxes' harsh lessons for Babylon.

version”.²⁶ Some sources that he could access probably expressed Persian ambivalence about the Achaemenid “miracle”. Such sources included popular tales, somewhat garbled Ionian verbal accounts of Persian chronicles, and individuals’ family narratives with personal, emotional responses (e.g., Zopyros’?).²⁷ There was pride for the rapid expansion of their people’s power and realm. There was disappointment, embarrassment, or even grief for the defeats of the Balkan expedition: the emotionally hollow Persian victory at Thermopylai, the fleet’s trouncing at Salamis, and the army’s at Plataiai.²⁸ Herodotean pathography shapes the historian’s narratives of Greek and Persian cultures and personalities.

III

Structural polarities, however, and stark contrasts between East and West in his text have recently, I believe, been *overemphasized* (Hartog 1988, cf. Isaac 2004, 257-61 with bibliography). Herodotos tells us that the Persians borrow foreign customs freely, as do the Greeks (1.135). These two cultures were — and remained — comparable, even intertwined, before and after Xerxes’ defeat and collapse. Soldiers on both sides naturally experienced fear in battle (1.169, 6.14, 7.219, 8.86).²⁹ Persians fight as bravely

²⁶ See Robert Graves’ profound poem (ca. 1940-45) of this title, a deflation of the significance of the battle of Marathon:

Truth-loving Persians do not dwell upon //The trivial skirmish fought near Marathon.
As for the Greek theatrical tradition //Which represents that summer’s expedition
Not as a mere reconnaissance in force //By three brigades of foot and one of horse
(Their left flank covered by some obsolete //Light craft detached from the main Persian
fleet)

But as a grandiose, ill-starred attempt //To conquer Greece — they treat it with
contempt;

And only incidentally refute //Major Greek claims, by stressing what repute
The Persian monarch and the Persian nation //Won by this salutary demonstration:
Despite a strong defence and adverse weather //All arms combined magnificently
together.

²⁷ Wells (1907, repr. 1923) argued for Herodotos’ finding and interviewing Zopyros, the renegade Persian aristocrat who abandoned the Achaemenid hierarchy and bureaucracy and deserted them to live in Athens (cf. 3.150-60). Unlike his eponymous trickster grandfather who only pretended to join the enemy’s cause (when Dareios besieged Babylon), Zopyros the Younger really deserted the King. Herodotos, however, never identifies him as a *source*. Lewis (1985, 105-6) reviews subsequent literature and finds reason to disvalue Zopyros but to believe Herodotos may have had access to many other Greeks who had served the Persian bureaucracy. Thus he downgrades Zopyros as less necessary and, if a source, inaccurate.

²⁸ Herodotos repeatedly has strategic experts, his advisers, urge the King to drive a divisive wedge into the risible and divisible Hellenes (Harrison 2002a, 568-9, citing 7.236-7, 8.4-5, 9.2). Herodotos endorses this strategy in the strongest terms (7.139). The strategic hypothetical and the cheaper bribes do not conform to Xerxes’ inflexible expectations, Achaemenid political practices, or Persian *nomoi*. Even Xerxes’ pugnacious commander-in-chief Mardonios eventually attempts to implement this bloodless and tearless strategy (8.136; cf. Artabazos, 9.41). The Achaemenid autocrat rejects this sane plan that could have expanded his nation’s empire (7.7-9, 13, 18).

²⁹ 3.129-37; 5.35 & 6.29-30; 8.4-5, 22-3, 57-63, 109-10. Kyros, Dareios, and Xerxes all score palpable hits when criticizing Greek sharp business practices, ethical lapses, and political

as Greeks (9.62), while Greeks side opportunistically with homegrown and foreign oppressors (8.30). Persians are as mercenary and deceitful as Greeks, however high the value they allegedly place on the Truth. At Bisitun, all Dareios' opponents, 'rebels', are naturally deemed 'liars' (1.136, 138 and 3.85 present two Persian views of the central Herodotean issue of truth and tricks [*sophismata*]; cf. DB passim; Kuhrt 2007: 152 n.15), and Kyros had described Greeks as cheats and oath-breakers (1.153).³⁰

Herodotos recognizes that the Hellenes, despite their vaunted common values and interests (8.144), could barely cooperate for one battle or campaign, for a day or a month. Mardonius remarks on their fractiousness despite a common culture (7.9b: ἀγνομοσύνη καὶ σκαίότης; see it happen again at Salamis, 8.56-64, 74-6). Actually, congenital Hellenic dissension shapes Herodotos' unappreciated *thesis*: that Greek inveterate and egalitarian competitiveness, acephalous power structures, mutual distrust, and polytropic institutions defeat Persian-dominated, organized Asia's centralized, authoritarian, and monocephalous decision-making structure. Indeed, the palace coup that ended in the assassination of Xerxes (465 BCE, Diod. 11.69; cf. Hdt. 6.98), although beyond the temporal borders of Herodotos' *Histories*, looms over it. Similarly, the anticipated Persian defeat at Salamis looms over the first episodes of Aiskhylos' play set at the richly imagined Achaimenid capital at Susa. All regimes turn out to be precarious, monarchical ones simply more so!

Herodotos positions the Greeks precariously, hovering between contrast and similarity to the Persians. The list of Persian collective *nomoi* is selective, and selectively positive, as is the picture of their efficient and ingeniously administered empire. The historical narrative, however, regularly notes Persian greedy acquisitiveness. It also notes the Persian government's overbearing interference in private lives, bullying oppression (e.g., 5.27), and punitive tendencies such as mutilations and executions both of defenseless subjects and enemies (Munson 2001, 49, 153).

Thus, Herodotos positions himself precariously also, implicitly criticizing many Hellenic, Persian, and other barbarian habits, while maintaining a provocative posture of cultural relativism.³¹ He employs the stem *barbar-* (meaning only 'non-Greek') but 24 times up to 5.23, but 179 times after that, seven times more frequently, after Dareios and Xerxes resolve to conquer Europe. Xerxes, enraged at the loss of his magnificent

bribery (1.153). Then we see them deceived by Hellenic imposters like Demokedes and Histiaios. Themistokles' truth-bending cleverness wins allies for the mainland Greeks, leads to Persian distrust of the Ionians, produces the successful claustrophobic strategy that at Salamis destroyed the Persian fleet, and wins him eventual refuge — at the court of the King of the Persian Empire.

³⁰ "Truth" and "lie" (OP *arta* and *drauga*) are Zoroastrian religious and ideological concepts. Beyond frequent references to "lie" and "liars" on the Bisitun inscriptions, cf. Kuhrt's texts (2007: 503-5) on Dareios' tomb (DNb) and a similarly inscribed monument of Xerxes (XPl).

³¹ For example, he seems to describe neutrally Krestonian suttee and Massagetan cannibalism (5.5, cf. Padaian, Kallatian, and Issedonian: 1.216, 3.99, 3.38, 4.26), but his annotations suggest that something grotesque and humorous seeps into the telling (Munson 2001). Isaac (2004, 257-303) provides nuanced analysis of later change in Hellenic attitudes towards Eastern peoples: from unexpected, feared enemy to contemptible slaves waiting to be conquered (in the rhetorical and later historical tradition).

continent-spanning bridge, gave orders to flog the Hellespont. When, then, Herodotos describes this emotion-driven response as ‘barbarous and presumptuous’ in the later pejorative sense (7.35: ἐνετέλλετο δὲ ὦν ῥαπίζοντας λέγειν βάρβαρα τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα), he condemns the signature transgression of the most thickly described campaign event of the *Histories*. This behavior seemed wildly inappropriate — whether judged by the Greek or Persian *nomoi* that Herodotos had mentioned.³²

Herodotos faced a peculiar problem. The Greek investigator/historian wished to express extreme emotional states in idioms familiar to Greek audiences. He also needed to preserve the *Verfremdungseffekt*, the elements of ‘estrangement,’ in cultures that his Persian and other ethnographies had recorded. The necessarily Hellenocentric,³³ and sometimes Athenocentric, nature of most of his (Greek) sources affected his legitimate judgment of the failed Achaimenid adventure. Those sources colored the ethnic and

³² Both Aiskhylos and Herodotos explore “ethnic profiling” and the strengths and weaknesses of defeated enemies. Both portray Persians thinking, acting, and feeling. Both show interest in cosmic forces, natural laws, political traditions, decisive conflicts, and ethnic habits. The Athenian Aiskhylos lived through the Ionian Rebellion and fought at Marathon and Salamis in the Great War. Phrynikhos’ poorly attested drama, *The Capture of Miletos* (produced 493/2?, Hdt. 6.21, no fragments survive; see p. 140 above), described the disaster of 494 BCE that destroyed or severely damaged the leading city of Ionian east Greece. Phrynikhos thus had recently and publicly recalled the Athenian metropolis’s very own terrifying grief, offending the community. Having paid a huge 1,000-drachma fine, in 476 BCE after Salamis, Phrynikhos’ produced a palinode, the *Phoenician Women*. The hypothesis to Aiskhylos’ *Persians* (produced 472 BCE) claims that in Phrynikhos’ prologue a protatic (prologue providing) eunuch described Xerxes’ defeat. Phrynikhos’ later play provided a “better” (i.e., more patriotic?) template for Aiskhylos’ drama (ἐκ τῶν Φοινισσῶν Φρυνίχου παραπεποιήσθαι, but see the skeptical J. Roisman 1988). The historian’s more spacious medium allowed the recounting of both the Persians’ prior empire building and the campaign to reduce Greece to a satrapy. Herodotos seized a quickly receding opportunity (proem).

³³ The Greeks retold many stories of the “Greatest Generation”, the *Marathonomakhoi* and their equals of 480 BCE. Such stories produced partisan praise, serious criticisms, and slanders of fellow Greeks, the Aiginetans and the Korinthians, and even of fellow citizens, such as the Athenian Alkmaionid clan (6.131-40, 8.93-4). *A fortiori*, Herodotos also gathered fallible recollections and traditions about Asiatic invaders and their vast numbers that inevitably distorted a hodgepodge of rumors into *to mythōdes* — well structured stories. The Greek soldiers, sailors, and their proud children deformed and reformed accounts received. They further speculated on what they could not know — for example, the workings of the Persian high command or the Spartans’ cryptic decision-making process. Herodotos attempted to reconstruct *logoi* garbled by fifty to one hundred years’ transmission and by an increased awareness of ethnic identity. Attempting to explain the behavior of the now dead, exalted Persian ruler, Herodotos allows Xerxes more strategic capacity and generosity than later Greeks could stomach, e.g., Boiotian Plutarch’s *Malice of Herodotos* (*Mor.* 857a) condemns Herodotos’ open-mindedness as ‘philobarbarism’. Herodotos presents a Xerxes more complex than other autocrats, Persian or Hellenic (Lateiner 1988, Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002). Xerxes and the inherited, nearly inexorable Achaimenid policies *together* determined the Balkan campaigns of 480/79 BCE.

pejorative royal anecdotes collected long after the war was over, even after the era of the Peace of Kallias, ca. 449.³⁴

The last Hellenic acts recorded in the *Histories* encourage the reader's belief that Herodotos foresaw a repetition of the cycle of the latest great power in the process of forfeiting its greatness.³⁵ The Athenians advancing into Asia capture Artayktes, the agent of the Persians retreating from Europe. First, they force him to watch them stone to death his own son and then they nail him to death on a board (9.117-20). The instability of all polities is Herodotos' theme from page 2. Parallels between Persian and Greek thinking, dangerous aggressive inclinations, organizational talents, and codes of honor mark the first and last accounts of intercontinental wrongdoing (woman stealing and savage atrocities).

Herodotos reconstructed how empires — such as the autocratic Persian or the democratic Athenian — grow, rise, and fall. He deconstructed, however, any Athenian or Spartan self-satisfied sense of superiority, when he implies that the same downfall may — arguably does — await them — or awaits any other incautious and overconfident superpower (cf. 7.49). Herodotos suggests that all human success carries the seeds of its own destruction. This tragic,³⁶ cautionary, and skeptical perspective compels him to suggest that all imperial systems eventually fail, come to grief. No expedition was or is “too big to fail”. The Persian Empire indeed became ‘a pitiful, helpless giant’, to borrow former President Nixon's infamous, self-justifying formulation.³⁷

³⁴ Herodotos, then, at times effectively employs the organizing principles of analogy and polarity, inversion of custom or natural features, to point parallels and to distinguish one culture or another from the Greeks' own idiosyncrasies, and even to distinguish one barbarian culture from others (the polarities of Egypt and Skythia, e.g.). One of his most important, if implicit themes, as Fornara argues (1966, 80-91) identifies an analogy or parallel dynamic visible among hegemonic states and empires. This dynamic encourages growing powers to expand unwarily beyond their logistical and political capacity until they reach the breaking point. Herodotos perhaps intended to suggest that later super-powers, such as the Athenians or Lakedaimonians of his day, were ignoring inherent limitations and at their peril. Having analyzed past failures of empires, Herodotos suggests that imperial states should resist inclinations indefinitely to expand, whether these powers are advancing west to Sicily, east to Stalin's Soviet Union, or north to Afghanistan, the ‘graveyard of Empires’.

³⁵ Perikles had already stated, or would shortly provide, such a warning about hyperextension to the Athenian voting population (Thouk. 1.143, 144.1, 2.65.7). Cf. Hdt. 1.5 and 207* (instability, *pathēmata* and cyclicity); 1.32.4* and 7.49* for the accidents of the human condition.

³⁶ The Anatolian historian follows certain trails blazed by the Attic tragedian, Aiskhylos. The two both foreground the oft-remarked ‘common humanity’ of both sides at Salamis, but also display deep differences between the adversaries. Harrison (2000) rightly chastises those scholars who imagine that the Athenians derived no pleasure in celebrating their unlikely victory, in watching a replay of the devastation wrought then and later on Persia's elite, their multi-national armed forces, and their sense of invincible self-worth.

³⁷ Aiskhylos knew of *Schadenfreude*, although he expresses it differently. *Pers.* 1033-4, 843-4; cf. parallel phrasing at Hdt. 8.54, 8.98.1, and 8.99. Richard Nixon, speech of 30 April, 1970.

Herodotos did not regard the Greeks, as by nature, morally superior to the once and still hardy Persians, or in any way superior in personal strength or brains.³⁸ Rather, he concluded, after investigating and compiling ordinary habits and extraordinary *erga*, that the inferiority of Balkan Hellas in natural resources, in wealth and power, in central organization, in resources and luxuries, *reduced* their expectations and therefore ambitions. Their externally (geographically) inflicted sense of limits — ecological, material, and political — thereby *increased* their flexibility, their capacity to respond rapidly to opportunities, especially when fighting on their own familiar territory. The Persian “Deciders” failed to respond perceptively³⁹ to repeatedly noted disadvantages and strategic parameters. They over-extended their vast but never infinite military forces.⁴⁰

Herodotos’ *Histories* question and problematize again any sense of secure imperial superiority, now on the Athenian side. The iron fist of the Athenian empire extended its power and revenues, while its armed forces oppressed unwilling subjects and its unprecedented art projects glorified these oppressors. All the Athenian media recognize and celebrate the liberation. Herodotos at least also memorializes the concomitant grief experienced on both sides. The ‘great and wonderful deeds’ encompassed traumas of imperial control and the horrors of war between the Persians and the Greeks. Herodotos

³⁸ See Demaratos’ colloquy with Xerxes comparing the two “races”: 7.101-4. Isaac (2004) deconstructs an *idée reçue*, that Herodotos already draws an absolute opposition between East and West, slave and free.

³⁹ Thus Herodotos inherited from Phrynikhos and Aiskhylos (if not Homer himself), and bequeathed to his careful reader and follower Thoukydides, a belief that great historical narratives require a great defeat (Thouk. 7.87), a blow that crushes a world-view, even if it leaves a stunned empire standing.

⁴⁰ The Greeks developed ambivalent feelings for their suddenly arrived neighbors to the east, the potent Persians. They greatly admired Persian imperial achievements, material luxury objects, and their organization of trade and taxation, but they rejected Achaimenid judicial cruelty, autocratic political methods, and interest in exploiting Greek talents and resources. Awe for the unstoppable Persians bumped against determination to maintain local (not usually democratic) self-government. Fear eventually yielded to pride in the unexpected Athenian (490) and then Hellenic success (480-79) in halting the nearly unstoppable, barbarian military machine. One observes these evolving, ambivalent attitudes in Aiskhylos’ *Persians* (472), then sees self-confidence growing in contemporary red-figured pottery (Shapiro 2009, 72: ‘Amazons ... look remarkably like Asians minus the beard’). The ideological program of the Parthenon and Nike temple’s self-gratulatory friezes confirms the clay message in marble (aliens: Persians, Amazons and Centaurs; cf. Hall 1989, 102).

ensured that these events, too, will not become *aklea*, uncelebrated, or ever forgotten.⁴¹

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⁴¹ I am informed that Zoroastrianism prohibits mourning for the dead, a sharp contradiction to Hellenic religious practice and historiographical motives, but various Eastern and Western references suggest funeral and post-depositional mourning rituals for Persian royalty and others. See, for example, Persepolis tomb supplies and offerings (Kuhrt 2007: 574-5), Nabonidus Chron. 3.22-24 (=Kuhrt 2007: 51), Hdt. 2.1, 9.24 (Kassandane and Masistios; cf. Petropolou 2008), and Diod. Sic. 18.26-28 (Alexander's *Persian* funeral cortege). In any case, the contrast persists between social-psychological imperatives for Persians to diminish and Hellenes to magnify the significance of their wars' events (see again n. 26). I thank both the Editors and their Assistant, Michael Shenkar, for improvements to this paper, especially on Iranological points.

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