

CONSCRIPTION AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE ROMAN IMPERIAL ARMY

At all times in the history of Rome both citizens and subjects were legally liable to military service. Th. Mommsen, who recognized this, also held that after Marius the legions were mainly composed of volunteers, except in the great civil wars of the late Republic.¹ This opinion has been endorsed by countless other scholars and often generalized to cover all branches of the imperial army. I have tried to show elsewhere² that in the late Republic it was not only in civil wars that Italians were frequently subjected to conscription; I now propose to argue that at any rate until the second century AD conscription was far more common in the Principate than the current dogma, endlessly repeated, would allow. That in was normally employed in the fourth century I take to be accepted. It will not be denied that many recruits at all times were volunteers: only the government could not rely on a sufficient supply of such recruits; probably in certain regions conscription was usual; the evidence does not, of course, permit us to determine, however approximately, the proportions of volunteers and conscripts.

In the Republic the terms *dilectus*, *supplementum* and *conscribere* almost always suggest resort to compulsion;³ this nuance persists in imperial Latin though some ambiguity must be admitted.⁴ Fronto, for instance, can write: *in bello ubi opus sit legionem conscribere, non tantum voluntarios legimus sed etiam latentes militari aetate conquirimus*, a text which shows both that *conscribere* can be used neutrally and that in the mid second century the government did not necessarily rely on volunteers alone.⁵ In a letter to Pliny Trajan distinguishes between *voluntarii*, *lecti* and *vicarii*; the *lecti* are plainly con-

¹ *Roemisches Staatsrecht* (Leipzig 1887-1888³) 3.298, cf. 2.849 f. R. O. Fink, *Rom. Military Records on Papyrus* (Cleveland, 1971); G. Forni, *Il Reclutamento delle Legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano* (Milano, 1953); A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, (Oxford, 1964); K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung von Alen u. Kohorten an Rhein u. Donau* (Bern, 1951); H-G. Pflaum. *Les Carrieres procuratoriennes équestres* (Paris, 1960) are cited by authors' names.

² *Italian Manpower* (Oxford, 1971) ch. XXII. (cited infra by title alone).

³ *Ibid.* Appendix 20 (also for Livy's usage).

⁴ See esp. texts cited in nn. 5, 19 f., 31-33, 36, 43 f., 60 f., 65, 76-78, 82. Cf. also *Cod. Theod.* 7.13.9 (380), 7.18. 10 and 20.12 (400); *Amm.* 17.13.3; 31.4.4; and see n. 104.

⁵ 140 N=2.54H. Cf. texts in n. 45. Fronto 2.206 H. (better than 206 N) is not illuminating.

scripts, and the *vicarii* substitutes provided by men who thereby escaped conscription.⁶ The *voluntarii* are said *se offerre*; similarly Severan jurists distinguish recruits who *militiae se* (or *nomen*) *dederunt* from those who are *lecti* or who *se legi passi sunt*; the last phrase may again refer to *vicarii*.⁷ By contrast Fronto uses the verb *legere* for enlistment of both volunteers and conscripts, and with some reason, as the recruiting officer had to satisfy himself by *inquisitio* and *probatio* of the qualifications of all recruits alike.⁸ But it looks as if in technical language *legere* referred to conscription, and Fronto's use of *conscribere* may also be loose. Persons appointed *ad iuniores legendos* should, like *dilectatores*, have been empowered to enlist recruits by coercion.

If they did their duty, they would not have refused to accept volunteers suitably qualified. *Ceteris paribus* they should have preferred willing soldiers. Trajan seems to take it for granted that recruits might be either conscripts or volunteers. Apuleius parodies the activity of a Roman recruiting officer when he makes a robber leader recommend to his comrades: *inquisitioni commilitonum potius insisteretur et tirocinio novae iuventutis ad pristinam manum numerum Martiae cohortis facies integraretur; nam et invitos terrore compelli et volentes praemio provocari posse*.⁹ Since his story is based on his knowledge of conditions in Africa, this passage is particularly relevant to levies there, but I do not doubt that he describes the normal conduct of the *dilectus* everywhere. Only an official bent on lining his own pocket would actually prefer compulsion, with a view to extorting ransoms from those unwilling to serve. Given the general standard of official morality,¹⁰ I suspect that such malpractices, forbidden by the *lex Iulia de repetundis*¹¹ were more common than we know and did much to add to what Velleius calls the *trepidatio delectus* (n. 32).

Scholars who claim that conscription was a rarity in the Principate un-

⁶ *Ep.* 10.29f. with Sherwin-White's admirable commentary (A. N. Sherwin-White *The Letters of Phiny* [Oxford, 1966]). For *vicarii* cf. Liv. 29.1.

⁷ *Dig.* 40.12.29, 49.16.2.1, *h. t.* 4, 1-4 and 8 f.; *h. t.* 8; *h. t.* 16 *pr*; Liv. 4.4.3; *Cod. Iust.* 12.33.1 (Severan), cf. Tac., *Hist.* 2.97.2, 3.58.2. In Liv.5.10.3 (cf. 2.27.10) and Vegetius, 1.3 men can be forced *nomina dare*.

⁸ *Probatio* applies to conscripts as well as volunteers, cf. n. 7 (*contra* Wilcken on *Chr.* 453=Fink 87). Full description of recruitment partly based on Vegetius by R. W. Davies, "Joining the Roman Army", *BJ* 169 (1969) 208ff. (cf. also Watson [n. 69 *infra*] ch. 2 and A. H. M. Jones, 616f.); in my view he misinterprets some texts considered below. Both he and Watson repeat virtually without argument that recruits were normally volunteers "'Tis the song of the Jubjub! The proof is complete. If only I've stated it thrice".

⁹ *Met.* 7.4.

¹⁰ Cf. my article "Charges of Provincial Maladministration" *Historia* 10 (1961) 189ff, esp. Part II.

¹¹ *Dig.* 48.11.6.2, cf. Tac. *Agr.* 13.1: *ipsi Britanni dilectum ac tributa et iniuncta imperii munia impigre obeunt, si iniuriae absint*, nn. 57, 65; pp. 106 f.

lingly quote a dictum of the jurist Arrius Menander, who is named as a *consiliarius* by Ulpian (*Dig.* 4.4.11.2) and who wrote under Severus or Caracalla (49.16.13.5f., cf. 49.16.5.4). Arrius certainly contrasts the present, when *most* soldiers were volunteers, with a former age, when men who evaded the levy were liable to be sold into slavery; this is recorded as the old Republican penalty, and Augustus sold a Roman *equus* for maiming his sons so as to make them unfit for service, very probably in the crisis of AD 9–10, when he put some men to death for refusing to serve.¹² The capital penalty, says Arrius, had been abandoned *mutato statu militiae*; what this may mean will be considered later. But he does not date the change, and we are not entitled to apply his dictum to any age before the Severan. Since the extracts from his first book *de re militari* also illustrate the continuance of the obligation to military service, I transcribe them, omitting a preliminary discussion of the conditions under which a man could not legally enlist either as a conscript or as a volunteer (*Dig.* 49.16.4, *pr.* –9); he then proceeds:-

10. Gravius autem delictum est detractare munus militiae quam adpetere; nam et qui ad dilectum olim non respondebant, ut proditores libertatis in servitutem redigebantur. Sed mutato statu militiae recessum a poena capitis est, quia plerumque voluntario milite numeri supplentur. 11. Qui filium suum subtrahit militiae belli tempore, exilio et bonorum parte multandus est; si in pace, fustibus caedi iubetur et requisitus iuvenis vel a patre postea exhibitus in deteriore militiam dandus est; qui enim se sollicitari sustinuit (*Mommsen*: se sollicitavit *codd.*) ab alio, veniam non meretur. 12. Eum qui filium debilitavit dilectu per bellum indicto, ut inhabilis militiae sit, praeceptum divi Traiani deportavit.

Though the units were generally recruited from volunteers and it had therefore become unnecessary to sell any one who evaded the levy into slavery (10), the father who tried to withhold his son was liable to heavy penalties, especially in time of war (11–12); however, even in peace, he committed a criminal offence, and it follows that a *dilectus* (which in Arrius' usage clearly denotes compulsion) could still take place in time of peace. The penalty then applied was a cudgelling; by the age of Severus this was not imposed on the *honestiores* (senators, *equites*, decurions), including even veterans;¹³ it may then be inferred that their sons were not liable to conscription.

Exemption from military service was a privilege recorded in a number of documents. It was conferred by Octavian on the trierarch Seleucus, his parents

¹² *Italian Manpower* 391; Suet., *Aug.* 24.1; Dio 56. 23. 3.

¹³ P. Garnsey, *Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1970). 136–141; 245–7.

and descendants (*FIRA* I no. 55, II 23) and on some veterans and their children (*ibid.* 56), though it does not appear in what is extant of an edict in which Domitian defined the privileges of veterans (*ibid.* 76). Modestinus cites a letter of Pius, which Commodus had apparently confirmed and which was itself a re-enactment of rules that Hadrian too had confirmed on his accession, conferring privileges on philosophers, sophists, *grammatici* and doctors; these included the right ‘not to be enrolled for military service against their will’ (*Dig.* 27.1.6.8). The mere fact that men were specifically granted this immunity shows that in the absence of such a grant they were liable to serve, but it does not follow that there was much risk of their being actually called up unless exempted; the list of privileges could be *tralatitiana*. *Militiae vacatio* was indeed an old Republican immunity.¹⁴

Forni (28ff) argues that “the Roman state did not dispose of sufficient means to undertake the burden of maintaining an army supplied by a generally obligatory conscription, nor if it had possessed the means, could it have compelled all citizens without distinction to a long term of service, without exposing itself to the peril of subverting the social and economic class order and of having recalcitrant and mutinous soldiers”. Already under Augustus the legionary’s term of service lengthened out to 25 years or even more, and thereafter we find that both legionaries and auxiliaries regularly served for 25 or 26 years.¹⁵ As Forni remarks, it was only necessary to raise on average some 5000–6000 men a year to keep the legions up to strength, and though we should substitute a much lower figure for the total number of adult male citizens in Augustus’ time than that Forni himself accepted,¹⁶ it is plain that there could be no question of enrolling more than a small proportion of them in the legions, even if the legions had still been recruited solely from citizens by birth. In fact of course provincials were already admitted to them;¹⁷ moreover, the number of citizens was itself continually on the increase with new enfranchisements. As for the *auxilia*, it is no less patent that their numbers did not require resort to universal conscription. Indeed it would be an absurdity to suggest that *all* fit males could have been called up for *long* service. But it is not at all absurd to suppose that individuals were selected by lot or by some other more or less arbitrary criterion to fulfil the obligation of military service that was only in principle incumbent on all. The unfairness of such a procedure is not proof that it was never adopted. On the contrary, to say nothing of modern states, we know that it was adopted in Republican Rome.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Italian Manpower* 391 n. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 401, 332–342; cf. Forni 37 f, and the *diplomata* for the *auxilia*.

¹⁶ He assumed that the Augustan census figures related to adult males. *V. contra*, *Italian Manpower*, Part I, esp. ch. IX.

¹⁷ Forni ch. IV.

¹⁸ Peter the Great instituted life-long selective conscription, later reduced to 25 years;

In many years during the first century BC scores of thousands of Italians were conscribed for the army, and some of them served for prolonged terms; and yet of course the majority of Italians remained in civil life. The author of a letter to Caesar ascribed to Sallust commented on this: *ne, uti adhuc, militia iniusta aut inaequalis sit, cum alii triginta, pars nullum stipendium facient'* (ep. 1.8.6); it matters little for our purpose if the letter was written by Sallust or in the imperial age. Again, it goes without saying that volunteers were always preferred. That does not imply that they were always forthcoming. And the government could hope on the basis of experience that stern discipline would check refractory behaviour on the part of conscripts. Tiberius at least did not think that the few Italians most likely to volunteer would prove better soldiers than men raised by conscription in the provinces (n. 36 infra).

In his Panegyric on Rome¹⁹ Aelius Aristides says that the Romans deemed it unworthy of their rule that citizens should be subject to military service and its hardships but saw the imprudence of relying on foreign troops; they therefore formed an army without disturbing the citizens by picking the subjects whose physique was most suitable to perform the 'liturgy' of military service in return for Roman citizenship. Each subject people was required to provide contingents not so large that it was a burden to furnish them, or that any could possess a potentially dangerous force of their own. If we were to attach any value to these effusions of a peaceful *Graeculus*, we might infer that citizens were no longer liable to conscription but that subject peoples were; in Aristides' eyes military service is a burdensome liturgy, and he has no conception that it was relished by any of the subjects. In fact conscription was not unknown among citizens and in Italy itself even in his time (infra); on the other hand we certainly must not assume that by then volunteers did not compose the majority of soldiers provided by the subjects. Aristides was most familiar with Greek cities which provided few recruits,²¹ and may have known little of the general practice of recruitment in the empire.

What Cassius Dio says is another matter: he had experience of government. He makes Maecenas advise Augustus to enrol in the army men of the greatest physical strength and in most need of livelihood, who would otherwise be most apt to turn to brigandage.²² As men in need of a livelihood would be ready to

a similar system existed in some of the Habsburg dominions in the 18th century. Lot: *Italian Manpower* 628 n. 5, 631; cf. Dio 56.23.2. See Appendix.

¹⁹ 26.74ff. Hdn. 2.11 thought (wrongly) that Augustus Ἰταλιώτας πόνων ἐξέπαιυσε καὶ τῶν ὀπλων ἐγύμνωσε; soldiers were henceforth mercenaries.

²⁰ Cf. *munus* in Arrius and elsewhere.

²¹ Forni gives 9 from Asia, 32 from Bithynia (22 in one Trajanic list of soldiers, n. 64) and 1 from Lycia for the whole period from AD 70. 'Each people' did not bear a fair share of the burden, or sometimes any, cf. Th. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.* (Berlin, 1905-1913); VI.22f.

²² Dio 52.27.4f.

enlist, this may thus fit the testimony of Arrius Menander. But Maecenas' speech is notoriously related to conditions in Dio's own time rather than to those of the Augustan age. His allusion to brigandage may well have sprung from his interpretation of the effects produced in Italy when Severus instituted the practice of recruiting the praetorians from provincial legionaries rather than from Italy and to a lesser extent from such relatively civilized regions as Spain, Noricum and Macedonia; in Dio's view (which may have been mistaken) men of the kind who had once joined the guard now took to brigandage and gladiatorial fighting; probably he had in mind the followers of Bulla who plundered Italy for two years.²³ As governor of Upper Pannonia Dio had also learned the fine military qualities of the inhabitants; he explained their belligerence by their poverty; life in such wretched conditions was hardly worth living. By his time Pannonians provided a high proportion of legionaries as well as auxiliaries on the Danube.²⁴ But that had only been true since the early second century. Dio's evidence is irrelevant to recruitment for the army at an earlier time. The extent to which conscription had once been used cannot be determined from any of the texts or general considerations so far examined: we must look for more concrete evidence.

Let us first take Italy. In the late Republic and most of all from 49 to 29 BC conscription was usual — and detested (n. 2). Yet at this time soldiers had some claim to be discharged after only six years' service, and if they were fortunate, secured handsome rewards in booty, lands and money. Under Augustus' system all citizen soldiers could count on *praemia militiae*, if they survived the term of service, but these were far less liberal than the luckier among their predecessors had secured,²⁵ and the term of service had lengthened to twentyfive years or more (n.15 supra), spent often in uncongenial climates and distant lands. Pay was modest, discipline harsh. In AD 14 the legionaries on the Rhine demanded *modum miseriarum*.²⁶ Of course the men in the praetorian and

²³ Dio 74.2.5; 76.10.1. Recruitment for the praetorians before Severus: 74.2.4 cf. Tac. *Ann.* 4.5.3 (who no doubt rightly ignores provincials, when writing of Tiberius' time), confirmed by data in A. Passerini, *Le Coorti pretorie* (Roma, 1939) 148ff. (note evidence for volunteering in 143 n. 1; it is also implied in *Edict. imp. Claud. de Anaun.*). The inscriptions similarly confirm the character and permanence of Severus' change, *ibid* 174ff.; the few Italians attested (173 n. 2) were probably themselves ex-legionaries, since some recruitment for the legions in Italy is attested in and after Severus' reign (nn. 47–50), and Dio then may have exaggerated the social effect of Severus' change. The conduct of the praetorians under Commodus and in 193 (cf. Dio 73.8, Hdn. 2.2.5, 2.4.4) does not suggest that they were to be preferred to the new guards (*contra* Dio 74.2.4–6) but well fits the suggestion that they were drawn from elements in the population that would otherwise have turned to brigandage, not disproved by a few epigraphic instances of praetorians who enjoyed rank and property before service, Passerini, 164f.

²⁴ Dio 49.36.

²⁵ *Italian Manpower* 412, cf. ch. XIX, esp. 339–342.

²⁶ Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.16f., 31f.

urban cohorts were far better off, and were doubtless always volunteers, though even this service seems not to have attracted for the most part those of high social standing (n. 23 supra). Yet Augustus clearly desired to found his regime on the goodwill of Italians and must have been reluctant to enforce conscription on the scale that had recently been common. Some volunteers were naturally to be obtained. We have evidence for the existence of over thirty auxiliary *cohortes voluntariae* of Roman citizens, which appear to have been raised in Italy or in provincial towns possessed of the Roman citizenship in his reign. The recently attested existence in Augustus' time of a *cohors Apula*²⁷ provides confirmation for the thesis of K. Kraft,²⁸ which was convincing in itself, that these cohorts are not to be identified with the units composed of freedmen formed temporarily in the crises of AD 6 and 9; moreover it is on these occasions that we hear of conscription both of freeborn and freedmen; and it is significant that none of the units later described as *cohortes civium Romanorum ingenuorum*, which may reasonably be held to have been raised in 6 or 9–10 (n. 33 infra) and named to distinguish them from the freedmen units, is designated as *voluntaria*. All the *cohortes voluntariae* are presumably of earlier date, as the *cohors Apula* is known to be. Men serving in such auxiliary units received on Augustus' death the same donative as legionaries;²⁸ probably their pay and conditions were also the same (and better than those of other auxiliaries).²⁹ It can hardly be supposed, however, that service in these cohorts was *more* attractive than in the legions, and it should follow that volunteers could also be found for the legions in Italy (and in citizen towns of the provinces).

At the same time the practice of enlisting provincials for the legions and giving them citizenship when they joined up, which had begun in the civil wars, appears to have continued, and eventually became normal especially in the east.³⁰ Yet it would seem that Augustus did not altogether abandon conscription in Italy itself. Livy refers to *dilectus*, held not (as of old) annually but at irregular intervals³¹. Velleius praises Tiberius because *quanta cum quiete hominum rem perpetui praecipuique timoris, supplementum sine trepidatione delectus providet*³²; he could hardly have written thus, if the terror of the levy had not been known since Actium, or known only in the crises of AD 6 and 9,

²⁷ J.M. Cook, *The Troad* (Oxford, 1973) epigr. appendix by G. E. Bean no. 50; for a fuller discussion see my forthcoming paper in *Zeitschr. f. Papyrologie u. Epigraphik*, 1974, 161 ff.

²⁸ Kraft 82ff.

²⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.8.2. On auxiliary pay see now Fink nos. 68–73; M. P. Speidel, *JRS* 63 (1973), 141 ff. argues that Fink's re-reading of the sum paid to soldiers thrice a year in 68 (=P. *Gen. Lat.* 1R) as 247½ dr. confirms the view that the soldiers were auxiliaries who received five sixths as much as legionaries.

³⁰ Forni ch. IV.

³¹ 6.12.4. Cf n. 3 supra.

³² 2.130.2.

when there is other evidence that conscription was employed.³³ It was of course precisely in AD 6 that Augustus complained of *penuria iuventutis*;³⁴ earlier, Livy had suggested that Rome could no longer raise ten new legions in an emergency, as in 349 BC (7.25.9), and in fact in AD 9 Augustus did not replace Varus' three lost legions. Obviously much larger forces could readily have been mobilized by conscription of the kind familiar in the 80s and 40s.³⁵ It is clear that it was employed but not systematically and universally, by what method or on what principle (if any) we do not know. Conceivably communities were required to furnish small quotas of recruits (v. Appendix). In AD 6 and 9 even the urban proletariat and freedmen were called on. Yet there were no mass levies. What was attempted was evidently unpopular. Tiberius preferred to abandon conscription in Italy, and this despite his judgement that men of the right type would not volunteer. In AD 23, to justify a proposed visit to the provinces, *multitudinem veteranorum praetexebat imperator et dilectibus supplendos exercitus: nam voluntarium militem deesse ac, si suppeditet, non eadem virtute ac modestia agere, quia plerumque inopes ac vagi sponte militiam sumant*.³⁶ Levies were to be held because there were not enough properly qualified volunteers; it is patent that Tiberius assumed the necessity for conscription. But the levies were to be in the provinces, not in Italy, or Tiberius would not have thought or affected to think of leaving Italy. In fact he did not go, but we are not to infer that no *dilectus* took place; they are attested in his reign in Narbonensis (n. 52) and Thrace (n. 77 infra). If Velleius asserts that Tiberius put an end to conscription, it is because Velleius only cared about the Italians.

After Tiberius new legions were raised occasionally, and sometimes, perhaps always, in Italy,³⁷ when conscription must have been employed, whenever necessary to fill their ranks. Strong arguments have been adduced to show that it was Gaius rather than Claudius who formed XV and XXII Primigenia,³⁸

³³ AD 6: Vell. 2.111.1, Plin. *NH* 7.149, Dio 55.31; cf. 57.5.4, Tac. *Ann.* 1.31; AD 9: Dio 56.23.2f; both years, Suet. *Aug.* 25.2; Macr. *Sat.* 1.11.30. Bean refers the 'dilectus ingenuorum' at Rome of the new inscription to AD 9; in my view it is of AD 6 (n. 27 supra).

³⁴ Plin. *l.c.*

³⁵ Dio 56.23.1 is ludicrous.

³⁶ *Ann.* 4.4.2. Tiberius' objection to *vagi* could probably not be sustained; note their recruitment in late empire, *Cod. Theod.* 7.13.6.1 (altered in *Cod. Iust.* 12.43.1), 7.18.10; 7. 18. 17; 7. 20. 12; 8.2.3 And cf. n. 23 supra.

³⁷ J. C. Mann, "The Raising of New legions during the Principate" *Hermes* 91 (1963) 483ff. argues that all new legions in normal times were raised in Italy, whether from 'blind conservatism' or to avoid interference with the ordinary process of provincial recruitment for existing units; he finds a little supporting evidence for I Minervia and XXX Ulpia. Cf n. 47f. infra.

³⁸ Ritterling, *RE Bd.* 12.1 (1924) s. v. *Legio*, cols 1244–1247; Syme, "The Northern Frontier from Tiberius to Nero", *CAH X* (1952) 788f.

and I would connect with their formation Suetonius' statement that *dilectus ubique acerbissime acti*; probably Suetonius' source or sources would have expressed indignation at the resumption of conscription in Italy;³⁹ in fact about 60% of the soldiers of known *origo* who served in these legions down to 69 came from Italy, and most of the rest from Narbonensis. Nero's *legio I Italica* was certainly raised in Italy, as its *cognomen* shows and Suetonius attests: *conscripta ex Italicis senum pedum tironibus nova legione*; even if no weight is placed on the verb *conscripta*, one might doubt if enough six-foot volunteers could have been obtained.⁴⁰ There is no evidence where or how Vespasian formed IV and XVI Flavia, unless we conjecture that the *dilectus* carried out by Agricola early in 70⁴¹ took place in Italy and was connected with their formation; but conceivably recruits were needed at this time rather to strengthen and Romanize the two legions recently formed from 'militēs' of the fleets, I and II Adiutrix.⁴² Not enough is known of the original recruitment for Domitian's I Minervia and Trajan's II Traiana and XXX Ulpia (But cf. n. 37 supra). But Marcus Aurelius certainly raised two new legions in Italy, as their *cognomina* reveal (II and III Italica); inscriptions also attest *dilectus* throughout Italy about 165, and though the precise dating of the levies is controversial, it cannot be doubted that at the time the defences of the empire seemed so precarious that the government could not have afforded to rely on sufficient volunteers coming forward.⁴³

In emergencies other levies were held in Italy. Nero tried to obtain recruits from the 'city tribes' for the suppression of Vindex; no volunteers appeared, and he did not resort to compulsion; his authority was breaking down.⁴⁴ In 69 Vitellius had more success; men readily gave in their names: *superfluente multitudine curam dilectus in consules partitur*; Tacitus offers a rare example of a *dilectus* in which volunteering is actually attested.⁴⁵ Levies under Hadrian in Transpadana and other parts of Italy are to be connected with the Jewish

³⁹ *Cal.* 43.

⁴⁰ *Nero* 19

⁴¹ *Tac. Agr.* 7, 3. So Ritterling *op. cit.* (n. 38 supra) col. 1540.

⁴² Of 16 soldiers in II Adiutrix known to Forni 217 as enlisted between Vespasian and Trajan 9 are Italian.

⁴³ *ILS* 1098 on M. Cl. Fronto *misso ad iuventutem per Italiam legendam* (certainly between 163 and summer 166); *AE* 1956. 123 on Ti. Cl. Proculus Cornelianus (Pflaum, I. 401), (*proc.*) *item ad dilectum cum Iulio Vero per Italiam tironum (utriusque) leg (ionis) Italicae*. I do not feel confident of the exact date, which cannot be inferred with confidence from such inaccurate sources as *HA. Marc.* 21.6 and 8; *Oros. Hist.* 7.15.6.

⁴⁴ *Suet. Nero* 44.1.

⁴⁵ *Tac. Hist.* 3.58. Cf. *Liv.* 5.16.5, 9.10.6 for *dilectus... prope voluntariorum*. *Suet. Vit.* 15.1: he promised recruits discharge after victory with the *praemia* of veterans; for a partial parallel see *Cod. Theod.* 7.13.17 (406).

revolt.⁴⁶ Domiciled at Rome, the emperor could still raise troops in an emergency, most immediately by calling up Italians.

All this did not end in the Severan age. A levy in Transpadana under Septimius may be connected with one of the civil wars or with the formation of new legions for operations against Parthia; there may well have been similar enlistments in other parts.⁴⁷ Herodian also attests special measures for enlisting men in Italy as well as in all the provinces for Alexander Severus' Parthian campaign, and an inscription has been plausibly restored to relate to this *dilectus* in Transpadana.⁴⁸ Under a system of purely voluntary enlistment we must suppose that recruits were continually coming forward and being accepted for service; if historians record special measures for recruitment, it is natural to infer that they had in mind *dilectus* in which compulsion was applied. It may well have been on this occasion that IV Italica was raised. Maximinus held a further levy in Italy,⁴⁹ and the senate raised troops there for their struggle with him; in their seemingly desperate position, they would not have refrained from conscription.⁵⁰

Certainly or probably, such levies in Italy were all extraordinary. Now it is a long known fact that gradually Italians almost disappeared from the legions. Forni supplies figures which may be summarized thus:

⁴⁶ *ILS* 1068: *T. Caesernio... Statio Quintio Statiano Memmio Macrino... misso ad dilectum iuniorum a divo Hadriano in regionem Transpadanam*. Cf. *Ann. Épigr.* 1955, 238 (partially reproducing an inscription published by Abdullatif Ahmed Aly, *Annals of Faculty of Arts, Ain Shams Univ.* 3[1955] 113ff., on which see also J. F. Gilliam "The veterans and 'Praefectus Castrorum'", *AJP* 77 [1956] 359ff.); this attests discharge of veterans of II Traiana in 157, including 15 from central Italy, enlisted in 132–3; Mann (n. 37) suggests that they were enrolled by Q. Voconius Saxa Fidus *ILS* 8828 ἐπιμελητῆν ὁδοῦ ᾽Ουαλέριας Τ[ε]ί βουρτεινῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τόποις στρατολογήσαντα. One third of the 136 veterans came from Africa, none from Egypt. (Numidians had been recruited not only for III Augusta but also for VI Ferrata and another legion outside Africa under Vespasian, *ILS* 9196).

⁴⁷ Pflaum 625ff. supposes that Cn. Marcius Rustius Rufinus was *dilector regionis Transpadanae* (*CIL* X 1127) just before the war with Albinus. Hdn. 2.14.6 records levies in Italy for the war with Niger. (It is not a solid objection to this that they would not have been ready for the one campaign that in fact took place). Mann (n. 37 *supra*) would connect the levies with the raising of the *legiones I, II* and *III Parthica* for the Parthian war. The presence of a few Italians in II Parthica (Forni 217) is easily explicable, as it was soon stationed at Alba.

⁴⁸ Hdn. 6.3.1; *ILS* 1173: *electo ab op[timo imp. Severo] Alexandro Aug. ad [dilect(um) habend(um)] per regionem Transpadanam*; Ritterling *op. cit.* (n. 38 *supra*) cols. 1329ff.; IV Italica was perhaps raised now.

⁴⁹ *ILS* 487: he restored a road near Aquileia *per tirones iuventut(is) novae Italicae suae dilectus posterior(is)*; perhaps the *dilectus prior* was Alexander's.

⁵⁰ Hdn. 7.12.1; *CIL* XIII 6763 (better text than *ILS* 1188): *...misso adv(ersus) h(ostes) p(ublicos) in re[g. Transp]ad(anam) tir(onibus) legendis... CIL* VI 31747: *'[misso] ad uniores legendos per Aemi[liam] may belong here.*

	Italians	Provincials
Augustus-Gaius	207	128
Claudius-Nero	117	123
Flavio-Trajanic	73	268
Hadrian -c. 300	17+ ⁵¹	1866+

Of course the dating of many of the inscriptions from which these figures derive is not quite certain, and other relevant inscriptions have been discovered since he wrote; moreover for some legions, notably those in the east, we have few epigraphic data, and since those stationed in Egypt were certainly largely provincial from the first and the same may be conjectured for the Syrian legions, it may well be that the proportion of Italians before Hadrian is somewhat too high. The relative contributions to the legions made by particular provinces (with which I am not concerned) can certainly not be determined from our epigraphic evidence, since it is so much more abundant in one region than another, and since a few inscriptions preserve lists of men serving or enlisted in one particular legion and at one particular time, which may be quite unrepresentative. But when every qualification has been made, and whatever changes in Forni's figures may result from subsequent finds or from revised datings, no one can suppose that the general picture that he presents and that others had presented before him can be substantially altered, in so far as it shows the decline in the Italian contribution.

In the provinces where troops were stationed the enlistment of new recruits, whether conscripts or volunteers, must have been entrusted to the governor, who was also their commander. The right to authorize levies belonged in theory to senate and emperor alike, in practice only to the emperor and to those who acted on his orders. His legates and prefects no doubt had standing instructions to fill the ranks of the units under their command, and proconsuls may have received similar permission to recruit men for the small auxiliary forces in senatorial provinces. It could only be the emperor who commissioned recruitment within one province for the purpose of strengthening armies stationed elsewhere.^{51a} Under Tiberius a proconsul of Narbonensis is also styled [*leg(atus) a]d cens(us) accip(iendos) et dilect(um)*]; presumably he held a levy on the emperor's mandate for the Rhine armies. The title is unique, and no doubt later proconsuls who levied troops did not think it necessary to state what every one knew, that they acted on imperial authority, nor even to mention what had become an integral part of their normal duties.⁵² The few

⁵¹ Mann (n. 37 supra) eliminates some of these. Forni wrote before discovery of *AE* 1955, 238 (n. 46 supra).

^{51a} For further discussion see forthcoming paper (n. 27 supra).

⁵² *ILS* 950. Note *ILS* 2305:... *dilecto (sic) lectus ab M. Silano*, proconsul of Africa under Tiberius; but as commander of III Augusta, he was in a special position.

dilectatores attested in the provinces are men of subordinate rank, who can be assumed to be responsible to the governors;⁵³ it is the latter who are alone known to 'approve' the enlistment of individual recruits.⁵⁴ In Italy alone we find men of senatorial rank specially commissioned to hold levies; it was evidently not a regular duty for any of the magistrates, and it was by Vitellius' special authority that the consuls were entrusted with it (n. 45 infra). This may mean that it was actually hard for volunteers in Italy to find an official there qualified to enrol them, unless of course they applied to the prefects commanding the praetorian or urban cohorts for admission to those units. Perhaps most of the Italians found in the legions after Augustus' time were then recruited on the extraordinary occasions when levies were held in Italy (which is not to say that they did not include volunteers). It is not at all likely that all of these occasions are known to us; if the Jewish war required a levy in Italy, other emergencies (notably under Domitian) may have had the same result.

Let us now turn to the provinces. In AD 54 Nero *iuventutem proximas per provincias quaesitam supplendis Orientis legionibus... iubet*.⁵⁵ In 58 Corbulo discharged soldiers who were over age or unfit, and *supplementum petivit; et habiti per Galatiam Cappadociamque dilectus*.⁵⁶ It is evident that in the east legions (and other units) were under strength in 54. If the government had been relying on volunteers, then the supply was clearly inadequate. The urgent need to make the army effective for the Parthian war made a resort to conscription requisite. It was certainly employed early in Nero's reign in Cyrenaica, where Pedius Blaesus (presumably the proconsul) was condemned for *repetundae*, partly on the ground of *dilectum militarem pretio et ambitione corruptum*.⁵⁷ In 65 *dilectus per Galliam Narbonensem Africamque et Asiam habiti sunt supplendis Illyrici legionibus, ex quibus aetate aut valetudine fessi sacramento solvebantur*.⁵⁸ Here, once again, it had not proved possible to fill the ranks

⁵³ viz. in Numidia (*ILS* 9195 see n. 46), Aquitania (1454, Hadrianic), an unspecified region ('delectator Augusti', 1341, Hadrianic) and Thrace (*IGRom* I. 824); the first three are numbers 35a, 106 bis and 113 in Pflaum. Sempronius Caelianus (Plin. *Ep.* 10. 29) may be another example. Of two Equites so employed in Italy (nn. 43 and 47) only the second appears to act independently; we now also know of a military tribune officiating at Rome under Augustus and Tiberius (n. 27). See also n. 66 infra.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Cod. Iust.* 12.33.1 (Severus and Caracalla): *si militiae nomen dare vultis, offerte vos his qui probandi ius habent*. The prefect of Egypt posts *tirones probatos a me* to their unit, Fink 87 (103), cf. 64 i 31 (156); likewise the legate of Syria (50 i 14) and if restorations are correct, other governors (63 i 30; 66 b i 5-10). Since governors even 'approve' horses for cavalry, ib. 83 and 99, we may suppose that the real work was done by members of their staff. I conjecture that when *dilectatores* were appointed, *probatio* was delegated to them.

⁵⁵ Tac., *Ann.* 13.7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 13.35.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 14.18, cf. n. 11 supra.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 16.13. *ILS* 986 illuminates the need.

with volunteers. That the *dilectus* on this occasion too involved coercion (although there was no grave emergency) is clear from the omission of Italy from the recruiting areas; there could have been no desire to exclude volunteers from Italy, but it remained the policy to spare Italians from conscription.

In civil wars rival pretenders were bound to raise forces with all speed, and thus to apply coercion, where necessary. When we read that Galba's new VIIth legion was 'conscripted' in Spain, the word should be given its full force.⁵⁹ Vitellius ordered levies throughout Gaul to make good the gaps in the Rhine army created by the despatch of expeditionary forces to Italy; the levies were countermanded after Bedriacum, but apparently resumed in face of the Flavian threat and finally terminated by Petillius Cerealis; that they involved more than the enrolment of volunteers is plain from Tacitus' explicit references to their unpopularity.⁶⁰ Similarly an attempt by the procurator of Corsica to win the island for Vitellius had been thwarted by the resentment his levy caused.⁶¹ We must assume that in the same way the new levy of 6000 Dalmatians in the Flavian army included conscripts,⁶² and that Vespasian's levies in the east again involved conscription; Tacitus suggests that they were less unpopular than his exactions of money, but it was doubtless only the latter which affected the upper classes, who were more articulate in stating their grievances.⁶³

Naturally we must not presume that the practice in civil wars was normal at other times. But it is clear that conscription persisted after 69 and not only in crises. Trajan took it for granted that recruits in Bithynia might be either conscripts or volunteers, including *vicarii* (n. 6 supra). Bithynian soldiers do not often figure in our epigraphic records; if we find no less than 22 out of 98 legionaries in Africa under Trajan who came from Bithynia, can we doubt that this was due to compulsion rather than to a sudden fever for military service?⁶⁴ Fronto writes of searches for men who had gone into hiding to avoid the call-up (n. 5 supra). Egyptian papyri not only attest volunteering (for service in Egypt) but also record a village official who was said to have hunted down recruits with dogs (AD 185), in order to extort money for their release. Indeed, if some *tirones probati* were *voluntarii*, others were presumably not.⁶⁵

Dilectus or *dilectatores* are attested in Britain (n. 11 supra; 82 infra), Gaul

⁵⁹ Tac., *Hist.* 2. 11; 3. 22; 25; Suet., *Galba* 10.

⁶⁰ *Hist.* 2.57.1, 2.69.2, 4.15.3, 4.19.2, 4.26.1 (*simul dilectum tributaque Galliae aspernantes*), cf. 4.31.1 (*militia sine adfectu*); 4.71.2 (*recepta iuventute facilius tributa toleravere*); and cf. n. 78 infra. By contrast in Africa men were keen to volunteer for Vitellius, *Hist.* 2.97.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 2.16.2.

⁶² *Ibid.* 3.50.2.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 2.82.1, cf. 2.84.1: *navium militum armorum paratu strepere provinciae, sed nihil aeque fatigabat quam pecuniarum conquisitio.*

⁶⁴ *CIL* VIII 18084, cf. n. 21 supra.

⁶⁵ Fink 65 i 30; volunteers, e.g. *BGU* 423; *P. Mich.* 465; dogs, *P. Lond.* 2.173f.

and Germany (nn. 52, 53, 58, 60 supra; 78, 81 infra), Spain (n. 59 supra), Africa and Numidia (nn. 46, 52f., 58 supra), Cyrenaica,⁶⁶ Egypt (n. 66), Syria etc (n. 56 supra), Asia Minor (nn. 6; 56; 58 supra) and Thrace (n. 53; 77 infra). There is also some further evidence in the *Historia Augusta*,⁶⁷ the value of which seems dubious, which is commonly held to mean that conscription was a burden to the *Italici* in Spain, though regulated by Trajan, as late as Marcus' reign. They could be members of citizen communities in the peninsula. No doubt they would have furnished recruits for the legions in Spain, but since the Flavian period only one had been stationed there. If these passages are to be taken seriously, Roman citizens in Spain were being drafted abroad for service in a period when local recruiting, long normal for the eastern legions, had apparently been introduced for those on the Rhine and on the Danube. Britain indeed remains, and the composition of the legions there is relatively ill documented; however only a few Spaniards are attested (in XX Valeria Victrix) and before Hadrian. The alleged quotation from Marius Maximus by the writer does nothing to instil confidence.⁶⁸

Since the *dilectus* is so often stated to have been oppressive, there should be no doubt that wherever it is attested, conscription was employed. Indeed this is hardly contested. Instead it is maintained that 'the infrequency with which resort was made to the *dilectus* is remarkable'.⁶⁹ But this contention is unjustified. We hear of it infrequently, but that is quite another matter. We do not hear much more often of the exaction of tribute (with which it is sometimes coupled) and which of course went on every year. Nor are there many more officials recorded who were specifically charged with taking the census or with collection of revenue than those who were appointed to levy troops. Both facts are easily explained on the hypothesis that it was the normal responsibility of regular officials in each province to perform all these functions, and that there were special circumstances of which we must profess ignorance when others were called in to do the work or to assist in doing it. No doubt

⁶⁶ *Ann. Epigr.* 1951, 88 (= E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* [Kendal 1953] 23ff.): *C. Iulio...Karo...trib. mil. leg. III Cyr.... centuriones et milites leg. III Cyr. et leg. XXII missi in provinciam Cyrenensium dilectus causa*; *Ann. Epigr.* 1957, 133: '*tirones lectos ex provincia Cyrenensi*'; the first probably (Birley), the second certainly Trajanic. cf. n. 57 supra.

⁶⁷ HA. *Hadr.* 12.4: *omnibus (!) Hispanis Tarraconem in conventum vocatis dilectumque ioculariter (!), ut verba ipsa ponit Marius Maximus, retractantibus Italicis, vehementissime ceteris, prudenter et caute consuluit. Marc. 11.7: Hispanis exhaustis Italica adlectione contra Traiani quoque (?) praecepta verecunde consuluit*'; irrelevant to *dilectus* according to, Sir R. Syme, "Hadrian and Italica" *JRS* 54 (1964) 147f. Recent speculations in J. Gagé, *Italici Adlecti*" *REA* 71 (1969) 65ff.

⁶⁸ For *verba ponit* HA. *Hadr.* 12.4 cf. the suspect *Trig. Tyr.* 11.6. I see no reason to think that quotations from Marius must be authentic.

⁶⁹ G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (Ithaca, 1969) 31.

historians tend to mention the levy only when it was necessary for the authorities to exert themselves to an unusual extent in filling the ranks of the legions, especially in military crises. It is not at all surprising for instance that the Syrian legions were seriously below strength in 54. The legate or legates (Ummidius Quadratus at least) who had failed to maintain discipline might well have been equally slack in keeping up the numbers of their forces. Indeed the efficiency of the central government itself can be doubted, on various grounds, for much of the period between c. 27 and 70.

If military service was so popular in the early Principate that volunteers were readily obtained, it is hard to understand why fewer and fewer Italians are found in the legions. Forni refuted the old view that they were deliberately excluded by Vespasian and his successors for political reasons.⁷⁰ The proportion of Italian legionaries was already diminishing before 69, and they still appear, though less and less frequently, thereafter. This is adequately explained if Italian recruits were mainly conscripts and enrolled on the relatively rare occasions on which the government found it necessary, for one reason or another (often unknown to us), to depart from its normal policy of avoiding levies in Italy. Forni suggested that this policy was inspired by a desire to conserve Italian population. But, to say nothing of the fact that the loss of some 5000–6000 young men a year (given that soldiers recruited for service abroad were unlikely ever to return) was not demographically serious, this takes no account of the reason why Romans valued a large population: it was a guarantee of military strength.⁷¹ It is for more plausible to suppose that the emperors wished to escape the unpopularity of imposing a hated burden on the Italians. But why was it so hated? Forni remarked that young Italians, especially those of the well-to-do classes, would not readily 'leave fatherland and family with little likelihood of return, to submit to prolonged service and lead a hard and comfortless life, garrisoning the most remote provinces in climates that might be intolerable, without adequate rewards, with no prospects of a brilliant career, with no guarantee of their rights, and all this though their fatherland was not in peril'. Some of this is well said, and explains alike why conscription was hated and volunteers would be few. But the great majority of Italians cannot have belonged to the well-to-do classes or have enjoyed comforts at home or have even thought of making a brilliant career, and if the material rewards of service were so low under Augustus as to provoke serious mutinies in AD 14, they were notably increased by Domitian (p. 111). Yet it was after Domitian that the disappearance of Italians from the legions but for emergency levies becomes complete. I suggest

⁷⁰ Ch. 5, whence quotations that follow.

⁷¹ *Italian Manpower* 5; and Plin. *Paneg.* 26.

therefore that of the factors Forni describes we should lay most weight on the length and remoteness of service.

But these factors should have been no less discouraging to provincials, so long as the armies were not recruited in the regions where they served. Now, so far as the legions are concerned, such recruiting did not become the rule till the second century.⁷² Thus of 39 legionaries serving in Egypt under Augustus or Tiberius only 9 came from Egypt and 24 from Asia Minor. Spaniards are found almost everywhere, though not in Africa, and men from Narbonensis were not used only for the Rhine legions, which were comparatively near. Africans are levied for distant service (nn. 46, 58 supra), though in Africa itself where there was a great number (as in Spain and Narbonensis) of communities with Roman or Latin status, from which legions in the west were as yet mainly recruited, 60% or more of pre-Hadrianic legionaries were on Forni's evidence not of local origin. Auxiliary units were normally posted to regions other than those where they had been raised. Already in the first century new recruits were commonly obtained from the hinterland of their station or from other regions to which they were temporarily transferred, but exceptions still occurred even in the second century; for specialist units, wherever employed, recruits continued to be drawn from the lands where they had been raised and where alone men of the skill required could be found; Thracians, enlisted in large numbers, are found in *alae* far distant from their homes; Britons and Dacians were apparently not used in their own country, to which it was therefore necessary to send men from other parts.⁷³ And until Trajan's time the legions at least, the kernel of the army, though they had ceased to be mainly Italian in composition, were to an even greater extent than the *auxilia* ethnically mixed, and in the west recruited chiefly from the more Romanized provincial communities. The government had not yet come to trust its subjects to defend their homelands. It is characteristic that in 65 supplements for the Illyrian legions were to be raised in Narbonensis, Asia and Africa. Naturally conscription was unavoidable. A young man from Narbo or Carthage had no greater incentive than one from Bononia to spend twenty five years on the Danube.

It is sometimes suggested that the Italians, who had so recently conquered the 'world' and had been fighting each other since 49 BC with undoubted courage, lost their warlike spirit in the Principate, whereas Rome could easily appeal to the bellicosity of less civilized subjects. Beyond doubt, there was an earnest

⁷² Generally ascribed to Hadrian. But the Roman government did not usually act *per saltum*. In Forni's lists (182f.) men from Pannonia and Moesia begin to appear in Danubian legions before Hadrian. I suspect gradual evolution.

⁷³ Kraft 43-68; in the earliest period Gallic and Spanish cavalry were so prized that they too had to be used extensively far from home, 26ff.

desire in Italy, extending to the soldiers themselves in 40 BC,⁷⁴ for an end to civil wars. In the Principate there is also evidence that the upper class in Italy had little taste for the military life.⁷⁵ Conceivably this distaste spread to all sections of the population. But it would not be convincing to account for this phenomenon (if it occurred) by the level of culture and prosperity in Italy. In modern times relatively civilized peoples, enjoying a far higher level of prosperity, have more conspicuously displayed their proficiency in war than their aversion for it. Patriotism (or some other ideal cause) will afford the explanation. As Forni observed, to Italians in the Principate 'the fatherland was not in *peril*, at any rate until the third century, when the habit and practice of bearing arms had been lost. But then neither were provincials fighting for their fatherland: most of them were serving far from their own homes and on behalf of a state which they would hardly have regarded as their own until they had lived for generations or centuries under the Roman peace.'^{75a}

In fact it is precisely among the 'fighting peoples' of the empire that the levy caused most trouble. None furnished so many auxiliaries as the Gauls in the Julio-Claudian era, and in 70 we hear of their objection to the *dilectus*⁷⁶. Over thirty auxiliary units were originally raised in Thrace, and after Hadrian Thracians are found in large numbers in the legions. Yet under Tiberius the Thracians rebelled *quod pati dilectus et validissimum quemque militiae nostrae dare aspernantur*.⁷⁷ The Batavians enjoyed fiscal immunity in return for accepting an obligation to provide troops; in 69 they furnished eight or nine cohorts and an *ala*, but Civilis was able to induce them to revolt in their resentment at the new levy ordered by Vitellius.⁷⁸ In two cases there were indeed special factors at work. Until Tiberius' reign the Thracians had served under their own chiefs and only in neighbouring lands, *ac tum rumor incenserat fore ut disiecti aliisque nationibus permixti diversas in terras traherentur*; the rumour was doubtless correct, since thereafter the Thracian *auxilia* were to serve in all parts of the empire under Roman officers and the units were to lose their old national character; indeed, like most other auxiliary regiments,

⁷⁴ *Italian Manpower* 112, 130, 713; add App. *BC* 5.59–64.

⁷⁵ Many senators and *equites* did no military service or the barest minimum.

^{75a} Lucian is the first Greek writer to refer to the Romans and Roman armies as 'us', J. Palm, *Rom, Römertum u. Imperium...* (Lund 1959) 54.

⁷⁶ Cf. nn. 60 and 73 supra.

⁷⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 4.46. Kraft 35ff. shows that the revolt was caused by the incorporation of Thracian forces as regular units into the Roman army. Note Amm. 26.7.5: *bellatrices Thraciae gentes*.

⁷⁸ *Hist.* 4.14, cf. *Germ.* 29 (like the Mattiaci, the Batavians paid no taxes in return for military contingents). See further my article "Tacitus on the Batavian Revolt", *Latomus* 19 (1960) 494ff., defending Tacitus' credibility against G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker* (Basel 1951) 86ff; I do not find L. Bessone, *La Rivolta Batavica e la Crisi del 69 d. C.* (1972) any more convincing.

those called Thracian were soon recruited locally. The Batavians in 69 were still under the command of their own chiefs, and their special grievance lay in the conduct of the new levy by Roman prefects and centurions; it is notable that they were not left to enrol recruits through their own *principes*.⁷⁹ *Iussu Vitellii Batavorum iuventus ad dilectum vocabatur, quem suapte natura gravem onerabant ministri avaritia ac luxu, senes aut invalidos conquiendo, quos pretio dimitterent*. But these abuses only aggravated the hardship of the levy, which Tacitus regarded as *suapte natura gravem*⁸⁰, and he makes Civilis say: *instare dilectum, quo liberi a parentibus, fratres a fratribus velut supremum dividantur*. Until 68 the Batavian cohorts had been stationed in Britain, a foreign land, whence probably home leave was not given; many would die without seeing friends or family again.⁸¹ It was on the same count among other that the Thracians had revolted against the *dilectus*. Similarly in the *Agricola* Tacitus represents the Britons complaining at the time of Boudicca's insurrection *eripi domos, abstrahi liberos, iniungi dilectus tamquam mori tantum pro patria nescientibus* and Calgacus as declaiming: *liberos cuique ac propinquos suos natura carissimos esse voluit; hi per dilectus alibi auferuntur*.⁸²

No doubt the speeches of Civilis and Calgacus are the invention of Tacitus. At least the words are his; it would be too dogmatic to *assume* that he (or his source) had no information about the reasons that prompted revolt or resistance to Rome. Nor can this be proved by the paradoxical contention that in each passage he is merely using a *topos* and the parallels, instead of providing reciprocal support and confirmation, are in themselves evidence that all alike spring from the historian's imagination, and *therefore* can have no basis in reality. It must indeed be conceded that Tacitus *may* have drawn on his imagination (or that of a previous writer), and that the conception that men would be reluctant to serve for years far from their homes was familiar to Romans⁸³ and would readily have occurred to them as an explanation of the discontents

⁷⁹ *Hist.* 4.14.3.cf. n. 66 supra; no doubt normal for regular units, contrast the way in which the Dalmatians in AD 6 still raised for themselves the troops Rome required (Dio 55.29). Kraft 40f. conjectures that it was an innovation for the Batavians to be subject to Roman recruiting officers.

⁸⁰ Cf. Cic. *Att.* 9.9.1: *dilectus... ipsa per se molesta sunt*.

⁸¹ In *Latomus* 19 (1960) 500 (v.n. 78 supra) I inferred from figures given by A. R. Burn, "Hic Breve Vivitur" *Past and Present*, 4 (1953) 16 that a recruit of 17 had only a 50% chance of surviving till discharge. This estimate is common, cf. J. F. Gilliam, *loc. cit.* (n. 46 supra). I now have no confidence in Burn's statistics and have argued that legionaries in Augustus' time had a 60% chance of survival, *Italian Manpower* 132f. 332-41; many of them did not indeed serve for 25 years, but perhaps they did more fighting. The *cohors Usiporum per Germanias conscripta* which deserted in Britain (*Agr.* 28) was doubtless trying to get home.

⁸² *Agr.* 15.3, 31.1.

⁸³ e.g. Liv. 5.11.5 (cf. *Italian Manpower* 641); 29.1.4: service in Africa is *procul domo* for Sicilians. For another illustration of this surely universal sentiment, see Diod. 18.7.

of wild subjects. But even if so much be granted, must we not add that the explanation was intrinsically and overwhelmingly probable? Romans had learned to hate long and distant service in the Republic. Veterans had complained in AD 14 that on discharge they were dragged off to remote lands for settlement.⁸⁴ Others, born in the provinces or naturalized there by long service, had found it repugnant to leave the new homes they had made there for Nero's colonies in Italy.⁸⁵ In 69 the legionaries in Syria, most of whom were no doubt easterners by birth, were inflamed by a rumour that Vitellius designed to transfer them to Germany, not only because service there would be more rigorous but because *plerique (provinciales) necessitudinibus et propinquitatibus mixti, et militibus vetustate stipendiorum nota et familiaria castra in modum penatium diligebantur*.⁸⁶ Tacitus' belief that Thracians, Batavians and Britons had a natural attachment to their own homes was surely right. Julian's army was to include Germans who had joined him on the pledge that they were never to be taken south of the Alps.⁸⁷

It will not have escaped notice that the evidence for conscription is, except for Italy itself, almost entirely pre-Hadrianic and that the testimony that the army was chiefly recruited from volunteers is Severan. Now it is precisely within the period between Hadrian and Severus that it became the rule for the legions as well as most of the *auxilia* to be recruited within the province in which they were stationed or adjoining provinces; Kraft remarks that the area of recruitment for *auxilia* tends to become narrower, more strictly local.⁸⁸ It is a reasonable conjecture that the adoption of regional recruitment in itself made it less necessary for the government to resort to conscription. Since willing soldiers were presumably *ceteris paribus* better soldiers, and since men might be expected to show more devotion in protecting their own families and homelands,⁸⁹ local recruitment (which also must have saved transport costs and administrative complexities) was in the interest of the state, wherever it had become possible to rely on the loyalty of the subjects. The effect was to spare not only Italy but also the most Romanized provinces, Narbonensis, Spain and Africa; it was no hardship for Spaniards and Africans to serve in the small forces in their own lands, and enough volunteers could surely be found. In all these parts conscription should have become as rare as it had long been in Italy, and as a result we seldom find their natives serving elsewhere. Conceivably the increased number of magnates from these parts in the senate and

⁸⁴ *Ann.* 1.17.3.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 12.27.2.

⁸⁶ *Hist.* 2.80.3.

⁸⁷ *Amm.* 20.4.4.

⁸⁸ Kraft 50f.

⁸⁹ Cf. perhaps Dio 71.3.3.

the equestrian service contributed to the change, making the emperors more sensitive to local feelings represented by powerful patrons.

No doubt the government experimented cautiously at first, and found that local recruiting worked well (cf n. 72 supra). Of course it could not avoid sending soldiers away from their homelands to meet new dangers on another frontier. But for the potential recruit it was one thing to join an army in which he *might* be posted abroad, and another to enlist when he knew in advance that this was bound to be his fate. Some peoples, as we have seen, were still required to serve outside their own homelands; they were a minority, and if (as I think probable) they still had to be obtained mainly by conscription, that would be compatible with Arrius Menander's statement that *most* soldiers were volunteers. In emergencies conscription could always be re-introduced, as in Italy itself, where apart from the urban and praetorian cohorts there were no units stationed before Severus which Italians could join. And if Severus established a legion in Italy, he also denied would-be volunteers the chance to enter the praetorian guard.

The grant of the Roman citizenship to *peregrini* on discharge from the *auxilia* or on enlistment in the legions seems to have made very little difference in the evolution we are considering. In the first century the citizenship was a relatively rare distinction in the provinces, and perhaps of more practical value than later, and the prospect of acquiring it should have been a stronger incentive to volunteering precisely in the period when the evidence points to the prevalence of conscription. It was during or before the time when volunteering is likely to have become more usual that the privileges of ex-auxiliaries were reduced; from 140 their children born in service were no longer to obtain the citizenship. The *Constitutio Antoniniana* naturally altogether removed the incentive to enrolment that the special privilege of citizenship may once have provided. Indeed in the second century more and more recruits to the *auxilia* were citizens before they joined up.⁹⁰ (This, incidentally, must suggest that the terms of auxiliary service were not much inferior to those of legionary, cf. n. 29 supra).

Arrius Menander seems to have connected the greater number of volunteers in his day with a change in the *status militiae*. If this is taken to refer to the legal condition of soldiers, only one change can be in question: Severus' repeal of the prohibition on soldiers marrying, which had subsisted since the early Principate.⁹¹ However, in practice soldiers had always been free to

⁹⁰ Kraft 69ff. On the change in 140 H. Nesselhauf, "Das Bürgerrecht der Soldatenkinder" *Historia*, 8 (1959) 434ff.; Kraft, *ibid.*, 1961, 120ff.

⁹¹ Prohibition: Mitteis, *Chr.* 372,11; Dio 60. 24. Hdn. 3. 8,5 says that Severus τοῖς στρατιώταις ... ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συνεχώρησε ἃ μὴ πρότερον εἶχον ... καὶ ... ἐπέτρεψε γυναιξὶ τε συνοικεῖν. P. J. Garnsey, "Septimius Severus and the Marriage of Soldiers", *CSCA* 3 (1970) 45ff., who denies or doubts that Severus legalized soldiers' marriages, would take

form permanent unions with women who in strict law were concubines but who were called wives in common parlance and even in official documents⁹². The sons of such unions were legally bastards and took the status of the mother; hence they were Roman citizens, if she was *civis Romana*,⁹³ and *peregrini*, if she was *peregrina*. From the early Principate such men, born *castris*, were admitted to the legions, and it is often supposed that they always obtained citizenship on enlistment and that this was in their eyes the chief attraction of army service. In actual fact some will have been citizens from birth, indeed a growing number as the citizenship was more widely diffused among the peoples from whom soldiers might find their concubines. Moreover in all ages it has been common for men to follow the calling of their fathers, and no more specific explanation is needed for the enlistment of soldiers' sons, whereas desire for the Roman citizenship seems not to have acted as a decisive incentive towards enrolment (above). The proportion of such recruits seems to grow in the second century, though it was never so large as to justify a suggestion that the abundant supply of such recruits made conscription less necessary.⁹⁴ Since units now tended to remain more or less permanently in or near one place, with relatively comfortable quarters and sometimes close to towns, including the *canabae* which grew up by the great camps, conditions favoured family life. The government had long condoned the violation of a disciplinary rule it could not enforce; Severus finally set it aside. What he did was simply to make the marriage of a soldier valid, *iure civili* or *iure cuiusque gentis*, in such conditions as the marriage of a civilian would have been. But under Roman law, though a marriage could be contracted without *conubium* between a citizen and an alien, the children of such a marriage were aliens: *sive civis Romanus peregrinam sive peregrinus civem Romanam uxorem, eum qui nascitur peregrinum esse* (Gaius 1.75). (Once marriage had been recognized, the sons did not necessarily take the status of the mother, as they did if they were

this to refer to mere cohabitation, but that had been tolerated for generations ('concessa consuetudine', *CIL XVI* 122) and required no innovating constitution. He would also take all legal texts that imply that a soldier could be married to relate to marriages contracted before service, although (given the freedom of divorce) we hardly need the testimony of Gaius (*Dig.* 24. 1,61): 'propter militiam satis commode retineri matrimonium non possit'; he can only reconcile *Dig.* 23.2,35 (Papinian: 'filius familias miles sine patris voluntate matrimonium non contrahit') with his view by supposing in effect that Papinian means concubinage by 'matrimonium'; but Pap. clearly means marriage *iure civili*, since the Roman institution of *patria potestas* is introduced. See also n. 95. Garnsey gives bibliography.

⁹² As in the diplomata (*uxoribus quas tunc habuissent cum est civitas iis data*) and *ILS* 9059; *P. Gnom.* 62.

⁹³ E. Weiss, *RE Bd.* 3A2 (1929) s.v. Spurius, cols. 1889f., *FIRA III* 4 and 6.

⁹⁴ Forni (n. 21 supra) 126–8, giving no statistics, but see Mommsen. *Ges. Schr.* VI 29 for soldiers born *castris* constituting a third or even half in some second century lists from III Augusta. However, R. Cagnat, *L'Armée rom. d'Afrique* (Paris 1912) 298f. observed that in one such list (*CIL VIII*.18087) the proportion sinks to one fortieth.

bastards!) Hence praetorians who formed unions with *peregrinae* still required a grant of *conubium*, which was made only on discharge.⁹⁵ Of course the *constitutio Antoniniana* made it less likely that such anomalous unions would occur. Severus' reform no doubt improved the position of the soldier and his family in regard to succession, dowries and the like, but it is hard to believe that it did much to carry further the development of family life of soldiers or to increase the supply of volunteers.

However, Arrius Menander's words may refer simply to a change in the social esteem that soldiers enjoyed, or indeed to the general conditions of army service. Regional recruitment, increased amenities, more family life — all these conditions then become relevant. Pay must also be considered. Domitian increased by a third the pay of legionaries, and Severus seems to have raised it from 300 to 500 denarii, Caracalla to 750.⁹⁶ (It is conceivable, though it must not be assumed, that Arrius wrote under the last emperor). Other branches of the army must surely have benefited proportionately. It is not easy to be sure what these rises represented in real terms. The metal value of the denarius in weight and purity was always declining, but it is hard to determine when there was a consequential increase in prices, at any rate before the inflation of the third century. (Writers on this subject often ignore the huge fluctuations that could take place in the prices of wheat or other foods because of bad harvests). However, even if the depreciation of the coinage was reflected (and in the end it must have been) in price levels, Domitian's increase of pay should have been equivalent (when made) to one of 20–25% over the Augustan *stipendium*. In the second century further devaluation went on, and became abrupt with Severus; conceivably the increment he gave did no more, perhaps less, than offset rising prices, but that given by Caracalla must have made a real and substantial improvement.⁹⁷ It is, however,

⁹⁵ *CIL* XVI.134–56, with few exceptions diplomata for veterans of praetorian or urban cohorts who (as in the past) obtain on discharge *ius conubii dumtaxat cum singulis et primis uxoribus ut etiamsi peregrini iuris feminas in matrimonio suo iunxerint, proinde tollant ac si ex duobus civibus Romanis natos*; the latest is of 298. Here, as always in such documents, the terms *uxores* and *matrimonium* are inappropriate in strict law to the relationship existing before discharge. In my view the draftsmen did not bother to change the old formula (cf. *ILS* 1993) to take account of the new fact that a true *matrimonium* now existed, if the *uxor* was *civis Romana*. Since the praetorians were now recruited from the legions, the marriage rights of praetorians cannot have been inferior to those of legionaries, and the only alternative to this interpretation seems to be Garnsey's, rejected in n. 91 supra.

⁹⁶ Brunt, "Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army", *PBSR* 18 (1950) Part II; for the subject matter of Parts III and V see n. 29. I no longer feel confident that officers of all ranks received rises proportionate to those of common soldiers.

⁹⁷ On post-Severan inflation see T. Pekary, "Studien zur römischen Währungs und Finanzgeschichte" *Historia* 18 (1959); A. H. M. Jones, *Econ. Hist. Rev.* 23 (1953) 295–299, 443ff.. On relation of price rises to soldiers' pay see now R. Duncan-Jones, *The Economy of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1974), 7–11.

hard to believe that the soldiers were not much better off under Severus than they had been. We have to allow for donatives, the frequency, amounts and recipients of which are imperfectly recorded, and for allowances in kind.⁹⁸ Whether or not Severus instituted the *annona militaris*, one must doubt (especially if everything had in fact become much dearer) if soldiers were still liable to pay, as in the past, for food, clothing and arms. Unless they were now very liberally treated, the testimony of Dio and Herodian that the Severi depended entirely on the troops and pandered to their greed is merely absurd, but even the vague rhetoric of Herodian deserves some respect, and Dio much more.¹⁰⁰

In their view discipline too was relaxed, always an objective of the common soldiers, as in the mutinies of 14 and civil wars of 69. That did not mean merely that there was less drilling and fatigue duty, but that they were not easily brought to book for misconduct to the civil population. It is no accident that *concussio* and its correlative verb first appear in Latin in Severan writings. Not that the practice was new; we may think of Juvenal's sixteenth satire; provincial governors were hardly more able or willing than the praetors at Rome to repress military outrages, and scattered indications show that they had been well known in provinces before 193. I doubt if many persons of rank and property ever enlisted as privates; those who are attested were, we may suspect, mostly 'black sheep'. If that be right, it is rather sinister that there is much evidence for serving soldiers, not officers, as well as veterans in possession of substantial property; can this generally be attributed to savings from pay, donatives and occasional booty? Especially in the frontier areas, veterans also enjoy an honoured place in local society. Once again, the evidence for soldiers' affluence and dignity tends to increase in volume in the second century and above all in the Severan age. It is then too that we find more and more soldiers occupying administrative posts in the offices of governors and procurators. The recruit with a little education had a good prospect of leading a comfortable and very unmilitary life. Indeed never before was advancement to higher posts more accessible to the *caligatus*, but even if few young men think far ahead in choosing a career, opportunities for reasonably good jobs in the army were

⁹⁸ Fiebiger, *RE* Bd. 5.2 (1905) s. v. Donativum, cols. 1542ff. Severus' payment of 250 den. on entering Rome (Dio 46.46.7) was very low by past standards; but the treasury was bare; it was probably only an earnest of his bounty. In the light of Augustus' practice (*Tac. Ann.* 1.8), which is likely to have been a decisive precedent, I assume that legionaries always received some donative proportionate to that given to praetorians; *HA. Marc.* 7.9 (AD 161) is here surely right. Cf. Dio 77.24.1 (Caracalla).

⁹⁹ D. van Berchem, "L'annone militaire dans l'empire romain au III siècle", *BSAF* 80 (1937) 117ff.

¹⁰⁰ Dio 74.2.3; 76.15.2; 77.3; 9f.; 77.24.1; 78.3; 78.9.2, 78.11.5, 78.27.1; 78.36.3 etc; he lays the blame chiefly on Caracalla. *Hdn.* 2.6.14, 3.8.4ff.; 4.4f. etc.

plainly visible to all. The social condition of the soldiers was certainly far different from the days when they asked for *modum miseriarum*.¹⁰¹

The golden age for the soldiery did not last. For half a century before Diocletian the empire was plagued by incessant civil wars and foreign invasions. Naturally none can have suffered more than the troops, whose unruliness was a major cause of the disasters. Casualties must have been enormous and peaceful amenities greatly reduced. Inflation made pay almost worthless, though of course the soldier obtained subsistence in kind. A career in the army must have lost its old attractions. Diocletian had to tie the sons of soldiers to their fathers' occupation. But that did not suffice. He and his successors actually needed a larger army, and compulsion had to be systematically applied, even though some volunteers were still to be found. It is unlikely that conscription had ever been abandoned at all times and in all places, and it is reasonable to assume that Diocletian built his system on the old. It was now the duty of cities or large landowners to furnish quotas of recruits; I suppose that this had always been true, whenever levies had been held (Appendix). The new system went on to the end of the fourth century, when once more the government could give up systematic conscription of its own people because it relied on barbarian *foederati*. These developments do not concern us.¹⁰²

Professor Eric Birley writes that 'the implication of Vegetius (*epit. rei militaris* II 3) is surely that there were plenty of volunteers in the "good old days".'¹⁰³ I can see no such implication in the text cited or in any other,¹⁰⁴ but in any case Vegetius in the judgement of most scholars, including Birley, had in mind the army of the third century. For perhaps a rather brief period

¹⁰¹ This paragraph represents mere impressions. Much evidence and bibliography in R. Macmullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the later Rom. Emp.* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963) esp. chs. 3–5. On property and social status of legionaries see Forni ch. IX. Conscripts might well have some property!

¹⁰² Jones 614–9. In this period of conscription some soldiers were quite well off (646ff.). Of course illicit military exactions went on.

¹⁰³ "The Epigraphy of the Roman Army", *Actes du Deuxième Congrès int. d'épigr. gr. et lat.*, (Paris 1953) 235.

¹⁰⁴ 2.3 insists that the legions should be kept up to strength by continuous recruitment. Vegetius' main discussion of recruitment is in 1.2ff. In 1.3 he says that rural recruits are to be preferred: *interdum tamen necessitas exigit etiam urbanos ad arma compelli*. Note in 1.4 *pubertatem ad dilectum cogendam*; 6: *qui dilectum acturus est*; the verb *legere* is used passim. He certainly assumes that recruiting officers can normally pick and choose; this implies either conscription or a surplus of volunteers. Such a surplus in Egypt would be likely in the second century if Davies and Watson (n. 8 supra) were right in supposing that men needed letters of recommendation to be enrolled. In *P. Mich.* 468 (CPL 251) a *classarius* who hopes to be transferred to a cohort says that such letters will be useless, if a man does not help himself! All the supposed allusions to letters of recommendation for enrolment are conjectures, asserted as facts, which did not occur to the original editors and seem to me unfounded and implausible. On Vegetius see Watson 26 with bibliography.

the army did no doubt consist mostly of volunteers. We may reflect with some irony that this was the army that tore to pieces an empire that conscripts had conquered and long protected. The triumph of the voluntary principle was in my judgement the result of local recruiting and a general improvement in the conditions of service, carried furthest by the Severan policy which Septimius allegedly expressed in his dying advice to his sons: 'enrich the soldiers and treat every one else with contempt' (Dio 76.15.2).

APPENDIX

Under Diocletian's system it was the responsibility of the cities or of landowners to furnish recruits each year, though in some years the government chose to exact money (*aurum tironicum*) in lieu of men. See Jones 615; his documentation omits the post-classical allusion of Arcadius Charisius to *tironum productio* as a *munus personale* in cities (*Dig.* 50.4.18.3) and he cites no evidence earlier than the 370s for *aurum tironicum*, though in its context *Lact. mort. pers.* 7.5 (*Haec quoque tolerari < non > possunt quae ad exhibendos milites spectant*) suggests that the levy was made the occasion for official or illicit demands for money.

Jones shows that the recruits had to be furnished from the rural population. In Vegetius' opinion (I 3) the army had been composed of *agrestes* in the good old days (those of Cincinnatus). There is conclusive evidence that this was true in the late Republic (Brunt, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution", *JRS* 52 [1962] 73ff), and the fact that legionaries name cities as their places of origin in the Principate does not of course show that any change had taken place; for cities had *territoria* and most of them were fundamentally agricultural centres.

In the late Republic the *dilectus* in Italy and Cisalpina demanded the co-operation of the local governments. I cited some evidence for this in *JRS* 1962, 86: add *Diod.* 38/39.13; *App. BC* 1.66. 76; *Cic. Cat.* 2.24(?); *Caesar BC* 1.15.2, 1.23.2, 1.30.1, 2.29.3; *Dio* 41.9.7. In the same way they could be required to furnish money or supplies for military purposes, *Caesar, BC* 1.6.8, 1.15.2, 1.18.4; *Dio loc. cit.*, *App. BC* 2.34. Augustus obtained *commeatus* in this way probably for operations against the Raetians, *Vitr.* 2.9.15. In *Italian Manpower* *App.* 19 I argued that this reliance on the cities for the *dilectus* goes far back in the history of the Republic. It was inevitable since the central government lacked any sort of bureaucracy. Even under the Principate the number of officials remained small. Provincial governors could not dispense with the aid of local governments. A military officer might be sent to a centre to recruit, but if could not obtain sufficient volunteers, he was bound to rely on local authorities to produce (*exhibere* or *producere*) men suited for his purpose, or

to resort to the methods of the press gang. The traditions of the Republic make it likely that he was instructed to adopt the former course.

In the fourth century it is the liability of landowners to provide recruits, all but the largest forming consortia in which the obligation (*protostasia* or *prototypia*) falls on each in turn; the technical terms first occur in the 290s. Vegetius laments that *indicti possessoribus tirones* are too apt to be the workers the landowner can best dispense with (1.7). But as early as Trajan Frontinus says that provincial cities may claim in territorial disputes with great landowners that they have the obligation *legere tironem ex vico* (53L). In Egypt village officials are concerned with the levy in 185 (n. 65) as in the fourth century. Rostovtzeff, "*Syntelesia Tironon*", *JRS* 8 (1918) 26ff. noted that under Gordian the Scaptopareni had to furnish *burgarii*. Now *burgarii* are not regular soldiers, but is it not natural to suppose that whenever the government required conscripts for regular units from communities like Scaptopare it operated in the same way? Rostovtzeff also argued convincingly that an inscription from a Lydian village which refers to τὴν τῶν τειρώνων συντελείαν belongs to the third century and relates to *aurum tironicum*.

In the fourth century the communities or magnates who furnished the recruits also had to fit them out at some cost. Cicero tells of a man who had assisted his neighbours to join up in 43 (*Phil.* 7.24). An inscription from Teos, probably triumphal, seems to commemorate similar munificence (*IGRom* 4.1572). One might suspect that voluntary and occasional liberality of this kind came to be required, and that it was because it was costly to furnish recruits, people would pay not to do so, hence the origin of *aurum tironicum*. (Similarly *aurum coronarium* had its roots in 'benevolences'.) Obviously *lecti* had to pay something to *vicarii* who replaced them.

It is extremely improbable that the recruiting system of the fourth century was entirely new; though it was connected with the capitation system of taxation Diocletian devised, that meant only that the mechanism differed in certain details from anything that could have existed before. Selective conscription of men drawn mainly from the farms required the co-operation of local councils and landowners and was probably developed from the practice of the Republican government in Italy. We are obliged to guess, for we have no detailed information for the Principate on this and many other such matters (taxation for instance) that matches the Theodosian Code or even the writings of Cicero. The inscriptions that are so abundant seldom illuminate the way in which the administration was actually carried on. Tacitus and Dio are sometimes more revealing.