

temple in Jerusalem was not rebuilt will have led to a general disappointment among rebellious Jews in the diaspora in 115-117 as well as among the Jews, who joined Bar Kokhba's revolt. Messianic overtones, no doubt, also attached to Bar Kokhba, and his revolt will have gained widespread following, though it was mainly concentrated in Judaea and Idumaea.

The chapter on Bar Kokhba is no doubt the most successful in the book, and with his impressive knowledge of the landscape, H. manages to describe the territory under Simon's control in detail and furthermore brings to life the last days of the siege of Beththera by resorting to archaeology and rabbinic texts. Alongside this long tradition for revolt H. posits a more loyal Judaism, centred around Jewish teachers and synagogues, continuously responsible for the perseverance of Judaeen Jewish life.

Apart from discussions of date, H.'s reconstruction of the events concerning the second and third revolts differs little from other descriptions. H.'s firm command of the sources, Graeco-Roman authors, rabbinic texts, inscriptions, papyri and archaeological artefacts, as well as the entire tradition of interpretation of these two revolts from Orosius on is what has impressed the reviewer most. To this should be added H.'s insistence on seeing not only the revolts under Trajan and Hadrian, but also the first revolt, as firmly connected by the themes of the redemption and freedom of Jerusalem. Awe-inspiring in size and detail this book is a must-have for anyone working on the Jews in the Roman Empire.

Søren Lund Sørensen

Freie Universität Berlin

Greta Hawes, *Rationalizing Myth in Antiquity*, Oxford University Press, 2014. 279 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-967277-6.

This book is a revised version of a dissertation submitted at the University of Bristol. Hawes (hereafter H) presents a vigorous apology for the rationalizing approach to Greek myth taken by Palaephatus, whom H identifies as a peripatetic who lived in the second half of the fourth century BCE (p. 228), in his *Peri Apistōn* (pp. 37-92), traced down in subsequent authors — Heraclitus (pp. 92-118), the anonymous *Peri Apistōn* (pp. 119-132), Conon, *Diēgēsis* (pp. 133-148), Plutarch, *Life of Theseus* (pp. 149-174) — and culminating in the *Periēgēsis* of Pausanias, who lived in the second half of the second century CE (pp. 175-222). The book thus offers snapshots of the rationalizing approach over a span of more than four hundred years. Two brief Appendices conclude the book, the first a discussion of the date and authenticity of Palaephatus, *Peri Apistōn* and the second a translation of the anonymous *Peri Apistōn*.

H's objective is to rehabilitate rationalizing interpretation of myth, to redeem it (1) from its use (abuse?) in Christian polemic as a means for proving that the Greeks and Romans did not believe in the truth of their own tales, as narrated primarily by Homer and Hesiod and then (2) from the low regard in which it was held by some of the giants of Classical Studies, such as U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, who dismissed Palaephatus' work as an intellectually inferior approach to the glories of Greek life and literature, a "wretched, failed effort", written in a banal everyday style, which wasted great effort for little reward (pp. 3-4). This judgment cast a shadow over all the ancient authors who attempted rationalizing interpretations, a shadow which H aims to lift so that ancient rationalizing interpretation will shine forth in its full contextual glory.

To accomplish these goals, H opens the discussion with an extended Introduction (pp. 1-36) in which H places rationalizing interpretation in comparison and contrast with Euhemerism and Allegory, as three of the ways in which educated and sophisticated readers coped with the difficulties of Greek mythology. Euhemerism, H elucidates, was a theory of institutionalized religion, explaining the origins of the worship of the gods as a consequence of the actions of extraordinary mortals, who were then raised to divine status. From that perspective, Euhemerism was

historicist and concerned with discovering the human truth behind myth. This historicist concern was shared by rationalizing interpretation, but the latter had a different objective. It occupied a liminal space between the original myth, without which it cannot exist, and its reworking. It relied on first retelling the original or, at the very least, on the original being so well known that the resonance between the original and the subsequent revision was obvious.

The motivating concern behind the revision of rationalizers was based on contemporary experience — the original story was improbable and contrary to all known experience, therefore could not have taken place. The story as it was conventionally told was a riddle to be resolved, which then revealed events entirely at home and plausible in everyday human terms. In solving these riddles language had a central role. Linguistic polyvalence, the inherent ambiguity of language, allowed Palaephatus and his successors to take words, phrases and names central to a myth and reinterpret them as meaning something different, and then propose that this was the original story. For example, a Bull in a myth was really a person named Bull, a monster, an oppressive tyrant. Someone who was “devoured by his own dogs” was actually rendered financially destitute by expensive purchases of food for his dogs (p. 60).

Rationalizing interpretation shared a different point of departure with allegory. Like the allegorists, the rationalizing interpreters were convinced that the mythopoetic texts were not talking about the topics and events which they seemed to be describing. However, for the allegorists, the poets were actually hiding a deep philosophical or physiological message behind their tales. The task of allegory was to uncover that hidden meaning. The rationalizers might agree with the allegorizers concerning the point of departure, however rather than look for some concealed philosophical truth their goal was to offer a cure, a therapy of sorts for the ills of the myths, which would reveal the plausible and believable events which were then reworked and often misunderstood to yield the myth as was widely known.

Therefore, if Euhemerists could be accused of atheism and of disbelief in the gods accepted by all, if allegorizers could be charged with inventing meanings which the poet could never have intended (Was Homer really a Stoic? as Chrysippus made him out to be, a question raised by Cicero, *ND* 1.41, pp. 32-33), the rationalizers could be dismissed as substituting a banal and trivial story for the body of knowledge which comprised the ‘corpus of stories every educated person was expected to know’ (p. 77).

While many scholars see Palaephatus as the end of the rationalizing approach, based on the work of predecessors, H insists on seeing him as the first link in a chain of rationalizing authors that ran down five centuries to Pausanias, and H’s book offers a series of snapshots of six authors, who comprised links in that chain, as outlined above.

I found the discussion of Heraclitus (not, the “obscure”, pre-Socratic), who lived in the first or second centuries CE, most intriguing (pp. 92-118). He based his work on the example set by Palaephatus, and his dependence on the latter was already noted in antiquity (p. 95), but Heraclitus was notable for being eclectic in his approach, including in his work specific interpretations developed by Euhemerists and allegorists (pp. 98-115). For H, this example demonstrates that despite the tensions and mutual criticisms of the adherents of one approach against another, these approaches could coexist within the rich and diverse tradition of Greek myth and its interpretation: their commonalities (pp. 35-36) could overcome their differences.

The interpretation proposed for Pausanias (pp. 175-222) is important for several pages discussing the explicit difference between H’s approach and that of P. Veyne in his well-known, *Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination* (pp. 178-185). H finds Veyne’s work misguided and based on an incorrect understanding of Pausanias: Veyne saw Pausanias as a rationalist, a new Palaephatus. Nevertheless, for Veyne, Pausanias was fundamentally religious and his criticism of the majority of the legends was based in his piety. Veyne noted: ‘as a philologist, Pausanias tacitly accepts all the legends he does not criticize, but as a man he challenges them’ (Veyne, p. 98; cited by H, p. 182).

In contrast to Veyne, H intends to understand the vast amount of material in Pausanias not in terms of belief or truth, but in terms of ancient patterns of story-telling and habits of thinking about myth (p. 184). The *periēgēsis* was a travel guide to a world in which each village had a story and these stories delineated the regions and communities Pausanias visited. They conveyed the significance of each place, how their local traditions were used and manipulated and why they mattered. Local stories were related to local geography and to local monuments, thus forming a whole world of present meaning. In his search to understand the reality he encountered, Pausanias, like Heraclitus, could be eclectic and pluralistic, drawing on rational criticism in diverse ways in response to particular circumstances. At the same time, when in Arcadia, long thought to be a wild place of primordial otherworldliness, where the mythic past seemed palpably present, Pausanias recognized the value of the allegorical interpretation of the story of Cronos devouring his sons (p. 215). He could insist that in the events of olden times related in Arcadian myth men could become gods, sounding very much like a Euhemerist (p. 215).

In sum, H has written a very interesting and stimulating book that forces the reader to think. H insists that ‘mythic rationalization was embedded into the ancient system of myth’ (p. 223). This was a world of eclectic plurality, and rationalization provided solutions to specific problems by engaging in “bricolage”, creating new narratives by tinkering with familiar motifs and patterns. It offered a new way of speaking about the past which resonated “truthfully” with the present and then became part of the same tradition it had attempted to “cure”. In the end, as H concludes, ‘rationalization ...does not signal the death of myth or the corruption of ancient storytelling traditions. It is not antithetical to the authenticity and purity of Greek myth. It is myth’ (225).

Albert I. Baumgarten

Bar-Ilan University

Thomas E. Jenkins, *Antiquity Now: The Classical World in the Contemporary American Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 253 pp. ISBN 9780521196260.

Antiquity Now is a delightful book, whose accessible style in no way detracts from the excellence of its scholarship. Concentrating on the reception of ancient Greece and Rome in contemporary America, it consists of a introduction, conclusion and five chapters entitled: gay and lesbian receptions of the ancient world; classics and ideology; September 11th on the Western stage; From the borders: contemporary identity, community, and the ancient world; Power, the canon, and the unexpected voice. These chapters cover a wide range of issues that concern modern America, including sexuality, race, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, feminism and ecocriticism. This book therefore will be of use to those working within these areas of classical reception, but will also be of interest to a much wider audience, due to its study of a wide range of contemporary sources and texts.

From the outset, Jenkins sets the tone of his book, with its emphasis upon, and illuminating analysis of, texts of popular culture, by beginning with a study of a scene from the TV series, *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, in a fascinating demonstration of the way in which the complex messages broadcast by this episode are an example of how ancient culture is received in contemporary Western society (pp. 1-8). He then moves on to another case-study, this time of Robert Mezey’s *To the Americans*, an ‘American-ization’ reception of Horace’s *Odes* 3.6 (pp. 8-20), before progressing to summarise the recent theoretical developments within classical reception studies, as he outlines the debate between the ‘Classical Tradition’ and ‘Classical Reception’ (pp. 20-25). This section in itself, due to its admirable clarity, will be of benefit to anyone involved in the field, and in particular anyone teaching courses or seminars within Classical Reception. After a brief examination of both Purcell’s *Dido and Aeneas* (1689) and Mark Morris’ dance theatre version from 1989, Jenkins declares his main focus, namely