The parallels between the two cultures are not sufficiently highlighted. These need to be commented upon, to provide details from both the Greek and the Ancient Near Eastern perspective, from coeval sources, parallel passages, etc.[8] However, the work completed by the author is enormous, and the tracks left unexplored by its end serve as highly fruitful hints for research ahead. We may be very grateful for the groundbreaking work, even if there are areas that need further investigation.

There are occasional linguistic slips. Owing to word limits, I will provide just two examples: the intervocalic sound changes * m > w in Babylonian history;[9] and the etymology of Typhon < Mount Ṣipon.[10] These glitches can be ironed out in a second edition, however.[11]

With the array of new information and approaches it contains, this volume fills a perceived gap, is appropriate for a wide scholarly audience, and will ideally stimulate deeper conversation within scholarship concerning the pre-classical traditions of Greek literature.

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Mark Hebblewhite, *The Emperor and the Army in the Later Roman Empire, AD 235-395*. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. 240 pp. ISBN 9781472457592.

Mark Hebbelewhite's book deals with the relationships between the armies and the Roman Emperors. It contains a few subjects which have been neglected in the study of the period 235-395. The book is an adaptation of the author's PhD dissertation at Macquarie University, Australia. It comprises an introduction and six thematic chapters followed by a concluding one.

Hebblewhite establishes his thesis on the basic assumption that the Roman army was a political entity. The introduction shows that he is well aware of the writings of ancient authors like Tacitus, who mentioned the importance of the army and its capability to overthrow the Emperor and to seat a General on the throne. Tacitus viewed it as 'the innovation' in the 'year of the four Emperors'. Accordingly, Hebblewhite refers to Emperors trying to please the army and to secure its backing, acknowledging the role it had been playing in determining the ruler even before the 3rd century. The author argues the army had been growing in importance during the 3rd and 4th centuries, enhancing its role as 'kingmaker', but he doesn't provide any proof to his claim. Indeed the 3rd century witnessed a high frequency of usurpations, but the author doesn't make any comparison between events before and after 235 in order to verify his assertion.

8 Whether linked historically/geographically or not, the structural and expressive modalities — which constitute literary texts — show parallels. Without unraveling the contexts, one works on comparative literature 'without influence' — which is not the case with the book reviewed here. This road has been well-trodden, involving *Gilgamesh*, by R. North and M. Worthington, KASKAL 9 (2012), 177-217 and A. R. George, KASKAL 9 (2012), 227-242.

9 In discussing the dubious Mesopotamian origin of Thetys. For more on the subject of Akkadian historical phonology, see W. von Soden 1995, §21d; A. Militarev and L. Kogan 2000, lxxi-lxxii.

10 In addition to being far-fetched, this goes against one of Watkins' arguments on the spread of the myth from the Anatolians to the Mycenaeans during the Late Bronze Age. See Watkins 1995, 448-459.

11 For numerous annotations on these aspects, see the review by Dale.

The first chapter seeks to prove that around 235 the Emperor's military capabilities became the main factor in the army's decision to support him or not. But there is a problem in the way Hebblewhite formulates his arguments. Even though he analyzes the texts very well and uses coins in a very original way, he is too focused on the tasks he has set for himself and disregards many other causes and grounds for changes at the helm. For instance, the author refers to the death of Gordian III, demonstrating his familiarity with the different versions regarding Gordian's death (10, n. 15). But when he uses the Historia Augusta, in the context of Gordian's death, murdered by Phillipus the Arab, Hebblewhite ignores this text's descriptions of the Emperor's traits and relationships with the army. Likewise, he ignores the repeated assertions of the Historia Augusta about Gordian being beloved by the troops and having achieved some military success. Thus, there is a constant omission of certain facts about military achievements, and an avoidance of a web of causes and factors involved in deposing an Emperor. Had he used all these facts, it would have diluted the author's argument that military success was a sole or overwhelming factor in deposing or installing a ruler.

Another case in question, is Gratian's dethronement by Maximinus Magnus. The reason for this, given by Hebblewhite, is the Emperor's incompetence in war. However, Gratian survived on the throne much longer than many other Emperors who were better field commanders than him. This undermines the assumption that an Emperor's military capabilities determine his tenure of office. Another assertion up for scrutiny: Hebblewhite claims the troops acclaimed Theodosius's ascendancy to co-Emperor because he possessed military prowess, which Valens lacked. But there was already nothing to be compared between the two of them at the time, as Valens was not deposed but died in battle, creating a vacancy which Teodossius filled. Moreover, the defeat and death of Valens in Adrianopolis were due to recklessness: he was probably too eager to acquire what Hebblewhite sees essential to an Emperor's success — battlefield glory.

In the second chapter, the author resorts to an original method — scrutinizing coins and titles which were used by the Emperors to promote their military success and battlefield glory. Hebblewhite argues this propaganda was designed to catch the eye and heart of their soldiers. Nevertheless, there are two caveats to the author's worthy arguments: he does not state the distribution and percentage of coins of this sort in circulation, and there is no discussion of the reading abilities of the common soldier who was supposed to grasp the messages the coins delivered. It is also not clear to me, why the author is certain that the message on the coins is targeted towards military personnel alone, and not towards others — civilians, political rivals, etc.

Focusing on coins as a means of transferring messages, especially military ones, is refreshing. However, readers of Hebblewhite's book might notice the weaknesses in his descriptions of body armor (40): He uses the term cuirasses for any upper torso armor, including scale armor, no matter what technique or technology is attached to it. He also defines both the *lorica squamate* and the *lorica hamata* as scale armor, while the latter is actually a chainmail. That being said, these inaccuracies are trifles, which should not detract us from the main message of the book.

The further we pursue the book's chapters, the better they are. Chapters 3-6 contain more valuable data and interesting comments. The third chapter is the best among them, and the longest in the book. It deals with all kinds of salaries, other payments, gifts and other goods, given to the soldiers. This subject has been surveyed in books about the early Roman Empire, while Hebblewhite is pioneering these issues in later years. His overdue contribution is enriched by the extensive use of primary sources.

The fourth chapter is also very helpful. First, it tells us how the Roman legal system was adapted to the special needs of the Roman soldiers and the constraints of the military service. Then it grapples with the question whether the Emperor was ready and willing to relax the *disciplina militaris* in order to get greater support from the army. The author uses primary sources to show complaints about disciplinary matters and the 'softening' of the troops and their conditions; complaints were not a new phenomenon but rather a constant one throughout the existence of the Empire. Hebblewhite also proves that the army continued to be an effective and well-oiled machine till the beginning of the fifth century. He provides well-researched evidence of Emperors being harsh and demanding, conducting a strict discipline in the army, which means they didn't try to get the troops' affinity by compromising on discipline or demonstrating leniency.

The fifth chapter assesses three ceremonial interactions between the Emperor and his army. The first is the *Acclamatio* — the ceremony where the army acknowledges the legitimacy of the Emperor and proclaims its support for him. Hebblewhite concludes that these ceremonies became more formal and important and were conducted in front of larger units, in the later Empire. The second interaction is the *adlocutio* — the Emperor's speeches in front of his troops. The author states that both ceremonial events were scrutinized by the army to decide if the Emperor is fit for the job or not. The third one is the *sacramentum* — the military oath, which the soldier took a few times during his service. The author claims, that even though revolts were frequent at that period, most soldiers honored the oath and regarded themselves committed to it. Hebblewhite wraps up this informative chapter with a conclusion that is consistent with his stance about the crucial role of military prowess: The oath and the ceremonies cannot by themselves — without the Emperor's proven military skills — maintain the loyalty of the troops.

The sixth chapter deals with three main elements. The first one is the army's standards and banners (*signa militaria*) which serve as a constant reminder of the obligation of duty and loyalty to the Emperor. The second one is honorific titles given to units in the army either as a tribute for their achievements or to tighten their ties to the Emperor. The third element is coins which emphasize the close bond between the Emperor and the army or glorify the latter. Hebblewhite deftly shows that in the third century coins were focused on relationships between Emperor and army (*concordia*) or refer to an obligation of loyalty (*fides*) — two ways of encouraging closer ties in an era of instability. The fourth century was witness to a greater stability of the regime. Thus coins had no longer to remind the army of the need for loyalty, and their contents shifted towards an emphasis on *virtus* and *gloria* — celebrating the army's importance, capabilities and achievements.

The Conclusion superbly knits together all the main ingredients of the different chapters and topics, and provides the reader with clearsighted interpretations and concluding remarks. Although Hebblewhite mentions his assertions about the crucial importance of the Emperor's military skills, the author then waters it down by ending this last part of his book in a totally different vein. Noting that an Emperor could do everything right and yet lose the army's support, the author highlights the fragility and perils of the regime. One can define Hebblewhite's conclusion as a Machiavellian one. His conclusion sustains Machiavelli's main stance in 'The Prince', that every man needs both *virtus* and *fortuna* for continuous success, and that even the most talented of men can be betrayed by bad luck.

Hebblewhite's basic assumption is that the Emperor had to satisfy a plethora of elements in his Empire, none more important than the army, which was a main political player. This in itself is not a novelty, but Hebblewhite's study is filled with new materials and original viewpoints, especially

in the economic, monetary and numismatic spheres relating to the Roman army. It will surely be of value and importance to scholars and students of the period for many years to come.

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Kaius Tuori, *The Emperor of Law: The Emergence of Roman Imperial Adjudication*. Oxford studies in Roman society and law. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. xiii + 482 pp. ISBN 9780198744450.

This monograph sets out to examine the formation and foundation of the role and function of the emperor as the final juridical authority since the dictatorship of Julius Caesar until the crisis of the third century. With an early reference in the introduction to an often-quoted letter of the young Alexander Severus to the Greek community in Bithynia, emphasizing the importance given to the function of the emperor as a permanent-presiding supreme court and an embodiment of sovereignty, Kaius Tuori (henceforth KT) wishes to demonstrate that the evolution of this aspect of the Roman emperor was the result of various events which occurred during early imperial era, and not a pre-determined policy. This he successfully achieves using five case studies, organized in five chapters, and a comprehensive appendix. The first considers early apprehensions of judicial power embodied in the person of Julius Caesar, and using Cicero's *pro Ligario*. The second chapter examines the jurisdictive role of Augustus during the formation of what will later be a principate, where the ruler acts both as an administrator and as a universal ruler. A following chapter examines the boundaries of imperial judicial authority through the image of Augustus' successors, and their actions as sovereigns. The fourth chapter looks into the consolidation of an ideal imperial sovereignty in the image of Hadrian, mainly — but not exclusively — using literary evidence. The final chapter is concerned with the legal function of the Severan emperors during the mature stage of Roman law.

The overarching contention of KT is to demonstrate the evolution of imperial sovereignty as a bottom-up phenomenon, created by events rather than imposed by Augustus and future emperors. KT's point of departure is Cicero *pro Ligario*, and an analysis of Cicero's portrayal of Caesar's judicial authority during his dictatorship. In fact, this fist chapter is a detailed and impressively presented analysis of Caesar's legislative acts within its appropriate late Republican context. KT demonstrates Caesar's desire to consolidate Republican traditions with his dictatorial duties, at least as Caesar himself perceived them. KT is aware of the tension between Republican traditions and Hellenistic notions which were at play during Caesar's dictatorship and were used by Cicero. It is here that KT examines the role of Hellenistic traditions — both institutional and intellectual — on the legislation policy of Caesar as a dictator. KT argues that 'as a dictator Caesar was safely within the traditional Roman constitutional framework'. It is also convincingly argued that Caesar was conscious of this tradition and eager not to depart from it.

The second chapter is devoted to the function of Augustus as a sovereign and to his conduct as a judge. KT focuses on three case studies here which bring to light the new position of the princeps who was both a magistrate with a clearly defined set of responsibilities and a Roman leader entrusted with the Roman *mos maiorum* and moral conduct. The first of these case studies is the relegation of Ovid. Here the responsibilities of a princeps will have to be drawn. The two other case studies concern petitions from the provinces. In this chapter KT traces an evolution of a narrative which portrays imperial sovereignty. He explores the testimonies of Ovid (*Tr*. 2.121-40),